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# ASPECTS OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

DECEMBER 1648-MAY 1649.

EDWARD ANDREW VIVIAN BEESLEY

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF  
BRISTOL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE  
FACULTY OF ARTS.

SUBMITTED ON THE 1st May 2001.

## Abstract.

This thesis attempts to determine the extent of the ideological commitment and opposition to the purging of Parliament and the subsequent execution of King Charles. It analyses the role of one individual and four groups involved in the politics of the English Revolution. The first chapter will focus upon the activities of Oliver Cromwell. Chapter two will analyse the levels of commitment to the revolution amongst the Members of Parliament that survived the purges. The third chapter will consider the role of House of Lords. The last two chapters will consider the influence of a political group traditionally called the Presbyterians with the final chapter focussing on the contemporary press.

The argument presented will suggest that one of the reasons for the failure of the Republican Government to implement reform rests with the activities of groups outside of Westminster. It will also argue that there was an attachment to the principle of political change amongst men who withdrew from politics before the signing of Charles's death warrant but returned in February 1649 to engage in politics. The commitment demonstrated by this group who were supported but not led by Oliver Cromwell, contrasts with the opponents of revolution who failed to unite and lacked a sufficient ideological commitment to launch a challenge to the new Government. All of these decisions were taken at a time when the press was relatively free and developing their own political agenda.

## Acknowledgements

Due to the current dearth of post graduate funding, I must extend heartfelt thanks to two individuals and two institutions. My Uncle and Aunt paid my tuition fees and provided a bit more on top. I must also thank the Head Master of Colston Collegiate Lower School, Mr Graham Phillips, who provided me with a job for three years and, along with his family, a friendship that I will always treasure. Second, I would like to thank the Head Master of Rugby School, Mr Michael Mavor, who provided me with my second job and then promoted me before the completion of this thesis. I am sorry that it has taken so long. Also I am extremely grateful to all my colleagues in the History Department at this school. They have given me friendship and support which has made my professional life a delight. My parents too have been the source of perpetual assistance.

I would also like to thank various libraries for their assistance. The staffs of the British Library, the Bodleian Library, the Dr Williams Library, the National Library of Wales, the Public Record Office, Cambridge University Library and Bristol University Library, were unfailingly courteous and efficient. I would like to extend especial thanks to the porters at the University of Bristol who helped me make numerous copies of the Thomason Tracts. During the course of this research I delivered a number of papers to various universities and conferences and I always received valuable advice. I would like to mention one in particular which was a paper delivered to the University of Cambridge. In particular I benefited from the questions posed by Professor Morrill and Dr Adamson.

Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Ronald Hutton. He has been subjected to delay after delay as I wrestled with my dual life. He has been the greatest source of inspiration and his support went far beyond the call of duty. Without his tolerance this thesis would not have been completed.



The dedication of this work is for a family whom apart from my own mean more to me than any other. Just before I embarked upon this thesis, one of my greatest friends Alberto Ambroso was killed in a tragic car accident. The memory of his life has been the source of sadness, joy and inspiration. I, like all his friends, miss him dreadfully.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Alberto Ambroso. It is written for the Ambroso family.

## Authors Declaration.

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original except where indicated by special reference in the text and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other degree.

Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University of Bristol.

The dissertation has not been presented to any other University for examination either in the United Kingdom or overseas.

SIGNED *Edward Bully*.

DATE *1 May 2001*.

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## List of Abbreviations

Abbott        Wilbur Cortez Abbott (ed), 'The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell (4 vols, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1937-47.)

ADD Mss      Additional Manuscripts housed in the British Library.

Carte         Correspondence of the Marquis of Ormonde, the Bodleian Library.

CJ             The Journals of the House of Commons.

CSPD         Calendar of State Papers Domestic, 1649-50. His/Her Majesties Stationary Office.

CSPV         Calendar of State Papers Venetian Series, 1647-52. His/Her Majesties Stationary Office.

EHR          English Historical Review.

Harl          Harley Manuscripts, British Library.

HJ             Historical Journal.

HMCR         Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts Reports.

LJ             The Journal of the House of Lords.

Merc         Mercurius (newspaper titles).

NLW         National Library of Wales.

P&P         Past and Present

SP             State Papers housed in the Public Record Office.



T.T            Thomason Tracts, British Library (I used the microfilms in the Universities of  
Wales and Bristol.)

## Aspects of the English Revolution

December 1648 - May 1649

This thesis will focus upon the events between Pride's Purge and the formal establishment of a Commonwealth in May 1649<sup>1</sup>. May has been used as a boundary for two reasons; first it marks the collapse of the Leveller or army mutinies which had seriously threatened the new regime. Second, May was an important month symbolically since Monarchy was formally replaced with a new style of Government.

Samuel Gardiner's work upon this period remains the most detailed narrative of the events which led to the regicide and the subsequent establishment of the Commonwealth. He saw the revolution as the triumph of the radical Independent Party over the more moderate Presbyterians; although the latter had a larger parliamentary majority, the Independent's victory was due to the unequivocal support they received from the New Model Army. The radical rump of Independent MPs then governed the nation for more than three years. According to Gardiner, this novel Parliament failed to implement reforms because they became a corrupt government characterised by power seeking and self-indulgence. Finally, Cromwell's patience was exhausted when the Rump initiated proposals to perpetuate their own power. In April 1653 the Long Parliament was dissolved by the New Model Army.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> C.H Firth and R.S Rait The Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660 3 vols (London 1911), vol ii p.120.

<sup>2</sup> S.R. Gardiner, A History of The Commonwealth to the Protectorate 1649-1656 4 vols (1893). This is the overriding argument in his work. It was centrally challenged by Blair Worden cited below n.6, 7 and 8 below.

The publication of David Underdown's Pride's Purge fatally undermined Gardiner's dualist portrayal of Parliamentary politics. Developing upon the work of Jack Hexter and Valerie Pearl<sup>3</sup>, Professor Underdown demonstrated that, throughout the 1640s the majority of MPs could not be consistently identified with either the Presbyterians or the Independents. But most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, Professor Underdown argues that membership of the Rump was not synonymous with support for the events which brought the Republic into existence. He suggests that the crucial decision which explains the Rump Parliament's moderation was taken upon the 1<sup>st</sup> February 1649. MPs who had failed to register their dissent to the 5<sup>th</sup> December vote were permitted to resume membership upon the condition that they acknowledged the error of their ways and subscribed to the dissent, albeit belatedly. These "conformist"<sup>4</sup> MPs returned (over one hundred in number) during February and their numerical advantage<sup>5</sup> over the revolutionaries (defined as those men who had taken the dissent prior to 30<sup>th</sup> January and/or were regicides) explains the Rump's failure to extend the revolution beyond the execution of the King. In addition to this valuable argument, Professor Underdown's narrative of the events between the purge and regicide raises a number of issues which were not considered by Samuel Gardiner. First, he argues that Westminster politics cannot be isolated from the events in the localities. Second, he provides useful information upon the opposition to the new regime from the Levellers and the Presbyterians. Finally, Pride's Purge includes a sustained portrayal of Oliver Cromwell, suggesting that the contradictions of the Commonwealth are partially explained by the ambiguities and complexities found in the personality of the future Lord Protector.

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<sup>3</sup> J.H. Hexter Reign of King Pym (Cambridge, Mass 1941). Valerie Pearl "Oliver St John and the Middle Group" *EHR* lxxxix 490-520; David Underdown Pride's Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford 1971) p.45-75.

<sup>4</sup> Underdown Pride's Purge p. 210, 215-17, 224-53.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p.220.



Professor Underdown's narrative of the events leading up to the regicide was soon followed by Blair Worden's detailed examination of politics during the Rump Parliament.<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of this thesis it is important to note two differences which exist in their interpretations. Professor Worden questioned Professor Underdown's use of the term 'revolutionary' for the early dissenters and regicides. Professor Worden rejects notions of radicalism suggesting that many of these revolutionaries objected to the person of the King rather than the institution of Monarchy<sup>7</sup>. Second, Professor Underdown's suggestion that the conformists returned to Westminster because they joined a revolutionary bandwagon was questioned in Professor Worden's thesis. The latter suggests that these MPs had more positive reasons for returning than Professor Underdown's bandwagon theory allows.<sup>8</sup>

Despite these peripheral differences, upon major issues these two historians agree. Both argue that membership of the Rump was not synonymous with social radicalism. Both works appear to have replaced Samuel Gardiner's account which saw the Rump as an initially radical body which then became dilatory and corrupt. And both historians agree that Cromwell was influential in both establishing the new Republic and then moulding it in a conservative fashion.

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<sup>6</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament (Cambridge 1974)

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p.33-60.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p.63; Worden argues that MPs resumed membership for a variety of reasons including a desire to curb radical tendencies by influencing events from within Parliament.



The chorus of praise which greeted these two publications<sup>9</sup> has not reduced over time. Both accounts remain the most significant analysis of politics during the Revolution and in the first months of Republican rule. However, two other historians deserve a mention.

John Adamson has attempted to demonstrate the importance of the House of Lords during the 1640s. As is well known, his arguments resulted in a bitter debate<sup>10</sup>. But despite this interest in Dr Adamson's published work, little use has been made of the final chapter of his doctoral thesis<sup>11</sup>. At present we have two entirely different interpretations. Dr Adamson portrays the Lords as a small but important chamber still fulfilling an important legislative function. Moreover, he has revived the radical credentials of a number of the peers. First, he argues that the Lords had the respect and, for a month at least, the support of many in the Army. Second, Dr Adamson suggests that the peers who sat in Parliament in the weeks between 6<sup>th</sup> December and 3<sup>rd</sup> January accepted or even supported Pride's Purge. Finally Dr Adamson claims that five or six peers would have countenanced the trial of the King provided the result was deposition rather than regicide<sup>12</sup>. This exciting re-interpretation challenges the views presented by David Underdown and Veronica Wedgwood. The former presents the House of Lords as a pathetic handful of insignificant aristocrats eclipsed by an omnipotent Lower

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<sup>9</sup> Reviews of their work can be found in the following journals Derek Hirst HJ. 1972, p. 812 - 815; Austin Woolrych EHR (1972), p.1972; Robert Ashton HJ (1975) p.184; B.S. Capp EHR 1975 p.1975.

<sup>10</sup> John Adamson, "The Baronial Context of the English Civil War" TRHS 40, p.93 - 1320; Adamson, "The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647" HJ 30 (1987) p.567-602; Adamson "Politics and the Nobility in Civil War England" HJ 34 (1990) p.231-255. Mark Kishlansky "Saye What" HJ 33 (1990) p.917-37, Kishlansky "Saye No More" JBS (1991) p.399-448.

<sup>11</sup> John Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics 1645-9.' (PhD thesis, Cambridge, 1986), p. 257 - 279.

<sup>12</sup> 'Ibid' p.272.

Chamber.<sup>13</sup> Dame Veronica provides a useful narrative of the debate which resulted in the Lords rejection of the proposals to erect a High Court of Justice. However, the absence of any discussion of the House of Lords prior to the 4<sup>th</sup> January vote tacitly demonstrates her belief that the peers failed to play a significant role.<sup>14</sup>

The most significant re-appraisal of the Rump Parliament can be found in the work of Sean Kelsey. In his book Inventing a Republic, he makes it clear from the start that his aim was to “take issue with a conventional wisdom which depicts the Rump Parliament as a feckless, shallow and unconvincing expedient.”<sup>15</sup> Dr Kelsey did not concern himself with political divisions within the rump, allowing the Parliament to speak for itself by looking at the spectacle which accompanied the parliament’s proceedings. He also re-examines the political background to the eventual dissolution.<sup>16</sup> Although he remains an admirer of Blair Worden’s work he challenges the view that the Rump always regarded itself as a temporary expedient.<sup>17</sup> His assessment at the Parliament is the most significant work to appear since the publication of Blair Worden’s The Rump Parliament.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p.181–202.

<sup>14</sup> C.V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (1964), p.84-5.

<sup>15</sup> Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic. The Political culture of the English Commonwealth (Manchester 1997)

<sup>16</sup> Ibid p.151-199.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p.200-227.

<sup>18</sup> This refers to politics during 1649 – 53 within parliament. Ian Gentles’ The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-53 (Oxford 1992), has plenty of detail upon the activities of the Army p.266-442.



Two other books deserve a mention at this stage.<sup>19</sup> Dame Veronica Wedgwood's account of the trial of Charles I remains the most detailed account of the days proceeding the regicide. The book brilliantly captures the mood of the occasion. However, the account is concerned with *how* rather than *why* and the motivations which prompted the major protagonists remain obscure.<sup>20</sup> Ian Gentles has also written an important book upon the New Model Army.<sup>21</sup> His account investigates the background to the Army's Remonstrance and the New Model's attitude towards the remaining MPs and it also includes a comprehensive account of the trial of the King from the Army's perspective. Apart from providing a wealth of new information upon the activities of the Army, Professor Gentles departs from Professor Underdown's argument in two areas. First, he regards Cromwell as a committed radical, who from the first day of the purge, was willing to support the regicide. Also, Professor Gentles rejects the view that during the Whitehall debates Ireton deliberately kept the Levellers talking, to allow the more moderate officers the opportunity to pursue their own, more limited revolution.<sup>22</sup> His argument suggests that there was a closer relationship between the Army and Parliament than the works of Professor Underdown and Professor Worden allow.<sup>23</sup>

All the historians cited above have retained the term 'revolution' as a description of the events covered in this thesis. My title, 'Aspects of the English Revolution' will not result in a theoretical discussion of the term. As Dr Aylmer notes, many of these discussions have

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<sup>19</sup> In the chapters which follow I will make reference to certain important articles. These include Ian Gentles "The Struggle for London during the Second Civil War" HJ 26 (1983) p.280-300; Barbara Taft "The Council of Officers", *Agreement of the People 1648-9*, HJ 28 (1985) p.169-85; Barbara Taft "Voting Lists of the Council of Officers", *BIHR* L11 (1979) p.138-54.

<sup>20</sup> C.V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I, passim.

<sup>21</sup> Ian Gentles, The New Model Army cited in n.18 above.

<sup>22</sup> This argument is also found in the works of Barbara Taft cited in n.19 above.

<sup>23</sup> Gentles, New Model Army, p. 276 – 314.

resulted in rather sterile arguments.<sup>24</sup> Whilst I accept that many MPs who sat in the Rump Parliament were not social radicals, England did witness a Revolution. A simple chronology of political events including Pride's Purge, the formal and public execution of Charles I, the abolition of Monarchy and the House of Lords and the establishment of a Commonwealth do, in Professor Hutton's words, "amply deserve" the title Revolution.<sup>25</sup>

Even if we strictly adhere to one of the definitions of the term Revolution, "a sudden or far reaching change", the term, despite the Restoration in 1660, still has its merits. In many respects the Interregnum did result in fundamental long-term change. England became the dominant nation within the British Isles.<sup>26</sup> The interregnum also ensured that there would be a greater acceptance of those wishing to worship outside the established church. In a provocative article, Derek Hirst has questioned the tendency of revisionist historians to underestimate the amount of change in social and economic affairs.<sup>27</sup> The second definition, fundamental political change, certainly arose during the period covered by this thesis. The abolition of Monarchy, with the institution replaced by a single chambered legislature with special executive responsibilities given to an elected Council of State, does, by any yardstick, amount to a fundamental, political change. Since this thesis is principally concerned with politics the term 'Revolution' appears to be the only satisfactory description. Moreover, Sean Kelsey's work upon the Rump has shown that this was a period of profound change in politics; although historians differ upon the motives of the leading protagonists, revisionists

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<sup>24</sup> G.E. Aylmer, Rebellion or Revolution, (Oxford 1986), p. 204. A roll-call of the most famous Stuart Historians have used the term revolution. The list includes S.R.Gardiner, Christopher Hill Blair Worden, John Morrill, Sean Kelsey and Ian Gentles.

<sup>25</sup> Ronald Hutton, The British Republic, 1649-60 (1990), p.4

<sup>26</sup> Ibid p. 135

<sup>27</sup> Derek Hirst, "Locating the 1650s in England's Seventeenth Century", *History*, vol 81, July 1996, p. 359-383.



and counter revisionists appear to accept that England witnessed a revolution in the period covered by this thesis.<sup>28</sup>

This thesis began its life as a study of the English Presbyterians during the Rump Parliament.<sup>29</sup> After four months of study upon the primary material, it became clear that my interpretations would upon a number of issues, be very different to the arguments found in the works of Professor Underdown and Professor Worden. A seminar paper was delivered<sup>30</sup> which tested a number of my arguments, and it became clear that I had enough material to focus my study upon the Revolution.

The first chapter of this thesis will focus upon Oliver Cromwell. This will include a re-examination of his attitude to the Armies Remonstrance, the reasons for his late arrival in Westminster, his role as an MP and his involvement in last minute negotiations with the King. By devoting a chapter to Cromwell I intend to look at the man in great detail, assessing his attitude to the Army, his political and religious vision, his influence within the parliamentary arena and his views upon Levellers, Presbyterians and Royalists. The most important aim of the chapter is to determine whether Cromwell provided the Revolution with its momentum or if he was one leader amongst many. Dr Kelsey's findings, which portrayed the members of the Rump as more determined Republicans suggests that Cromwell was not as influential as

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<sup>28</sup> See note 24 above. Although these historians differ upon the nature of the English Revolution, they accept the term – even the most revisionist.

<sup>29</sup> The Rump remains the orthodox description of the Parliament which sat from 1649 – 53. For an alternative term see Ronald Hutton, The British Republic p. 136.

<sup>30</sup> I am grateful to have been afforded the opportunity to present a paper upon Oliver Cromwell to the University of Cambridge.

once thought.<sup>31</sup> This thesis will attempt to establish his role during the Revolution and in the first months of Republican rule.

The second chapter of this thesis will focus upon the MPs who sat in Parliament between Pride's Purge and the 19<sup>th</sup> May. It will re-examine the Purge itself and analyse the reasons for Parliament's delay in commencing the proceedings against the King. It will also investigate the roles performed by the regicide MPs, attempting to answer two questions. First, were the regicides subjected to intense pressure to sign the death warrant? Second, the chapter will scrutinise their participation in parliamentary committees and their attendance in the Painted Chamber. This section will also consider the MPs who sat in Parliament between the purge and regicide but refused to sign the death warrant. This will result in an examination of alternative solutions which may have been proposed, which did not necessarily sanction regicide. The chapter will also comment upon the appropriateness of the labels 'conformist' and 'revolutionary', and in the process it will comment upon the political conviction of these so called Rumpers.

As mentioned above, Professor Underdown and Professor Worden have explained the limited nature of the Revolution by focusing upon the conservative backgrounds of the majority of MPs. In my chapter upon the MPs, I will examine the possible influence exerted by groups outside of Westminster. John Lilburne encouraged army revolts at a time when the new regime's survival was seriously threatened. This thesis will attempt to determine whether the Rump's draconian response to the Leveller threats was based upon pragmatic issues of survival or an ideological aversion to demands for reform. Pressure upon the regime did not solely come from the Levellers. The secluded MPs and the Presbyterian clergy bitterly complained about the moves against the King. Mark Kishlansky has shown how pressure

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<sup>31</sup> This view is clear throughout Dr Kelsey's book Inventing a Republic especially p.4

groups influenced MPs in the 1640s. This chapter will consider the possible connection with demands for moderation outside of Westminster with the legislation enacted by the Rump Parliament.<sup>32</sup>

My third chapter will focus upon the House of Lords, assessing the two different arguments we have at our disposal. The chapter will test a number of Dr Adamson's contentions including the Peers' attitude towards the Purge, the events leading up to their abolition, their importance in the Parliamentary process and their involvement in the last minute negotiations with the King. The section will also consider contemporary opinions of the Lords. The chapter will also examine three prominent Peers, the Earls of Warwick, Denbigh and Pembroke. After Pride's Purge, Warwick declared his loyalty to the new regime but he failed to become a regicide. Soon after Charles lost his head, Warwick was dismissed from his position as Lord Admiral. Apart from this, little is known about Warwick's attitude and actions during the Revolution.<sup>33</sup> The same dearth of secondary source material applies to the Earls of Denbigh and Pembroke. Both men sat in the Lords during December 1648, and according to Professor Underdown, both Peers were key participants in negotiations to spare the King's life.<sup>34</sup> Neither man became a regicide, but both agreed to serve the new regime. This chapter will consider their involvement in the events before and after the execution. By analysing their role in politics an assessment will be made of their motives for joining the new regime and their influence within the unfamiliar world of parliamentary government.

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<sup>32</sup> Mark Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army (Cambridge 1979) p. 76-102.

<sup>33</sup> The most useful account can be found in B.S. Capp, Cromwell's Navy: the fleet and the English Revolution 1648-1660 (Oxford 1989) p. 44-45.

<sup>34</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.148-50.

The chapters upon Cromwell and upon the two Houses of Parliament will, to varying degrees, focus upon groups of men who supported the new regime. My fourth chapter will focus upon a group traditionally regarded as opponents of the new regime – the English Presbyterians.<sup>35</sup> The chapter will comment upon the controversy surrounding the term Presbyterian<sup>36</sup> with special reference to the divide between secular and clerical Presbyterianism, other issues including the scale of the Presbyterian opposition and the relationship between Presbyterians and Royalists will be discussed in the course of this chapter. This section will also examine the possibility that certain Presbyterians attempted to influence Parliament by deliberately acting as a political pressure group. It is interesting to note that in Blair Worden's study of the Rump Parliament, petitions from Presbyterians were only mentioned upon three occasions.<sup>37</sup> But most importantly this chapter will attempt to determine the nature of Presbyterians ideology; even if they do not belong to a coherent political party, dramatic events can unite disaffected individuals. The chapter will also include a section upon William Prynne, assessing his influence upon the new regime and his motives for making so many criticisms of the new regime.

The final chapter of this thesis will focus upon the press during this revolutionary period. It will consider every title and assess various journalists' attitude towards Presbyterians,

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<sup>35</sup> L.H. Carlson, "A History of the Presbyterian Party from Pride's Purge to the dissolution of the Long Parliament" Church History xi 1942; G. Abernathy The English Presbyterians and the Stuart Restoration 1648 – 1663, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. P. Crawford, Denzil Holles, 1598-1660, (1979). These appear to be the most significant works upon the Presbyterians, although useful information is contained in Worden and Underdown cited above.

<sup>36</sup> S. Foster, "The Presbyterian Independents Exorcised" P&P 44, (1969), p.52 -75; David Underdown, "The Independents Reconsidered", JBS 3 (1964) p.57-84; Underdown "The Independents Again", JBS 8 (1968) p.94-118. J.H Hexter, "Presbyterians, Independents and Puritans, A Voice from the Past" P& P 47 (1970), p.134-6; Underdown Pride's Purge p.45-75; Worden Rump p.4-11.

<sup>37</sup> Blair Worden did accept that there were outside pressures, Rump 163-169.



Levellers, MPs, the House of Lords and their rivals from other newspapers. It is intended that the finished product will demonstrate the kind of information the people had access to. The chapter will also test the accuracy of the newspapers and comment upon their value as a source. The thesis will also consider the possibility that even amongst licensed newspapers, journalists were willing to promote a defined political view. The chapter will attempt to discover which journalists acted in isolation and which editors were working in close co-operation with factions either within or outside Parliament. Finally, the chapter will consider the attachment to the principle of a republic from this important element in English society.

This thesis will consider all these groups within a very short time-span. Historians are habitually aware of the dangers of using hindsight to present a picture of simplicity and inevitability. Most people know that Cromwell was a regicide whose name appeared third on the regicide document. But when did the King's death become inevitable and when did Cromwell decide that the King must die? Many historians believe that Charles's death only became certain when Cromwell finally bequeathed his support to the idea of regicide. The crux of this argument rests with the assumption that the purging of Parliament did not inevitably lead to regicide. Historians have been correct to highlight the source material which supports this case. But the acknowledgement of the dangers of hindsight as a means of explaining history within straightforward notions of consistency, persistence and orderly sequence should not make the historian oblivious to source material which suggests that the purge was designed for, and inevitably led to regicide. By pursuing this approach, I hope to demonstrate more clearly than before the level of ideological commitment amongst the supporters and opponents of the English Revolution.

## Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution.

This thesis will analyse Oliver Cromwell's role in the events between Pride's purge and the regicide and then assess his influence in the early months of the republic. The conclusions will suggest that Cromwell arrived in London satisfied with the decision to purge Parliament. The chapter will also indicate the problems with the view that Cromwell favoured a last minute settlement with the King. This perspective is similar to conclusions found in the works of other historians.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Ian Gentles and Veronica Wedgwood have produced accounts which have claimed that Cromwell's views were from the first day of the purge, at one with his more radical colleagues.<sup>2</sup> However, there remain a number of reasons for pursuing this fresh investigation.

Veronica Wedgwood's argument was successfully challenged by David Underdown, with the latter citing fresh evidence to support the view that Cromwell, initially at least, attempted to influence events in a more moderate direction. Miss Wedgwood had attempted to challenge the view propounded by Samuel Gardiner, which had placed Cromwell at the forefront of the alleged moves to spare the King.<sup>3</sup> As so many historians have found, challenging Samuel Gardiner is not an easy task.<sup>4</sup> For Miss Wedgwood the problem was compounded when

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<sup>1</sup> John Morrill (ed.), The Nature of the English Revolution, (1994) p.18-29. W.C Abbott, Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell 4 vols, (Harvard Press 1937-47), vol.i, p.750.

<sup>2</sup> Ian Gentles, The New Model Army (Oxford 1992), p.283-314; C.V Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (1964), p.76-82.

<sup>3</sup> S.R Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War (1893), vol.iv p.281-90; C.V Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I, p.77 and p.233 n.30.

<sup>4</sup> This point was made by John Morrill during a seminar at Bristol University. Also, as will be shown, Professor Underdown developed Gardiner's case rather than offering an alternative explanation.

Professor Underdown accepted, and then developed upon, Gardiner's argument. By 1972 her views upon Cromwell appear to have collapsed within academia.<sup>5</sup>

More recently, Professor Gentles has challenged aspects of Professor Underdown's argument. He has suggested that Cromwell's arrival after Pride's Purge was not a deliberate ploy, illustrating Cromwell's reluctance to see force used against a constitutional body.<sup>6</sup> This part of Professor Gentles' argument will be supported in this thesis. Also Professor Gentles' claim that, throughout December 1648, Cromwell was convinced that the king must be executed will be developed in the course of my discussion.<sup>7</sup> However, his argument fails to provide us with a consistent picture of Cromwell during this critical December month. In addition to portraying Cromwell as the committed radical resolved on regicide, Professor Gentles contradicts this argument by linking Cromwell with plans for the preservation of monarchy with Charles remaining as the titular Head of State.<sup>8</sup> Also, at one point during his account, Professor Gentles suggests that Cromwell may have favoured a scheme which would have resulted in Charles' abdication.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> With the exception of Ian Gentles, historians have followed Professor Underdown's account. A.B Worden, The Rump Parliament, (Cambridge 1975) p.67-68. B. Coward, Oliver Cromwell (1991) p.64-68; Charles Carlton, Charles I: The Personal Monarch (1983), p.338. Austin Woolrych 'Cromwell the Soldier' in John Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution, (1990) p.110. J.S.A Adamson 'The Peerage in Politics 1645-49' (Cambridge PhD thesis 1986) p.263; B.Coward, The Stuart Age (2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1994), p.201. D.Hirst, England in Conflict (Oxford 1999), p.253-4. Robert Ashton, The English Civil War: Conservatism and Revolution (2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1989) p.346-7. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (Oxford 1997), p102-3. For Professor Underdown's account see Pride's Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford 1971), p.150-168. My views are very close to John Morrill and Philip Baker, 'Oliver Cromwell, the Regicide and the Sons of Zeruah', paper given to the Institute of Historical Research, December 1999.

<sup>6</sup> Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.284, Underdown Pride's Purge p.119, p.148-50.

<sup>7</sup> Both Ian Gentles and Veronica Wedgwood dismissed the royalist accounts as "mere wishful thinking". My version fully discusses these royalist sources.

<sup>8</sup> Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.298.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid p.299. The argument countering Professor Gentles' claim is found later in this chapter.

Professor Underdown's portrayal of Cromwell remains the most consistent and detailed account available. Prior to the publication of 'Pride's Purge' historians had failed to explain Cromwell's activities in the middle of December. Most accounts claimed that Cromwell deliberately delayed his arrival to London, and historians made use of the evidence which suggests that Cromwell favoured a last-minute settlement with the King.<sup>10</sup> However, Cromwell's part in events between the 7<sup>th</sup> of December and the 18<sup>th</sup> December remained obscure.<sup>11</sup>

Professor Underdown provided a cohesion to Cromwell's activities during December 1648. He suggested that Cromwell was never a wholehearted supporter of Pride's purge, and after his belated return to London, he pursued a conciliatory policy consisting of three components. First, Cromwell was behind moves to secure the release of all but the most irreconcilable MPs. Second, Cromwell wished to undo the purge by securing the return of a number of secluded M.Ps. Third, through the Earl of Denbigh, Cromwell attempted to reach a compromise with the King.<sup>12</sup> This thesis will challenge Professor Underdown's interpretation and, in so doing, it will question an orthodoxy established in the works of Samuel Gardiner, Charles Firth, Christopher Hill, Blair Worden, Barry Coward and most recently by Peter Gaunt.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Prior to Professor Underdown's work, the most extensive use of these sources was made by Samuel Gardiner cited n.3 above. For a discussion of these sources see below.

<sup>11</sup> The 18<sup>th</sup> was the date, according to Underdown's account, that the Earl of Denbigh began to discuss the formulation of a scheme to allow Charles to remain as King.

<sup>12</sup> Underdown Pride's Purge p.150-168.

<sup>13</sup> See Footnote 5 above; for Gardiner's account see n.3; C. Hill, God's Englishman (Harmondsworth 1970), p.102-3; C.H Firth Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of Puritans (1961), p.215-16. Peter Gaunt Oliver Cromwell p.102-3.



Professor Underdown illustrated his argument that Cromwell was not an enthusiastic supporter of Pride's purge with four pieces of evidence. First, he suggested that Cromwell indulged in a period of self-imposed exile during November 1648. Second, he pointed to a quotation made by Cromwell which revealed a preference for delaying the Army's Remonstrance. Third, Cromwell was deliberately dilatory when travelling from Pontefract to London. And finally, Professor Underdown pointed out that intelligent contemporaries were quick to note that Cromwell had stayed away from London until after the purge.<sup>14</sup>

Professor Gentles' argues that Cromwell stayed in the north, not to indulge in the luxury of indecision, but to direct military operations in the last major theatre of war<sup>15</sup>. This is supported by an analysis of Cromwell's writings during the second Civil War.<sup>16</sup> In a letter to Derby House, written on the 15<sup>th</sup> of November, Cromwell illustrated his own view of the difficulties surrounding the siege of Pontefract Castle:

"The men within are resolved to endure to the utmost extremity, expecting no mercy, as indeed they deserve none. The place is very well known to be one of the strongest inland garrisons in the kingdom, well watered situated upon a rock in every part of it, and difficult to mine. The walls very thick and high with strong towers, and it baltered, very difficult to access by reason at the depth and steepness of the graft."<sup>17</sup> Apart from revealing Cromwell's own opinions of the difficulties involved with the siege of Pontefract, the reference to the

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<sup>14</sup> Underdown Pride's Purge p.148-150; Peter Gaunt Cromwell p.96-102.

<sup>15</sup> Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.284

<sup>16</sup> Abbott The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell vol i, p.602-750.

<sup>17</sup> Cromwell to the Committee of Lords and Commons at Derby House (15 November 1648) Abbott i p.683-4; Thomas Carlyle The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell 2 vols (1845), vol i, p.384 -. See also A Declaration Collected Out at the Journals of Both Houses T.T E. 475 (17) (Wednesday November 29 – Wednesday 6 December) p.6; The Moderate T.T E. 475 (8) (Tuesday November 28 – Tuesday 6 December.)

Royalists wishing to endure to the “utmost extremity” is of importance. Upon the 28<sup>th</sup> June, Cromwell had commented upon the royalists claiming that they were gentlemen of quality and “men thoroughly resolved.”<sup>18</sup> Cromwell clearly respected the Royalists determination He was not issued with a direct order to leave the north until the 29<sup>th</sup> of November.<sup>19</sup> As he has previously reminded Derby House, his brief was to “prosecute the remaining party in the north and not leave any of them to be a beginning of a new Army, nor cease to pursue the victory till [I] finish and fully complete it.”<sup>20</sup> Cromwell’s desire to “finish and complete” the destruction of the royalist cause is evident in numerous letters he wrote during the Second Civil War.<sup>21</sup> In November 1648, this remained his principle aspiration.

John Adamson has shown how service in the field occupied the majority of Cromwell’s time - from August 1642 to January 1644; from February to November 1644; from March 1645 to July 1646. Although the First Civil War ended in 1646, Cromwell was with the Army again for much of the period from April to December 1647. The outbreak of the Second Civil War meant that he was with the Army again from April 1648 until the end of November.<sup>22</sup> We are

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<sup>18</sup> Cromwell to Fairfax, June 28 1648, Abbott i p.618-19 and Carlyle i p.319-22. For further examples see Cromwell to Fairfax May 9 1648 Abbott i p.606-7; Cromwell to Lenthall 20 August 1648 Abbott i p.634-638 esp p.637 also Carlyle p.341. Cromwell to Derby House Committee 23 August 1648 Abbott i p.641-42.

<sup>19</sup> Underdown’s Pride’s Purge p.150; Gentles The New Model Army p.284; Woolrych “Cromwell the Soldier” in Morrill ed Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution p.110 Wedgwood Trial of Charles I p.32.

<sup>20</sup> Cromwell to Derby House 20 September 1648 Abbott i p.656-658.

<sup>21</sup> Cromwell to John Poyer July 10 1648 Abbott i p.620; Cromwell to the Committee of Lancashire August 17 Abbott i p.632-633 also Carlyle i p.329-30; Cromwell to Major Thomas Saunders June 17 Abbott i p.615-16; letter to the Lord Grey Groby 20 August 1648 Abbott i p.640; letter to the Committee of York 23 August Abbott i p.640 also Carlyle i p.346-347, Declaration of the 8<sup>th</sup> September Abbott i p.647-648 also Carlyle i p.355-356.

<sup>22</sup> J.S.A Adamson “Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament” in Morrill (ed) Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution p.55. See John Morrill’s Introduction to this collection of essays p.4.

therefore looking at a relatively inexperienced parliamentary politician. The bulk of Cromwell's energy throughout the Civil War had been channelled against the Royalists. Until their defeat was achieved, it was natural that he remained in the north in his more accustomed role as Military Commander, rather than return to the unfamiliar world of Westminster. Cromwell's decision to remain in the north, rather than being a refuge was consistent with his actions throughout the Civil War.

In addition to the issues raised above, it is possible that Cromwell remained in the north to continue his role as spokesman for his soldiers. Throughout the two Civil Wars, Cromwell showed a consistent concern about the physical plight of his men.<sup>23</sup> Cromwell feared that, unless the Derby House furnished his regiments with the money owed to them, there was a real danger of mutiny. The concerns voiced by Cromwell continued during the month in which Underdown claimed that Cromwell was indulging in a period of self-imposed exile. On the 10<sup>th</sup> November Cromwell wrote to Colonel Charles Fairfax, promising that he would "do what lies in me to get you supplied". Recognising the seriousness of the situation, he offered Fairfax an immediate loan of £100.<sup>24</sup> Five days later Cromwell wrote to Derby House asking for funds to be provided for three complete regiments of foot and two of horse.<sup>25</sup> Just three days before leaving Pontefract, Cromwell almost begged the Treasurer of the County Committee of West Riding to furnish his soldiers with pay. The seriousness of this demand is illustrated by Cromwell's warning that the soldiers are ready to mutiny, the justifiable reason

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<sup>23</sup> Cromwell to Fairfax 9 May Abbott i p.606-7; Cromwell to the Committee at Carmathen 9 June 1648 Abbott i p.611-612; Cromwell to Fairfax 28 June 1648 Abbott i p.618-19 also Carlyle i p.319-23. Cromwell to Lenthall 20 August 1648 Abbott i p.634-38; Cromwell to Derby House Committee 23 August Abbott i p.641-41; Cromwell to Sir Henry Cholmley and Sir Edward Rhodes 20 August 1648 Abbott i p.639 also Carlyle i p.345-6.

<sup>24</sup> Cromwell to Charles Fairfax, 10 November Abbott i p.681-2.

<sup>25</sup> Cromwell to Derby House 15 November 1648 Abbott i p.683-4.



being that they did not have enough money to buy bread.<sup>26</sup> There can be little doubt that during this November month, Cromwell believed that a failure to supply his soldiers with their arrears of pay was potentially fatal; as he remarked to Charles Fairfax on the 10<sup>th</sup> November “nothing else will keep the men together.”<sup>27</sup>

It would be entirely wrong to assume that Cromwell’s concern for his soldiers simply reflected his desire to prevent them from indulging in refractory behaviour. Cromwell frequently commented upon the valour of his officers and soldiers,<sup>28</sup> and how their success had been achieved against overwhelming odds.<sup>29</sup> He suffered with them, alarmed that the poor “Godly people should still be made the object of wrath and anger”<sup>30</sup> As Commander of the Northern Forces, it was his duty to represent the plight of his soldiers to Parliament, to act as their mouthpiece. Cromwell continued to write to the Derby House in November 1648. This should not be dismissed as a smokescreen which hid a form of personal political paralysis. Cromwell remained in the north to complete the siege of Pontefract and to continue his role as spokesman for his troops, his arguments given greater credence by the simple fact that he witnessed the conditions which his men were forced to endure. During this November month, Cromwell was the military man determined to oversee the demise of the Royalist cause. The evidence presented also reveals a man showing a genuine concern for the plight facing his soldiers.

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<sup>26</sup> Cromwell to Thomas St. Nicholas 25 November 1648 Abbott i p.643-694 also Carlyle i p.392.

<sup>27</sup> Cromwell to Charles Fairfax 10 November 1648 Abbott i p.681-82.

<sup>28</sup> Cromwell to Lenthall 20 August 1648 Abbott i p.634-638 Carlyle i p.336-344; Cromwell to Derby House 23 August 1648 Abbott i p.641-42.

<sup>29</sup> Cromwell to Lenthall 20 August 1648 Abbott i p.634-638; Carlyle i p.336-344.

<sup>30</sup> Cromwell to Fairfax 28 June 1648 Abbott i p.613-619 also Carlyle i p.319-322.



Professor Underdown's suggestion that Cromwell's preference to delay the Army's Remonstrance was another indication of his reluctance to endorse the purging of Parliament, is also open to question.<sup>31</sup> His argument is derived from a letter written by Cromwell to his cousin Robert Hammond. Commenting upon the Remonstrance, Cromwell stated that "we could perhaps have wished the stay of it till after the treaty". However, Professor Underdown failed to finish the quotation; immediately succeeding these words came the important statement "yet seeing it come out, we trust to rejoice in the will of the lord."<sup>32</sup> It appears, therefore, that Cromwell objected to the timing rather than the content of the document. The content was radical enough, calling for an instant end to the Newport negotiations. Even more significantly it demanded that the "King be brought to justice as the capital cause of all the late wars."<sup>33</sup> Hammond provided Cromwell with the ideal opportunity to reveal his moderate stance. Apart from being a close relation, for whom Cromwell had a great deal of attraction, Hammond held grave reservations about the Army's moves against the King.<sup>34</sup> Had Cromwell been opposed to the Army's Remonstrance, he could have written to his cousin to re-assure him, by promising that steps would be taken to moderate some of the Army's demands. Instead, the only advice Cromwell afforded was to place trust in God's providences. Far from revealing a moderate disposition, Cromwell referred to the Newport negotiations as a "ruining hypocritical agreement", suggesting that a number of MPs had been occasioned to overlook what was "just and honest". The King was also described as "that man against whom God hath witnessed".<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Underdown Pride's Purge p.119, 121 150.

<sup>32</sup> Cromwell to Hammond 25 November 1648 Abbott i p.696-699 esp p.698; Carlyle i p.393-400.

<sup>33</sup> The Remonstrance or Declaration of the Army T.T E. 473 (3) 20<sup>th</sup> November 1648.

<sup>34</sup> Old Parliamentary History XVII p.240 quoted in C.V. Wedgwood Trial p.30-31.

<sup>35</sup> Cromwell to Hammond 25 November 1648 Abbott i p.696-699; Carlyle i p.393-400.

Cromwell revealed his tacit support for the Army's Remonstrance by promoting a number of petitions from his own regiments. These petitions were similar to the Remonstrance, demanding that a diligent inquisition be held for the innocent blood shed in this late war. As in the Remonstrance, Charles Stuart was not spared. The petitions included a clause stating that "neither king, lords or any such persons [should] be exempted from being proceeded against"<sup>36</sup>. In a letter to Fairfax, Cromwell endorsed the petitions with the unequivocal statement, "I do in all my heart concur with them".<sup>37</sup>

Cromwell's attitude towards the Army's Remonstrance and the petitions from his own regiments, reveal a man who was following rather than initiating political events. He found a "very great sense" in the petitions from his regiments, but there is no evidence that he participated in the framing of these proposals. Although sceptical about the timing of the Army's Remonstrance, "seeing it come out" he was prepared to endorse it. This reluctance to initiate a political programme is, however, very different from being in a state of indecision. Cromwell remained a conviction politician. His opposition to the Newport negotiations was clear. He sent a message to Sir Henry Vane encouraging him not to "shift and shirk", in favour of Charles Stuart. As mentioned above, Cromwell used apocalyptic language when he described Charles Stuart as "that man against whom God hath witnessed."<sup>38</sup> In a letter to Hammond, Cromwell wrote that "peace is only good when we receive it" warning that it was

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<sup>36</sup> The Declarations and Humble Representatives of the Officers and Soldiers in Colonel Scroop's Saunders and Waulton's regiments .T.T.E.475(13) 5<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648 p.2-4. Also, The Humble Representation of your Officers and Soldiers in Nottingham T.T E. 475 (24) 7<sup>th</sup> December; A new Remonstrance from the Northern Army T.T E 475 (4) 4th December p.3 (clause12)

<sup>37</sup> Cromwell to Fairfax 20 November 1648 Abbott i p.690-91; Carlyle i p.390-1.

<sup>38</sup> Cromwell to Hammond 6 November 1648 Abbott i p.676-678.

dangerous to go against the will of God to attain it.”<sup>39</sup> Cromwell appreciated that the Newport negotiations needed to be disrupted. The Army only had two options, a purge or a dissolution. It appears unlikely that Cromwell would have favoured a dissolution. On the 6th January 1649, Cromwell disagreed publicly with Ireton over the date at which Parliament should be dissolved. Ireton believed that Parliament should be compelled to dissolve on the last day of April, whereas, Cromwell argued that it would be more honourable to let Parliament set the date for its own dissolution.<sup>40</sup> Considering Cromwell believed that the Newport negotiations were dangerous and hypocritical,<sup>41</sup> there is no reason to doubt Ludlow’s remark that Cromwell was glad about the purge and would endeavour to maintain it.<sup>42</sup>

Professor Underdown’s argument that Cromwell was deliberately dilatory in his journey was questioned by Ian Gentles.<sup>43</sup> Professor Gentles argues that Cromwell had to ensure that his responsibilities in the north would be taken care of during his absence; his account also points out that in light of the numerous attacks on parliamentary leaders in the autumn of 1648, and with the death of Rainborowe fresh in his mind, the journey from the north was always going to be a slow one.<sup>44</sup> In addition to Ian Gentles’ observations, it can be argued that Cromwell’s late arrival was not particularly significant. It is true that Cromwell missed Pride’s purge, but he was in the parliament receiving the House’s hearty thanks,<sup>45</sup> at the very time a second and

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid; also Cromwell to Hammond 25 November Abbott i p.696-699.

<sup>40</sup> Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.284-5.

<sup>41</sup> Cromwell to Hammond 25 November 1648 Abbott i p.696-699.

<sup>42</sup> C.H Firth (ed) Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow (2 vols, 1894) i p.211-12. For a discussion of Ludlow’s account see below.

<sup>43</sup> Underdown’s Pride’s Purge p.149-50; Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.284-5; Peter Gaunt Oliver Cromwell p.102.

<sup>44</sup> Ian Gentles The New Model Army cited n.43 above.

<sup>45</sup> C.J vi p.94.



equally important purge was taking place. The significance of this purge should not be underestimated. On the 6<sup>th</sup>, it was widely reported that there was “Little hope of an accord” between Parliament and the Army.<sup>46</sup> Also, on the 6<sup>th</sup> Parliament refused to proceed with the Army’s requests, spending most of the day complaining about the plight of the secluded members.<sup>47</sup> It was only after the second purge upon the 7<sup>th</sup> that Parliament agreed to debate the Army’s proposals.<sup>48</sup> Cromwell did not arrive after the dirty work; he was in the thick of it.

Professor Underdown also noted that “intelligent contemporaries” appreciated that Cromwell had deliberately remained away from London until after Pride’s purge.<sup>49</sup> The two intelligent contemporaries were Edmund Ludlow and Marchamont Nedham. Nedham was the editor of the royalist *Mercurius Pragmaticus*. In his editorial covering the political events from Tuesday December 12<sup>th</sup>, until Tuesday December the 19<sup>th</sup>, he noted that “Oliver forbore coming to London until after the force acted upon the House.”<sup>50</sup> There are two problems with Professor Underdown’s use of this source. First, as editor of a royalist newspaper, it was in Nedham’s interest to reveal divisions amongst the Army leaders. Second, his comments are at variance with those he wrote in the previous week’s edition. In that paper Cromwell was

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<sup>46</sup> This is a quote from The Moderate Intelligencer T.T E.475 (26) Thursday 30th November – Thursday 7th December 1648; see also The Perfect Weekly Account T.T E. 476 (15) 1648 p.306; The Moderate T.T E.476 (5) Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December–Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648; A Declaration Collected out of the Journals of Both Houses T.T E.476 (17) Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December – Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.11; A True Relation of the Army’s Seizure of Eminent Members T.T E.476 (14) ; Mercurius Pragmaticus E.476 (2) Tuesday 5th December- Tuesday 12th December 1648; C.J vi, p.93-4.

<sup>47</sup> Sources listed n.46 above. Also Whitelock and Lucy Hutchinson reveal the unpopularity of the purge. Bulstrode Whitelock Memorials of English Affairs 4 vols (Oxford 1853), vol ii, p.471

<sup>48</sup> C.J vi p.94-95

<sup>49</sup> Underdown Pride’s Purge p.150.

<sup>50</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T E. 476 (35) Tuesday 12 – Tuesday 19 December 1648.



not depicted as a man who either disagreed with the purging of Parliament, or an individual attempting to undo the purge. Nedham admitted that Cromwell arrived after the purge, but he included the sarcastic comment, “Nol Cromwell arrived, as if he poor man had no hand in the business.” Nedham’s obvious irony at this juncture is re-enforced by his account of Cromwell’s entry into the House. “In came that pure holy Goblin Nol Cromwell, who brought in along his fellow saint Henry Marten, who looks thin, as if he had “gotten a Scottish clap.”<sup>51</sup>

Ludlow, writing a long time after the purges, wrote that Cromwell had not been acquainted with the design, “yet since it was done, he was glad of and would endeavour to maintain it.”<sup>52</sup> Far from implying that Cromwell deliberately remained away from London because he had reservations about the purging of Parliament, this statement supports the argument above; Cromwell was a supporter of the purge, but he was following rather than initiating events. Moreover, Ludlow categorically states that Cromwell supported the purge. He wrote his account after the dissolution of the long Parliament, an action he viewed as “trecherous and impious”.<sup>53</sup> It is likely that had Cromwell objected to the purge, Ludlow would have mentioned it to highlight the future Lord Protector’s hypocrisy. Whatever our opinions of Cromwell, it cannot be denied that both the purges and regicide gave him more political power than he had previously enjoyed. Had he been opposed to the very act which brought him this power, it is inconceivable that Ludlow would have failed to highlight this duplicity.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T E. 476 (2) Tuesday 5 – Tuesday 12 December 1648. For a detailed discussion of all of Nedham’s newspapers see below in this chapter and in chapter 5

<sup>52</sup> Ludlow Memoirs i p.211-12

<sup>53</sup> Ibid p.347-355 quoted from p.355; A.B Worden (ed) A Voyce From the Watch Tower Part Five 1660-1662, (Camden Fourth Series, 1978), p.68-69.

<sup>54</sup> The best available account dealing with Cromwell and his contemporaries is found in John Morrill’s “Cromwell and his Contemporaries” p.259-81 in Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution. No mention of Cromwell’s duplicity is mentioned in this account.

Cromwell's arrival after Pride's purge was not a deliberate ploy which indicated his reservations about using force against a constitutional body. Although he did not play a part in the planning of the purge,<sup>55</sup> he objected to the Newport negotiations, believing that the parliamentary majority had "by their passive principle overlooked what was just and honest."<sup>56</sup> Cromwell, at this stage, was not directing events, but his own comments and actions suggest that he supported the Army's dramatic purges. Moreover, nearly all those contemporaries who commented upon the purge, whether Royalist, Presbyterian or radical, saw no hint of Cromwell being at odds with those who planned and carried out the purges.

Professor Underdown argued that from Cromwell's return to London, until the end of December, he attempted to undo the purge and prevent the trial of the King. The next part of this chapter will consider aspects of this argument. This section considers Cromwell's role in plans to re-admit a number of secluded members and his involvement in the release of the imprisoned members.<sup>57</sup>

Professor Underdown argued that Cromwell's return to London was followed by several hints of moderation. He provides three examples. First, Hugh Peters delivered a restrained sermon on the 8<sup>th</sup> of December. Second, "rumours were being spread" suggesting that there would be a settlement with the king. Third, upon the 12<sup>th</sup> of December a few imprisoned MPs were

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<sup>55</sup> We cannot know for sure who actually planned the purge. From Ludlow's account we know that six men were involved. These probably included Ireton, Ludlow, Harrison, Sir William Constable, Lord Grey of Groby and Cornelius Holland. It is possible that Colonel Pride and Sir Hardress Waller took part. Ludlow Memoirs i p 209-10; Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.281-2; David Underdown Pride's Purge p.141-2.

<sup>56</sup> Cromwell to Hammond 25 November 1648 Abbott p.696-699.

<sup>57</sup> Underdown Pride's Purge p.150-172. Professor Underdown's account is supported by Ian Gentles New Model Army p.297-298.

released. Although Professor Underdown rightly cited the source, *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, which mentioned Peters' sermon,<sup>58</sup> there is no evidence suggesting that Cromwell was influential. Furthermore, Professor Underdown needed to explain another sermon delivered by Peters on the 22<sup>nd</sup> December. In this sermon Peters suggested that the Army should "root up monarchy, not only here but in France and other kingdoms." Peters also added that precedent should be ignored since this was an age to make examples.<sup>59</sup> This second sermon was spoken at the very time Professor Underdown suggested that Cromwell was working for a compromise which included the release of the remaining imprisoned members and the restitution of the secluded members.<sup>60</sup> If Underdown's view that Cromwell was behind Peters' first sermon is accepted, Cromwell's influence did not last very long. It is more likely that Peters' sermon on the 8<sup>th</sup> was independent, designed to re-assure wavering MPs who had survived the two purges.<sup>61</sup>

The second example Professor Underdown cited to suggest that Cromwell's arrival coincided with hints of moderation rests with the evidence he acquired from *Mercurius Pragmaticus*. Marchamout Nedham claimed that these were moves afoot to save the king, coupled with overtures and offers to the imprisoned members. At this stage, Nedham did not link these signs of moderation with Cromwell; he implicitly stated that these conciliatory moves were a reaction to the "general outcries" and distaste caused by the Remonstrance and the late force

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<sup>58</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* T.T E. 476 (2) Tuesday 5-Tuesday 12 December 1648; *Mercurius Pragmaticus* T.T E. 477 (30) Tuesday 19 December-Tuesday 26 December 1648

<sup>59</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* T.T E.477 (30) Tuesday 19 – Tuesday 26 December 1648; H.R Trevor-Roper *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change* (1972) p.332-3; Clement Walker *A Complete History of Independency* 4 vols (1661), part ii, p.49-50

<sup>60</sup> See below in this chapter. A new study of the purge is made in chapter 4.

<sup>61</sup> As Professor Underdown points out, a number of MPs survived the purges of the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> but still had reservations about the Army's actions, *Pride's Purge* p.143-172.



upon the House.<sup>62</sup> Also, not one contemporary account made reference to Cromwell being party to any moves towards a compromise. It is significant to note that Whitelock, apart from reporting Cromwell's arrival, does not mention him until he was apparently involved in a compromise scheme on the 18<sup>th</sup> of December.<sup>63</sup>

Professor Underdown's final example linking Cromwell's arrival with hints of moderation, was the release of four MPs on the 12<sup>th</sup> of December. It is again difficult to associate Cromwell with this decision. It appears that Thomas Lane and Henry Pelham were released after a request from Thomas Widdrington,<sup>64</sup> but no other individual M.P. is linked with making a direct appeal for the discharge of any imprisoned member. The most significant objection which can be raised against Professor Underdown's argument, is the supposition that the Army altered their policy because of pressure from the moderates. From the first day of the purge the Army's policy towards the imprisoned members was chaotic. Upon the 6<sup>th</sup>, Nathaniel Fiennes and Benjamin Rudyard were released with six other members offered their paroles.<sup>65</sup> Two other events on the 6<sup>th</sup> illustrate that the Army was not following a carefully planned and fastidiously executed policy. First, the officer guarding the prisoners had no idea what was to be done with them.<sup>66</sup> Second, it appears that Fairfax was not familiar with the names of those imprisoned; a Presbyterian account of the purge stated that by order of the

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<sup>62</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T E.476 (2) Tuesday December 5 – Tuesday December 12 1648.

<sup>63</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.471-477.

<sup>64</sup> Mercurius Elencticus T.T. E.476 (4) Tuesday 5 – Tuesday 12 December 1648 p.532.

<sup>65</sup> Parliament Under the Power of the Sword T.T 669 f.13 (54), 7<sup>th</sup> December 1648; The Moderate Intelligencer, T.T. E. 475 (26), Thursday 30<sup>th</sup> November – Thursday 7<sup>th</sup> December 1648; The Perfect Weekly Account T.T E.476 (15), Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December 6 – Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.305.

<sup>66</sup> A True and Full Relation cited in n.46 above.



general, Hugh Peters visited the imprisoned members “ to take a list of their names.”<sup>67</sup> Colonel Pride was also unsure what was to be done with the members under restraint. When he was asked, he could only state that he had no other employment for the present and could not wait upon them.”<sup>68</sup> At one stage later on, Fairfax was not aware that William Prynne, the Army’s most vocal opponent, was a prisoner.<sup>69</sup> Also, despite Parliament’s requests for a charge to be brought in against the imprisoned members, it took the Army until the 4<sup>th</sup> of January to respond.<sup>70</sup>

Throughout December the Army’s primary concern was to provide a more tractable Parliament. It is clear that the Army wished to bring the eleven MPs impeached in 1647 plus Major General Browne and Lionel Copley to justice.<sup>71</sup> With the exception of Sir Robert Harley who had close connections with Fairfax<sup>72</sup> and Edward Massey who escaped,<sup>73</sup> the MPs amongst this group who were present in London between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> of December remained in confinement until 1651. In December 1648, the future of the other imprisoned

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<sup>67</sup> A True and Full Relation, T.T E.476 (14), 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.4

<sup>68</sup> Ibid p.5

<sup>69</sup> Underdown Pride’s Purge p.192 and sources listed in footnote 49.

<sup>70</sup> C.J vi p.93, 95, 97, 101 and 111.

<sup>71</sup> The Humble Proposals and Desires of His Excellency the Lord Fairfax.T.T.E.475 (25) 17<sup>th</sup> December 1648 Whitlock Memorials ii p.469; D Brown (ed) The Historical Collections of John Rushworth 8 vols, (1721-22), vol vii, p.1354 – from now on all references to Rushworth relate to vol vii, unless otherwise specified.

<sup>72</sup> Historical Manuscripts Commision Report, 14<sup>th</sup> Report appendix, part II Portland Manuscript- Col E. Harley to Lord Fairfax p.166. (1894)

<sup>73</sup> Underdown Pride’s Purge p.195

members took a very secondary place. This explains why these members were both treated and released in such an ad-hoc fashion.<sup>74</sup>

Professor Underdown's whole argument linking Cromwell's arrival with hints of moderation is open to question. If anything his arrival coincided with policy moving in a more radical direction. As noted earlier, the 7<sup>th</sup> saw a continuation of the purge and Parliament deciding to proceed with the Army's requests.<sup>75</sup> Another purge took place on the 11<sup>th</sup>, a clear indication that the Army, far from desiring a compromise, wanted Parliament to move with haste.<sup>76</sup> There is no evidence suggesting that Cromwell was behind these moves, and this, coupled with the absence of evidence linking Cromwell with a more moderate policy indicates that, certainly until the 18<sup>th</sup> of December, Cromwell was not taking an active interest in the future of the legislature.

Whitelock's memorials reveal that between the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December, Cromwell was involved in discussions concerning the future of the secluded and imprisoned MPs.<sup>77</sup> On the 18<sup>th</sup> December Whitelock, Widdrington, Cromwell and Coloner Deane held a meeting and discussed how the settlement of the kingdom might be best effected.<sup>78</sup> Whitelock saw Cromwell the following day but no record of their conversation survives. Two days later,

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<sup>74</sup> Of the eleven MPs: Clockworthy, Waller, Sir William Lewis along with Browne and Copley remained in confinement. The other MPs amongst the eleven did not arrive at Westminster during the purge with the exception of the aforesaid Maney and Harley, these five remained in prison until 1651. All the other MPs taken into custody had been released by April 1649. This is discussed in greater detail in chapter 2 below.

<sup>75</sup> See above. The significance of this second purge is discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.

<sup>76</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus E.476 (35) December 12-19 1648; Second Part of the Narrative p.4; Underdown's Pride's Purge p.159.

<sup>77</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.477-485.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid p.477.

another meeting took place involving Cromwell, Whitelock, Widdrington and Speaker Lenthall. Cromwell and Lenthall asked the two lawyers to “draw up some heads upon discourse, to be considered by the same company. The lawyers were also asked to “frame somewhat in order to the restitution of the secluded members.”<sup>79</sup> From this account Professor Underdown claimed that Cromwell appeared to be working for the return of the secluded members and the release of the imprisoned MPs. There are a number of problems with this view.

First, although it is clear from Whitelock’s account that Cromwell was involving the two lawyers in discussions, it would be wrong to assume from this account, that Cromwell was behind, or favoured plans to overturn the Army’s work during the purges. Whitelock never stated Cromwell’s position on these issues. More importantly, this reference to the ‘Presbyterian’<sup>80</sup> MPs was not a new scheme drawn up by either Whitelock or Cromwell. On the 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 14<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> of December Parliament had sent a committee to Fairfax enquiring about the future of the members under restraint.<sup>81</sup> Far from being a new compromise scheme, Whitelock was merely reflecting moderate parliamentary opinion.

Professor Gentles argues that Cromwell invited Whitelock to draw up these proposals because he recognised the importance of having as many M.P.s as possible backing the King’s trial.<sup>82</sup> This is a more plausible explanation; if the Army was to secure the support of the moderates, to keep them in Parliament, thus providing a hint of legitimacy to the actions against the king, the views of the moderates would, at the very least, have to be listened to. It is significant that

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid p.479.

<sup>80</sup> By Presbyterian I mean secluded and imprisoned MPs. The term is discussed in chapter 4.

<sup>81</sup> C.J vi p.93, 95, 97, 101 and 111.

<sup>82</sup> Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.298.

Whitelock and Widdrington survived the purge, but both men held serious reservations about the Army's actions. Both men were appointed to a parliamentary committee to "consider how best to proceed against the King."<sup>83</sup> By including Whitelock in these discussions Cromwell was pursuing a not totally unrealistic hope, that the two lawyers would support the Army's actions.

Professor Underdown's view that the meetings with Whitelock were a serious attempt to provide a settlement for the secluded members is not supported by the evidence in the memorials. Upon the 23<sup>rd</sup>, in keeping with their previous agreement, Whitelock was able to put forward his case for moderation. However, Whitelock's account reveals that this discussion concerned the future of monarchy, rather than the restitution of the secluded members.<sup>84</sup> Had Cromwell been behind, or even supported the restitution of the secluded members, it is likely Whitelock would have mentioned it. Moreover, it is highly probable that Cromwellian support for the scheme would have ensured that the issues were discussed. Instead of supporting Whitelock, on the 29<sup>th</sup> Cromwell wrote to Harrison asking him to come to London.<sup>85</sup> Had Cromwell favoured proposals to undo the purge, Harrison was the last person he would have wanted in London.

Although it was resolved on the 23<sup>rd</sup> to re-convene the discussions, the meeting never took place.<sup>86</sup> This was not the result of a sudden change of policy upon the part of Cromwell. On

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<sup>83</sup> C.J vi p.103.

<sup>84</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.481.

<sup>85</sup> Cromwell to Harrison, 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1648, Abbott i p.714-15.

<sup>86</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.481-82.



the 26<sup>th</sup>, Cromwell's attempts of flattery were put to the test; Whitelock was asked to join the "king killing" committee. Both he and Widdrington refused.<sup>87</sup>

There is not enough evidence to suggest that Cromwell was taking an initiative by asking Whitelock and Widdrington to draft some proposals. Although Whitelock implied that his proposals were of great significance, no other contemporary made reference to them. Indeed, the Presbyterians did not mention any attempt by Cromwell to assist the cause of the secluded and imprisoned members. Nathaniel Stephens and other MPs were praised for voicing their objections to the purge<sup>88</sup> but Cromwell was not mentioned. (We must conclude that these were not particularly serious discussions.)

If there is not sufficient evidence to support Professor Underdown's view that Cromwell wished to secure the return of the secluded members, it remains possible that Cromwell participated in moves to prevent the trial of the King. Historians who subscribe to this view,<sup>89</sup> accept the evidence left by Royalists, and in particular the views and writing of Marchamont Nedham.

Between the 19<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> of December Nedham claimed that the radical cause was dividing and this would culminate in the return of Charles as King. A close examination of Nedham's

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<sup>87</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.484.

<sup>88</sup> The Second Part of the Narrative T.T E.477 (19) p.4. A True and Full Relation T.T E.476 (14).

<sup>89</sup> The best two accounts dealing with this royalist evidence are found in the works of Professor Underdown and Samuel Gardiner. Underdown's Pride's Purge p.168-172; S.R Gardiner History of the Great Civil War vol. iv p.284-7.

newspapers will cast doubt upon this assertion. It will also develop upon the works of both Veronica Wedgwood and Ian Gentles.<sup>90</sup>

Before considering the contents of Nedham's papers<sup>91</sup> two important points must be remembered. First, Nedham's reports indicating a split between the Grandees and the Levellers vindicated his own editorials. He went to great lengths to explain why the political system would not survive without a King. At the core of Nedham's argument rested the assumption that without a king, the radicals would split. He warned that instead of peaceable government under hereditary kings, the land would groan under the burden of successive tyrannies.<sup>92</sup> His claims that the Grandees wished to rid themselves of the Levellers, did justice to all the exaggerated dangers Nedham warned his readers about. Second, Nedham was a very able journalist. At this stage of his career he was writing for the Royalists and he therefore attempted to please his readers and promote the Royalist cause. But, as Nedham admitted<sup>93</sup>, defeat in two civil wars had left the Royalist party in a state of dejection. Royalists yearned for glimmers of hope and Nedham proved adept at providing these.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Both Veronica Wedgwood Trial of Charles I p.77 and note 30 p.232 and Ian Gentles New Model Army p.298 believe that the royalist accounts were the product of wishful thinking. Although I agree with this view, my account provides new information upon Nedham's journalistic style.

<sup>91</sup> Nedham was responsible for four newspapers during this period. Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 476 (2), E. 476 (35), E. 477 (30), E. 537 (20). They are all found in the Thomason Tracts. From now on all references with E refer to the aforementioned collection. They are all listed in the notes on the Press, chapter 5 below.

<sup>92</sup> Mercurius. Pragmaticus E. 476 (2) Tuesday 5 December – Tuesday 12 December.

<sup>93</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 537 (20) Tuesday 26 December – Tuesday 9 January. From now I have abbreviated this title to Merc Prag.

<sup>94</sup> Nedham was the most effective of all the royalist journalists. For more information on the royalist press see chapter 5 below.

Nedham was the editor of four editions of *Mercurius Pragmaticus* during the period between the purge and Regicide. In each issue he provided his royalist readers with optimistic forecasts. In the first edition, Nedham made two references to the Grandees, both suggesting that they would not be too extreme. However, he did not develop upon this theme preferring to place royalist hopes upon the “general outcries and distaste caused by the Army’s Remonstrance.”<sup>95</sup> He triumphantly reported that Colonel Ashton was preparing to launch a counter-revolution. These factors, coupled with the Prince of Wales’ strength in Ireland, “opened a door of hope for Charles’ deliverance.”<sup>96</sup>

In his second paper, Nedham continued to make optimistic forecasts. The issues raised above were mentioned again, but Nedham had a new story to illustrate how the radical cause was dividing. He confidently asserted that the Earl of Warwick had refused to side with the Army, preferring to support the Newport compromise. For good measure Nedham claimed that Warwick believed that the Newport agreement had placed too many restrictions upon Charles.<sup>97</sup>

Before considering Nedham’s final two papers, it is worth assessing the accuracy of his version. He was correct when he stated that there were general outcries against the Army’s Remonstrance. But this verbal hostility, which mainly came from Presbyterian MPs – the people who the purge was directed against, did not represent a threat to the Army. Moreover, as mentioned above, the Army took no notice of protests, illustrated by the additional purges of Parliament.<sup>98</sup> The reports concerning Ashton were again an exaggeration; whilst it is true

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<sup>95</sup> Merc. Prag E. 476 (2) Tuesday 5 December - Tuesday 12 December 1648.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>97</sup> Merc. Prag E. 476 (35) Tuesday 12 December – Tuesday 19 December 1648.

<sup>98</sup> See above. For more detail on this second purge see chapter 2 below.



that the Lancashire man disagreed with the purge, there is no evidence to support Nedham's view that Ashton was prepared to lead a counter-revolution.<sup>99</sup> The reports from Ireland again over-stated the immediacy of the threat. Although Parliament and the Army recognised a potential threat, the notion that there was an immediate danger did not exist.<sup>100</sup> Such a report outlines a potential threat, but it does not suggest that the Army had any immediate cause to panic.

Nedham's account concerning the Earl of Warwick proved to be fallacious. It is clear that he had attempted to take advantage of certain confusion which existed over Warwick's attitude towards the Parliament.<sup>101</sup> But Warwick soon clarified his position by publicly declaring that it "never entered into his thoughts to stand against the Army."<sup>102</sup> Nedham had attempted to manipulate a confused situation to suit his royalist readers. The attempt failed and in his next

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<sup>99</sup> The evidence concerning Ashton is very conflicting. Cromwell had a high regard for him (Cromwell to Lenthall 20 August 1648 Abbott p.634-638) which perhaps makes it unlikely that Ashton would have launched a counter-revolution. Mercurius Elencticus E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5 December 1648, mentions Ashton's hostility but George Wharton did not believe that a counter revolution would be the result. The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencier E. 476 (39) Tuesday 12 – Tuesday 19 December 1648 p.1191 printed a letter from colonel Ashton claiming that he and the Lancashire forces "were resolved to submit to the orders of the General." The Moderate E. 536 (2) Tuesday 19 – Tuesday 26 December 1648, produced an identical report to the one found in the Weekly Intelligencier. From these accounts, coupled with the absence of panic amongst those in power, it is clear Nedham vastly exaggerated the danger.

<sup>100</sup> See footnote above 99.

<sup>101</sup> Rushworth Historical Collections vii p.1366.

<sup>102</sup> As with Ashton's activities, these are conflicting reports concerning Warwick. The Kingdome's Weekly Intelligencer T.T E. 476 (39) Tuesday 12 –19 December 1648 p.1190 claimed that Warwick had returned home due to poor weather. The same report was made in The Moderate E.477 (4). A Declaration from both Houses T.T E.477 (7) claimed Warwick returned because he was unwell. Merc Elencticus T.T E 476 (4) p.532 had "great hopes" that Warwick had returned to join the royalists. The situation was resolved when Warwick came out in favour of the new regime. Declaration of the Earl of Warwick T.T E.476 (21) 14<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648. 1649; Adamson "The Peerage in Politics" p.262. Rushworth vii Historical Collections p.1366.

edition, Nedham was forced to concede that Warwick had sided with the Army.<sup>103</sup> However, this was not a problem, Nedham had a new story to reveal how the radical cause would collapse.<sup>104</sup>

Before we consider Nedham's final two newspapers it is worth glancing at the political situation. By the edition of *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, covering the events between the 19<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of December, Nedham was running out of stories. Warwick and the Lancashire forces had issued declarations of loyalty to the new regime.<sup>105</sup> Upon the 13<sup>th</sup> of December, Parliament had revoked the former votes which annulled the vote of No Addresses. On the same day the Treaty of Newport was voted dishonourable.<sup>106</sup> On the 20<sup>th</sup> of December, further restrictions upon Parliamentary membership were established; all MPs were expected to declare that they had, or would have dissented to the 5<sup>th</sup> of December vote.<sup>107</sup> And most significantly on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December, the House considered how to proceed in a way of justice against the king and other capital offenders.<sup>108</sup>

Against this background Nedham attempted to supply his readers with hope. He no longer suggested that there would be an insurrection by discontented Presbyterians. Nedham now argued that Cromwell and the Grandees would allow Charles to remain as titular Head of State. To add gloss to his argument, Nedham pointed out that the views of the levellers and

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<sup>103</sup> Declaration of the Earl of Warwick T.T E.476 (21), 14<sup>th</sup> December 1648, and note 102 above.

<sup>104</sup> Merc. Prag E.477 (30) Tuesday 19-26 December 1648.

<sup>105</sup> See Warwick's Declaration above notes 102 and 103

<sup>106</sup> C.J vi, p. 97.

<sup>107</sup> Worden The Rump Parliament p.33-55.

<sup>108</sup> C.J vi p.102-103.

the Grandees were as different as “fire and water”.<sup>109</sup> As with Nedham’s earlier editions, it is difficult to accept his account.

Considering it was no longer credible to suggest that deliverance would come from either Warwick or discontented Presbyterians, Nedham needed a new story. It is plausible to assume that he seized upon Cromwell’s relatively low profile<sup>110</sup> and manufactured an account to suit his Royalist readers. In addition to this argument there are specific issues which undermine his account.

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December, Parliament established a committee to consider “how best to proceed against the King”.<sup>111</sup> Nedham believed that this was not significant because only a small minority of MPs were ‘mad enough’ to countenance the trial of an anointed sovereign.<sup>112</sup> In Whitelock’s memorials, far from implying that the majority of MPs favoured moderation, the lawyer stated that the “fierce party prosecuted their design with all eagerness.”<sup>113</sup> Whitelock’s account proves to be the more authentic, thirty-eight MPs were invited to sit upon this committee. Moderates, including Whitelock himself, were nominated but the majority were future regicides. Sixteen members had already shown their radicalism by taking the test of dissent.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Merc. Prag T.T E 477 (30) Tuesday 19 – 26 December 1648.

<sup>110</sup> See below for a survey of Cromwell’s role during this period.

<sup>111</sup> C.J vi p.102.

<sup>112</sup> Merc. Prag T.T E. 477 (30) Tuesday 19 – 26 Decembe 1648.

<sup>113</sup> Whitelock’s Memorials ii p.480.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid; C.J vi p.101-3; Underdown Pride’s Purge p.366-99. Worden The Rump Parliament p.33-55.



Nedham continued to argue that Cromwell wished to spare the king, even after Cromwell had spoken in favour of the trial. Upon the 26<sup>th</sup>, Nedham suggested that the Grandees “would be nimble in preventing Parliament from moving against the King.”<sup>115</sup> Instead of making a dramatic intervention on the king’s behalf, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of December, Cromwell joined the “king-killing committee”. From this point onwards, Nedham accepted that the King would forfeit his crown, though his life would be spared.”<sup>116</sup>

Nedham never explained how the Grandees would prevent the trial of the King. At the end of his account concerning the events between the 19<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of December, he promised his readers that the next edition would show “the way whereby (the Grandees) intend to comply and remove all objections”,<sup>117</sup> to their projected settlement. But this information was never provided. In its place we have been left with unsubstantiated accounts.

The accounts in Nedham’s *Mercurius Pragmaticus* provide the majority of information concerning the alleged attempts to save the King. In addition to writing his newspapers Nedham was sending letters to Nicholas which were almost identical to his editorials.<sup>118</sup> Although Nedham made no reference to the Denbigh mission, Professor Underdown used his account to indicate the terms that were offered to Charles.<sup>119</sup> Apart from the Royalist *Mercurius Melancholicus*, no other newspaper substantiates Nedham’s version of events.

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<sup>115</sup> Merc. Prag T.T E 537 (20) Tuesday 26 December – Tuesday 9 January 1648.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid By the end of this edition Nedham appears to have accepted that the Grandees would not secure a settlement with the king, however, Nedham still believed they would preserve his life.

<sup>117</sup> Merc. Prag T.T E. 477 (30) Tuesday 19 – 26 December 1648.

<sup>118</sup> Bodl Lib, The Clarendon Manuscripts, 34 f. 12, 16, 17, 19; Underdown Pride’s Purge p.366-99; S.R. Gardiner History of the Great Civil War vol iv p.284.

<sup>119</sup> Underdown Pride’s Purge p.168.

Mercurius Melancholicus has been described as the “most unreliable newspaper, characterised by scurrility, wild rumours and breast beating.” On the 25<sup>th</sup> December this paper reported that Cromwell had agreed that “there was no policy in taking away the King’s life.” This edition also reported that 7,000 men in Lancashire and 20,000 men in Wales were on the brink of launching a counter-revolution. Apart from having the same motivation as Nedham, the exaggerations in this account render the paper a most unreliable source.<sup>120</sup>

Finally, how much significance should we attach to the Denbigh mission? The French Ambassador Grignon heard a rumour that Cromwell had asked Denbigh to make a final offer to the King, the terms of which would have allowed Charles to remain as titular Head of State.<sup>121</sup> This account was quite possibly the product of rumours circulated by the Royalist press. As late as the 28<sup>th</sup> of January, some royalists still claimed that the Grandees would spare the King. These accounts are rightly dismissed by historians as the product of wishful thinking. The same could be said about this account. Moreover, Grignon had no detailed knowledge of the mission, which suggests that his account may have been the product of an unsubstantiated whisper.

If we accept that the mission did take place, John Morrill has provided the most sensible explanation. Professor Morrill argues that many officers and soldiers were convinced that God was responsible for their victories in battle. Therefore, the King’s decision to precipitate the Second Civil War was a direct challenge to God’s authority. Professor Morrill suggests

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<sup>120</sup> J.Frank, The Beginnings of the English Newspaper 1620-1660 (Cambridge. Mass 1961), p.162. Merc. Melancholicus E.536 (27), Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January 1648, p.3 for Cromwell’s alleged desire to spare the King, p.8 for the information concerning Ashton’s forces and those in Wales.

<sup>121</sup> S.R Gardiner History of the Great Civil War vol iv p.285-6.

that the point of the Denbigh mission was to demonstrate that God had hardened the King's heart; even at this stage, the King was incapable of reason and was being driven to destruction by his own folly.<sup>122</sup>

The dearth of evidence surrounding Cromwell's activities in December 1648 created a vacuum. This persuaded a number of historians to accept Royalist accounts. But the evidence left by a professional journalist, and wishful thinking Royalists, should not be accepted without critical analysis. In light of the reservations noted concerning Professor Underdown's argument, I will now attempt to provide an alternative explanation concerning Cromwell's activities between the purge and regicide.

It is important to re-state the orthodoxy which existed prior to Professor Underdown's work and admit that, until the trial commenced, we know very little about Cromwell's actions. Indeed, between the 7<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> of December we know practically nothing about him.<sup>123</sup> But on the 14<sup>th</sup> of December it was widely reported that Cromwell visited Hamilton. The mission was intended to obtain "discoveries of Hamilton's correspondents in England," during the Second Civil War.<sup>124</sup> It is clear from the contemporary accounts that this was an important mission, and Cromwell's reasons for making this visit are at one with his utterances and actions during the previous seven months.

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<sup>122</sup> John Morrill The Nature of the English Revolution p.21.

<sup>123</sup> On the 8<sup>th</sup> December, Cromwell wrote a letter on behalf of an "old royalist". However, it has no political significance. Abbott i p.709. We also know that Cromwell arrived in London upon the 6<sup>th</sup>, and attended Parliament upon the 7<sup>th</sup>. Apart from this, his activities remain obscure.

<sup>124</sup> The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T E.476 (39) Tuesday 12-19 December 1648; A Declaration Collected out of the Journals T.T E.477 (7) Wednesday 13-20 December 1648 p.19; Mercurius Elencticus T.T E. 476 (36) Tuesday 12 December – Tuesday 19 December 1648 p.540, Merc.Prag T.T E. 476 (35) Tuesday 12 December – Tuesday 19 December 1648.



As we have seen, the Army wished to bring the eleven members, plus Browne and Copley to justice, because it was believed that they were implicated in the decision to invite the Scots to invade England. Cromwell visited Hammond to secure evidence against these aforesaid members. It was a mission Cromwell must have relished considering his contempt towards the men who had altered their allegiance from Parliament to the Royalists during the Second Civil War. After the siege of Pembroke, Cromwell condemned three Royalists who had earlier “apostatized” from Parliament “judging their inequity double.”<sup>125</sup> As Blair Worden points out Cromwell believed that these men had failed to recognise God’s providence. By changing sides they had been blind to all of God’s marvellous dispensations. Cromwell’s feelings towards anyone who had a hand in the invitation to the Scots is illustrated in a letter he wrote to Robert Jenner:

“This being a more prodigious treason than any that had been perpetuated before; (because the former quarrel on their part was that Englishmen might rule over one another; this to vassalise us to a foreign nation.”<sup>126</sup>

Two other pieces of evidence place Cromwell at the forefront of moves against the Presbyterians. First, just days after the visit to Hamilton, a pamphlet claimed that Cromwell wished to execute Browne and Walker.<sup>127</sup> Also, Ireton, Cromwell and Peters attempted to stifle the Presbyterian clergy’s opposition to the new regime.<sup>128</sup> These visits were designed to secure justice against men, for whom, Cromwell believed had betrayed a glorious cause. Also, as will be argued in the second chapter, the Commons were anxious for a charge to be brought

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<sup>125</sup> Cromwell to Lenthall July 19 1648. Abbott i p.621.

<sup>126</sup> Cromwell to Robert Jenner and John Ashe 20 November 1648 Abbott ii p.691-92. See also B.Worden “Providence and Politics in Cromwellian England” P&P 109 (1985) p.55-99.

<sup>127</sup> The Tyranny of Tyrannies. T.T. E. 476 (34) 19 December 1648.

<sup>128</sup> Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.304.

in against the secluded members. It is possible that Cromwell was attempting to provide some cohesion to the Army's policy towards the imprisoned and secluded members.

It is very likely that Cromwell also visited Hamilton to secure evidence against the King. There has been no concrete evidence suggesting that Cromwell favoured a solution with the monarch. His support for the Army's Remonstrance, and his two statements describing Charles as "that man against whom God hath witnessed", suggest that he favoured bringing Charles to justice. Moreover, Mercurius Elencticus placed Cromwell "at the head of moves against the King".<sup>129</sup> Even Nedham, at this juncture, claimed that Cromwell visited Hammond to secure the "ruin of his majesty".<sup>130</sup>

Professor Gentles argues that the purpose of Cromwell's visits to Windsor "may have included the overseeing of security arrangements."<sup>131</sup> This argument is supported by a letter written by Cromwell and Ireton to the Governor of Windsor Castle. The letter provides instructions concerning the protection of their prisoner. It includes details about where horse guards should be positioned, where the King should be lodged and who should be allowed within the confines of the castle. This letter was probably the result of Cromwell's visits to Windsor and it is likely that Cromwell reported this back to the House of Commons.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Mercurius. Elencticus T.T E. 476 (36) Tuesday 12 December – Tuesday 19 December 1648 p.539.

<sup>130</sup> Merc. Prag E.476 (35) Tuesday 12 December – Tuesday 19 December 1648.

<sup>131</sup> Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.299.

<sup>132</sup> Cromwell to Whitchcott 22 December 1648 Abbott i p.714-15.

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of December Cromwell visited Warwick to “confer about the dangers from the new fleet being prepared by Prince Charles.”<sup>133</sup> The visit should not be regarded as an example of Cromwell’s wish to appease moderates. Warwick’s loyalty to the new regime had already been “amply manifested.”<sup>134</sup> Cromwell’s expertise lay in the military rather than the political field. Parliament had already begun to ‘new model’ the Navy<sup>135</sup>, making it quite natural for Cromwell to discuss naval matters with the Admiral.

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December Cromwell was the only officer to object to the requirement that a soldier must be present during Charles’ conversations.<sup>136</sup> It has been suggested that Cromwell opposed this instruction because it inhibited last minute negotiations with the King.<sup>137</sup> But this view fails to take into account the safeguards which had already been undertaken before Cromwell voiced his objection. On the 22<sup>nd</sup>, Cromwell instructed the Governor of Windsor Castle to “turn out all malignant or Cavalierish inhabitants” and to remove “loose and idle persons.” Also, Whitchcote was instructed to “restrain any numerous or ordinary concourse of unnecessary people ... of whose affection and faithfulness was unknown.”<sup>138</sup> The letter to Whitchcote and another to Harrison are important for three reasons. First, they demonstrate Cromwell’s concern for security arrangements. Second, having made these meticulous plans, Cromwell believed it unnecessary to insist on an officer being present during all the king’s

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<sup>133</sup> Abbott i p.712. Three sources mention this visit. A Perfect Diurnall, Rushworth and Whitelock. All corroborate the story that Cromwell made these visits to discuss the Navy, not to discuss a possible compromise.

<sup>134</sup> See above notes 101 and 102.

<sup>135</sup> B.S Capp Cromwell’s Navy: the Fleet and the English Revolution. 1648-1660 (Oxford 1989), p.42-45.

<sup>136</sup> Abbott i p.713-15.

<sup>137</sup> Ian Gentles The New Model Army p.299.

<sup>138</sup> Cromwell to Whitchcote 22 December 1648, Abbott p.714-15.

conversations. Third, as he saw during the Second Civil War, Cromwell was more concerned with military rather than political considerations.

From Whitelock's account, it is clear that Cromwell was present during the discussions concerning the future constitution. But as mentioned previously, Cromwell was attempting to keep moderates in Parliament but his name is not linked with calls for the preservation of monarchy. It is likely that the moderates who advocated the retention of Charles as Head of State, or the candidature of the Duke of Gloucester, were the same MPs who survived the purges but refused to be associated with the regicide. Whitelock's account that was used by Professor Underdown to show that Cromwell was attempting to undo the purge, does not prove that he was involved in the negotiations to spare the King's life. Moreover, there is nothing in Whitelock's account to prove that Cromwell was not one of the men that favoured "no King at all."<sup>139</sup>

Cromwell played a relatively minor role in December 1648. His name hardly appears in the Journals of the House of Commons and he played little part in the Whitehall debates. He evidently preferred to speak to Warwick about naval matters, make arrangements for the royal prisoner and interview Hammond. This thesis accepts that Cromwell attempted to keep moderates in Parliament but he was not willing to actively and enthusiastically endorse the perpetuation of Charles's rule. He was pursuing a policy of "realpolitique" attempting to provide moderates with an apparent voice in the framing of the future constitution without conceding upon the important issue of Charles's culpability for the blood that was shed in the Second Civil War.

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<sup>139</sup> Whitelock, Memorials ii, p.480.



Cromwell's actions once the trial began are well known and they do not require too much additional comment. He certainly played a leading role attending twenty-one of the twenty-three sessions in the Painted Chamber. His name also appears third on the death warrant.<sup>140</sup> He had played little part in the parliamentary committees that determined the form of the trial, allowing others to perform the meticulous preparations. Despite the number of times Cromwell's name appears in Phelp's account, the view that the future Lord Protector almost single-handedly drove the trial forward is no longer accepted. A. W. McIntosh complained that many historians had accepted the accounts left by a number of regicides as though "they were calm, spontaneous and detached submissions of unbiased evidence."<sup>141</sup> Barry Coward has argued that Cromwell was one leader amongst many. Peter Gaunt has pointed out that we should not swallow all the colourful stories made by some of the regicides when they were on trial for their lives. These views are, I believe, correct. It is simply not tenable that Cromwell bullied, joked and humiliated MPs into signing the document.<sup>142</sup> In addition to the arguments outlined by Drs McIntosh, Gaunt and Coward a few more points can be added. First, not one contemporary account available during the trial substantiates the view that outright coercion was used. Second the accounts left by some of the regicides is most conflicting. Downes claimed that Cromwell's mood was one of acute seriousness and resolution refusing to countenance any view that did not correspond with his own. In contrast the testimony of Thomas Waite portrayed Cromwell as the callous and flippant tyrant laughing, smiling and jeering in the days before the execution.<sup>143</sup> Waite's testimony does not fit easily with the view propounded by some historians that accept the accounts of the regicides whilst suggesting that Cromwell had agonised over the decision to execute the King explaining this final decision

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<sup>140</sup> Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (Oxford 1996) p.64-5.

<sup>141</sup> A.W McIntosh, "The Number of English Regicides" History vol 67 (1982), p.195-216.

<sup>142</sup> Gaunt and McIntosh cited above. Barry Coward, Oliver Cromwell (Harlow, 1991) p.64-5.

<sup>143</sup> Wedgwood, Trial of Charles I p.216-224.

upon the grounds of Godly providentialism. This thesis accepts the important part played by providence in Cromwell's mind, but it was always a serious business that had no room for frivolity. It is clear from his future comments vindicating the regicide that he always took the business seriously. It must also be remembered that many of the regicides refused to blame Cromwell for their part in the regicide.<sup>144</sup> Finally, we must not forget the atmosphere in which the regicide trials took place. On the one hand, there was the prospect of clemency shown to William Heveningham and Colonel Hutchinson that may have prompted regicides to use excuses with the hope that they could receive pardon. Linked to this was the prospect of death conducted, in the words of Professor Hutton, in an atmosphere of "bear baiting."<sup>145</sup> In such circumstances, the arch enemy of the Royalist cause, with the added advantage of his being unable to speak for himself, seemed a convincing alibi.

Contemporaries writing at the time of the regicide placed more than one person at the head of the moves against the King. Cromwell was amongst them but other names including Sir Peter Wentworth, Sir James Harrington, Sir Henry Mildmay, John Ven, Edmund Harvey, Francis Allen, John Blackiston, Sir Gilbert Pickering, Henry Marten and Thomas Scott were identified as leading radicals.<sup>146</sup> The Journals of the House of Commons and the Journals of the High Court of Justice show that Miles Corbet, Nicolas Love and Henry Smith played an important role in politics from the first day of the purge. John Gurdon, Thomas Boun and Thomas Widdrington attended Parliament at the time John Downes and Richard Ingoldsby swore that Cromwell was forcing everyone to sign the warrant. The testimony left by

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<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Ronald Hutton, The Restoration A Political and Religious History of England and Wales 1658-1667. (Oxford 1986) p.132-4.

<sup>146</sup> C.J vi, p.93-126. See also chapter 2 below which analyses the role performed by a number of MPs in the High Court of Justice.

Bulstrode Whitelöcke is also very revealing. His memoirs written at the time of the Restoration, went to great lengths to show his reluctance to support revolutionary change. He too was in the vicinity of Parliament at the time of the alleged onslaught for names. He also went to great lengths in 1660 to prevent punishment which even included parting with money to secure his freedom. It is noteworthy that he makes no mention of Cromwell prompting him to sign.<sup>147</sup> It is possible, even likely, that Cromwell encouraged people to sign the warrant considering that such a high proportion of the nominated commissioners had refused to serve on the court. But the idea that he terrorised men, or in the case of Richard Ingoldsby forced his hand to sign, should be discounted as the testimony of frightened men.

This thesis has challenged the notion that Cromwell almost single-handedly drove the revolution forward after his belated conversion to the principle of regicide. This next section will challenge the view advanced by Dr Worden that claims that Cromwell was the “architect of the Rump regime” whose “complex political temperament, and in particular his desire for constitutional propriety” pushed the Rump in a conservative direction after the regicide. Dr Worden suggests that Cromwell’s conservative strain ensured that the Rump was full of unrevolutionary members. He also argues that the Godly zeal - the other strain running through Cromwell was never totally extinguished. After 1651 the regime that Cromwell had created refused to reform, resulting in acrimony that soured relations between the creator and his conservative colleagues.<sup>148</sup> It is a testimony to the dominance of Dr Worden’s work upon the early Rump period that his views upon Cromwell have never been the subject of debate. Austin Woolrych, Ian Gentles and Sean Kelsey have questioned part of his argument in the

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<sup>147</sup> Whitelock’s role will be discussed in chapter 2. See Hutton, The Restoration cited above n. 145, p.133-4.

<sup>148</sup> This is the one of the central themes of Blair Worden’s work on The Rump Parliament; See in particular, p.19 and 163-93.



months leading up to the dissolution but little is mentioned on Cromwell's role in the first few months of 1649. Moreover, Dr Kelsey's desire to allow the Rump to speak for itself did not lend itself to a debate upon the politics of 1648/9.<sup>149</sup>

There is a great deal to be said for Dr Worden's view that Cromwell was a moderating influence during the first few months of the revolution. He did support the retention of the House of Lords, he appears to have favoured the return of some of the secluded members and he may have been willing to see the confirmation of the Presbyterian church. He also supported a mild oath as a prerequisite for sitting on the Council of State and he was very hostile to the Levellers. This was more moderate than some of the policies favoured by men such as Henry Marten, but Cromwell's initiatives here do not demonstrate a dualist personality. They merely reflected a prudent approach to politics. Moreover, it is difficult to regard Cromwell as the architect of the regime since a number of the policies he promoted met with failure and he was still a rather nominal figure in the House of Commons.

His decision to support the House of Lords was not an indication of his conservatism. Although the Lords rejected the decision to try the King, a number of the peers had shown a desire to remain in politics making it plain that they wanted to play a role in the future constitution. The reasons for his desire to retain the Lords were neatly summarised in one of his utterances:

"they were mad to take these courses to incense the peers in the whole kingdom against them at such a time when they need to study a near union with them."<sup>150</sup>

These are the words of a prudent politician rather a man wishing to defend a conservative order. Three other factors require stipulation. First, when Cromwell made these utterances the

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<sup>149</sup> Kelsey, Inventing a Republic (Manchester 1997) passim.

<sup>150</sup> The attendance of the members of the peerage is discussed in chapter 3. This quote is taken from J.S.A Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics' (PhD thesis, Cambridge 1986), p.277.



issue of the Peers role in the constitution was not concerned with parity. The final debate was whether the Lords should retain an advisory role within the constitution and therefore his decision to support the peers was about symbolism rather than political power.<sup>151</sup> Second, his initiative failed which is hardly a suggestion that he was controlling the character and nature of the Parliament. Finally, there is no evidence that Cromwell was the leading force behind the desire to retain the Lords. Ludlow remembered Cromwell's part in the debate but Ludlow's memory of Cromwell's significance owes a great deal to the events after 1653. In the Commons Cromwell was not one of the tellers in the motion - that role was performed William Sydenham and William Purefoy.<sup>152</sup>

The second role that points to Cromwell's conservatism was his support for an oath to join the Council of State which only required members to adhere to "this present Parliament in the maintenance and defence of the public liberty and freedom of this nation, as it is now declared by this Parliament." Blair Worden has described the political background to this decision and for the purposes of this chapter I will briefly provide a summary of his account.

Ireton and Harrison were not voted on to the Council of State. Ireton responded by demanding that all the members of the Council swear an oath approving the judicial proceedings of the regicide court. As is well known 22 of the elected members refused to subscribe. Cromwell secured a watered down oath by obtaining the support of some of the members who had recently returned to the House. However, his original proposal for an oath was replaced with the words that councillors would agree to "the settling of the government of this nation for future in the way of a republic without King or House of Peers." Again Cromwell failed to

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<sup>151</sup> See C.J vi, p.132. The background to the dissolution of the Lords is one of the central themes of chapter 3.

<sup>152</sup> C.J vi, p.132.

secure an outright victory, but more importantly than this, his willingness to advocate a less rigid oath was not too much of a compromise.<sup>153</sup>

The peers nominated had shown an inclination to support the regime and their role will be discussed later in the thesis. The judges were needed to provide legitimacy to the new regime. Of the thirty four MPs nominated to sit on the Council, twenty two of them had demonstrated their support for the regime by either taking the early test of dissent and/or signing the regicide document. A great deal has been made of the fact that so many MPs refused to endorse the events that brought the Commonwealth into existence. In Cromwell's original oath he still required the acceptance of de facto parliamentary rule. Moreover, the men who refused to accept a retrospective oath did have a radical pedigree. Gilbert Pickering, Bulstrode Whitelock and Rowland Wilson had been prominent between the purge and regicide. Of the MPs nominated, only Sir William Armyn, Alexander Popham, Sir Henry Heselrige and Sir William Masham had played no part in the period between 6<sup>th</sup> December 1648 and 30<sup>th</sup> January 1649. Sir Henry Vane was a well known radical who was more likely to support the perpetuation of the Commonwealth once it came into existence, than the majority of other so called revolutionary MPs. It appears that he attended Parliament on the 20<sup>th</sup> January and his reasons for objecting to the purge have remained a mystery, but his career, both before and after the regicide demonstrated his commitment to radical politics.<sup>154</sup> Sir Arthur Heselrige had been away from London dealing with Royalists and although he did not support the purge he would not have countenanced the return of a Stuart monarch. That effectively leaves only

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<sup>153</sup> Worden, The Rump, p.178-81.

<sup>154</sup> C.J vi, p.93-126 for the names of MPs who sat after the purge. For Sir Harry Vane's attendance on the 20<sup>th</sup> see, Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.196-7, and sources listed in n.62, which suggest that Vane attended on that date. See chapter 2 below for a discussion upon the activities of the members who survived the purge but avoided signing the regicide document.

Wallop, Popham and Sir William Masham as members whose attitude was potentially dubious.<sup>155</sup>

This mirrors Cromwell's attitude in December 1648. He had a set of fixed principles but he was willing to accommodate more moderate opinion provided it did not undermine the revolution. This was once again prudent politics. In terms of public relations the regicide had not gone well. A small proportion of the nominated commissioners sat in the High Court; Charles produced a superb defence which must have confounded even his most staunch supporter. The Government was faced with chronic problems as their existence was threatened by external danger. For Cromwell, who never concerned himself with political faction a debate over retrospective support for regicide was unimportant. The new regime needed as many supporters as possible and it was not a time to become embroiled in a debate that essentially looked backwards. Finally, this was not a policy manufactured by Cromwell alone. It had the support of a broad cross section of MPs, who appreciated that reform had to be delayed until the dangers both within Westminster and outside, had been dealt with. This is perhaps best illustrated by the actions of Ireton. His opposition to allowing MPs to sit on the Council, who would not endorse the regicide, was the last time that he differed with the mainstream majority.

The return of the members who had played no part in the events leading up to the regicide almost certainly had Cromwell's support. This will be discussed in the next chapter, but for the purposes of this account it must be stressed that a number of the MPs who returned in February had demonstrated some support for the purge. John Gurdon had actually endorsed

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<sup>155</sup> Sir Arthur Heselrige was in Newcastle. See A Perfect Diurnall of some Passages in Parliament, E. 527 (19), Monday 5<sup>th</sup> February – Monday 12<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.2323.

the purge by introducing the test of dissent. He did not sign the regicide document, but returned in February. All of these returning MPs still had to demonstrate their hostility to negotiating with Charles, by taking their retrospective dissent to the Newport accord. Moreover, some of the people who Cromwell attempted to persuade to resume their membership had “resolved not to fall out with the Army”, basing their objections to the projected settlement debated at Whitehall, rather than the purge and even the regicide.<sup>156</sup> Finally, it will be argued that the Army was not concerned about the precise membership of the Commons apart from providing a more tractable Parliament. It was implied in January 1649 that the secluded members were only going to face suspension. This was mooted at the time when Cromwell was in his “revolutionary mode” so his influence cannot be detected.<sup>157</sup> Again this initiative was not original and it did not compromise the revolution.

The same is true of his apparent offer to confirm the Presbyterian church. The proposal, which was only mooted in one source, would still have allowed for a degree of liberty of conscience. It was reported that tithes would be retained until a viable alternative had been found.<sup>158</sup> Far from being a conservative initiative by Cromwell this is consistent with parliamentary politics from the start of the Long Parliament in 1640. The issue of the future of the church had essentially been fudged from the outset. It did cause the most division and MPs from Pym onwards had attempted a series of holding operations to appease as many factions as possible. By confirming tithes but affording the opportunity for a degree of liberty of conscience and suggesting that the system would be replaced in the future was an attempt

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<sup>156</sup> William Ashurst, The Reasons Against Agreement, T.T.E.536 (4), 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>157</sup> The Humble Answer of the General Council, T.T.E. 537 (14), 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1649, p.2. See also chapter 2 below.

<sup>158</sup> Clement Walker, A Complete History of Independency, 4 vols (1661), Part ii, p.57. Worden, The Rump, p.191. A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, Saturday 31<sup>st</sup> April - Saturday 7<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.4.



to appease radical sentiment.<sup>159</sup> With this achieved Cromwell could channel his efforts to the real issue of the day - the expedition to Ireland. Finally, as Professor Davis has shown, the issue of the form of the church government was never particularly important to Cromwell, provided that the majority could worship freely. In such dangerous circumstances a confirmation of the Presbyterian church was not important.<sup>160</sup>

His attitude towards the Levellers was determined by an aversion to their doctrine and more importantly a belief that their activities would prevent the expedition to Ireland. This was consistent and does not require too much comment. The activities of Lilburne had a profound effect upon the discontent in the Army and it was widely reported that this could destroy the plans for Ireland. The Council of State had spent most of their time building up the Navy, which they had assumed direct responsibility for, along with ensuring that the Army were strong enough to counter the Royalist threat.<sup>161</sup> The reaction that greeted the crushing of the Levellers at Burford shows that Cromwell's actions had broad support from the vast majority of the MPs. Most importantly, on the 12<sup>th</sup> April Cromwell, Whitelock and Lisle attended a meeting with the Common Council. The aim was to secure a loan for the forthcoming trip to Ireland. It is clear from the assurances given by Cromwell that the Council expressed a concern about the divisions in the Army. Cromwell responded with the following guarantees. First, all of the money would go towards the expedition. He reminded the Council that this was a conflict to be fought by Protestants, against "popery and prelacy", and that this cause should override all other considerations. Second, he assured them that the Army would go to

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<sup>159</sup> The Perfect Weekly Account, T.T.E. 550 (17), Wednesday 4<sup>th</sup> April – Wednesday 11<sup>th</sup> April, p.440.

<sup>160</sup> J.C Davis, "Cromwell's Religion," in John Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution, p.181.

<sup>161</sup> CSPD, 1649-50 eg: p.13, 16, 18.

Ireland if they could have assurances about their pay. Finally, and related to the last point, he said that there were no major divisions in the Army. As Cromwell was spending most of his time working on the preparations for Ireland it was only logical that he would crush the mutiny.<sup>162</sup>

What, therefore, were the main considerations at the forefront of Cromwell's mind after the regicide? The first and most important factor was the preservation of the new regime. As mentioned above, this aim was at the forefront of his mind when it came dealing with the Levellers. It also took up most of his time in the Council. He was involved in the survey of English forces to determine how many were needed for Ireland and what proportion should stay at home for the purposes of civil defence. He was also involved in the plans for the reorganisation of the fleet. As Ian Gentles pointed out Cromwell spent a vast amount of time ensuring that the Army was properly equipped.<sup>163</sup> As mentioned above Cromwell had acted as the spokesperson for his soldiers in the north. When he was in London after the revolution he did everything he could to ensure that his army for Ireland would be well-equipped. His earlier utterances from Pontefract had not been hollow words and the efficiency of these preparations for Ireland are a testimony to his (and others) determination and efficiency. Above all else Cromwell remained a military man. In politics his initiatives did not meet with success but when it came to military matters he appears to have been omnipotent. This is a reflection of where his abilities lay and also of his own order of priorities.

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<sup>162</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer E.551 (1), Thursday 12<sup>th</sup> April – Thursday 18<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.1989. CSPD, 1649-50, p.9-10, 19, 22, 33, 77.

<sup>163</sup> CSPD, 1649-50 eg: p.9-10, 19, 22, 25-6, 33, 37, 40, 62-3, 77, 97. Ian Gentles, The New Model Army, p.353-356.

## Conclusions.

This chapter has highlighted three important aspects of Cromwell's personality. First, his attitude towards the campaigns in the Second Civil War reveal a man who was primarily concerned with military rather than political considerations, a sentiment that he would continue to display after the regicide. Second, this thesis suggests that Cromwell was a man unwilling to initiate political programmes. Finally, by suggesting that Cromwell supported regicide prior to the purging of Parliament and remained a staunch supporter of the new regime, the chapter portrays Cromwell as a conviction politician.<sup>164</sup> It is worth considering how these findings correspond with the most recent studies of Cromwell during the 1640's.<sup>165</sup> There is, I believe, a growing consensus upon his role in politics in the years leading up to the regicide.

There is widespread agreement that Cromwell was one of the MPs who, in John Morrill's words, "grasped the nettles" and took the initiative when it became clear that the nation was on the brink of Civil War.<sup>166</sup> Historians also accept that from 1642 until 1646, Cromwell's life was dominated by war.<sup>167</sup> During these years, apart from favouring a religious settlement

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<sup>164</sup> See above for Cromwell's concern for military matters showing his preference to follow rather than initiate events see. I believe that this account portrays Cromwell's as more of a conviction politician than any of its predecessors.

<sup>165</sup> Most of what follows has been based upon: Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell. Barry Coward, Oliver Cromwell. The essays in John Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution. Ian Gentles, The New Model Army.

<sup>166</sup> John Morrill "The making of Oliver Cromwell" in Morrill (ed) Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution p.48; Austin Woolrych, 'Cromwell the Solider' in Morrill (ed) p.94-95; Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.41; Barry Coward, Oliver Cromwell p.219-22.

<sup>167</sup> Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.43. Morrill "Introduction" in Morrill (ed) p.5. J.S.A. Adamson, 'Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament' in Morrill (ed) p.55.



which would have provided a limited form of religious toleration<sup>168</sup>, Cromwell does not appear to have considered the constitutional restraints which would have had to be imposed upon the King. Instead he concentrated upon winning the war, allowing others in Parliament to discuss a future settlement. The two most recent studies of Cromwell have shown his pre-occupation with a desire to administer the defeat of the Royalists.<sup>169</sup> Cromwell's appetite for victory accounts for his choice of soldiers of ability, irrespective of their social status.<sup>170</sup> Historians also agree that his heated argument with Manchester and his role in the self-denying ordinance reflected his determination to produce a more efficient army.<sup>171</sup>

As mentioned above, throughout the 1640's, Cromwell spent the majority of his time with the Army, and although he was involved in discussions at Putney,<sup>172</sup> most of his career in the 1640's was spent fighting. Therefore, his decision to remain in the north in November 1648, his discussions with Warwick in December 1648, and his involvement in the security arrangements for the King, are consistent with a man whose career had been dominated by military concerns.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> For the limits of Cromwell's perception of religious toleration see Blair Worden, 'Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate' in W.J Sheils, Persecution and Toleration: studies in Church History, (Oxford 1984) p.199-233; See J.C Davis, 'Cromwell's Religion' in Morrill ed p.181-208; J.P.Sommerville, 'Oliver Cromwell and English Political Thought' in Morrill (ed) p.254-55. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.54-5.

<sup>169</sup> Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.43-66. Barry Coward, Oliver Cromwell p.24-42. For his attitude to the Second Civil War see above. I believe that my interpretation complements Cromwell's involvement in political and military affairs before the regicide

<sup>170</sup> For a sensible discussion of Cromwell's remarks upon the social origins of his soldiers see Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.49-50. Coward, Oliver Cromwell p.28.

<sup>171</sup> Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p.27. J.S.A. Adamson, 'Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament' in Morrill (ed) p.63. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.60-61, p.56.

<sup>172</sup> See below. For discussions on Cromwell's role in the Putney Debates see, Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p.202-19. For a first-class account of Cromwell's failure to control proceedings when he chaired meetings see Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.82-88.

<sup>173</sup> See above.



Although the bulk of Cromwell's time was spent fighting the Royalists, his exemption from the self-denying ordinance and his role as Lieutenant General in the New Model Army made him, potentially at least, one of the most important men in Parliament. It has been argued above that Cromwell was unwilling to take a lead in constitutional matters. We will now consider whether or not this view is consistent with his position in the 1640s.

Peter Gaunt argues that there can be no doubt that Cromwell played a significant role in the opening of the Long Parliament.<sup>174</sup> He supported Lilbourne's petition asking for a review of his sentence for printing puritan pamphlets. He sat on various committees concerned with religious matters. Also, Cromwell attended the important committees which put the kingdom in a posture of defence. However, whilst acknowledging that Cromwell was a vocal member of Parliament in 1641-42, certain important factors require comment. First, John Morrill suggests that Cromwell was working for other more senior MPs.<sup>175</sup> Second, and most importantly, Cromwell was silent upon the most significant constitutional issues. He did not feature in the debates concerning the trial of Strafford, the Grand Remonstrance, the Militia Ordinance and the Nineteen Propositions.<sup>176</sup> Although Cromwell revealed his concern for religious and military issues, before the war commenced, it does not appear that Cromwell considered any practical solution which could have averted the crisis.

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<sup>174</sup> Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.39.

<sup>175</sup> John Morrill, 'The Making of Oliver Cromwell' in Morrill ed p.45-47; J.S.A. Adamson, 'Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament' in Morrill (ed) p.51-2, sees Cromwell acting in isolation. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell highlights the difficulty with the source material but believes Morrill's account to be the more likely, p.40-1. Morrill's view appears, in light of this argument (Cromwell not an original political thinker), to be the more probable.

<sup>176</sup> John Morrill "The Making of Oliver Cromwell" in Morrill (ed) p.47. Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.40.

In the summer of 1646, Cromwell returned to Parliament. The evidence concerning his activities is scarce but his letters in the summer of 1646, and in the early part of 1647, reveal a man distressed about the plight of his soldiers, a sentiment precipitated by Parliaments' desire to press ahead with disbandment.<sup>177</sup> It is clear that during 1646 and 1647 Cromwell genuinely attempted to heal the breach between Parliament and the Army.<sup>178</sup> Although his precise role remains unclear, Cromwell evidently failed in his task illustrated by the refusal of either Parliament or the Army to compromise. It is also evident that Cromwell made no concrete proposals to breach the gap which had developed. When the Presbyterian ascendancy in Parliament ended, Cromwell threw his weight behind the 'Heads of Proposals.' Although there has been a fierce debate over who participated in the framing of these proposals, historians accept that Cromwell played little part.<sup>179</sup> Moreover, at the Reading Debates in July 1647, Cromwell was not even familiar with the contents of the document.<sup>180</sup> This did not prevent him from vigorously advocating the proposals and this is another example of his tendency to follow, rather than initiate events.

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<sup>177</sup> Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.70. See Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p.140-189.

<sup>178</sup> Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell, p.73-7. Gaunt rightly dismisses the accusations that Cromwell welcomed the growing militancy of the Army.

<sup>179</sup> John Adamson, 'The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647' HJ 30 (1987) p.567-602. Adamson puts forward the case for Saye's involvement. This was attacked by Mark Kishlansky in 'Saye What' HJ 33 (1990) p.917-937. Adamson slightly modified his account by acknowledging Ireton's involvement in HJ 34 (1991) p.231-255. Another broadside by Kishlansky was produced in 'Saye No More' JBS 30 (1991). Although Kishlansky "challenges" Adamson's contention that Cromwell was closely associated with the Lords, neither historian suggests that Cromwell was involved in the drafting of proposals. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.82 believes Ireton drafted the proposal. The same view is expressed by Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p.181 although he does acknowledge the role of the peers, p.182. The same line is taken by Austin Woolrych "Cromwell the Soldier" in Morrill ed p.107. All these accounts make no mention of Cromwell's involvement in the framing of the proposals.

<sup>180</sup> Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell p.82.

This chapter has claimed that from the start of the Second Civil War Cromwell was a man of conviction, determined to bring the King to justice. This view coincides with modern interpretations which accept the predominant role of providence in Oliver Cromwell's political philosophy.<sup>181</sup> John Morrill argues that, by waging another war, the Army believed that Charles had so offended God that he had to be destroyed.<sup>182</sup> Cromwell belonged to this school, hence his apocalyptic utterances describing Charles as "that man against whom God hath witnessed."<sup>183</sup> The view that Cromwell was convinced that the King must die due to his role in precipitating the Second Civil War has been supported by Barry Coward. Dr Coward rightly points out, that for the first time in Cromwell's career, he came to a realisation that a future settlement would not include Charles I. The foundation of Cromwell's belief rested with Charles' failure to accept the judgement of God, which had been expressed in the New Model's victory in the First Civil War.<sup>184</sup>

In addition to Cromwell's unwavering belief in providence, he also recognised the futility of negotiating with Charles. Upon the eve of the Second Civil War, Cromwell acknowledged that he should never have attempted to negotiate with the King.<sup>185</sup> Cromwell's distrust of Charles makes it highly unlikely that he would have countenanced a solution which resulted

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<sup>181</sup> The best example remains, Blair Worden, "Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate" cited above. Also essays by Davis, Fletcher and Morrill in, Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution, all show the centrality of providence in Cromwell's character. Also, republican writers such as Sarah Barber, accept the centrality of Cromwell's religion, Sarah Barber, Regicide and Republicanism (Edinburgh, 1998), p.121-146.

<sup>182</sup> John Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution p.21.

<sup>183</sup> Cromwell to Hammond 25<sup>th</sup> November 1648, Abbott, i p.696-699; Carlyle, i p.393-400.

<sup>184</sup> Barry Coward, "Oliver Cromwell and the Regicide" The Historian (December 1996.)

<sup>185</sup> Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p.235.



in Charles' abdication.<sup>186</sup> For an historian writing in the twenty first century, it is clear that Charles' temperament and principles would have ensured that he, and his supporters would not have accepted an enforced abdication.<sup>187</sup> We can be almost certain that, after two bloody Civil Wars and a number of failed peace initiatives this fact would not have been lost on Cromwell.

The evidence presented in this chapter challenges Professor Underdown's view that from November 1648 until January 1649, Cromwell was "torn between the two conflicting principles of puritan idealism and constitutional propriety."<sup>188</sup> In its place a different picture of Cromwell emerges which is at one with recent studies. We find a less complex but a more committed character. His behaviour during December 1648 and January 1649 was at one with his political stance during the 1640's. In November 1648 he found "a very great sense" in the petitions written by his regiments but, as noted, he had not participated in the framing of the documents. In December 1648 he played little part in the parliamentary committees which made provisions for the trial of the King; as with the November petitions, when preparations had been made he provided his unequivocal support.<sup>189</sup> From this information we should not view Cromwell as the calculating politician waiting to see how events materialised before seizing "control of the process"<sup>190</sup>. Instead during this revolutionary period we find not a conviction politician but a man unwilling to initiate events. This mirrors his attitude to

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<sup>186</sup> My view differs from Gentles case, The New Model Army p.299. Cromwell encouraged Hammond to stand against the King; and he used Hamilton's knowledge of Charles as a justification for the proceedings. Cromwell to Hamilton 25<sup>th</sup> November 1648, Abbott p.696-9; above n.183.

<sup>187</sup> For Charles' fixed principles see, BM Harl Mss 6988 f. 208.

<sup>188</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.150.

<sup>189</sup> See above.

<sup>190</sup> R. Hutton, The British Republic (1990) p.59.



politics throughout the 1640's; he was willing to speak his mind but not prepared to draft proposals. In short this chapter confirms the view Cromwell was neither a "Westminster man" preoccupied with parliamentary committees or an intellectual in politics.<sup>191</sup> His defence of monarchy during the highly charged Putney Debates perhaps shows that Cromwell found it difficult to look beyond the existing constitution. However, by the Autumn of 1648, Cromwell had decided that the King must die. As he wrote in a letter to Fairfax, the demands for impartial justice were "things God puts in our heart".<sup>192</sup> After the regicide he was concerned with the defence of the new regime but he was not concerned with the form that the Government should take and who made up the membership of the new regime, provided that they were willing to endorse the events of 1648/9.

For Cromwell, the precise form of the new Government was of peripheral importance because God had determined that the King must die. He was certainly not a republican. It is likely that he would have had sympathy with a pamphlet published in February 1649. This did call for reform but in a very ill defined fashion. It also stated that "names or titles are but tokens of things"<sup>193</sup> If Cromwell did not care about the precise form the Church Government should take, he certainly was not interested in defining a new system of republicanism. His politics during the revolutionary period were determined by short term considerations. It took Cromwell until the eve of the Second Civil War to believe that God had condemned Charles. It did not require any sole searching to appreciate that God demanded action against the 'Jesuits' in Ireland and it was this that dominated his politics in the early years of Commonwealth rule - it was also a view shared by many of his colleagues in Parliament.

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<sup>191</sup> John Morrill's introduction in Morrill (ed) Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution p.8.

<sup>192</sup> Cromwell to Fairfax 20<sup>th</sup> November 1648, Abbott i p.690-1. Carlyle, i p.390-1.

<sup>193</sup> The Parliament Justified, T.T.E. 545 (14), 27<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.1 and 8.

## The House of Commons

The last chapter argued that Oliver Cromwell should not be regarded as the architect of the new regime. It was also suggested that he demonstrated a remarkably detached stance upon the precise form the new government should take. The position he assumed rested upon the mutually inclusive desire to defeat the Royalists and maintain the unity of the Army. This chapter will attempt to decide upon the levels of commitment to the new regime amongst the MPs who decided to play a role in revolutionary politics. It will also, where sources allow,<sup>1</sup> endeavour to determine the motivating forces that governed the minds of these MPs. The chapter will also explore the relationship between the MPs and the Army in an attempt to determine the origins of this conflict which came to dominate politics from 1651 to 1653. The chapter will also consider the role of the Levellers<sup>2</sup> outside of Parliament assessing how this group influenced politics. The chapter will argue that events outside of Westminster had more

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<sup>1</sup> For the problem with sources in this period see Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament (Cambridge 1974) p.398-404; Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic (Manchester 1997) p.11-19. This particular period is notorious for the dearth of sources. It is not, however, only the Interregnum that has suffered from this difficulty. The whole issue of allegiance in the Civil War has resulted in a protracted debate that is essentially due to the limitations of evidence. See Ronald Hutton, The Rise and Fall of Merry England (Oxford 1994) p.204.

<sup>2</sup> I have deliberately separated the Army from the Levellers suggesting that the grievances of the Army were based primarily upon material concerns rather than a commitment to wholesale political reform. See Ronald Hutton, The British Republic (1990, 1999) p.15-49, especially p.15, where he states that "the principle source of discontent was arrears of pay." See also, Ian Gentles, The New Model Army (Oxford 1992) p.315.

of an effect upon the early months of the Rump<sup>3</sup> than any of the other accounts of this period have suggested.<sup>4</sup>

This chapter will, to an extent, support two very distinct schools of historiography. David Underdown and Blair Worden pointed out that membership of the Rump was not always synonymous with support for the events that brought it into existence. Although peripheral differences emerged in the two accounts, most notably their definition of a revolutionary, both historians pointed to the moderation and conformity of the majority of the members.<sup>5</sup> These two historians continue to dominate the historiography of this period. Derek Hirst's recent and thoroughly revised interpretation of the period still supports the arguments outlined in the works of Underdown and Worden. This chapter will support many of their findings, especially Professor Worden's view that many of the so-called revolutionaries supported the regicide because they objected to the person of the King rather than the institution of monarchy.<sup>6</sup> However, differences will emerge, most notably upon the issue of commitment to both regicide and to the post revolutionary parliament. This thesis will argue that both the revolutionary and conformist MPs demonstrated a greater willingness to actively support the

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<sup>3</sup> I have reluctantly retained the use of the unflattering term of 'rump', for the MPs that sat in Parliament. This follows Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p.25. For an alternative term see Ronald Hutton, The British Republic p.136. I have decided to retain the term for two reasons. First, it is the word used by the majority of historians and it seems unnecessary to alter it. Second, however unflattering the term may be, it is a more pleasant word than the ones used by contemporaries. See Clement Walker, A Complete History of Independency (4 vols 1661) Part ii, p.46-150.

<sup>4</sup> This will develop upon themes identified by Blair Worden. Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p.163-9; Hutton The British Republic p.15-16.

<sup>5</sup> David Underdown, Pride's Purge (Oxford 1971) p.4-5, p.281-3; Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p.41-73. Worden points out that the term revolutionary should not apply to all the early dissenters and the regicides.

<sup>6</sup> Derek Hirst, England in Conflict, 1603-1660 (Oxford 1999), p.255-282, also in his bibliography p.342. Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p.50.



execution or, in the case of the conformists, positively acquiesced with the new form of Government.<sup>7</sup>

The latter part of the 1990s saw an increased amount of interest in the intellectual origins of republicanism.<sup>8</sup> Both Sarah Barber and Sean Kelsey produced detailed accounts of the politics that governed the form the new republic would take, Both historians have attempted to demonstrate that there was more of a deep rooted attachment to the principle of republicanism than the work of Dr Worden, and to a lesser extent Professor Underdown allowed.<sup>9</sup> Dr Barber revealed that a small clique of MPs favoured a republican solution that dates back to 1646.<sup>10</sup> Dr Kelsey did not concern himself with factional politics, but he described how the Commonwealth created a republican image for itself.<sup>11</sup> This chapter will accept that there was more enthusiasm in some quarters for a republican regime but it will be stressed that this opinion was only shared by a few. Moreover, this chapter will argue that the impetus for reform was destroyed both by the conservatism of the members and also by the activities of the Levellers outside Parliament. It will be argued that Lilburne's largely unjustified attacks

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<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the terms 'revolutionary' and 'conformist', see Worden cited in n.5 above. This in many respects is closer to Sean Kelsey's view that there was more of an attachment to the Commonwealth than Blair Worden's account allowed. However, it will become clear that I do not regard the MPs as doctrinaire republicans.

<sup>8</sup> Sarah Barber, Regicide and Republicanism (Edinburgh 1998); Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic. David Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in the English Revolution (1984); David Norbrook Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics 1627-1660 (Cambridge 1999). From a slightly different perspective see Jonathon Scott, England's Troubles (Cambridge 2000).

<sup>9</sup> Sarah Barber appears to support David Underdown's categorisations. See Regicide and Republicanism n.9 p.140.

<sup>10</sup> Sarah Barber cited above passim.

<sup>11</sup> Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic. This is the major theme of his book but he also includes a fresh interpretation of the events that culminated in the dissolution p.200-227.



against the new regime pushed even the most committed republican to a conservative stance.

But to start, I will focus upon the first phase of the revolution- Pride's purge.

## The Purging of Parliament

David Underdown began his study of the background to, and consequences of the English Revolution with these words:

“Pride's Purge is one of those venerable historical incidents known, as the old phrase has it, to every schoolboy.”

He then wrote a book to illustrate that the background to this conflict was extremely complex and he demonstrated that the simple portrayal of a Colonel letting in radicals and secluding moderates does not survive under detailed scrutiny.<sup>12</sup> But the day itself has not lost its aura. Christopher Hill remarked that Colonel Pride, “the son of a drayman or a brewers employee” purged the gentry from the House of Commons.<sup>13</sup> Pride's Purge remains a great symbol of the revolution that brought condemnation upon the Colonel from contemporaries<sup>14</sup> and the image of Pride standing before the leading politicians allows schoolboys to remember the story and affords the opportunity for Marxists to celebrate. It also retains its significance for the history of the revolution. It was the first stage of a process of events that culminated in the execution of the King and ultimately the establishment of a Commonwealth without a monarch as the titular Head of State. But the significance of the day itself requires one serious qualification: Pride's purge, upon the 6<sup>th</sup> December 1648, was a failure for the revolutionary minority that devised the plan.

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<sup>12</sup> David Underdown, Pride's Purge p.1.

<sup>13</sup> Christopher Hill, God's Englishman (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1970) p.102.

<sup>14</sup> See chapter 5 below for the attitude of the royalist press towards the Colonel.

On Monday 11<sup>th</sup> December, George Wharton, the editor of *Mercurius Elencticus*, informed his readers that the “Little flock was currently debating the Army’s proposals.”<sup>15</sup> He was, of course, referring to the remnant of the Long Parliament which continued to sit after Pride’s purge. Such imagery depicting a diminutive and subservient Parliament was used by all the opponents of the purge.<sup>16</sup> Such disparaging comments did have a legitimate foundation; the Parliament that sat between the purge and regicide was a shadow of its former self, and it is true that the Army was in control of the nation’s political destiny. However, this traditional picture of a subordinate Parliament does require comment. The Parliament that survived Pride’s Purge on the Wednesday was a very different body to the one that sat on the Thursday.

On 6<sup>th</sup> December, as the secluded members vehemently protested against the Army’s draconian measures,<sup>17</sup> approximately one hundred and twenty MPs took their seats.<sup>18</sup> These members immediately showed some sympathy for their secluded colleagues; hearing that various members had been carried to the Queen’s Court or the Court of Wards<sup>19</sup>, the House commanded their Sergeant at Arms to go to them and require their attendance in the House.

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<sup>15</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus* T.T.E. 476 (4) Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December – Wednesday 11<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.531.

<sup>16</sup> Clement Walker, *A Complete History of Independency* (4 vols, 1661) Part ii, p.46-50.

<sup>17</sup> The Presbyterian MPs will be discussed in chapter 4. See *Parliament Under the Power of the Sword* T.T. 669 f.15 (54) 7<sup>th</sup> December 1648; *A True and Full Relation of the Armies Forcible Seising of Divers Eminent Members of the House of Commons* T.T. E.476 (14) 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648; *The Second Part of the Narrative Concerning the Armies Force and Violence upon the Commons House* T.T.E. 476 (14) 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648. Most of these appear to have been written by William Prynne and it is likely that he exaggerated the scale of the Presbyterian hostility.

<sup>18</sup> *Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow* ed. C.H Firth, 2 vols, 1894, i p.211.

<sup>19</sup> *C.J* vi p.93.

The secluded members seemed willing to consent, but were prevented from doing so by an officer who informed the Sergeant that “he could not allow them to come until he had received his orders.”<sup>20</sup> It is also possible that the Sergeant was sent again to restate the House’s wishes, but upon this second attempt he was not even allowed out of the chamber.<sup>21</sup> According to Edmund Ludlow (writing a long time after the purge, and who right up until his death firmly supported it,) the sending of the Sergeant was a token gesture “made upon account of decency, rather than from any desire that their message be obeyed.”<sup>22</sup> Veronica Wedgwood supported this account by stating that this was “a formal gesture for the House was now composed only of the friends of the Army.”<sup>23</sup> Both these statements are at variance with other more contemporary accounts. It will be argued here that upon the 6<sup>th</sup> the majority of MPs were infuriated by the Army’s entry into the political arena. Also, doubt must be cast on Ludlow’s assertion that the men who drew up the list of MPs were not mistaken in many.<sup>24</sup>

Nearly all of the contemporary accounts portray a Parliament at odds with their military employers. The editor of the Perfect Weekly Account stated that the Parliament “expressed

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<sup>20</sup> Bulstrode Whitelock, Memorials of the English Affairs (4 vols, 1853) vol ii p.468.

<sup>21</sup> Parliament Under the Power of the Sword T.T. 669 f.13 7<sup>th</sup> December 1648; A True and Full Relation p.3. I use the term ‘possible’ because Prynne would not have seen the event. He was arrested before he had a chance to enter the chamber. He could, however, have been informed by one of the Members imprisoned on the 7<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> Ludlow, Memoirs (i) p.211.

<sup>23</sup> C.V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (1964) p.42.

<sup>24</sup> Ludlow, Memoirs (i) p.210. Other sources admitted that the Army had allowed some ‘bad Members’ in, N.L.W, Mss ii, 434 (8) fol.3. This source is cited by Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p.43 n.1. I have checked the source.

much sorrow” about the plight of their secluded colleagues.<sup>25</sup> The editor of *Mercurius Elencticus* clearly revealed his hostility towards the remaining members but he did note that they “showed much pity towards their distressed brethren.”<sup>26</sup> As I mentioned in the last chapter, the *Moderate Intelligencier* stated that there “was little hope of an accord or unity between Parliament and the Army by this days work.”<sup>27</sup> The *Moderate* claimed that Parliament refused to proceed with the Army’s requests until their colleagues were set at Liberty.<sup>28</sup> Whitelock remembered MPs leaving the House in a troubled state of mind, part of the reason being the condition their friends were in.<sup>29</sup> The future regicide Colonel Hutchinson viewed the purge as an “insolvent force upon the House.”<sup>30</sup> A further account of the events upon the 6<sup>th</sup>, states that Parliament resolved not to enter any vote until their members were discharged.<sup>31</sup>

The assertion that Parliament resolved not to enter any vote until their members were discharged is supported by the evidence in the Journals of the House of Commons.<sup>32</sup> Parliamentary business came to an almost complete standstill. Apart from concerning themselves about the plight of the secluded members, the MPs only attended to two issues.

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<sup>25</sup> The Perfect Weekly Account T.T.E. 476 (15) Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> – Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.306.

<sup>26</sup> Mercurius Elencticus T.T.E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.528.

<sup>27</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer T.T.E. 476 (24), Thursday 7<sup>th</sup> December – Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.1777

<sup>28</sup> The Moderate T.T.E.477 (4), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December- Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>29</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.471.

<sup>30</sup> Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson of Nottingham by his Widow Lucy (1906) p.269. Cited in Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p.46.

<sup>31</sup> A True and Full Relation p.3. The Second Part of the Narrative p.5.

<sup>32</sup> C.J vi p.93-4.



Major General Skippon was sent to the city to “employ his best endeavours to appease any tumults that might happen there.” Although Veronica Wedgwood has rightly stated that Skippon had thrown his weight behind the decision to purge Parliament, this does not reflect parliamentary approval of the purge. The mission was designed to ensure that the capital did not degenerate into a bloodbath. Apart from concerning themselves with the problems facing their colleagues, the MPs attended to only one other issue upon the 6<sup>th</sup> - they did agree to hear the Army’s proposals.<sup>33</sup> This again should not be regarded as a demonstration of support for Pride’s Purge. Once it was decided not to suspend the session,<sup>34</sup> the Commons had little option but to hear what the Army had to say. Had they refused to even contemplate the Army’s requests, it is possible that the dissolution favoured by Ireton would have been implemented.<sup>35</sup>

One final action by the Commons undertaken upon the 6<sup>th</sup> requires comment. As I mentioned above, the MPs sent a request for the secluded members held in the Court of Wards to return to the house. This was then followed by a formal request to Fairfax designed to secure the restitution of their members. The deputation was led by William Pierrepont, a man who had made his opposition to the purge patently clear. Fairfax responded by stating that “he did not conceive it to be the positive pleasure of the House that the members be discharged.”

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<sup>33</sup> C.V Wedgwood, Trial p.41. Wedgwood portrays Skippon as a lending radical in the early weeks of the revolution, but then distanced himself from the regicide. Whilst I accept this view to an extent, I am prevented from adopting her case wholesale. Her claim that Skippon was implacably opposed to the Newport accord is only based on the evidence left by Clement Walker. Walker was implacably opposed to any MP that survived the purges and was indiscriminate in his attacks upon MPs. See Wedgwood, Trial , p.76-7 for her view of Skippon based on Walker’s account (and n.29 p.232.) For her view of Skippon’s attitude to the regicide see p.98-9. For Walker’s indiscriminate attacks upon MPs see Walker, Independency part ii passim. For the days proceedings see C.J vi p.93-4.

<sup>34</sup> Underdown, Pride’s Purge , p.145.

<sup>35</sup> For Ireton’s preference for a purge see: Underdown, Pride’s Purge , p.152’ Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p.281.

Pierrepoint assured him that it was, but Fairfax retorted that no answer would be forthcoming until Parliament had responded to the Army's proposals.<sup>36</sup>

Despite the notoriety of Pride's Purge, it is clear that it failed in its attempts to produce a more tractable Parliament. The six men who planned the purge had anticipated that they would secure a legislature that would be willing to proceed with the Army's requests. Instead, the MPs began and ended the day complaining about their colleagues under duress. Significantly, there was no hint that Parliament would proceed with the Army's requests. However, this was not, of course, a serious problem for the Army and the chore of radical MPs.<sup>37</sup> It simply required another purge and this is exactly what happened.

On the 7<sup>th</sup> in order to "make councils more concise" the Army continued their management of the political process. It appears that some kind of meeting took place upon the evening of the 6<sup>th</sup> to make up a new list to ensure that a more compliant legislature was established. This was demonstrated by the new procedure that differed from the activities the day before.<sup>38</sup> On the 6<sup>th</sup>, a door keeper and Lord Grey of Groby had identified a number of MPs on Pride's list, necessary because the Colonel only knew a few by sight.<sup>39</sup> This time nothing was being left to chance. As each MP approached, the officers demanded to know their names. If they were on the list, they were denied entry into the chamber. Most contemporary accounts state that

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<sup>36</sup> C.J vi p.94. BM Add Mss vol iv 37, 344 fol.250. The failure of Pierrepoint's mission was reported on the 7<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> A discussion of these MPs will take place later in the chapter.

<sup>38</sup> One of the most important factors being the replacement of Pride by Hewson. Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.152.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid

approximately fifty MPs were prevented from performing their legislative function<sup>40</sup> It appears highly probable that those members denied entry had “stickled for the privilege of Parliament and the restoration of their members, then in hold the day before”. It is inconceivable to suppose that this second purge was a “moping up exercise” undertaken to remove those members who had figured on his list, but had managed to take their seats.<sup>41</sup> The Army’s motivation behind this second purge was neatly summarised by the editor of *Mercurius Elencticus*:

“Some fifty more were kept from coming into the House, so that now they have separated the chaff from the wheat, the wicked from the Godly, and that now they have a pretty nimble bow of instruments, that will prosecute the end of their remonstrances.”<sup>42</sup>

Apart from this second purge, it is also highly likely that a number of MPs had decided to retire from politics after the events of the previous day. Although no friend of the Presbyterian cause, Clarendon conceded that many MPs “out of conscience or indignation, forbore coming any more to the House.”<sup>43</sup>

All the evidence suggests that the second purge had been successful. The House opened proceedings by voting thanks to Oliver Cromwell, for the actions “performed by him for his

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<sup>40</sup> *A Perfect Diurnall* T.T.E. 526 (40) Monday 4<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 11<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.2254; *The Moderate Intelligencer* T.T.E. 476 (24) Thursday 7<sup>th</sup> December – Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.1777; *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer* T.T.E. 476 (9) Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December – Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.1180; The latter comes to a figure of approximately 50. Underdown *Pride’s Purge* p.152.

<sup>41</sup> *A True and Full Relation* T.T.E. 476 (14) 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.4. Stephens and Birch were pulled out of the chamber.

<sup>42</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus* T.T.E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648. Wedgwood, *Trial*, erroneously attributes this remark to the 6<sup>th</sup>, p.42-3.

<sup>43</sup> Edward Clarendon, *History of the Great Rebellion and Civil Wars in England* (ed) W.D. Macray 6 vols (Oxford 1888) vol.iv p.513-14.

Parliament and the Kingdom”<sup>44</sup> The reference to this Parliament is significant; the day before MPs had all but refused to carry out any resolutions. By thanking Cromwell for his services to “this Parliament”, MPs were clearly beginning to regard themselves as a legitimate legislature. Also, some parliamentary business, not directly concerned with the purges was accomplished. The most important aim was achieved which illustrates the success of the purge - Parliament agreed to proceed with the Army’s proposals.<sup>45</sup>

Although a more cordial atmosphere now existed between the Army and Parliament, a number of MPs remained adamantly opposed to the Army. Encouraged by a number of secluded members who wrote a brief but courteous letter to the Speaker, indicating that they had been denied entry,<sup>46</sup> coupled with the knowledge of Pierrepont’s failed negotiations with Fairfax the day before, there was still an element of hostility towards the Army. Twenty-eight MPs voted against proceeding with the Army’s proposals.<sup>47</sup> It was rumoured in the press that the House was unwilling to enact the Army’s proposals until their members were released from custody.<sup>48</sup> Although the House agreed to proceed with the Army’s proposals the debate was postponed until the following Saturday.

The framers of the purges must have been more content at the completion of business upon the 7<sup>th</sup> than they had been the previous day. However, there were still some MPs that held

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<sup>44</sup> C.J. vi p.94.

<sup>45</sup> C.J. vi p.95.

<sup>46</sup> Henry Cary (ed), Memorials of the Great Civil War in England from 1646 –1652 (two volumes 1842) vol ii p.74-5. C.J. vi p.95.

<sup>47</sup> C.J. vi p.95. Erasmus Long and Sir John Trevor acted as tellers objecting to proceedings. It is impossible to tell the names of the other twenty six MPs. The vote passed by 50-28 with Sir Edward Bainton and William Heveningham supporting the motion.

<sup>48</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer T.T.E. 476 (24) 7<sup>th</sup> December – 14<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.1178.



reservations about the purging of Parliament. On the 8<sup>th</sup>, the Commons listened to three sermons, ordered money to be sent to the treasurers of the poor and maimed soldiers and widows, ordered their committees to sit during the adjournment (that decision had been taken upon the 7<sup>th</sup>) and made provision for a vote of thanks to the three preachers. With no other business attended to, the Commons adjourned at four o'clock.<sup>49</sup> This fast day and the decision to adjourn does not suggest that all the MPs were enjoying the "power of reformation".<sup>50</sup> Instead it is an indication that many of the MPs held reservations about the purges. As the editor of the *Moderate Intelligencer* stated, Parliament was still unwilling to make decisions "without serious pre consultation and deliberation".<sup>51</sup> This hesitancy explains why a number of Pride's soldiers were found at the entrance of Parliament when business resumed the following Tuesday with a list in their hands.<sup>52</sup> It appears that a further twelve MPs were denied entry. Nathaniel Stephens witnessed the whole affair and reported it to the House. He moved that the chamber should "vindicate their privileges and right their members by not proceeding with any business."<sup>53</sup> Stephens' outbursts fell on hollow ears, as the Army now had a more tractable Parliament. The following day they voted to enact the Army's proposals by destroying the framework of the Newport negotiations and paving the way for the trial of

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<sup>49</sup> *C.J.* vi p.95; *The Moderate* T.T.E. 476 (5) Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.198; *Mercurius Pragmaticus* T.T.E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648; *Mercurius Elenticus* E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.529; *Second Part of the Narrative* p.3.

<sup>50</sup> I do not share David Underdown's view that these MPs were enjoying the power of reformation. At this stage there were many MPs that were uneasy about the purge. This explains the Army's continued management of the House.

<sup>51</sup> *The Moderate Intelligencer* T.T.E. 476 (24) Thursday 7<sup>th</sup> December – Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.1178.

<sup>52</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* E.476 (35) 12<sup>th</sup> December – 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648. *Second Part of the Narrative* p.4. Underdown, *Pride's Purge* p.159.

<sup>53</sup> *Second Part of the Narrative* p.4-5.

the King.<sup>54</sup> On the 15<sup>th</sup> December, in response to a Presbyterian pamphlet that bitterly denounced the purge, the Commons appeared, publicly at least,<sup>55</sup> to restrict its own membership. They informed the nation that anyone who had a hand in “contriving, framing, printing or publishing this paper” would be “incapable of holding office or having any place of trust or authority in the Kingdom”. Furthermore, the House insisted that “every member of either House respectively now absent, upon his first coming to sit in the House, whereof he is a member, for the manifestation of his innocency, shall disavow and disclaim” the aforesaid document.<sup>56</sup> Although there is no evidence that this was enforced, it was encouraging news for the Army. By the 15<sup>th</sup> the Newport accord had been dismantled and Parliament had apparently restricted its membership. Although the hostile *Mercurius Pragmaticus* reported another purge upon the 18<sup>th</sup> it was a very low key affair.<sup>57</sup> The final confirmation that Parliament was comprised of the appropriate personnel was provided upon the 20<sup>th</sup> December. Upon the urging of John Gurdon, all MPs were asked to declare that they had or would have dissented to the 5<sup>th</sup> December vote.<sup>58</sup> The purging of Parliament that began upon the 6<sup>th</sup> was over, and the Army sat back and watched the remnant of the House of Commons participate in the trial of the King.

### The Army and the Commons

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<sup>54</sup> C.J vi p.96.

<sup>55</sup> I do not believe that this was implemented, this is discussed in chapter 3.

<sup>56</sup> A Solemn Protestation of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members T.T.E 669. f.12, 55, 11<sup>th</sup> December 1648; A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled quoted in A Perfect Diurnall of some Passages in Parliament, E. 526 (4), Monday 11<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 18<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.2263.

<sup>57</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus E. 476 (5) Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>58</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus E.477 (30) Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648; Walker, Independency part ii p.48.

It therefore took the Army three purges to produce the legislature that would implement their proposals. The chaos that surrounded these events provides a clue as to the priorities that governed the leadership of the Army. Harrison remarked to the King, that the proceedings against him would be done in public and it was therefore important that a degree of parliamentary legitimacy prevailed in the weeks leading up to the execution.<sup>59</sup> The decision to purge rather than dissolve the chamber governed the nature of the revolution because the Army attempted to keep as many MPs in the House as possible. As a consequence they tended to respond to the events in a rather ad hoc fashion by attempting to identify the most hostile members and denying them entry the following day. It is also clear that the leaders of the Army had a very limited agenda for the future of the Commons. They wanted a Parliament that would be willing to support the trial of the King and exclude the eleven members impeached in 1647 along with Major General Browne and Lionel Copley who was associated with the late engagement with the Scots. These demands featured in all their proclamations concerning the future membership of the Commons and this policy had the backing of their supporters in the localities.<sup>60</sup> The desire to censor these MPs is, by and large, supported by their actions. They failed to secure the arrest of all these members. John Glyn and Denzil Holles had fled abroad. It appears that Sir John Maynard, Anthony Nicholas and Walter Long did not attend Parliament at the time of the purge. Sir Philip Stapleton was dead and Sir Robert Harley appears to have been given preferential treatment because of his

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<sup>59</sup> The Perfect Weekly Account T.T.E. 536 (33) Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1648/9 p.327. BM Harley Mss 7369 f.13.

<sup>60</sup> The Declaration of his Excellency, the Lord General Fairfax, and his General Council of Officers showing the grounds of the Armies advance towards the City of London, T.T.E. 474 (13) p.13, 1<sup>st</sup> December 1648; The Humble Proposals and Desires of His Excellency the Lord Fairfax, T.T.E. 475 (25), 6<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.3-7. The Humble Answer of the General Council of the Army to the Demands of the Commons in Parliament, concerning the securing and secluding of some members thereof, T.T. E. 537 (14) 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1649. The hostility of the secluded members is discussed in chapter 4.



family's close relationship with Fairfax.<sup>61</sup> Sir William Lewis, Sir John Clotworthy, Sir William Waller and Major-General Massey were imprisoned and, in contrast to all the other secluded members, they were kept in confinement (with the exception of Massey who escaped) for a very long time.<sup>62</sup> Further, whereas the other imprisoned members were held in various London inns, these members were moved to St James' Palace, where they kept in strict confinement. Copley and Browne, both of whom were closely associated with the engagement with the Scots, joined these members in custody. It is also clear that the Army wanted to secure evidence against these men and at one stage they were promised by their friends in Somerset that proof would be provided but the assurances came to nothing.<sup>63</sup>

In contrast, the framers of the purge were more forgiving to the members that had voted for the continuation of the Newport accord. It was officially suggested that they would only be suspended from the House until after the trial.<sup>64</sup> This shows an attachment to the institution of Parliament and a belief that to vote in favour of the Newport accord was in itself pardonable.

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<sup>61</sup> For the close relationship between Fairfax and Harley see: Fairfax to Officers and Soldiers, HMC Mss of the Duke of Portland (14<sup>th</sup> report) p.164-5. Also the letter of Colonel E. Harley to Lord Fairfax, 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1648 (Portland 14<sup>th</sup> report) p.167. The same Fairfax to the Marshall-General (Portland 14<sup>th</sup> report) p.167. It is highly unlikely, given the proclamations made by the Army, that Maynard, Nicholas, and Long would not have been arrested had they attended. None of these MPs were appointed as commissioners whereas other secluded members were. Firth and Raith (eds), The Acts and Ordinances of Interregnum (3 vols 1911) vol.ii, p.30-46. For Stapleton's death see, Underdown, Pride's Purge p.83. For Holles' departure see Underdown, Pride's Purge p.147. I cannot accept Ivan Root's view that Holles was "strangely not secluded". I am certain that he was not there. Ivan Roots, The Great Rebellion, 1642-1660 (Alan Sutton, 1995) p.133.

<sup>62</sup> Most of these declarations were printed, quite accurately, in Walker, Independency part ii p.39-41. A Declaration of the taking away of Sir William Waller, Sir John Clotworthy, Major General Massie and Colonel Copley, Members of the House of Commons from the King's Head in the Strand to St. James, T.T. 669 f.13 (55) 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648. For Massey's escape see Underdown, Pride's Purge p.195.

<sup>63</sup> A Perfect Diurnall of some passages in Parliament, T.T.E. 527 (4), Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January – Monday 8<sup>th</sup> January 1648/9 p.2283.

<sup>64</sup> The Humble Answer of the General Council of the Army to the Demands of the Commons in Parliament concerning the securing or secluding of some members thereof, T.T.E. 537 (14) 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1649 p.2.



It also explains why the Army raised no objection to the return of the conformist MPs after the regicide.<sup>65</sup> They were not, however, so willing to forgive the activities of the men associated with the engagement with the Scots. This is illustrated by one pamphlet that stated that because of the MPs involvement with the Scots nobody in the capital “would lament their cause.”<sup>66</sup>

It is perhaps a reflection of modern-day values that explains why historians have tended to focus upon the debates over the Agreement of the People rather than the specific actions of the Army Council that conceived and then implemented the purge.<sup>67</sup> It was of course these actions rather than debates over a projected constitution that governed the nature of the revolution.<sup>68</sup> From the evidence obtained from the official publications of the Army Council and the details presented concerning the purges we can learn a lot about the views of the leaders of the Army and the impact they had upon the course of the revolution.

First it is clear that the ideological basis behind the desire to bring the King and the leading Presbyterians to justice was based upon their decision to engage with the Scots. This mirrors Cromwell’s attitude and suggests that there was a direct line from the Windsor prayer meeting right up until the regicide.<sup>69</sup> Second, the rather limited nature of the assault upon Parliament demonstrates the rather contradictory nature of the Army’s involvement in the political process. Upon the one hand they showed little inclination to consider the type of constitution

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<sup>65</sup> This is discussed later in the chapter. Worden, The Rump Parliament p.62-7.

<sup>66</sup> The Staffe set at Parliament’s own door, T.T.E. 475 (25) 8<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.8.

<sup>67</sup> B.Taft, “Voting Lists in the Council of Officers December 1648 Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research L11 (1979) p.138-54; B.Taft, “The Council of Officers Agreement of the People,” H.J. 28 (1985) p.169-85. Ian Gentles New Model Army p.285-294.

<sup>68</sup> The Agreement of the People was only a projected settlement, and it will be shown that the overriding concern of the radicals in the counties was for justice against the King.

<sup>69</sup> See n.60 above. Also, A Vindication of the Army and Parliament, N.L.W Mss 11434 B f.1-2. Justifications of regicide upon the grounds that Charles went against the will of God continued after the regicide.

that would follow the execution, basing all their justifications for the alteration of the constitution on the grounds of the failings of this one particular monarch.<sup>70</sup> But this inability to look beyond the regicide does not indicate a lack of commitment to the revolution. In one important respect it shows the levels of determination amongst the high ranking officers because all other considerations were of peripheral importance whilst Charles was alive.<sup>71</sup> The death of the King was the important issue for the Army and the form of the future constitution could, with certain qualifications, be left in the hands of the parliamentarians. This also supports the view that the King's rejection of the providence of God meant that he had to be brought to justice and this transcended constitutional forms.<sup>72</sup>

Second, it is interesting to note that the Army still had a great deal of respect for the institution of Parliament. In the weeks before the purge it was made clear that it was some of the personnel in Parliament whom were wanting, but the majority were worthy of the great institution. The House's vote to proceed with the negotiations altered this stance as it meant that there was a need to remove more members than they had originally intended, but their respect for the institution was maintained, demonstrated by the limited nature of the purge. This argument is enhanced further by the fact that some MPs, with William Pierrepont being the best example, were allowed to remain in the chamber despite their criticisms of the Army.<sup>73</sup> Also, the Army allowed the release of William Prynne who had produced almost a pamphlet a day condemning their actions.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> The Humble Answers (cited in n.64 above) 3<sup>rd</sup> January p.12-13.

<sup>71</sup> N.69 above. See also God's Delight in the Progress of the Upright, sermon by Thomas Brooks to Parliament, 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.1-47 T.T.E.536 (6); An abridgement of the Late Remonstrance of the Army, signed by John Rushworth, T.T. E.536 (8) 27<sup>th</sup> January 1649 p.3.

<sup>72</sup> See n.60 above and n.69 and 71.

<sup>73</sup>. BM Add Mss vol.vi 37, 344 fol.250. HMCR Mss of the Marquis of Ormond (14<sup>th</sup> report) vol.11, Matthew Rowe to Colonel Michael Jones, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1649 p.87.

<sup>74</sup> Prynne's activities are discussed in chapter 4 below. Underdown, Pride's Purge p.194.

Finally, despite all the criticisms levelled against the Army by Royalists and Presbyterians, who portrayed them as the great usurpers and complained about how the nation groaned under the power of the sword, the Army kept their involvement in the political process down to a minimum.<sup>75</sup> William Sedgwick had told “them not to meddle in politics” and the fact that Parliament was purged suggests that his advice was not heeded.<sup>76</sup> But one important qualification needs to be applied. There is no evidence that, in the weeks before the regicide, the Army were going to enforce their will upon the Commons with the exception of insisting upon the trial of the King and the other persons involved with the engagement with the Scots. By 1648/9 the latter was an issue of spiritual rather than temporal importance.<sup>77</sup> Finally, at Whitehall some members of the Army were discussing the possibility of a radical new constitution and when this was presented to Parliament the usual respect was accorded to the institution, with the only peculiarity being that the approval of the Lords was no longer necessary. The decision to remove the negative voice of the Lords had been taken by the Commons without prompting from the Army.<sup>78</sup>

The evidence used above has focussed upon the activities of the Army officers who directed policy in Westminster. It is worth considering some of the views held by the regiments in the

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<sup>75</sup> The nature of the Presbyterian response is discussed in chapter 4 below. The term “under the power of the sword” was, apparently, first coined by Nathaniel Fiennes. Parliament Under the Power of the Sword, T.T.E. 669 f.13 (54), 6<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>76</sup> William Sedgwick, Justice Upon the Armie Remonstrance, T.T.E. 475 (34), 11<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.48.

<sup>77</sup> This, in light of the reluctance to implement a programme for the future of Parliament, is the only logical suggestion for the Army’s actions. It is also in line with Sarah Barber’s view of the Army. Sarah Barber, Regicide and Republicanism (Edinburgh 1998) p.96-113.

<sup>78</sup> C.J. vi p.122; A Petition from Lord Fairfax and the General Council T.T.E. 539 (2) 20<sup>th</sup> January 1648; S.R. Gardiner, Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660 (Oxford 1906) p.359-371; For the Commons having the supreme authority see, A Declaration of the House of Commons, T.T.E. 537 (18), 4<sup>th</sup> January 1649, see chapter 3 below.



localities and the supporters of the revolution who have been dubbed as the “honest radicals”<sup>79</sup>

It is clear that many of the supporters of the revolution had different hopes in the period between the first purge and the regicide. Rainsborowe’s widow petitioned for money and other regiments stayed out of high politics by concentrating upon their own material grievances. One distraught soldier asked for £20 of his arrears to provide for his pregnant wife.<sup>80</sup> In stark contrast other petitions called for the implementation of a wide-range of reforms that would include major alterations to the constitution.<sup>81</sup> But the vast majority of the pressure from the localities concerned the implementation of justice against the King and the eleven members using a very similar language to the one adopted by Army Council in London.<sup>82</sup> Few of the petitions were concerned with the precise form that the parliament

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<sup>79</sup> David Underdown, “Honest Radicals in the Counties” p.186-205. In D.H Pennington and Keith Thomas Puritans and Revolutionaries (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978) p.186-205.

<sup>80</sup> A Perfect Diurnall T.T.E 526 (43), Monday 18<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.2268; Heads of a Diarie (Petition of Thomas King), T.T.E. 537 (25) Tuesday 2<sup>nd</sup> January – Tuesday 9<sup>th</sup> January 1649 p.46.

<sup>81</sup> A Perfect Diurnall, E.527 (1) Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January 1648/9 (petition from Norwich), p.2274; Perfect Occurrences, E. 527 (8) Friday 12<sup>th</sup> January – Friday 19<sup>th</sup> January 1649 (petition from the Common Council); The Moderate, T.T.E. 536 (2) Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648 (petition from Kent), p.213; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T.E. 536 (33) Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1648/9 (petition from Norwich), p.1203; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer (petition from the Isle of Wight, Southampton, Portsmouth and Poole), also (same title) T.T.E. 539 (6) Tuesday 16<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1649 p.1228, (petition from London), p.1229; The Moderate, T.T.E. 541 (15) (petition from Surrey), p.286.

<sup>82</sup> A Perfect Diurnall (letter from the Garisons of Hull), T.T.E. 527 (1) Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January (petition from Shropshire), p.2276-77; A Perfect Diurnall T.T.E. 527 (4) Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January – Monday 8<sup>th</sup> January 1649 p.2282. This shows the editor’s dislike of the Presbyterians who were linked with the engagement. p.2283 (letter from Somerset) suggesting that they must exact revenge against the King for their own preservation; A Perfect Diurnall, T.T.E. 527 (16), Monday 8<sup>th</sup> January – Monday 15<sup>th</sup> January 1649 (letter quoted in the editorial), p.2238. Perfect Occurrences, E. 527 (18) Friday 12<sup>th</sup> January – Friday 19<sup>th</sup> January 1649 (letter from the north), p.797; A Perfect Diurnall, T.T.E. 527 (9) Monday 15<sup>th</sup> January – Monday 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1649 (petition from the counties of North Wales) p.2303. The Moderate Intelligencer, T.T.E. 476 (24) Thursday 7<sup>th</sup> December – Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.1777 - this is an attack by the editor on the Presbyterians; (petition from Pride’s regiment) p.1778-1780. The Moderate T.T.E. 477 (4) See Over

should take, and if comment was made, it was done so in an ambiguous fashion, simply stating that there should be a dissolution at some stage. The date of April, stipulated in the Agreement of the People did not feature in many of the petitions.<sup>83</sup> There was talk of power being vested in the people but it is remarkable how many justifications of regicide were made upon the basic premise of power and victory in war. The editor of 'A Perfect Summary' justified regicide upon the Old Testament notion of vengeance. A petition from Bristol called the Army "God's instrument", apparently providing them with a carte blanche right to implement a constitution of their choice.<sup>84</sup> A petition from Pride's regiment is a very good example of the attitude of the Army after the purging of Parliament. It began with a list of their material grievances and then went on to warn of the dangers of going against God's providences. They then listed their demands. First they wanted impartial justice for all, but they were quick to denounce the Leveller party. They demanded that none of the "royal or neutral party" should have any influence in the future government "lest their enemies become their rulers." They conclude their desires with these words;

"The grand capital enemy may, without delay be brought to justice which is the main root of our misery, we finding all other ways attempted, altogether invalid."<sup>85</sup>

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Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648, (editorial comment); p.201 p.211 (petition from Dover); The Perfect Weekly Account, E. 477 (15) Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> December – Wednesday 20<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.313 (letter from Exeter); p.316 and petition from Warep.317; The Moderate, T.T.E. 536 (30) Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1648/9 (petition from the castle of Denbigh); The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer E. 539 (6) Tuesday 16<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1649 (petition from the Common Council), p.1227.

<sup>83</sup> See n.81 above. Some of these petitions asked that a time be set on the sitting of the current parliament, Gardiner, Constitutional Documents p.359.

<sup>84</sup> A Perfect summary of Exact Passages, T.T.E. 527 (20) Monday 5<sup>th</sup> February – Monday 12<sup>th</sup> February 1649 p.17; The Moderate, T.T.E. 477 (4) Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.210.

<sup>85</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer T.T. E. 476(24) Thursday 7<sup>th</sup> December- Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.1778-1780.

Underlying practically all of the radical petitions was the notion, articulated by one journalist, that “all the nation cry out, let justice be done”<sup>86</sup> A letter from Somerset appeared in the *Moderate* newspaper on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January calling upon all the honest people in the country to unite. In many respects this happened and the survival of so many of these petitions is testimony to the determination of a small radical minority that existed all over England and Wales.<sup>87</sup> It also questions the view that a number of so called levellers objected to the regicide. This view tended to be propounded after the execution when they were complaining about the fact that their constitution had not been implemented in the manner they had demanded.<sup>88</sup> Although differences existed amongst these radical groups upon what kind of constitution should be enacted, upon the one central issue they were united:<sup>89</sup> Charles I had to be brought to justice for his actions over the last decade. From this evidence it is possible to make two generalisations. First, there is no case to suggest that the officers in London, who managed the purge, were pursuing an agenda that was at variance with the wishes of their natural allies in the nation. Second, the revolution that was inspired by the petitions and actions of these people in the localities was based upon biblical justifications of punishment against an individual who had failed to recognise God’s providence, rather than an attachment to a new republican order.

### The House of Commons and the English Revolution

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<sup>86</sup> A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses T.T.E. 475 (17) Wednesday 29<sup>th</sup> November- Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.1

<sup>87</sup> The Moderate T.T E.536 (30) Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December-Tuesday 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1648/9.

<sup>88</sup> The reaction of the Levellers is discussed below. I am slightly sceptical of Sarah Barber’s view that significant “sections of the Leveller movement” had opposed the regicide. Barber Regicide and Republicanism p.154.

<sup>89</sup> The petitions that demanded widespread reform almost invariably demanded justice first. See n.81 above.



The membership of the House of Commons has been scrutinised very thoroughly by David Underdown and Blair Worden. As has been mentioned above, their view that the majority of the rumpers were conservative by nature has been questioned in the works of Sarah Barber and Sean Kelsey. Yet despite these challenges, the two books written in the 1970s remain the outstanding accounts upon the early years of the Rump Parliament.<sup>90</sup> David Underdown brilliantly explained the narrative of the events between the purge and regicide and in the course of this argument he attempted to show that his revolutionaries were eclipsed by the conformists in the Rump. It was this, rather than a degeneration into inertia, that explains why the revolution was not extended beyond the events of 1648/9<sup>91</sup>. This view was confirmed and extended by Dr Worden who politely pointed out that many of Underdown's revolutionaries were not in themselves committed to the principle of radicalism, being driven to act because of the activities of one particular monarch.<sup>92</sup> For the purposes of this thesis their works are more important than more recent accounts that have detected a republican tradition in England. Underdown and Worden have scrutinised the sources directly related to the revolution itself and despite Sean Kelsey's excellent description of how the Rump created an image for itself, his failure to explain how and why the republic was established means that Worden's account remains the definitive version.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Underdown Pride's Purge, Worden Rump, Kelsey Inventing a Republic, Barber Regicide and Republicanism. They have all been cited in full in the notes above.

<sup>91</sup> Underdown's account replaced the narrative and the arguments of S.R. Gardiner. Blair Worden resurrected the reputation of the rump and this was taken even further by Sean Kelsey. I was surprised when Kelsey wrote that the rump had never received a favourable press from academics. See Inventing a Republic p.2-6. He does admit that Blair Worden repaired the reputation of the rump but he still regards Worden's account as hostile. I believe that Worden salvaged the rump by essentially saying that the parliament was dissolved because it failed to meet the demands set of it by Oliver Cromwell. Worden Rump passim.

<sup>92</sup> Worden Rump p.50.

<sup>93</sup> Worden Rump p.163-195. Underdown Pride's Purge p.143-207.

Professor Worden demonstrated that the Rump was not a regime that was radical at the onset and then became altered over the course of time. He suggests that Cromwell was the architect of the regime and was influential in establishing it as a conservative body. This argument was questioned in the last chapter as Cromwell was portrayed as a man who was not initiating events at the start of this revolutionary period. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to determine the levels of commitment to the new regime. In so doing, I will not follow the categorisation outlined by David Underdown that an early dissenter and/or a regicide necessarily acts as a neat demarcation between conservatism and radicalism. It is widely accepted that the Rump began its life surrounded by dangers and the horror that greeted the regicide could have resulted in dire reprisals from a Royalist party that simply described all the MPs who sat in Westminster as regicides.<sup>94</sup> Therefore to sit in the Parliament in early 1649 arguably demonstrated a substantial commitment to the principle of a government without a monarch.

Blair Worden suggested that there were approximately twenty men who demonstrated a real enthusiasm for either (or both) the purge and the regicide. The evidence in the Journals of the House of Commons supports this view and the attendance figures in the Painted Chamber show these men supported the moves against the King.<sup>95</sup> But the number of twenty can be extended. Francis Allen, who stood up and owned the court upon the 27<sup>th</sup>, thus, became certainly liable to Royalist reprisals at the restoration. He had sat upon a committee that condemned the protestation made by the secluded members. He was also a member of a committee, designed to keep Royalists and Presbyterians out of London. Along with some

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<sup>94</sup> For the attitude of the Royalist press see chapter 5 below.

<sup>95</sup> The MPs identified are: Scot, Marten, Carew, Sir John Danvers, Challenor, Blackiston, Millington, Humphrey Edwards, Sir Gregory Norton, Venn, Corbet, Purefoy, Garland, Lord Grey of Groby, Oliver Cromwell, Marten, Ireton and Harrison; His view is undoubtedly correct. T.B. Howells A Complete Collection of State Trials (1816) vol iv p.1057-1115; BM Add Mss, 35,322, fol.118-119; C.J vi p.93-126.

ceremonial responsibilities he deliberated on the committees that established the High Court of Justice and he consistently attended the meetings held in the Painted Chamber.<sup>96</sup> Sir John Bourchier had hardly attended the chamber in the months before the purge and his apathetic posture towards Parliament remained, indicated by his poor attendance record when he was in London. However, his zeal for justice was evident throughout the meetings of the Painted Chamber where his name featured for majority of the sessions. John Dixwell was another MP who had failed to attend Parliament upon a regular basis but returned to play a role in the moves against the King.<sup>97</sup> A good example of commitment to the revolution is shown by the actions of Sir William Constable. As Blair Worden noted, he was governor of Gloucester with a very heavy workload. He returned to London at the time of the revolution to add his considerable presence to the moves against the King.<sup>98</sup> Edmund Harvey stormed away from the High Court in protest when the King was not allowed to speak towards the end of the week. This may have been a last minute scruple of conscience, or just, as he himself suggested, a dislike of the procedure. But he had previously shown a commitment to the principle of regicide demonstrated by his attendance in Parliament when the bills for creating a High Court of Justice were read. He also stood up in the Painted Chamber the day that the sentence was passed.<sup>99</sup> Another good example is John Fry who had not attended at all in 1648. He returned to Parliament in December and was an enthusiastic supporter of the moves against the King. He was prevented from signing the regicide document because he was

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<sup>96</sup> For Francis Allen See C.J vi p.97-98, 111, 112, 120; State Trials iv p.1062, 1067; A W McIntosh "The Number of English Regicides" History (67) (1982) p.198.

<sup>97</sup> For Sir John Bourchier See Worden Rump p.40 n.1; State Trials iv (eg) 1092, 1099. For Dixwell Worden Rump p.40 n.1; C.J vi p. 112 119. State Trials iv (eg) 1068, 1092, 1099, 1114-1115.

<sup>98</sup> Worden Rump p.27, 40 and 181. C.J vi p.106. State Trials iv (eg) p.1059. A. Wood Athanae Oxoniensis (3 vols 1691) vol.i, p.205.

<sup>99</sup> C.J vi: p.102, 105, 107; State Trials iv, p.1066. McIntosh, "History" p.199.



expelled from the House for promoting socinian views but his zeal for justice cannot be doubted.<sup>100</sup>

There are further examples of men who made the choice to move against the King who Blair Worden failed to mention in his account, but whose names feature prominently in the Journals of the House of Commons and in the Painted Chamber. As mentioned in the first chapter there is little evidence of coercion compelling members to either remain in Parliament or sign the regicide document. Men such as Whitelock were nominated as commissioners but never attended a session in the Painted Chamber. It is surprising that Blair Worden chose to accept the testimony of men such as Thomas Waite, Simon Mayne and John Downes, who claimed that they were bullied into signing the death warrant when they were facing trial for their lives. They were not forced to sit in the Painted Chamber in the first place, and in the case of Downes he attended Parliament at the time when the format of the trial was decided upon.<sup>101</sup>

One other factor about the commitment to the moves against the King requires comment. The spectacle of the King's trial remains one of the most famous events in English history. For Charles it was a moment of triumph and his dignified stance was even admired by his contemporary critics and his performance has won him praise from the majority of historians.<sup>102</sup> He did prove more than a match for Bradshaw but this should not eclipse the

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<sup>100</sup> Worden Rump p.126; For examples of his attendance See C.J vi p.103, 106-7,110.

<sup>101</sup> Worden Rump p.43. Downes' attendance in the Painted Chamber was not as impressive as some members but considering that no coercion was applied especially in the early stages he must have had an inclination to move against the King. He also sat in Parliament when the MPs moved against the secluded members. State Trials iv p.1060 1068; C.J vi p.97. p.107. For a discussion of Whitelock's role see below. A List of the Names of the Judges of the High Court of Justice for the trial of the King. 11<sup>th</sup> Jan 1649, T.T 669.f.13; more names could be added See C.J and State Trials cited above n.95.

<sup>102</sup> For the generally favourable reaction from the press see chapter 5 below. Most historians have been impressed with Charles's performance. The classic remains C. V. Wedgwood Trial passim. Charles Carlton was not as impressed, Charles I The Personal Monarch (second edition) (1983) p.343-351.

fact that the planning that went on behind the scenes had been thorough, with many MPs involved in the preparations. Without this meticulous planning, the regicide would not have been such a spectacle. The nature of the available evidence means that we have little knowledge of the motives which governed the decisions taken by the majority of these MPs. Yet, their tireless work committees suggests that they were very committed to the execution of their King.

The solemn ritual of the event owed a great deal to the efforts of John Blackiston and John Fry. The large number of witnesses ready to testify against the King had been arranged by Nicholas Love. Augustine Garland decided upon the location of the trial.<sup>103</sup> A large committee was appointed to deal with problems as they arose, anticipating that Charles would question the legality of the court.<sup>104</sup> Ludlow, Purefoy and a number of Army officers were responsible for the transportation of the King to Westminster and the security arrangements during the trial. Colonel Harvey was responsible for reporting upon the reasons why some MPs had withdrawn from the court, although the attendance record during the latter part of the meetings in the Painted Chamber reveal that Harvey was rather under-employed as the numbers remained fairly consistent.<sup>105</sup>

The efficiency with which the regicides worked demonstrated a commitment to their cause however narrow this may have been. As mentioned, the absence of rhetoric justifying the regime should not be deemed as testimony of their lack of revolutionary zeal. Instead, the firm evidence left in the journals of the House of Commons and in the records of the Painted Chamber reveal a commitment to rid the nation of the King.

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<sup>103</sup> For Blackiston and Fry State Trials iv p. 1058; they were assisted by Tichbourne and Roe; for Love p.1110; for Garland p.1060.

<sup>104</sup> The people on the committee were Millington, Marten, Harvey, Challoner, Harrison, Corbet, Scot, Lisle and Say. State Trials iv p.1060.

<sup>105</sup> State Trials iv 1061, 1079 1079 –1116.

One other point about these regicide MPs requires comment. The moves against the purging of Parliament and the attack upon the King certainly caused a breach within the parliamentary party and there was no evidence that this was going to be temporary. It was also acknowledged by supporters of the regicide that they were part of an unpopular minority accused of being in the pockets of their Army employers. But this did not prevent them from playing an active role in the events. This determination to bring the King to justice was similar to the wishes of the leaders of the Army and the radicals in the counties.<sup>106</sup> Moreover, as the arrangements for the trial demonstrated, the Commons were capable of working with their colleagues in the Army.

As I mentioned above, upon the 20<sup>th</sup> December the Commons decided to restrict their membership by imposing the test of dissent. Accordingly all the MPs were expected to pronounce that they had or would have dissented to the 5<sup>th</sup> December vote. According to *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, this resulted in another reduction in membership as a number of MPs had the grace to refuse subscription. Nedham cited the names of five MPs, Francis Rous, George Snelling, Rowland Wilson, Luke Hodges and John Carew<sup>107</sup>. David Underdown used the early dissent as a means of identifying his revolutionaries and Blair Worden, whilst accepting that some members managed to avoid taking the dissent, regarded this as a most important day as it marked the time that the Rump finally decided upon its membership.<sup>108</sup> Both historians accept that the decision to take the test was significant for two reasons. First, according to David Underdown this demonstrated an undiluted commitment to revolution. A

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<sup>106</sup> See Above n.82-83.

<sup>107</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* T.T. E. 477 (30) Tue Dec 19-Tue Dec 26.

<sup>108</sup> Underdown, *Pride's Purge* p.210, 215-17 Worden *Rump* 24-25.



number of members were allowed to take the test after the regicide and Underdown logically concluded that taking the test before the execution demonstrated more of a commitment among these members in comparison to those who took the test in early February. For Blair Worden the emphasis was slightly different. He suggests that it was widely believed that in the event of a Royalist counter-revolution the late dissenters would not have been associated with regicide and therefore not culpable for punishment. This thesis will take a slightly different line by highlighting that the test of dissent upon the 20<sup>th</sup> had little impact upon the immediate membership of the Commons and it will also suggest that there was little distinction in contemporary circles between the early and late dissenters or indeed between the regicides and the members that resumed their seats having failed to sign the warrant.

If we take Nedham's five members it becomes immediately apparent that he made a number of errors. John Carew actually took the test of dissent upon the 20<sup>th</sup>. George Snelling and Francis Rous may have gone home, but Rowland Wilson was in the chamber upon the 23<sup>rd</sup>. He was not an insignificant member as he took control of a bill that limited the membership of the Common Council. This would ultimately place the same restrictions upon the city of London that were placed upon the Parliament by the Army.<sup>109</sup> Luke Hodgets was also in London upon the 23<sup>rd</sup> and sat upon the committee that would consider the trial of the King.<sup>110</sup> These are just two isolated examples, but Francis Thorpe and a minimum of eleven other MPs avoided taking the test of dissent but remained in Parliament after the 20<sup>th</sup> December. In the case of William Lord Monson he would play a very prominent role right up until the end of

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<sup>109</sup> For Carew see Underdown Pride's Purge p.369; For Wilson see C.J vi, (23<sup>rd</sup> December, ) p.103; Underdown believed that Nedham meant Current instead of Carew, Pride's Purge , n.69 p.166. This is possible, but it is also plausible that Nedham was mistaken; An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament for the Choosing of Common Councilmen, T.T.E 476 (29), 18<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>110</sup> C.J vi, p.103. Luke Hodgets would return on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1649, C.J vi p.129.

January.<sup>111</sup> Some of these members had played a very important role in the radical politics prompted by the purge. John Gurdon actually proposed the test of dissent though he did not take it himself. He was associated with radical politics in the weeks after the purge being responsible for a proclamation that would have debarred the most vocal of opponents of the purge from attending Parliament.<sup>112</sup> John Goodwin sat upon the committee to restrict the membership of the Common Council and he was still in Parliament at the time of the second reading of the bill against the King. Finally as Blair Worden noted the two “trimming” lawyers: Bulstrode Whitelock and Sir Thomas Widdrington attended intermittently right up until the trial.<sup>113</sup>

The number of people who failed to take the test of dissent shows that it was not a fixed principle. It was easily avoided and does not mark a turning point in the revolution. Further, it demonstrates that many MPs were willing to support the purge but not the regicide. In the last chapter, it was noted that there were discussions about the future of the monarchy, with some MPs supporting the retention of Charles whilst others favoured deposition.<sup>114</sup> To be opposed to regicide does distinguish these MPs from the active perpetrators, but their support of the purging of Parliament helps to explain why so many returned after the execution. From this

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<sup>111</sup> Francis Thorpe, Sir Gilbert Pickering, Lislebone Long, Richard Aldworth, Sir William Allanson, Thomas Boone, John Browne, John Corbet, John Goodwin, John Gurdon, Bulstrode Whitelock, Sir Thomas Widdrington. This extends the number mentioned in Worden, The Rump Parliament, p.33-35; For all of these members see C.J vi, p.101-116. For Monson see C.J vi p.103-120.

<sup>112</sup> Worden, The Rump Parliament p.34; A Declaration of the Lords and Commons cited in The Moderate Intelligencer E.477 (14), Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December – Thursday 21<sup>st</sup> December 1648, p.1781.

<sup>113</sup> For Goodwin see C.J vi p.103-6; For Whitelock Memorials ii 416-512. BM Add Mss (vol vi) 37, 344 f.232-254; Worden, The Rump Parliament p.34.

<sup>114</sup> See chapter 1 above.

perspective it is worth looking at how Parliament treated the secluded members between the first purge and the regicide.

As I mentioned above, the Parliament that survived Pride's clutches on the 6<sup>th</sup>, complained bitterly about the plight of their secluded colleagues. On the 14<sup>th</sup> December another committee was sent to the General, "to know of him upon what grounds the members of the House were restrained from coming to the House by the officers and soldiers of the Army."<sup>115</sup>

Whitelock explained the reasons behind this request:

".... to desire that a charge may be brought in against such of their members not admitted to sit against whom they have any matter; and that the rest against whom they have no matter may have the freedom to sit in the House."

Whitelock's account clearly reveals that this was a suggestion rather than a demand, although sixteen members did not feel that they should trouble the General.<sup>116</sup> Although this account shows that there was a certain unease about the scale of the purge, it may also have been an attempt to make the Army confirm its policy towards the secluded members. This desire for clarification is not synonymous with opposition to the Army's policy. This is revealed in three ways. First, on the 14<sup>th</sup> Parliament had made their hostility to the most extreme Presbyterians clear by publishing their declaration which appeared to restrict membership to the House.<sup>117</sup> Second, the Army's charge, advocating the imprisonment of those MPs who engaged with the Scots and suspension for the supporters of the Newport Accord, was accepted by Parliament.<sup>118</sup> Third, the Commons would make it perfectly clear in a response to the Scottish

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<sup>115</sup> C.J vi p.97.

<sup>116</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.475; Ibid Smith and Marten opposed the moves.

<sup>117</sup> A Declaration of the Lords and Commons in The Moderate Intelligencer, T.T.E. 477, Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December – Thursday 21<sup>st</sup> December 1648, p.1781.

<sup>118</sup> The Humble Answer of the General Council, T.T.E. 537 (14), 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1649.



commissioners that they were satisfied with the imprisonment of the members associated with the engagement with the Scots.<sup>119</sup>

Between the 20<sup>th</sup> December and 1<sup>st</sup> February the MPs spent very little time considering their own membership. They did discuss the matter on Christmas day, but it was then put to one side.<sup>120</sup> From that date until the regicide they only discussed the Presbyterians on two occasions. On the 27<sup>th</sup> December Thomas Watson preached before the truncated House. The minister used the occasion to launch an unequivocal attack against the purges and the projected settlement without the King. Accusing Parliament of hypocrisy, he warned that God saw their inward desires and would ultimately cast his judgement upon them. On the same day, Thomas Brooks saw the apocalyptic opportunity, informing the congregation that they had the unique chance “to honour God” and do good to his saints. It is hardly surprising that when Parliament debated as to whether the preacher should be thanked, Mr Brooks was given the honour whereas Thomas Watson was not “thanked for his pains.”<sup>121</sup> The latter was also given a stern warning not to print the sermon.<sup>122</sup>

The next interlude concerned the “irrepressible” William Prynne. The House instructed Mr Edwards and Mr Fry to go to him and show him a pamphlet which began with the preamble “a brief memento to the unparliamentary juncto.” They were further ordered to ask Prynne if he would accept responsibility for the book. In the pamphlet Prynne had accused the Army

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<sup>119</sup> The Resolution and Votes Concerning Major Browne, T.T. E. 550 (11), 10<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.2.

<sup>120</sup> BM Add Mss (vol iv) 37, 344, fol.250.

<sup>121</sup> Thomas Watson, Gods Anatomy Upon Mans Heart, T.T. E. 536 (7), 27<sup>th</sup> December 1648. Thomas Brooks, Gods Delight in the progress of the Upright, T.T.E. 536 (6), 27<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>122</sup> A Perfect Diurnall, T.T.E. 527, Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December 1648 – Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January 1649, p.2280.

and the remaining MPs of being involved in a Jesuit conspiracy. The MPs had clearly found the publication palpably annoying. They demanded that the Ordinance of the 27<sup>th</sup> September 1647, regarding the publication of scandalous pamphlets should be enacted. They also ordered the clerk to ensure that a copy of this publication did not end up in public circulation.<sup>123</sup>

When Edwards and Fry visited Prynne he refused to answer their questions because he did not regard them as a lawful authority. When this was reported to the House, Parliament instructed the Seargent at Arms to bring Prynne to the chamber. In a rather comic interlude Prynne told the Seargent that he could not attend Parliament because he was currently a prisoner of the Army. The bemused Seargent returned to Parliament and told them of Prynne's response. Before they had time to answer, it was reported that Waller had asked for a habeas corpus for Prynne. Whitelock informed the House that this could not be denied, and despite Prynne's previous hostility to the chamber, he was released from custody. As Professor Underdown states, "the decision to release so articulate an opponent is a striking demonstration of the revolutionaries continuing respect for legal formalities."<sup>124</sup> However, there was no prospect of Prynne returning to Parliament.

The actions undertaken against the secluded members does not reveal a Parliament that was too concerned about the Army's involvement in the political process. It is important to remember that this was not just the regicides or the early dissenters who supported the purging of Parliament. The decision taken upon the 1<sup>st</sup> of February to allow MPs to return, who either voted for an extension to the Newport accord or were absent at the time of the

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<sup>123</sup> William Prynne, A Brief Memento, E. 537 (7), 4<sup>th</sup> January 1649; C.J vi, p.111; C.J vi, p.319. Firth and Rait, Acts and Ordinances, vol I, p.1021-1023. The Examination of Mr William Prynne, E. 537 (3), 11<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.6.

<sup>124</sup> C.J vi, p.111-115.; Whitelock Memorials vol ii, p.493. Underdown, Pride's Purge p.194.

vote, did not result in the return of many members who had been forcibly secluded at the purge. This suggests that there were some restrictions placed upon the membership and this would be extended after the 23<sup>rd</sup> of February.<sup>125</sup> It is true that a number of these MPs had played little role in the events after the 6<sup>th</sup> but their return to Parliament did not alter the policy towards the secluded members.<sup>126</sup> The principle that governed Cromwell's thinking was shared by a majority of the MPs who sat consistently between the purge and regicide. They would allow MPs to remain in Parliament upon the condition that they would not attempt to undermine the revolution. It is important to state that there was not a dissenting voice in the House against this policy of readmission.<sup>127</sup> With regard to the Presbyterians the returning MPs did not make a difference. The declaration made by Parliament upon the 18<sup>th</sup> December which prevented any Londoner associated with the Second Civil War from sitting on the Common Council was continued after February 1649. In the case of the Lord Mayor

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<sup>125</sup> Worden, The Rump Parliament p.61; This was done in a very low key fashion and was 'never official' policy. It was reported in, A Perfect Diurnall, T.T.E. 527 (16), Monday 29<sup>th</sup> January – Monday 5<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.2313.

<sup>126</sup> MPs that did not play a major role: Robert Andrews, Sir William Armine, William Armine, Edward Ashe, John Baker, John Bingham, Robert Blake, Robert Brewster, Abraham Burrell, William Current, John Dormer, John Fagge, John Feilder, George Fenwick, Charles Fleetwood, Roger Gratwich, Nathaniel Hallows, Sir Arthur Heselrige, William Hay, Thomas Hoyle, Sir Thomas Jervoise, Francis Lascelles, Nicholas Lechmere, William Leyman, John Lowry, William Masham, James Nelthorpe, John Palmer, Edward Poham. Alexander Popham, Robert Reynolds, Algenon Sidney, Philip Smith, William Stephens, Thomas Stockdale, Thomas Toll, Sir Henry Vane, Sir Thomas Walsingham, John Weaver, Edmund West, Benjamin Weston. Some, but rather few, would sit on committees, State Papers, 23, 28. See below for Sir Arthur Heselrige. For the dates they took the dissent see Underdown's Pride's Purge, p.366-390.

<sup>127</sup> Throughout the text and the footnotes I have pointed to the limitations of the available evidence. In this case however, we can determine divisions. The traditional route is through the votes themselves. These were only called if the vote was close. Examples of these divisions can be found in C.J vi. p. 128, 132, 158, 164, 172, 197. Proposals were dropped if it was clear that they did not have sufficient support, eg. C.J vi, 10<sup>th</sup> March 1649 when Marten's bill for the poor was laid aside without a division.



Reynoldson, he was fined £2,000 for refusing to endorse the new form of government, stripped from office and prevented from being an alderman.<sup>128</sup>

It was suggested earlier in the chapter that a number of MPs were active on the committees which paved the way for the regicide. This is testimony to their determination to see the execution of the King. Their motives for this will be considered later, but it is worth considering the views of these so called conformist members. As a short case study, I will use Bulstrode Whitelock described by David Underdown as the “typical rumper.”<sup>129</sup>

Whitelock has been depicted in a variety of ways. David Underdown hated him, Blair Worden regarded him as a trimmer, but he has been the subject of a favourable biography. He is also extremely useful for historians of the Civil Wars and Interregnum, because he provides a great deal of information upon the revolutionary period. It is clear that his memoirs may have been produced to vindicate his actions at the time of the restoration and that his diary has not provided historians with much more evidence than his more detailed memorials. Yet, he is still one of the few rumpers who demonstrates any indication of motive. He also provides a great deal of information upon his decision to serve the Commonwealth.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> For the same policy continuing see (for example): C.J vi p.177 and The Moderate Intelligencer, E. 543 (3), Thursday 8<sup>th</sup> February – Thursday 15<sup>th</sup> February 1648, p.1186. For the episode with Reynoldson, C.J vi p.177; The Restoration and Votes Concerning Major Browne, T.T.E. 550 (11), 10<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.2.

<sup>129</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.296.

<sup>130</sup> For a neat summary of Underdown and Worden's views upon Whitelock see Ruth Spalding, The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelock 1605-1675 Records of Social and Economic History New Series, xiii p.25; For the limitations of the memoirs and the diary see Worden, “The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelock”, EHR 12 (108), (1993), p.122-34; See also Ronald Hutton, The British Republic 1649-1660, p.23; For the diary see Spalding cited above. Ruth Spalding, The Improbable Puritan (1975); Memorials ii p.518-218. BM Add Mss (vol iv) 37, 344, f. 256-267.

In 1651 Whitelock attended the famous meeting where it was claimed that he advocated the restoration of Charles II. The use historians have made of this source brought criticism from Professor Hutton who pointed out that Whitelock had the best possible reason to depict himself as a covert Royalist. The account was written at a time when Whitelock, as one of the leaders of the republican movement, was facing the prospect of arrest which could have culminated in execution.<sup>131</sup> It is essential that the circumstances in which Whitelock wrote his account are remembered. Moreover, he did have a great deal of explaining to do. He was one of the first of the February dissenters, having previously spent plenty of time in the Commons in the weeks between the first purge and the regicide. He claimed that he objected to the abolition of the Lords but he still drafted the ordinance that gave full sovereignty to the Commons. He witnessed the smashing of the great seal and he agreed to act as one of the new commissioners. In his memorials he recites all his attempts to persuade Parliament not employ him but they clearly regarded him as indispensable to their cause. In the end he did agree to serve, but it is interesting to note that his friend and colleague Widdrington managed to avoid office.<sup>132</sup> So what were Whitelock's aims? He could have been a moderate who leapt onto a bandwagon, as Professor Underdown suggests, but this overlooks the fact that Whitelock could have jumped on earlier when it became clear that Charles was going to die. It is possible that he joined to keep power in civilian hands, a view suggested by Dr Worden and one that Whitelock would have supported. This argument may overlook two important factors. First, as outlined above this was a convenient excuse at the time of the restoration. Second, and most importantly, Whitelock's account was tarnished by the events of 1653 when there was a clash between the Army and Parliament. The same is true of the accounts written

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<sup>131</sup> R. Hutton, The British Republic p.23; Also, non regicides such as Heslridge and Vane did face execution.

<sup>132</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.518-528.

by Lucy Hutchinson which talk of a perpetual conflict between the Army and the “representative chamber.”<sup>133</sup>

There is, perhaps, an alternative explanation which is consistent with some of Whitelock’s utterances. It is clear that he did not approve of the regicide - the fact that his name is not on the document is testament to this. But in his memoirs he does state that he was deeply engaged with “that party.”<sup>134</sup> The decision to execute the King was one with which he could not agree, but it was not serious enough to alter his allegiance. This view may have been shared by a number of the conformists. The lack of a clear distinction between the regicide MPs and the non-subscribers is evident in a one other piece of evidence - the lack of an ideological conflict between the two groups in Parliament.

If we take the first twenty-three divisions after February 1649 it becomes patently clear that there was not a split between the revolutionaries and the non-subscribers.<sup>135</sup> During these divisions they only divided neatly into their groups on one occasion. On the 21<sup>st</sup> March 1649 the House divided upon whether the current levels of assessment should remain the same for six months.<sup>136</sup> This was not regarded as a major concern since it failed to make the newspapers. Also, the issue of supplying the Army for the trip to Ireland did not divide the MPs, and thus cannot be regarded as a major ideological issue. But the future of the House of

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<sup>133</sup> Worden, The Rump Parliament p.47 and n.4. I do have reservations about the use of Hutchinson Ludlow. See C.H Firth (ed), Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson, Governor of Nottingham, by his Widow Lucy (1906) p.269.

<sup>134</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.524.

<sup>135</sup> Blair Worden notes that there was not such a significant divide between the revolutionaries and the conformists. I believe that it is even less than he thought. He retained both terms. As mentioned in the text, I have decided to dispense with conformist preferring non subscriber which relates to both the early test of dissent and the regicide. For the divisions see C.J vi p.128, 132, 140, 141-2, 145. 147, 158, 159, 160, 164, 167, 170, 172, 188, 192, 195, 197.

<sup>136</sup> Sir John Burchier and Henry Martin believed that they should remain the same for six months. Sir William Masham and Sir John Goodwin opposed, C.J vi. p.170.



Lords can, and one would imagine that if a great distinction did exist it would be over the nature of the future constitution. The regicide William Purefoy sided with William Sydenham a man who played no role in the events between the purge and regicide.<sup>137</sup> Sir William Brereton, a non-subscriber, understandably supported the candidature of the Earl of Salisbury to the Council of State. He was joined by the committed Philip Lord Lisle. Against them stood Henry Martin who joined with Lord Monson who had failed to commit himself to either an early dissent or the regicide.<sup>138</sup> When it came to determining whether the Council should have a president it saw four revolutionaries battling it out.<sup>139</sup> On the 8<sup>th</sup> of March Oliver Cromwell sided with Sir Arthur Heselrige against the revolutionary Ludlow and the non-subscribing Masham.<sup>140</sup> It was clear from all of these divisions that the issue of commitment to either the early dissent or the regicide had little impact upon the political groupings in the early months of the Commonwealth. Although it is claimed that the return of the non-subscribers had a profound effect upon the conservative nature of the new regime it is remarkable that out of all the divisions noted above the conformists only worked together as tellers on four occasions.<sup>141</sup>

Although it is no longer fashionable to consider seventeenth century politics in terms of parties, it is clear that these members shared a number of common aims.<sup>142</sup> Had this not been the case than there would have been more of a division when the conformists returned. This

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<sup>137</sup> They were opposed by Lord Grey and Henry Martin C.J vi. p.132.

<sup>138</sup> C.J vi. p.141.

<sup>139</sup> Sir John Danvers and Colonel Wauton supported, whereas Sir Michael Livesey and Henry Marten opposed. The latter were successful by 22 votes to 16, C.J vi p.145.

<sup>140</sup> C.J vi, p.159.

<sup>141</sup> C.J vi, p.160, 164, 170 and 195.

<sup>142</sup> The issue of parties is discussed in chapter 4 below.

only happened over the oath to sit on the Council of State, where the opposition found themselves marginalized<sup>143</sup>. The main difference which separated the two was the execution of Charles I. This is, of course, a major ideological factor, but the politics between February and May 1649 suggest that it was not an irreconcilable conflict that would dominate political allegiance. In the first chapter it was argued that a large number of the people who sat upon the Council of State had demonstrated their support for the purging of Parliament. Earlier in this chapter it was suggested that a number of the non-subscribers may have favoured deposition and that many of them had endorsed the purging of Parliament. The MPs who countenanced either deposition or a major curtailment of Charles' power, were a group who showed a willingness to consider a major alteration to the Government. The precise form that this would take may not have pleased them, but they believed that it was not a sufficient enough obstacle to prevent them from serving. It can be argued that they had more in common with the revolutionaries than they did with their former colleagues who had decided to leave Westminster.

Finally, the non subscribers risked a great deal by supporting the new regime. Although the Royalists were unable to mount an immediate challenge to the regicide, the events of 1649 created bitter resentment in their circles. The notion of blood guilt is usually applied to the New Model Army. Yet, the vast amount of Royalist writings which poured out citing scriptural evidence suggesting that revenge would be exacted upon all the participants associated with the new regime, also points to vengeance.<sup>144</sup> This suggests that all the members of the Government could have faced reprisals for their actions during the revolution.

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<sup>143</sup> See chapter 1 for the view that many in the Council of State had supported the purge.

<sup>144</sup> For example: All is not Gold that Glisters, T.T.E. 536 (19), 29<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.6-7; Sir John Grenville to Sir E. Nicholas, 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1649. The Nicholas Papers, (ed) George F. Warner vol i, Camden Society (1886), p.107; HMCR Mss of F.W Leyborne-Popham (1889) p.9-11; B. Worden, "Providence and Politics in Cromwellian England" P&P no. 109, p.55-57. Below n.147.

The regicides would have been at the top of the list but it is likely that others would have faced the prospect of retribution also. The men that established the Commonwealth produced acts abolishing kingly Government and continued to persecute Royalists. In the event of an immediate restoration, it is very likely that these men would have faced punishment<sup>145</sup>. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the early years of the Commonwealth, Charles II was intent upon achieving a victory without making concessions to anyone in the Government. He would reluctantly endeavour to woo both English and Scottish Presbyterians, but this was only after Montrose had failed and the Royalist activities in Ireland had been crushed by Cromwell's forces. As far as the English Government was concerned, they had no reason to think that they would escape punishment in the event of a restoration. Charles II was conciliatory at the Declaration of Breda after a decade in exile. In the early years of this exile he was the angry young man determined to avenge his father's death.<sup>146</sup> Finally, it is important to note that the Royalist press made no distinction between the regicides and the non-subscribers. They were passed on information abroad to the Royalist court speaking of the evils of this homogenous Government. An edition of *Mercurius Pragmaticus* placed some of the non-subscribers at the head of it.<sup>147</sup> Had a restoration occurred this party would have demanded retribution against all of the members of the new Government. Given the depth, scale and nature of these Royalist writings, the possibility of a vengeful Royalist party would not have been lost on the new executive.<sup>148</sup> Considering that the regime faced the prospect of

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<sup>145</sup> S.R Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660 (Third edition 1906) p.381-3, 384, 388; C.J vi p.159-61 for the moves against the leading Royalists.

<sup>146</sup> Ronald Hutton, Charles II (Oxford 1991) p.34-70; B.M Egerton Mss 1533 fol. 18.

<sup>147</sup> The attitude of the Royalist press will be discussed below. Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T.E. 540 (15), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February 1649. List includes: Vane, Salisbury, Pembroke, Wilson and Whitelock. For the newsletters see chapter 1 above, also Bodelian Library Clarendon Mss 34 fol. 73.

<sup>148</sup> For example, An Elegie on Charles I T.T. E.553 (1) 4<sup>th</sup> May 1649; E. 553 (1); A Hand-Kirchife for Loyal mourners T.T.E. 541 (6), 30<sup>th</sup> January 1649.



invasion from European monarchies, armed Royalists in Ireland and Scotland, a Royalist party in England that screamed for revenge and a group of Presbyterians who may have sided with the royalists, the decision to serve demonstrates a certain courage and belief. The abstaining members certainly took the safest option. When Whitelock stated that he was taking a risk by joining the new Government, we have good reason to believe him.<sup>149</sup>

This chapter has suggested that there was not a gulf between the majority of the MPs and the Army. The former accepted the purge and the latter were, superficially at least, content with the membership of the Commons. The remainder of the chapter will focus upon the motives that governed both groups and attempt to provide an answer to the question posed by Dr Kelsey about the degree of attachment to a form of republicanism.<sup>150</sup> The argument will also attempt to explain why there was so little reform on religious and constitutional issues during the first few months of the revolution.

Dr Worden has explained the reasons for the Rump's conservatism. He has shown that many of the members of the Commonwealth did not possess sufficient social radicalism to extend the revolution beyond the events of 1649. This thesis supports this argument but I will place more emphasis upon the events outside of Westminster to explain why the Rump adopted such a conservative posture.

A great deal of the research undertaken upon the Army during this period has tended to focus upon the Leveller discontent during the early years of the Commonwealth. This culminated in the defeat of the Levellers at Burford in May 1649.<sup>151</sup> It is also widely accepted that material

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<sup>149</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p.525.

<sup>150</sup> Kelsey, Inventing a Republic passim.

<sup>151</sup> The most detailed account, can be found in Ian Gentles, The New Model Army p.315-49.

grievances were at the core of this discontent and that there was not such a widespread attachment to Leveller ideology. This view is certainly confirmed by the findings in this thesis. It is also worth pointing out that many members of the Army were opposed to the moves made by the so called Leveller movement.

Upon the 14<sup>th</sup> March Colonel Deane's regiment made it perfectly plain that they wanted to fight in Ireland and that this was only being prevented by the Leveller disturbances.<sup>152</sup> A petition from Norfolk called for union amongst the Godly.<sup>153</sup> From Leicester there appears to have been a rejection of Leveller doctrine as they professed support for the existing Parliament.<sup>154</sup> In early February a petitions asked that the defence of the seas be the most pressing issue.<sup>155</sup> A number of tracts written by supporters of the Army did not call for the extension of reform after regicide. A pamphlet entitled 'An Answer to the Cities Representative', published upon the 7<sup>th</sup> February called for the union of Presbyterians and Independents.<sup>156</sup> The author's principle justification for regicide was based upon the notion that if Charles had remained as king with limited powers, he would have broken any agreement and become even more intransigent.<sup>157</sup> Another pamphlet which appeared upon the 13<sup>th</sup> February was critical of the Presbyterian movement and based the justification for

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<sup>152</sup> The Perfect Weekly Account E.548 (10), Wednesday 14<sup>th</sup> March – Wednesday 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1649, p.425.

<sup>153</sup> The Armies Weekly Intelligencer T.T.E. 545 (3), Thursday 15<sup>th</sup> February – Thursday 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1649, p.34-5.

<sup>154</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 540 (2), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March 1649. Although this petition called for the abolition of tithes, it was clear that they wanted an expedition to Ireland.

<sup>155</sup> E.g. Perfect Occurances of Every Daies Journal E. 527 (17), Thursday 8<sup>th</sup> February – Thursday 15<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.822-3 and 830.

<sup>156</sup> An Answer to the Cities Representatives set forth by some Ministers of the Gospel T.T.E. 541 (23), p.3.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid, p.5.

regicide upon the grounds that the King had transgressed, but the author offered no suggestion of a system of Government to replace the monarchy.<sup>158</sup> Five days later an Army petition from the Northern Associations called for the reform of laws, but this pamphlet was also, a ringing endorsement of Parliament and expressed an absolute belief in God's providence.<sup>159</sup> Two other pamphlets appeared in late February. They both blamed the regicide on Charles, and the second entitled 'The Parliament Justified' clearly expressed that they did not support the Leveller doctrine.<sup>160</sup> Finally, Fairfax so maligned by the Leveller leaders, received high praise from a number of his regiments.<sup>161</sup>

In many respects the Army did not put pressure on the new Government to reform. They did want to see some alteration to the laws but they were not concerned with precise plans and timetables. Pressure would mount on the Parliament after the Battle of Worcester in 1651 but during the revolution this was not the case. Blair Worden rightly pointed out that for many MPs the events of 1649 took the revolution far enough. This view appears to have been shared by a number of members of the Army and it helps to explain why the revolution was not followed by radical reform; the purges had created the Parliament but not all of the Army had not followed this up with even more demands for change. As I mentioned above, the Army stopped their involvement in the political process on the 20<sup>th</sup> December and they did not intervene again throughout this revolutionary period. It is important also, to realise that

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<sup>158</sup> Eye Salve to anoint the Minsiters in the Province of London , E. 542 (16), 13<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.2.

<sup>159</sup> A Declaration from the Northern Association of the Counties of England , T.T.E. 544 (6), 19<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.1-5.

<sup>160</sup> The Execution of the late King Justified and the Army and Parliament Vindicated , T.T.E. 545 (7), 26<sup>th</sup> February 1649; The Parliament Justified T.T.E. 545 (14), 27<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.8 for the anti Leveller stand.

<sup>161</sup> England's Fortress Exemplified T.T.E 554 (14), 20<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.1-8, esp. p.2.



the Army should not be regarded as a homogenous body which always demanded progress and reform.<sup>162</sup>

When David Underdown wrote his book Pride's Purge, it was generally assumed that the debates upon the Agreement of the People were not taken seriously; it was merely a means for the Grandees to keep the Levellers busy while they got on with the more important business of trying the King.<sup>163</sup> Since the publication of his book, Colin Davis, Barbara Taft and Ian Gentles have questioned this view.<sup>164</sup> An examination of the Clarke papers confirms the views of the historians cited above. Ireton clearly took the debates seriously and his lengthy and often bad tempered interventions are a testimony to his desire to see a constitution that he could work with. It is also clear that he did allow the Levellers to have a voice in the proceedings demonstrated by the hostility that he faced from them.<sup>165</sup> All of this makes a mockery of Lilburne's subsequent charge that the debates were not taken seriously. Indeed Barbara Taft argues that the Levellers themselves were not committed to the agreement, illustrated by their refusal to "hammer out a constitution" which other revolutionary factions would have supported.<sup>166</sup> This thesis supports this view but will take the argument slightly

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<sup>162</sup> I therefore share some of the views outlined by Dr. Kelsey, Inventing a Republic p.151-189.

<sup>163</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.198-9, and the sources listed in n.70, p.199.

<sup>164</sup> Barbara Taft, 'The Council of Officers Agreement of the People, 1648/9' HJ, 28 (1985).; 'Voting lists of the Council of Officers, December 1648' BIHR, LII (1979); Ian Gentles, The New Model Army; J.C Davis, 'The Levellers and Christianity' in Brian Manning (ed), 'Politics, Religion and the English Civil War' (1973); Full listings of these sources can be found in n.67 above.

<sup>165</sup> The Clarke Papers (ed.) C.H Firth, 4 vols (Camden New Series 1891-1901), vol ii p. 75-7, 79, 88-9, 91-5, 139-40, 147.

<sup>166</sup> Barbara Taft, "The Council of Officers – Agreement of the People 1648/9" HJ 28 (1985) p.180-81.

further by suggesting that Lilburne seriously undermined the prospects of reform by making his outspoken and unsubstantiated attacks upon the new regime.

Before the publication of John Lilburne's tract 'England's New Chains Discovered', there had been rumblings of discontent amongst the Leveller faction. This bad feeling had coincided with Lilburne's return to London in early February.<sup>167</sup> Lilburne had been away from London before the regicide dealing with his estates in Durham but he officially entered the political debate on the 28<sup>th</sup> February with an outspoken attack against the new regime. He welcomed some of the rhetoric used by the Commons, but he then outlined some of his reservations. First, he warned that the Council of State aimed at "an absolute domination of the Commonwealth" and that this had always been the intention of a number of the members. Second, he attacked Parliament for their policies against the press claiming that the restrictions were now as severe as they had been at the time of Holles and Stapleton. Finally, and most significantly, he accused them of deliberately using the soldiers when they were needed in the wars but now they were being described by MPs as, "Levellers, Anachists and Jesuits."<sup>168</sup>

The criticisms levelled against the Parliament were unfair and bound to cause resentment against the Leveller cause. The charges created a gulf between his ideas and any possibility of implementation. Lilburne had every right to complain about the formation of the Council of State from a purist's perspective but it was designed to defend the Commonwealth from dangers and in 1649 it was certainly needed.<sup>169</sup> His criticisms of the press are also unsubstantiated since Gilbert Mabbott was still the Government's official censor who had

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<sup>167</sup> Gentles, The New Model Army p.316.

<sup>168</sup> "Englands New Chains Discovered" in William Haller and Godfrey Davis (eds), The Leveller Tracts, 1647-53 p.157-70 (New York 1944).

<sup>169</sup> C.S.P.D 1649-50, p.5-8.

Leveller sympathies but who also allowed individual editors to put forward their own ideas in their respective papers.<sup>170</sup> Finally, the Commons needed the Army for the expedition to Ireland so they did not subject them to verbal assaults. By criticising the Government in this fashion Lilburne had raised the stakes and if the Government was to have any credibility they could not be seen to cave in to these demands which were essentially a statement of contempt for the new regime.

This was not, of course, the last time that Lilburne would attack the ruling party. Ian Gentles has described 'The Second Part of England's New Chains Discovered' as a "declaration of war against the grandees". In this document Lilburne blamed the grandees for their role in provoking the Second Civil War, for orchestrating the death of Rainsborowe and even for the poor economic conditions that faced the nation. He concludes the pamphlet with these words; "(their actions) exceeds in the nature and measure of it, all the wickedness of both the other parties put together."<sup>171</sup>

This could only have one effect – it united the Army and the Grandees yet further.

It was not just Lilburne who was denouncing the new regime. Bray, Overton and Thompson had also produced pamphlets that bitterly attacked both the Parliament and the Army.<sup>172</sup> It is now worth considering the impact that this had upon the new regime. The Government's official Newspaper, A Modest Narrative of Intelligence claimed that the opposition to the Levellers was based upon the threat they posed to the expedition to Ireland. The editor warned that if Ireland was not dealt with the nation really would be subjected to slavery. In a

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<sup>170</sup> This will be discussed in chapter 5 below.

<sup>171</sup> Gentles, The New Model Army p.321. "Second Part of Englands New Chains" in Haller and Davis, Leveller Tracts p.170-89.

<sup>172</sup> Most of these are cited in, Gentles, The New Model Army p.315-349 and sources listed p.528-537. See also, BM Egerton Mss, f.93-97.



subsequent edition he warned that fresh elections were needed but that they could not happen immediately because, without the proper provisions, the secluded members would return and this would mark the end of the Republic.<sup>173</sup> When considering why the Levellers were so brutally crushed, it must be remembered that the circumstances in 1649 pushed the radicals in Parliament in a conservative direction. The Navy required reorganisation and the records of the Council of State show that the new Government was on war-footing throughout the period.<sup>174</sup> The men that made the revolution were capable of accepting political change and there were reformers in Parliament. Ireton and Harrison had been critical of the decision to allow an oath for the Council of State but they were silent after this date. Even Henry Marten seems to have dropped his quest for reform.<sup>175</sup> Whitelock remarked that after the regicide, that many opinions existed about the direction that the Government should take. Given the level of commitment to the regicide and the incontrovertible fact that the regime's survival depended upon the support of the Army, it is possible that if the right circumstances prevailed, the Rump could have become more of a reforming institution. But the grandees did not push Parliament in this direction because Lilburne was busy inciting the Army to mutiny. Moreover when a group of Anabaptists petitioned Parliament they received a favourable response which suggests that MPs were not oblivious to outside pressures.<sup>176</sup> Unfortunately, Lilburne and his fellow travellers were responsible for three future policies. First, he united the Army Grandees with the Parliament. Barbara Taft was critical of Ireton after the

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<sup>173</sup> A Modest Narrative of Intelligence E. 551 (9), Saturday 14<sup>th</sup> April – Saturday 21<sup>st</sup> April 1649, p.17; A Modest Narrative of Intelligence T.T.E. 555 (32), Saturday 12<sup>th</sup> May – Saturday 19<sup>th</sup> May, p.49.

<sup>174</sup> The Navy will be discussed in chapter 3. For its importance see, C.S.P.D p.6-149.

<sup>175</sup> This is clear from the lack of divisions mentioned earlier in the chapter. The formation of the Council of State is discussed in chapter 1.

<sup>176</sup> The Perfect Weekly Account, T.T.E 549 (3), Wednesday 28<sup>th</sup> March – Wednesday 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1649, p.434.

Agreement accusing him of suffering from a lack of nerve by not pressing the Agreement on the new regime. In light of Lilburne's personal assaults against him, it is hardly surprising that, at a time of chronic danger, Ireton distanced himself from a document which was intrinsically associated with the Leveller leader. Moreover, it was rumoured that the Levellers had made some overtures to the King.<sup>177</sup> Second, as I mentioned above, many in the Army did not support these Leveller ideas. As the conflict deepened between the Levellers and the Grandees the Army became less inclined to promote reform. Finally, Lilburne helped to ensure that the Government was even more distracted from issues of reform than it would otherwise have been. This can be illustrated from an account of the proceedings in the Council of State.

On the 26<sup>th</sup> of March the Council wrote to Captain Nicholls, the Governor of Chepstow Castle. The Council expressed a concern that there was a waste of timber which was hindering the building of ships. The letter went on to say that the Council had heard that much of the timber in the forest was being used for iron works but not enough attention was being paid to the preservation of the "corpses" which could be used by the Navy. This shows the attention to detail employed by the Council of State and how desperate they were to utilise all of the resources at their disposal to defend the Commonwealth from invasion. It was not an isolated incident and the records of the Council of State are testimony to the efficiency and effort they put in to both the reorganisation of the Navy and equipping of the Army for Ireland.<sup>178</sup> The day after this letter was sent to Nicholls the Council became aware of John Lilburne's 'Second Part of England's New Chains Discovered.' It is hardly surprising that they endorsed a declaration from Parliament which condemned the document. The Council

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<sup>177</sup> Taft, HJ, p.185 cited n.166 above.

<sup>178</sup> CSPD 1649-50, Council of State to Captain Nicholls, p.1788. For the Navy see p.3-107. All of the pages are littered with accounts about building up the strength of the Navy.

also wrote to Fairfax asking him to “proceed against them for attempting to raise a mutiny in the Army”<sup>179</sup> When Lilburne was summoned before the Council he refused to recognise their authority. The Council, quite understandably threw him into the Tower.

The pressures outside Westminster pushed the Parliament in a conservative direction. The revolution was full of ironies and one of the greatest, rests with the fact that Lilburne assisted the drift towards conservatism which was so apparent in the months after the regicide. It was, of course, not just Lilburne who was responsible for this. Blair Worden’s analysis of the backgrounds of the MPs goes a long way in explaining why the regicide was not followed by a series of reforms. However, politicians are always influenced by external pressures. The conservative background of these MPs cannot be isolated from the circumstance in which they governed. Essentially politics was dominated by the issue of survival, and the Levellers merely succeeded in increasing the difficulties which faced the new regime. It will be argued in chapter four that some of the Presbyterians adopted a more positive approach towards the new regime than has been previously thought. The Government believed that their acquiescence was at least possible, but such a view could never have been taken of the Levellers.

### Conclusions.

The publication of Sean Kelsey’s book ‘Inventing a Republic’ challenged all of the conventional historiography of the Rump period. He suggests that due to a number of long-term conditioning factors of English history, the Commonwealth was able to establish itself because “Englishmen were perfectly adequately equipped to turn the unprecedented circumstance of Kinglessness into a set of convictions based upon ideas already long since

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<sup>179</sup> Ibid



dormant in early modern culture.”<sup>180</sup> This thesis will not attempt to judge the origins of republicanism apart from stating that the return of the non-subscribing members may indicate that MPs did believe that the system could survive without a king. It is, however, difficult to determine whether these MPs had been influenced by a deep rooted attachment to republicanism. The lack of available evidence accentuates the problems faced by the historian of this period. It is possible to argue that there is a danger of looking at the outward form of government and regarding this as manifestation of an almost subconscious attachment to the principle of a government without a king. The leaders of the Commons had to present themselves as a legitimate authority when they executed Charles. It is clear from the evidence consulted in this thesis that they were not in a desperate hurry to make the transition to republicanism.

As I mentioned above there is a real problem with evidence for the historian of this period. It is simply impossible to determine the views of the majority of the MPs. But where the evidence does exist it appears that the majority of the MPs decided to establish the Commonwealth because they disliked the person of the King rather than the institution of monarchy. This supports one of the central findings of Blair Worden’s work. Thomas Scott produced a pamphlet before the regicide justifying the legislation against the King upon the grounds that Charles could not be trusted. He attacked the King for his religion, his record of government throughout his reign and most importantly his engagement with the Scots.<sup>181</sup> This testimony from one of the leading regicides, points to ‘blood guilt’ rather than a support for a new republican order. This hostility to the engagement with the Scots was a crucial issue in pushing men towards regicide. A series of votes passed before the regicide condemning the eleven members and Lionel Copley for their part in the engagement suggests that feelings ran

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<sup>180</sup> Kelsey, Inventing a Republic, p.201.

<sup>181</sup> A Pair of Cristal Spectacles with which Any Man my see Plainly, T.T.E. 476 (30), 18<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.1-6.

high against the Scots.<sup>182</sup> At the time of the trial of the leading Royalists after the regicide, Holland, Capel, Goring and Owen had petitions on their behalf listened to, whereas Hamilton's was simply laid aside.<sup>183</sup> This was almost certainly due the latter's alleged involvement with the Scots. Parliament's declaration published upon the 22<sup>nd</sup> February principally justified the purges and the regicide upon the grounds of Charles' engagement with the Scots. A further declaration by Parliament upon the 17<sup>th</sup> March justified the destruction of the monarchy upon the grounds that Charles had abused his trust.<sup>184</sup> Dr Kelsey is only partially right when he says that at the trial of the King there was "an almost overwhelming amount of theory, both biblical and constitutional, as well as precedent, ancient and contemporary, justifying the inevitable regicide itself".<sup>185</sup> It is true that justifications for regicide looked backwards and these apologias tended to focus predominantly upon the person of Charles. The people who supported the new regime tended to base their ideas upon the negative issue of being opposed to Charles and then would justify their actions upon the grounds of precedent. They are self-justificatory in tone and do not appear to have embraced a new order which had its origins embedded in English history.<sup>186</sup> Moreover, it must be recognised that this opinion was shared by both the MPs and many in the Army. It is interesting to note that Morgan Llwyd regarded them as one in the same.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> A Declaration Collected out of the Journals of Both Houses, T.T.E. 477 (7), Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> January – Wednesday 20<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.19.

<sup>183</sup> C.J vi, p.159-61. For Hamilton's petition being laid aside, see p.160.

<sup>184</sup> The Parliament Justified, T.T.E. 545 (14), 27<sup>th</sup> February 1649; A Declaration of Parliament T.T.E. 548 (12), 17<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.1-20.

<sup>185</sup> Kelsey, Inventing a Republic, p.204.

<sup>186</sup> A Declaration of Parliament and The Parliament Justified cited above n.184; The Execution of the Late King Justified, T.T.E. 545 (7), 26<sup>th</sup> February 1649, esp. p.25; The Golden Rule of Justice Advanced T.T.E. 543 (6), 16<sup>th</sup> February 1649.

<sup>187</sup> NLW, Mss. 1143B, fol.1, 2.

This is, of course, far closer to the arguments of Blair Worden than it is to the new writings which see a republican tradition in England. My argument simply states that this hostility to the King was more widespread than Dr Worden's thesis allowed. Also, this thesis has argued that many of the sitting MPs supported the purging of Parliament, which was confirmed in an official parliamentary publication that appeared on 17<sup>th</sup> March.<sup>188</sup>

Finally, the evidence presented here suggests that origins of the conflict between the Army and the MPs should be studied from a fresh perspective. During the revolution both sides (and I am obviously distinguishing the Levellers from the Army leaders), united in their desire to see, first the execution of the King, and then the protection of the new regime from the variety of dangers it faced. The majority of the radicals demonstrated a scant desire to see the revolution extended beyond the actions of both the purge and regicide. It also disputes the argument first levelled by John Lilburne that the Parliament and the grandees pursued a set of policies that were at variance with the majority of the "radical" nation. It is not the place here to address the reasons for the future conflict between the Rump and the Army but one explanation, which owes a great deal to the interpretations of Blair Worden, Austin Woolrych and Ian Gentles, can be mooted. Between its formation and 1651, the New Model had not been idle. The success they enjoyed in England in the first two Civil Wars was succeeded with remarkable achievements in Ireland and Scotland. Their religion demanded action and they returned to England to find a government that had not displayed the same type of energy that they had experienced. However, they found a government that had grown in self-confidence and no longer believed that an Army should play a significant role in politics. From the findings in this chapter, it must be stressed that this was not an inevitable conflict, rather, it would be conditioned by the events that followed the revolution.

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<sup>188</sup> A Declaration of Parliament, 17<sup>th</sup> March 1649, cited above n.184.



What were the priorities which governed this new regime? The answer is, I believe, far closer to the interpretations of the 1970s than it is to the recent accounts expounding a republican tradition. The Commonwealth spent the first months of its rule fighting for survival. They found it difficult to look beyond the immediate problems they faced at home and abroad. They gave little thought to the future and displayed little concern about their republican image.

On the 30<sup>th</sup> April 1649 the master of ceremonies, Sir Oliver Fleming submitted a report to the Council of State, which asked for direction upon how he should portray the Commonwealth when he was dealing with foreign dignitaries. Dr Kelsey attached a great deal of significance to this report;

“Fleming’s report gives an interesting insight into post-revolutionary political culture, indicating the awareness in England of the importance of maintaining and rewriting the familiar fictions of political theatre which were so important to diplomatic relations.”

Dr Kelsey then goes on to add, “it would certainly seem that Rumpers needed little reminding of the importance of protocol and ceremony.” In many respects this is important and his work has certainly shown that by 1653 the Rump had managed to create an image for itself. However, Fleming’s report can be interpreted in a very different fashion. Instead of regarding it as an indication of the Rump’s willingness to establish an image for itself, the report infers that the Rump had not taken its image seriously enough.

Fleming begins the report by asking the members of the Rump Parliament to “know of the titles” he was to give to “the Council of State and the Commonwealth,” when he was “conversing with foreign ministers.” He suggested that without the necessary pomp the regime would not be taken seriously at a time when the support, or at least the acquiescence of foreign powers was desperately needed. He then described how official protocol worked in a number of other “republics.” He concluded his report with a list of recommendations upon

how the Commonwealth should treat foreign ambassadors visiting England. The list included the manner in which an ambassador should be greeted; where they should sit in the House, now that the chamber was not “subject to another power” and where they should stay during their visit. Underlying all of his suggestions rested one simple principle: if the Commonwealth was going to be taken seriously, it had to adopt a protocol that befitted a great power. As Dr Kelsey has shown a great deal of this was accepted by the new Government but this was a consequence of the events of 1649 rather than a belief in a republican form of government.

The mere fact that Fleming was forced to point out that the new Government had made little provision for the pomp and circumstance that surrounded the new regime, suggests that contemplation of the precise form that the new government should take was not high on the list of priorities for the members of the new regime.<sup>189</sup>

The Commonwealth was a republic, but as Blair Worden rightly states it was “triumphant by default.”<sup>190</sup> This chapter suggests that the momentum that sustained it in the early months of its rule was the memory of a reprehensible prince. It is unlikely that either the MPs or the Army officers, (most notably Cromwell) had given much thought to the form that the new government should take. This lack of enthusiasm about the form of government, coupled with the dangers that faced the regime from abroad, explains the why the monarchy and the House of Lords were not formally abolished until March 1649 and why the Commonwealth was only established three months after the regicide. This in turn does not explain fully the reasons for the conservatism of the Rump; rather they are found in the events outside of Westminster where most radicals defended the new regime upon the grounds that the last king had done such an awful job. It is certainly possible that the Rump grew in confidence and started to adopt a more classically republican posture. However the evidence produced in this chapter

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<sup>189</sup> Kelsey, Inventing a Republic, p.56-60. CSPD 1649-50, p.113-17.

<sup>190</sup> This view is discussed by Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic, p.205.

suggests that the English Republic was born out of a belief that Charles had to leave the political stage and, without a suitable replacement on offer, the monarchy went with him.



## The House of Lords

The last two chapters focussed upon the role of Cromwell and the House of Commons during the revolution. The findings suggest that there was more of an ideological commitment to the revolution than other accounts have claimed. This chapter will focus upon the attitude and activities of the peers during the first months of the revolution and it is intended that this will provide a more detailed narrative of events than any of the secondary sources mentioned in the introduction. This chapter will also comment upon the significance of the peers in the early months of 1649, and in the process a number of Dr Adamson's arguments will be tested. This chapter will attempt to question some of them, whilst also including information which has been neglected in his and other accounts.

### The Purge.

Pride's Purge is viewed as one of the most famous interventions made by the Army during the period of the Civil War and Interregnum. It is rightly regarded as one of the key events in the revolution, but historians and contemporaries have, by and large, discussed the event in terms of the assault upon the privileges of the House of Commons.<sup>1</sup> Its enduring legacy perhaps stems from the writings of William Prynne who claimed that he was prevented from asserting

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<sup>1</sup> David Underdown, Pride's Purge Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford 1972) p.143-172.; Derek Hirst, England in Conflict (1999) p.257-8; G.E.Aylmer, Rebellion or Revolution (Oxford 1986) p.97-9; A.B. Worden, The Rump Parliament (Cambridge 1974) p.23-6; Ian Gentles, The New Model Army (Cambridge 1986) p.276-83; A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members T.T.E. 539 (5), 20<sup>th</sup> January 1649. Edward Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, (ed) W.D Macray, 6 vols (Oxford 1888) vol iv p.512; J.S.A Adamson, "Eminent Victorians: S.R Gardiner and the Liberal as Hero" H.J 1990 vol 33 p.641-57; Clement Walker, A Complete History of Independency (London 1661) part ii p.46-7; Rushworth Historical Collections (8 vols), D. Browne (ed) vol vii p.1333-6, 1721-2; Ludlow Memoirs, (ed) C.H Firth 2 vols (Oxford 1894) vol i p.470; A Voyce from the Watchtower, part five (ed) A.B Worden Camden Society 4<sup>th</sup> series xxi (1978) p.143; Whitelock Memorials of English Affairs 4 vols (Oxford 1853) vol ii p.468-470; BM Add Mss 37.344 f.232-3; BM Egerton Mss 2618 fol 31.

the just rights of the English people through the institution of Parliament,<sup>2</sup> and in more modern times the image of an Army usurping an elected, (however undemocratic), chamber is unpalatable. But it is this affront to the supremacy of an elected chamber which makes the image of the purge so enduring.

Most historians have tended to overlook the effect the purge had upon the House of Lords.<sup>3</sup> David Underdown hardly mentions the Lords upon the day of the purge and his view of the irrelevancy of the Lords is sustained throughout his analysis of the political events between the first purge and the regicide. Professor Underdown does not imply that any force was used against the Lords.<sup>4</sup> In marked contrast to this argument, John Adamson suggests that the Army purged the House but it “soon became clear that the Army had adopted a far more lenient attitude to the peers involved in the treaty than it did towards the members of the House of Commons.”<sup>5</sup> Dr Adamson’s argument rests comfortably with his earlier work upon the Lords in two important respects. First, he shows that the Lords were significant participants in the Newport negotiations and therefore they too had to become victims of the

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<sup>2</sup> William Prynne, A Brief Memento to the present Unparliamentary Juncto T.T.E. 537 (7) 4<sup>th</sup> January 1649. Walker, Independency part ii p.49. All of Prynne’s writings and actions will be discussed in Chapter 4 below.

<sup>3</sup> Sources listed in note 1 above. The effect of the purge was not subjected to serious scrutiny by C.H Firth, The House of Lords During the English Civil War (1910) p.206; The same is true of G.F Trevallyn Jones, Saw-Pit Wharton Stuart Historical Studies (Sydney 1967) p.130-131; As will be seen, I agree with Firth’s view that the Lords were not subjected to a purge, but he failed to develop his case. I will attempt to show that the Lords were not purged but the seclusion of the members of the Lower Chamber had a profound effect upon the number of Peers attending their chamber. See also David Smith, The Stuart Parliaments 1603-1689 (1999) p.135; Ian Ward, ‘The English Peerage 1649-1660: Government Authority and Estates’ (PhD thesis Cambridge 1989) p.1-4.

<sup>4</sup> Underdown, Pride’s Purge p.157. Firth, The House of Lords p.204. Most historians have supported these accounts. See n.1 above.

<sup>5</sup> J.S.A Adamson, ‘The Peerage in Politics 1645- 1649’ (PhD thesis Cambridge 1986) p.258.

Army. Second, the Army had such deference for the Lords that they were unwilling to place any peer in custody.<sup>6</sup>

There is no doubt that the events in early December had a profound effect upon the number of peers attending the chamber. In the month before the purge twenty-seven peers showed their faces in the upper chamber; this reduced to twenty in the month after the purge.<sup>7</sup> Far more dramatically was the average attendance which dropped from approximately fourteen in November, down to an average of six in the period between the 6<sup>th</sup> of December and the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January.<sup>8</sup> For a number of peers the purge marked the end of their active involvement in politics. The Earl of Lincoln was a fairly active member in November and early December 1648, but he refused to take his seat after the purge of the Commons. The Earl of Rutland attended most sessions from the 3<sup>rd</sup> of November until the 5<sup>th</sup> of December but only appeared in the chamber upon the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> of December and again upon the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January to reject the moves against the King. Lord Hunsdon was another who attended upon the 6<sup>th</sup> of December, withdrew only to return to reject the moves against the King.<sup>9</sup> The same scenario can be seen with Manchester, Rutland, North, Maynard, Dacres and Berkeley.<sup>10</sup> Some peers, despite pressure to do so,<sup>11</sup> did not attend at all after the purging of the Commons. It is

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid p.258-260. All of these contentions will be discussed in this chapter.

<sup>7</sup> L.J x p.572-650; Table 4 below identifies the exact attendance during this period.

<sup>8</sup> L.J x p.572-641 and Table 4 below. For the attendance figures for all the Stuart Parliaments see Smith, Stuart Parliaments p.19-22- Dr Smith notes the decline in the attendance figures in December 1648 but he does not attribute this to the purge -

<sup>9</sup> For Lincoln's attendance see Table 4 below. On the 28<sup>th</sup> December he made a rather feeble excuse for not attending. See L.J x p.639. For Rutland's attendance see L.J x p.572-624. For his attendance after the purge L.J 624, 625, 641; see Table 4 below. For Hunsdon see L.J x p.624,641, and table 4 below.

<sup>10</sup> L.J x p.624+641. Table 4 below. This table shows the exact days that Manchester, North, Maynard, Dacres and Berkeley attended.

<sup>11</sup> L.J x p.636-7 648.



therefore important to note the effect the purge had upon the Lords, but two important questions remains. How much force did the Army use against the peers upon the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> of December and did the Army continue to restrict the membership of the Lords throughout January and February?

I have found no evidence to support the view that the Lords were physically denied entry into the House. It is clear that the Army surrounded the streets adjacent to both Houses and certain threats were made to members of Parliament and it appears that certain Lords were encouraged not to attend their chamber.<sup>12</sup> This mirrors the treatment the Commons received in the early hours of Wednesday morning.<sup>13</sup> But one significant difference remains: if the Lords did not bow to pressure and decided to enter the chamber, there was not another group of soldiers acting as a back up with a list of names for those who were, under no circumstances, allowed to enter the House.<sup>14</sup> The newspapers which covered the purges in great detail, make no reference to the purging of the upper chamber.<sup>15</sup> Also, all the Presbyterian literature and the correspondence of some of the peers, attack the purge as an assault upon the liberties of

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<sup>12</sup> BM Add Mss 37,344.f.258.

<sup>13</sup> BM Add Mss 37,344 f.233.

<sup>14</sup> See Chapter 2 above.

<sup>15</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, E. 476 (4) Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.527; Mercurius Impartialis, T.T.E. 476(3) Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.3 (Although this source does not provide a great deal of detail upon the purge it is clear that the editor is referring to a purge of the lower chamber by his references to Prynne); A Perfect Diurnal, E. 526 (40) Monday 4<sup>th</sup> December - Mon 11<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.2552; The Perfect Weekly Account, T.T.E. 476 (15) Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December - Wed 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.306; A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses, T.T.E. 476 (17), Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December - Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.11; It is clear from Whitelock's account that the Lords were being kept in the dark but they were not subjected to a purge. See BM Add Mss, 37,344 f.233; Also Alvise Contarini to Michael Morosisni C.S.P.V 1649 p.83.

Parliament but made no reference to the seclusion of the peers.<sup>16</sup> More importantly, the moderate peers who complained about the alteration of the constitution did not attack the Army for secluding them from the chamber.

As mentioned earlier, the Army kept a strict eye upon the membership of the Commons<sup>17</sup> but the same policy was not adopted for the Lords. After the 12<sup>th</sup> of December, attendance did decrease, but there is no evidence that this was a result of Army influence.<sup>18</sup> The Lords who failed to attend may have become disillusioned with their function within the legislative process; upon the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> of December they had hardly attended to any business.<sup>19</sup> It is very likely that a number of peers objected to the Army's role in the political process and withdrew in protest. This certainly appears to be the case for the fourth Earl of Wharton who within a month of the Restoration wrote;

“When the Army first invaded the House of Commons, in order to his death I declared against that horrid act and never came into the House after.”<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Parliament Under the Power of the Sword, T.T 669 f.13, 7<sup>th</sup> December 1648; A True and Full Relation of the army's forcible seizing of Eminent Members T.T.E 476 (5); Sir Thomas Dacres and Mr Doddridge to the Speaker, Cary Memorials of the Civil Wars (2 vols) ii p.74-75; Rushworth Historical Collections vii p.1355; The Second Part of the Narrative Concerning the Armies Force and violence on the Secluded Members, T.T. E.477 (19), 23rd December 1648; A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members, T.T E.539 (5) 20<sup>th</sup> January 1649; Clarendon History iv p.512; George Booth to the Inhabitants of Cheshire Clarke Papers ii p.136; A Public Declaration and Protestation of the Secured and Secluded Members of the Commons, C.S.P.D p.6-9, 13<sup>th</sup> January 1649; For the Lords see, A Declaration of the Peerage C.S.P.D 1649-50 p.2-6.

<sup>17</sup> See Chapter 2.

<sup>18</sup> Contrast L.J x p.624 with L.J x p.626-7.

<sup>19</sup> L.J x p.624-625; The Moderate Intelligencer E.476 (24), Thursday December 7<sup>th</sup> - Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.1778 (corr pag).

<sup>20</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer cited n.19 above. This quote is found in Trevallyn-Jones 'Saw Pit Wharton', p.129. I have tended to avoid retrospective statements taken at the time of the Restoration following the method used a number of years ago by Mark Kishlansky, The New Model Army passim; I am satisfied with this quotation because it is corroborated by evidence found in the Journals of the House of Lords and by contemporary sources. See note 19 above.

The clearest indication that force was not used to keep peers away can be shown with the return of so many Lords upon the day of the vote for erecting a High Court of Justice to try the King.<sup>21</sup> Had the Army been concerned with the membership of the Lords they would have refused the moderates entry.<sup>22</sup>

The purging of the House of Commons did have an effect upon the numbers of peers attending the Lords but the latter were not physically prevented from attending the chamber. This reduction in membership was due to a combination of fear,<sup>23</sup> a sense of redundancy precipitated by the Army's involvement in the political process and disgust with the manner in which parliamentary politics was now dominated by the Army.<sup>24</sup>

### The Role of the Lords in the Legislative Process.

On the 6<sup>th</sup> of December, seven Lords attended the chamber. Although their numbers had reduced, the influential Manchester remained as Speaker.<sup>25</sup> The Lords attended to very little business spending most of their time attempting to discern the aims of the Army and, when this was not forthcoming, they adjourned without censoring the Army in any way.<sup>26</sup> The

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<sup>21</sup> L.J x p.641; Walker Independency Part ii p.55.

<sup>22</sup> The Army kept a very close eye upon the Commons in the days following Pride's initial purge. See Chapter 2 above.

<sup>23</sup> This certainly happened to members of the Commons. See Walker, Independency ii p.46.

<sup>24</sup> Clarendon History iv p.520; The Moderate Intelligencer cited above n.19. The newspaper states that the Lords "thought not fit to act until the Commons House was free"

<sup>25</sup> L.J x p.624; BM Harley Mss 7001 fol 10; Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses T.T E.477 (7) Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> - Wednesday 20th December, p.19 (This editor referred to Denbigh as the temporary Speaker but it is not supported by the evidence in the Journals.)

<sup>26</sup> L.J x p.625; BM ADD Mss 37,344 f.233.



following day eight Lords attended the chamber which included Manchester acting as Speaker again and also the very influential Viscount Saye and Sele was present.<sup>27</sup> The peers did not attend to any business apart from stating that they did not “think it fit to act until the Commons House was free”<sup>28</sup> A motion to adjourn until the following Tuesday was passed.<sup>29</sup>

This decision by the Lords to reject their legitimate role in the legislative process was not discussed by Dr Adamson but it would act as an important principle which explains why so many Lords refused to attend the chamber during December 1648. Manchester and Rutland would only return to reject the moves against the King. Wharton, and Saye and Sele did not attend a session again.<sup>30</sup> As mentioned above, the initial purge of the Commons had a dramatic effect upon the membership of the Lords and when this is combined with the decision taken upon the 7<sup>th</sup>, it is possible to account for the low attendance figures for the remainder of December. It also demonstrates the principles which governed the minds of many of the Presbyterian peers. Although they did not write vociferous pamphlets attacking the new regime - a device which was left to their secluded colleagues in the other House,<sup>31</sup> it is clear that these peers did not wish to perform a legislative function until the restrictions upon the membership of the Commons had been lifted.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Adamson, “The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647” HJ 30 1987 p.567-602.

<sup>28</sup> See n.24 above.

<sup>29</sup> L.J x p.625.

<sup>30</sup> Manchester and Rutland returned upon the 2<sup>nd</sup> L.J x p.641; For the end of Wharton and Saye see L.J x p.641-650; See Also Table 4 below and Trevallyn Jones Saw Pit Wharton p.128-137.

<sup>31</sup> The opposition to the new regime is discussed below. See Ward, ‘The English Peerage’, p.14-16.

<sup>32</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer, T.T E. 476 (24) Thursday December 7<sup>th</sup>- Thursday December 14<sup>th</sup> 1649, p.1778 (corr pag).

For one newspaper editor, the decision to adjourn marked the end of the Lords as a credible part of the legislature<sup>33</sup> and from this moment on the Lords would face taunts about their diminutive attendance record<sup>34</sup>. The low average attendance was also an issue of concern for the handful of Lords who remained in the chamber which explains the decision to issue orders for all Lords within the vicinity of London to attend the chamber.<sup>35</sup> But despite these rumours, between the 12<sup>th</sup> of December and the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January, under the leadership of Denbigh the handful of Lords who sat in the Chamber continued to perform a legislative function. It is also clear that they were willing to support some radical legislation. Upon the 14<sup>th</sup> of December the Lords (Denbigh, Pembroke and Grey) supported motions sent to them by the Commons which destroyed the principles underlying the Newport negotiations.<sup>36</sup> Two days later the Lords supported the revocation of the militia Ordinance. The journals of both Houses suggest that there was little animosity between the two Houses<sup>37</sup> and it provides some support for Dr Adamson's view that there was "nothing about the actions of either the Army or Commons in the month after the purge which suggest that they saw the Lords as being implacably opposed to bringing the king to trial"<sup>38</sup> Moreover the evidence appears to support his view that the

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<sup>33</sup> A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses T.T E.476 (17) p.11; The editor wrote: "The Lords sat very little and adjourned until Tuesday, Sic Transit Gloria Mundis"

<sup>34</sup> The Moderate T.T E 536 (2) Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup>- Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December, p.216.;Clarendon History iv p.519.

<sup>35</sup> L.J x p. 636-7 and p.648.

<sup>36</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge , p.160 and sources listed; See also L.J x p.632.

<sup>37</sup> C.J vi p.95,96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 106; L.J x p. 627,631, 632, 633, 635; Rushworth Historical Collections vii p.1362.

<sup>38</sup> Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics' p.267

peers were willing to support the trial of the King provided that the result was deposition rather than regicide.<sup>39</sup>

Although it is possible to support the view that the remaining peers were willing to countenance the trial of the King, there existed limitations to their radicalism. As mentioned in the previous chapter, upon the 13<sup>th</sup> of December the secluded members issued a pamphlet which attacked the purging of Parliament stating that the new Parliament did not possess the legitimacy to enact legislation.<sup>40</sup> The Commons reacted swiftly to this asking the Lords to delay their adjournment so a joint declaration could be issued which condemned the Presbyterian actions. As was the norm the Lords agreed to the request and a statement was issued which proclaimed that any member wishing to attend either chamber would be compelled to disclaim the Presbyterian publication.<sup>41</sup>

Dr Adamson appears to suggest that this was a deliberate ploy, employed by the Earl of Denbigh to secure his pro-Army majority. However the evidence does not support this view. First, it is clear from the surviving evidence that the decision to issue a declaration against the Presbyterians originated in the Commons rather than the Lords.<sup>42</sup> It was not, therefore, a deliberate policy concocted by the Earl of Denbigh designed to ensure that he could control the upper chamber. Second, it is not clear why Dr Adamson highlights this one particular policy, since between the 12<sup>th</sup> of December and the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January the Lords supported

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<sup>39</sup> 'Ibid' p. 262

<sup>40</sup> A Solemn Protestation of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members T.T. 669 f.13 (53), 11<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>41</sup> A Declaration of Parliament T.T 669 f.13(56), 15<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>42</sup> C.J vi p.97-98; L.J x p.630-631.



practically all of the legislation sent to them.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, contemporary accounts do not make any distinction between the Lords' support for this piece of legislation and their approval of all the other bills.<sup>44</sup> Third, there is no evidence that this proclamation was used by either House as a means of restricting membership. In the House of Commons the test of dissent was used as the method of ensuring that a pro-Army majority was sustained.<sup>45</sup> But most importantly, the Earl of Denbigh wanted to increase the size of the chamber, not to place even more restrictions upon the membership. This explains his decision upon the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December to call upon over twenty- five peers to attend the chamber.<sup>46</sup> These peers were not all radicals. They included Middlesex, who only a few days earlier had discovered his name in the press for fighting a group of troopers in the name of the King.<sup>47</sup> Former moderates including Hunsdon and Suffolk were invited to attend, men who had been identified as moderates as far back as 1647.<sup>48</sup> The list also included Manchester, Saye and Sele and Wharton whose conspicuous absence since the 7<sup>th</sup> of December demonstrated their dislike of the purge.<sup>49</sup> If

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<sup>43</sup> See note 43 above. Also The Moderate Intelligencer T.T E.477 (14) Thursday 14<sup>th</sup>- Thursday 21<sup>st</sup> January p.1788; The Perfect Weekly Account T.T. E.536 (10) Wednesday December 20<sup>th</sup> - Wednesday December 27<sup>th</sup> 1648, p.322; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, T.T. E 536(5) Tuesday December 19<sup>th</sup>- Tuesday December 26<sup>th</sup> p.1196. The Moderate T.T E.536(2) Tuesday December 19<sup>th</sup>- Tuesday December 26<sup>th</sup>, p.215-16; The Perfect Weekly Account, T.T. E.536 (37), Wednesday 27<sup>th</sup> December- Wednesday 3<sup>rd</sup> January, p.325.

<sup>44</sup> All the sources listed in n.43 above. Rushworth Historical Collections vii p.1363 1365.

<sup>45</sup> Rushworth Historical Collections vii p.1366.

<sup>46</sup> L.J x p.636-7; Perfect Occurences T.T. E. 527(3) Friday December 29- Friday January 5<sup>th</sup> p. 782.

<sup>47</sup> The Joint Resolution and Declaration of the Parliament and the Council the Army for taking away the King and the Lords, T.T. E.538 (1), 11<sup>th</sup> January 1649 p.1; Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics' p. 265-6. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (1964), p.52.

<sup>48</sup> Adamson, "The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647", HJ xxx 1987 p.567-602.

<sup>49</sup> Manchester's role on the 2<sup>nd</sup> January is discussed below. Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics', p.268-70; Wedgwood, The Trial p.84-5; C.H. Firth, The House of Lords During the Civil War p.207.

Denbigh had been so content upon retaining a chamber full of radicals he would not have allowed these peers to return. Finally and most importantly, the contents of the Declaration were not used as a means of preventing the return of the moderate peers, illustrated by those who precipitated the rejection of the moves against the King.<sup>50</sup>

Dr Adamson was at pains to point out that Denbigh also enjoyed the support of the Army, but if this relationship was as close as he claimed, bearing in mind that Denbigh was attempting to manage the House of Lords, it is surprising that the Army was not evident upon the day of the vote to promote the trial of the King.<sup>51</sup>

Upon the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January two bills arrived in the Lords: the first proclaimed that it was treason for a King to levy war against Parliament, and the second was a bill for the erection of a High Court of Justice.<sup>52</sup> The bills were presented, in a background of cordiality between the two Houses.<sup>53</sup> Dr Adamson claims that the bills were rejected because of the unexpected return of

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<sup>50</sup> L.J x p.641-2; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T E.537 (3) Tuesday January 3rd - Tuesday 9<sup>th</sup> January, p.1209.

<sup>51</sup> This has never been disputed by Historians but it is worth pointing out that Nedham, as editor of Mercurius Pragmaticus was always attempting to show that the legislature was under the control of the Army. He never suggests that the Army restricted the membership of the Lords. See Mercurius Pragmaticus, T.T. E.537 (20), Tuesday December 26<sup>th</sup> - Tuesday January 9<sup>th</sup> 1648/9- although obviously biased this is the most detailed contemporary account of the debate that took place upon the 2<sup>nd</sup> January.

<sup>52</sup> Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics', p.268-9. Firth, The House of Lords p.207-8. Although this is a detailed account of the debate there is too much reliance upon Royalist writings where there was a natural tendency to exaggerate the scale of the opposition to the trial. The same is true of Veronica Wedgwood's account The Trial, p.84-5; For contemporary accounts see Mercurius Pragmaticus, T.T E.537 (20) Tuesday December 26<sup>th</sup> - Tuesday January 9<sup>th</sup> 1648/9; HMCR De L'Isle and Dudley Manuscripts 77 (vol 3) p.583; Walker, Independency Part 2 p.55-6; Clarendon History iv, p.520; Rushworth Historical Collections vii p.1382; Whitelock Memorials ii p.487-8.

<sup>53</sup> Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics', p.267. I accept that cordial relations were maintained at this stage but that was due to the fact that the Lords had acquiesced with all of the legislation sent to them. Examples of this can be found in n.37 above.; Perfect Occurrences T.T E.526 (42), Friday December 15<sup>th</sup> - Friday December 22<sup>nd</sup>, p.768; T.T E. 536 (10), Wednesday December ; BM Add MSS 37,344 f.237.

a number of moderate peers. Denbigh saw that his pro-Army majority was under threat so he attempted to delay the vote to give him time to mobilise his supporters. This was not agreed to, and the two bills were rejected. Dr Adamson suggests that Denbigh had been thwarted by Manchester's tactics but this did not represent Denbigh's reluctance to countenance the trial of the King.<sup>54</sup>

It is possible to provide a different explanation. Although the peers who sat in the chamber after 12<sup>th</sup> of December did support some of the radical legislation sent to them by the Commons, it is important to note that the peers did not initiate any of this legislation.<sup>55</sup> This suggests that there may have been limits to their radicalism. Four other issues require comment. First, an acknowledgement that the Newport negotiations were misguided is not synonymous with support for the trial of the monarch. Denbigh and the other so-called radicals may have felt that a trial was not an appropriate course of action. There is certainly more evidence to support this traditional view, which is clearly expressed in one newspaper which states that "their Lordships laid aside the ordinance for the trial of the King and adjourned their House for a week."<sup>56</sup> Second, there were signs that in the weeks leading up to the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January vote, the Lords were starting to question the direction of policy illustrated

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<sup>54</sup> Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics', p.270-1.

<sup>55</sup> See note 37 above for the listings in the Journals and supporting evidence can be found in the sources listed in note 53 above. Also The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T. E 536(5) Tue Dec 19<sup>th</sup> - Tue Dec 26<sup>th</sup> 1648 p.1196; The Moderate T.T. E.536 (30) Tue Dec 26<sup>th</sup> - Tue Jan 2<sup>nd</sup> 1648/9 p.225.

<sup>56</sup> This is based upon the fact some of the Peers demonstrated their hostility to the trial again when they were asked to swear an oath supporting the Regicide. Second, the simple but obvious fact that the Lords rejected the Bill without a dissenting voice. See L.J x p.641; I have not used the majority of the sources hostile to the Rump to formulate this view as they had a vested interest in showing the unity that existed amongst the opposition. I do however feel that Clarendon's assertion that "not one person concurred with them" is important. Although Clarendon disliked the Rump, he was more scornful of the Presbyterians and he displayed no affection for the peers even when they rejected the Bill. He therefore had little reason to fabricate the story. For his opposition to the Presbyterians see History iv p.511 and for his account of the 2<sup>nd</sup> January p.520. Ronald Hutton, Charles II (Oxford 1991), p.41.



by their desire to hold a day of humiliation to remove the “heavy judgements of God now upon this Kingdom”.<sup>57</sup> Instead of supporting the trial Denbigh refused to act as one of the commissioners to try the King, suggesting that far from being defeated by superior tactics Denbigh was ideologically opposed to the trial of the King.<sup>58</sup> His opposition to the trial would be demonstrated again when he refused to be associated with the regicide just before he joined the Council of State.<sup>59</sup> Finally, there is no evidence that Denbigh wished to delay the reading of the two bills because of the return of so many of the moderates. A more plausible reason for his attempt to delay the proceedings was the fact that not enough Lords attended the chamber to make such an important decision. This explanation is consistent with his previous attempts to persuade more Lords to attend the chamber, and prior to this vote Denbigh had involved Black Rod in an attempt to fill the chamber.<sup>60</sup> Further, as Denbigh would make clear when he rejected the initial oath to sit upon the Council of State, he would not take an unilateral decision if it went against the votes and wishes of the majority of the members.<sup>61</sup> This evidence is more reliable than the single newspaper which reported upon the eve of the debate that the Lords were in favour of the trial. This journalist may have paid too much attention to the apparent cordiality which existed between the two Houses or he may have been attempting to show the continuity between the aims of the Army and

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<sup>57</sup> L.J x p.632; The Commons did not agree to this request, see, The Moderate T.T E.477 (4) Tue Dec 12<sup>th</sup> - Tue Dec 19<sup>th</sup> 1648 p.212; The Perfect Weekly Account T.T E.477 (13) Wed Dec 13<sup>th</sup> - Wed Dec 20<sup>th</sup> 1648 p.318.

<sup>58</sup> The evidence here is not straightforward. Denbigh was nominated as a Commissioner and as is well known he did not take up the offer. Historians have assumed that this was due to his own conviction and this view is supported in this thesis. It was also accepted by Adamson. But according to Rushworth's account the Lords were removed as Commissioners. Denbigh and the other peers were not afforded the opportunity to register their dissents. Adamson, 'Peerage in Politics', p.271. Rushworth vii Historical Collections , p.1383.

<sup>59</sup> C.S.P.D 1649-50 p.9; Worden, The Rump Parliament , p.180-81; Ward, 'English Peerage', p.19.

<sup>60</sup> L.J x p. 636-7.

<sup>61</sup> Denbigh's speech can be found in Firth, House of Lords , p.222-223.

Parliament.<sup>62</sup> Although, it is unlikely that Denbigh said that he would rather be “torn to pieces than have any part in such an infamous business”<sup>63</sup>, the evidence suggests that he was either reluctant to countenance the trial of the King or if he did support the trial, he was not willing to go against the majority view. It is also possible that Denbigh objected to the trial because there was no precedent to support such an act.<sup>64</sup>

Dr Adamson argues that it was Manchester’s brilliance in the debate which persuaded Denbigh and others to reject service as commissioners in the trial of the King. Dr Adamson also suggests that Manchester persuaded the Lords to vote for an adjournment to prevent the realignment of the radical peerage and thus destroy the vote to reject the trial. Both suggestions are open to question. The view that one speech could influence Denbigh is at variance with his depiction of the Earl as the intransigent radical attempting to supervise the chamber to suit his own agenda. Also Denbigh was Speaker that day and his eclipse at the hands of Manchester remains inexplicable.<sup>65</sup> Finally, rather than managing the House, an adjournment was consistent with Manchester’s view that little good could come from the truncated House of Lords with a Commons which was under the almost complete control of the Army. It is unlikely that Manchester hoped that his actions “would force the Commons” to

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<sup>62</sup> The source stating that the Lords supported the trial, Heads of a Dairie T.T E. 536 (34) Tue Dec 26- Tue Jan 2 1648/9 p.38.

<sup>63</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T E.537 (20) Tue Dec 26- Tue Jan 9. Nedham remained hostile to the Lords, but he did say that they all came out against the trial. The exception was Lord Grey who introduced the Bill and made a speech in “favour of it.” I am reluctant to accept Nedham’s account wholesale since Grey would refuse to serve the new Commonwealth. Although he introduced the Bill it originated in the Commons, and the introduction of the Bill does not mean that he supported it.

<sup>64</sup> The Perfect Weekly Account T.T E.537 (32) Wed Jan 3<sup>rd</sup> Wed Jan 10<sup>th</sup> 1649 p.342; L.J x p.641.

<sup>65</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T.E 537 (20) Tue Dec 26<sup>th</sup>- Tue Jan 9<sup>th</sup>. This was accepted by Adamson “Peerage in Politics” p. 270. His depiction of Denbigh as the tactician is central to his thesis p.257-279.

delay the trial. This was his farewell to revolutionary politics, the clearest expression of his contempt for the political situation which had existed since the first purge of Parliament.<sup>66</sup>

Traditional accounts of the build up to the trial regard the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January as the effective end of the Lords as a participant in the legislative process.<sup>67</sup> Two very good reasons account for this view. Upon the 4<sup>th</sup> of January the Commons famously declared that they “being chosen by, and representing the people have supreme power in this nation”<sup>68</sup> This simple statement embodied the omnipotence of the Commons making resurgence of the “dying” second chamber a futile exercise. Also, as Veronica Wedgwood rightly pointed out, many peers left London never to return to Westminster to sit in their chamber. But this view is too simple, and Dr Adamson has resurrected the role of the peers in the month after the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January by suggesting that the eventual abolition of the Lords was not inevitable. What follows is a narrative of events which will incorporate, question and extend some of his findings.<sup>69</sup>

Upon the 9<sup>th</sup> of January Denbigh, Salisbury, Mulgrave, Kent, Howard and Hunsdon attended the chamber and it appears that they immediately attempted to court favour with the

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<sup>66</sup> I cannot accept Dr Adamson’s view that this was deliberate “brinkmanship upon the part of Manchester to force the Commons to delay the trial.” Adamson suggests that this was based upon “an over-confident but not ill-founded belief in the Commons respect for the authority of the House.” Manchester was registering his dislike of the proceedings against the king and this episode demonstrates his contempt for the Army and the purged house. My explanation is consistent with his attitude from the first day of the purge. Adamson ‘Peerage in Politics’ p.274-5.

<sup>67</sup> Underdown, Pride’s Purge p.173-207.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid p.143; C.J vi p.110.

<sup>69</sup> Wedgwood, Trial, p.85; Trevallyn Jones, Saw Pit Wharton p.130. Adamson, ‘Peerage in Politics’, p.258-279.



Commons.<sup>70</sup> They passed some outstanding bills, and more importantly they considered the following ordinance which included this preamble:

“That whatsoever King of England shall hereafter levy war against Parliament and the kingdom of England shall be guilty of high treason and be tried in Parliament.”<sup>71</sup>

This was both a revolutionary and conciliatory step. Had this been passed it could have provided the basis for a settlement with Charles which would have allowed him to live, and yet would have been subjected to the same sanction as his evil councillors had been in the first years of the Long Parliament. This was far more radical than the projected settlement negotiated between September and December 1648.<sup>72</sup> But in the circumstances it was obviously a far less dramatic course of action than the trial and execution of the King. It may have answered some of the reservations outlined during the debate upon the trial of the King, considering that one account claimed the Lords could not sanction the trial due to the absence of a firm precedent. It is also possible that this was designed to placate the Commons and bring the Lords back into the legislative process. It was widely rumoured that some radical MPs favoured outright dissolution.<sup>73</sup>

At a number of points in this thesis, I have pointed to the limitations of the available evidence, and this problem is perhaps most pronounced at this juncture. It is impossible to state categorically the reasons behind this initiative to alter the treason laws.<sup>74</sup> Although one

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<sup>70</sup> L.J x p.643-5.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> For the Newport negotiations See Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.106-42; Hirst, England in Conflict p.252-3; Worden, Rump, p.15, 164, 247. Gentles, New Model Army, p.270.

<sup>73</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T E.537 (20) Tuesday December 26<sup>th</sup>- Tuesday January 9<sup>th</sup>. Nedham stated that some members of the Commons wanted to place a “padlock on the Lords House;” Adamson, ‘Peerage in Politics’, p.273.

<sup>74</sup> The problems with the source material for the entire period is discusses in Chapter 5. See Worden, Rump p.398-404;.

newspaper reported that “Lords made progress” with the treason laws<sup>75</sup> it is clear that after the 9<sup>th</sup> January this issue was not considered again.<sup>76</sup> On the 10<sup>th</sup> only three peers attended the chamber (Denbigh, Pembroke and Howard) and a couple of writs were issued, but discussion about the future constitution was left in abeyance. The same scenario continued until the 18<sup>th</sup> January. Politics in the Lords consisted of small attendance figures and an aversion to taking difficult decisions.<sup>77</sup> It is difficult to state the reasons for this failure to consider the constitution, considering that an initiative was taken upon the 9<sup>th</sup> January. But it is possible, as one contemporary observed, that the Lords had deliberately avoided offending the Commons by broaching constitutional issues. They had considered issuing a declaration explaining their reasons for not moving against the King but this was rejected, in all probability, because they did not wish to offend the Commons.<sup>78</sup> Although the Commons had kept certain channels of communication open and the committees of both Houses continued to function,<sup>79</sup> the Commons had passed over some of the writs sent to them. Moreover three important points should be stressed. First, the majority of available evidence suggests that the House of Lords was a redundant chamber. Second although the Lords were allowed to sit upon committees they tended to refrain from attending. Finally, the Commons had made provision for committees to function without the peers demonstrating their tacit approval of the superiority of the Commons.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T E. 538 (17) Tue 9<sup>th</sup> Jan- Tue 9<sup>th</sup> Jan 1649 p.1221.

<sup>76</sup> L.J x p.642-9;

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. BM ADD Mss 37,344 fol 243.

<sup>78</sup> Perfect Occurences T.T E. 527(8) Friday 12<sup>th</sup> Jan- Friday 19<sup>th</sup> Jan 1649 p.799.

<sup>79</sup> State Papers 23/5 fol.48. State Papers 28/66 fol.461. BM ADD Mss 35,322 fol 117.

<sup>80</sup> For the Lords not taking the opportunity to sit upon committees see BM ADD Mss 35,322 fols 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 130; Also HMCR De Lisle and Dudley Manuscripts (vol iv) p.578; BM ADD Mss 37,344 fol.243- Whitelock stated that the Lords considered See over

On the 18<sup>th</sup> January, having behaved impeccably in the preceding week,<sup>81</sup> the peers tentatively approached an issue relating to the constitution. The five peers (Denbigh, Kent, Pembroke and Grey and Howard) asked for the concurrence of the Commons to adjourn until the following term.<sup>82</sup> The Commons considered the request and then politely reminded the Lords of the 4<sup>th</sup> of January vote and rejected the request.<sup>83</sup> After this the Lords reverted to their more accustomed role of avoiding constitutional issues which might cause offence to the Commons.<sup>84</sup>

The evidence presented above does provide some support for Dr Adamson's findings. It is clear that the 2<sup>nd</sup> January vote did not result in the absolute end of the Lords as a legislative body,<sup>85</sup> but it is also apparent that the Lords, by and large, refrained from indulging in high politics. The attitude of the Commons towards the Lords will be discussed later in this chapter,<sup>86</sup> but it is worth considering the role of the Lords in the week before the dissolution.<sup>87</sup>

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(see n.p.133 declaration to explain why they rejected the Bill for the creation of the High Court of Justice but they decided against it. This may have been because they did not wish to antagonise the Commons; Rushworth Historical Collections vii p.1387; The Perfect Weekly Account T.T. E. 538 (20) Wed 10<sup>th</sup> Jan- Wed 17<sup>th</sup> Jan 1648/9 p.349; For depictions of the Lords as a redundant chamber see the list above. Also Perfect Diurnall Monday Jan 8<sup>th</sup> 1649 T.T.E.527 (16) p.2238; Perfect Occurances E.527 (17) Friday Feb 2<sup>nd</sup>- Friday Feb 9<sup>th</sup> 1649 p.818; The Moderate T.T E. 538 (15) Tue Jan 9<sup>th</sup>- Tue Jan 16<sup>th</sup> 1649 p.250. For the Commons attitude to the Lords See C.J vi p.121.

<sup>81</sup> L.J x p.643-7.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid p. 646.

<sup>83</sup> C.J vi p.121; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T. E, 539(6) Tue 16<sup>th</sup> Jan- Tue 23<sup>rd</sup> Jan 1649 p.1288.

<sup>84</sup> L.J x p.646-8.

<sup>85</sup> Although it will be clear that I do not believe that the Lords were performing an important legislative function, Adamson's account of the final days of the Lords is more substantive than the detail found in C.H. Firth. See Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p.275-287. Firth House of Lords p.210-221.

<sup>86</sup> See the Conclusion to this chapter.



On the 28<sup>th</sup> January Denbigh spent the day with the Ambassadors of the States General and received a letter from the Government asking for an audience with the Lords.<sup>88</sup> The Ambassadors had been instructed to mediate in behalf of the King in an attempt to preserve Charles's power, and if this was not possible to spare his life. This was not the first time foreign nations had made a direct appeal to the Lords, and Denbigh took the matter seriously.<sup>89</sup> The following day, instead of reading the letter to their fellow peers, the Ambassadors were invited to speak directly to the Lords. Although the Lords had played little formal part in the political process since the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January, they adhered to the normal protocol that befitted a state occasion. As the master of ceremonies greeted the guests in the splendour of one of the great chambers of power, the Ambassadors delivered their message to six peers.<sup>90</sup> The contents of the plea from the State's General included a desire for close relations to be kept between the two nations and a plea that the King would be restored to his legitimate role as Head of the Government; appreciating that this was an unlikely scenario they asked if the person of the King could be preserved without an alteration to the Government.<sup>91</sup> This may have been a reference to either maintaining Charles as the symbolic Head of State or transferring the crown to the Duke of Gloucester.<sup>92</sup> The Lords listened

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<sup>87</sup> Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p.275-287.

<sup>88</sup> L.J x p. 647. ~

<sup>89</sup> BM Harley Mss 7001 fol.210.

<sup>90</sup> L.J x p.647; Summary of a relation made by the Ambassador Pau in the States General CSPV 1649 p.90.

<sup>91</sup> HMCR De L'Isle and Dudley Manuscripts 77 Vol 1V p.582.

<sup>92</sup> There is no direct evidence for this but the ambassadors stated that if it was not possible for Charles to remain as King, they hoped that there would be no harm done to his person and that there would be no alteration of the Government. The Duke of Gloucester was mentioned in some quarters but not specifically by the Ambassadors.

politely but, of course, there was little they could do. The messages were passed on to the Commons but they were not dealt with until after the regicide.<sup>93</sup>

The 29<sup>th</sup> also saw another attempt by the Lords to secure a greater number of representatives in the chamber and again this met with no success.<sup>94</sup> On the day of the regicide only five Lords (Denbigh, Pembroke, Mulgrave, Kent and Grey)<sup>95</sup> attended the chamber. The peers registered no protest to the execution but they did attempt to deliver a projected settlement which would have provided the Lords with a role in the legislature. To demonstrate their importance all judges were summoned to the chamber the following Thursday. More importantly a message was sent to the Commons proposing that ten peers and a proportionate number of MPs should meet to discuss the future constitution. It is clear the Lords still envisaged playing a role in the Government after the execution of the King.<sup>96</sup>

In keeping with their persistent desire to adhere to the 4<sup>th</sup> January vote the Commons refused to consider the messages from the Lords in the traditional fashion.<sup>97</sup> But this request did precipitate a debate in the Commons upon the future role of the Lords which culminated in the decision to abolish the Chamber.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> C.J vi p.130, 134.

<sup>94</sup> L.J x p.648.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid; Ward, 'English Peerage' p.14.

<sup>96</sup> L.J x p.649; Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p.279; The Perfect Weekly Account T.T. E.541 31<sup>st</sup> Jan- 7<sup>th</sup> Feb 1649 p.376; The Moderate Intelligencer T.T. E 541 (27) Thur 1<sup>st</sup> Feb- Thur 8<sup>th</sup> Feb 1649 p.1875. The Moderate T.T. E. 541 (15) Tue 30<sup>th</sup> Jan-Tue 6<sup>th</sup> Feb 1649.

<sup>97</sup> C.J vi p.130. The Perfect Weekly Account T.T. E 541 31<sup>st</sup> Jan- 7<sup>th</sup> Feb 1649 p.376.

<sup>98</sup> The debates can be found in C.J vi p.131-2.

Dr Adamson has shown that the formal abolition of the Lords was not inevitable from the moment that the debate started. He is not the only historian to have demonstrated that a number of MPs favoured the retention of the Lords in some capacity<sup>99</sup> the most famous being Oliver Cromwell.<sup>100</sup> When the final vote was taken twenty-nine MPs objected to outright abolition.<sup>101</sup> But the most significant contribution made by Dr Adamson rests with his view that outright abolition arose due to circumstance rather than ideology. He suggests that the Lords were not facing abolition until the 5<sup>th</sup> February. On the 5<sup>th</sup> two events occurred which persuaded MPs to vote for abolition. First, the text of the King's speech was in circulation on the streets of London and the originator of this had been one of the peers. Second, also on the 5<sup>th</sup>, a Royalist publication proclaimed Charles II King, nominating the Lords as the legitimate government.<sup>102</sup>

This view is very tenable, but it must be remembered that the debate centred upon whether the Lords should enjoy any role in the future constitution; it was not concerned with providing the Lords with an equal share in the Government.<sup>103</sup> It was clear to contemporaries that the Commons were willing to proceed without the Lords<sup>104</sup>, the issue was whether the Lords

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<sup>99</sup> Adamson 'The Peerage in Politics' p.282-6.

<sup>100</sup> This was discussed in Chapter 1 where it was argued that Cromwell favoured the retention of the Lords for pragmatic political reasons rather than an attachment to political forms.

<sup>101</sup> C.J vi p.132. We know the names of three mps who supported the retention of the Lords. Purefoy and Sydenham acted as tellers; Cromwell's utterances in support of the Lords are well known. See Abbott vol 3 p.10; Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p.277.

<sup>102</sup> Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 284.

<sup>103</sup> C.J vi p.32; The Moderate T.T. E.542 (11) Tue 6<sup>th</sup> Feb- Tue 13<sup>th</sup> Feb 1649 p.298; The Armies Modest Intelligencer T.T. E.541 (28) Thur 1<sup>st</sup> Feb- Thur 8<sup>th</sup> Feb 1649 p.10; Whitelock Memorials ii p.521; HMCRC MSS of the Marquis of Ormond Vol 2 Matthew Rowe to William Cadogan p. 87; BM Add MSS 37,344 fol.255-6; CF Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 282-4.

<sup>104</sup> Perfect Diurnall T.T E.527 (16) Mon 8<sup>th</sup> Jan - Mon 15<sup>th</sup> Jan 1649 p. 2238.



should be able to offer “advice in the exercise of legislative power.”<sup>105</sup> Although the Lords may have believed that they could secure an equal share in Government this was nothing more than wishful thinking and there is little evidence to support Dr Adamson’s view that the Lords insisted upon parity in Government - they were not in a position to make such a bold request.<sup>106</sup> The two events of the 5<sup>th</sup> may have altered the perspective of some MPs, persuading them to support outright abolition but it is inconceivable to imagine that these two circumstances shifted opinion from support for full constitutional status to outright abolition. Moreover, it is clear, from the 4<sup>th</sup> of January onwards, illustrated by the refusal of the Commons to engage in debate with the Lords, that the commoners believed that they were omnipotent in the legislative process.<sup>107</sup>

The formal abolition of the Lords did not prevent peers from serving in the House of Commons provided that they stood for election.<sup>108</sup> The peers were also allowed to sit upon the Council of State. Recent accounts have shown that this was another example of the moderation of some of the MPs.<sup>109</sup> This is certainly true, but the event also illustrates the desire amongst the MPs to secure the services of as many people as possible provided that

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<sup>105</sup> This is patently clear in the Journals of the House of Commons. The question was put that the House shall take “the advice” of the Lords in the exercise of legislative powers. C.J vi p.132.

<sup>106</sup> The source that suggests that the lords expected to keep full powers is HMCR De L’Isle and Dudley Manuscripts 77 vol. iv p. 583. The source does not, however, state that the Lords had good reason to believe they would achieve equal status. I cannot accept Dr Adamson’s view that the Peers insisted upon equal status. It is certainly not mentioned in the source cited above. CF Adamson ‘Peerage in Politics’ p.286.

<sup>107</sup> The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T. E. 538 (17) Tue 9<sup>th</sup> Jan - Tue 16<sup>th</sup> Jan 1649 p.1218; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T. E.. 539 (6) Tue 16<sup>th</sup> Jan- Tue 23<sup>rd</sup> Jan 1649 p. 1228; The Moderate T.T E.538 (15) Tue 9<sup>th</sup> Jan- Tue 16<sup>th</sup> Jan 1649 p.250; BM ADD Mss 37,344 fol.243,246.

<sup>108</sup> Worden Rump p.73.

<sup>109</sup> Worden Rump p.61-73, p.192-3.

they showed a retrospective support for the revolution. The same principle seen in the last chapter with regard to the conformist MPs was adhered to with the Lords who agreed to sit upon the Council.<sup>110</sup> An oath would have had to have been taken to demonstrate their acquiescence with the events which culminated in regicide.<sup>111</sup>

Five Lords (Denbigh, Pembroke, Mulgrave, Grey of Warke and Salisbury) were nominated to the Council of State. In keeping with tradition, the Lords, with one exception, appeared at the top of the list. For Denbigh and Warke there was no controversy surrounding their nomination. The same was not true for Pembroke and Salisbury. Twenty five MPs registered their protest against Pembroke's candidature but fortunately, for the Earl, double that number supported him.<sup>112</sup> It was far closer for Salisbury, as his nomination was only secured by three votes.<sup>113</sup> It appears likely that Salisbury was not initially considered as a potential candidate. His name appears towards the end of the list. This was not in keeping with either the format for the election of the other peers, or with the procedure followed when the Lords were appointed as commissioners for the trial of the King. He may have been a last minute replacement to prevent the election of Harrison and Marten.<sup>114</sup>

The decision to allow the Lords to sit upon the Council raises two important questions concerning the nature of the English Revolution. First, does the presence of the peers

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<sup>110</sup> See Chapter 2 Below.

<sup>111</sup> See n.111 Above Also C.S.P.D 1649-50 p.6-8; Worden Rump p.180.

<sup>112</sup> C.J vi p.140-142; Miles Corbet and William Heveningham supported Pembroke's candidature. It was opposed by Michael Liversey and Henry Martin. The vote was 50-25 in Pembroke's favour.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid- Sir William Brereton and Lord Lysle supported Salisbury. Lord Munson and Henry Martin opposed his candidature. The vote was 23-20 in Salisbury's favour.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. There was no division over the rejection of Harrison and Martin. Worden Rump p.180-181.

demonstrate the desire upon the part of the Commons to limit the revolution? By allowing the peers to return it was less likely that social revolution would follow the execution of the King. Second, the decision upon the part of the peers themselves to participate in the new executive raises questions that lie at the heart of the current historiography. Were they joining a bandwagon, caught up in the exciting times of revolutionary England but would later demonstrate their moderation by rejecting radical reform? Conversely were the Lords accepting office so they could limit the revolution from a position of principled conservatism? Finally it is possible that the decision to sit upon the Council provides some support for Dr Adamson's view that the peers possessed certain radical credentials.<sup>115</sup>

It is important to emphasise that the abolition of the Lords was, in itself, a revolutionary step. It was part of a process which shattered the traditional trinity that had governed England for generations. Upon the 5<sup>th</sup> of December 1648 the Commons supported a settlement with the King but within a very short period of time the King was dead, monarchy abolished, executive power vested in a Council of State, and the second chamber discarded because it was "useless and dangerous."<sup>116</sup> Although the background to these acts and ordinance require scrutiny, this should not eclipse the fact that the Lords was abolished - the presence of five peers sitting on the Council of State did not compensate for the loss of their chamber.<sup>117</sup>

There is no doubt that the inclusion of some of the peers at the expense of Marten and Harrison demonstrates the social conservatism of the majority of the members of the

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<sup>115</sup> The historiography of the parliamentary politics in this period is still dominated by David Underdown and Blair Worden. See David Smith Stuart Parliaments n.104 p.220. Their views can be found in the introduction above p. Sean Kelsey work deals with the evolution of the Rump once it had been established.

<sup>116</sup> C.J vi p.132.

<sup>117</sup> This is the value of Sean Kelsey's work allowing the Rump to speak for itself. Inventing a Republic p. 1-2. This will be discussed in the conclusion to this thesis.



Commons. It supports Blair Worden's argument that the conservative nature of many of the MPs prevented the implementation of a wide programme of political and religious reform.<sup>118</sup> However, it may be wrong to explain the decision to allow the peers to return solely upon the grounds of the conservatism of the members of the Commons.

It is possible that the peers were asked to sit upon the Council for pragmatic reasons. Cromwell objected to the destruction of the chamber upon the grounds that this would unite the entire peerage against the new regime. As I mentioned in the first chapter of the thesis, Cromwell's objection to the abolition was, in part, based upon the fact that it coincided with outbursts of hostility to the new regime from a wide cross-section of opinion.<sup>119</sup> It was not just the situation within England that caused concern for the MPs. Before the regicide a declaration from France warned the purged Parliament of retribution, should they take the ultimate sanction against the King.<sup>120</sup> As Professor Hutton remarked, "in an age when most European states were monarchies, it was a reasonable expectation that the unprecedented act of formal regicide would produce widespread revulsion and general sympathy for the exiled heir." The problem for the new regime was compounded by the fact that Charles II launched a diplomatic offensive which spanned thirteen nations in an attempt to secure the support of his fellow monarchs against the new regime.<sup>121</sup> It was already clear from the activities of the Dutch Ambassadors that foreign states regarded the House of Lords as an important

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<sup>118</sup> Worden Rump p. 33-73.

<sup>119</sup> See Above Chapter 1.

<sup>120</sup> The Declaration of his most Christian Majesty the King of France and Navarre against the most horrid proceedings of a rebellion part of Parliament. Thomas Carte A Collection of Original Letters and Papers... 1641-1660. Found Among the Duke of Ormond's Papers (2 vols, A Millar ed 1739) ii p.195-7; C.V Wedgwood "European Reaction to the death of Charles 1" in C.H Carter (ed) *From the Renaissance to the counter-Reformation. Essays in Honour of Garrett Mattingly* (1966); Worden Rump p.163-4; Wedgwood Trial p.151; The problems facing the Rump will be developed in the conclusion of this thesis.

<sup>121</sup> Hutton Charles II , p.34-35.

component in the legislature.<sup>122</sup> One of the roles of the Council of State was to cultivate relationships with foreign powers and it may not be a coincidence that this job was given to the Earl of Denbigh.<sup>123</sup> If these potential difficulties are added to the problems within the British archipelago,<sup>124</sup> it is hardly surprising that a gesture was made to the peerage designed to placate some of them in the aftermath of the revolution.

The whole question of the conservatism of the members is undermined by the fact that the Commons actually conceded very little in allowing the Lords to return to sit upon the Council. Although the Lords rejected the initial oath which provided direct support for the regicide, the oath that was finally subscribed to was an unequivocal acceptance of the Rump as the de facto government which was accompanied by a promise to “live and die” for the new regime.<sup>125</sup> In light of the difficulties surrounding the new Government, which prompted the attempt to widen its support base, concessions over retrospective support for the regicide were hardly of vital importance. As mentioned earlier, the important prerequisite for the Commons was commitment to government without the King. The first four clauses in the Council’s statement of responsibilities concerned the preservation of the Republic.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> BM Harley Mss 7001 fol 210.

<sup>123</sup> C.S.P.D 1649-1650 p. 6 (clause 6), p.37 for Denbigh dealing with foreign alliances C.S.P.D p.37.

<sup>124</sup> Worden Rump p.163-70.

<sup>125</sup> This is quoted quite accurately by C.H Firth House of Lords p.222 The Kingdomes Faithful and Impartial Scout T.T. E. 545 (6) Fri 16<sup>th</sup> Feb- Fri 23<sup>rd</sup> Feb 1649 p.28. The Perfect Weekly Account T.T. E. 546 (20) Wed 28<sup>th</sup> Feb- Wed 7<sup>th</sup> March 1649 p.410; I do not agree with Dr Ward that this was a significant climbdown ‘English Peerage’ p.9.

<sup>126</sup> C.S.P.D 1649-1650 p.6

Another important consideration rests with the fact that the Lords whom were invited to sit upon the council were not chosen on an entirely ad hoc basis, designed solely to placate the English aristocracy. Denbigh and Pembroke had shown their hostility to the Newport negotiations by supporting the moves that destroyed the framework upon which the treaty was based.<sup>127</sup> Both peers had attended the chamber in the weeks after the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January vote and they had hinted that they would serve the new regime.<sup>128</sup> Mulgrave too was a regular attender of the chamber, and significantly he broke the solidarity agreed by those Peers who had attended upon the 7<sup>th</sup> and then vowed that they would not attend the chamber until the restrictions upon the membership of the Commons had been lifted.<sup>129</sup> Lord Grey's actions are more obscure. He was present upon a number of occasions before the 1<sup>st</sup> of January. He introduced the bill claiming that it was treason for a King to levy war against Parliament, but after this vote he retired from the House until the 29<sup>th</sup> January. Although his attendance was not as regular as the three mentioned above, he was present during the important vote upon the decision to destroy the Newport negotiations and it was believed in Royalist circles that he supported the trial. He also sat upon a parliamentary committee in late January which may have made the MPs believe that he would serve the new regime.<sup>130</sup> The decision to elect Grey to the Council was, of course, a mistake as he refused to serve the new regime.<sup>131</sup> The Earl of

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<sup>127</sup> L.J x p.632; A Declaration of Parliament T.T. 669 f. 13 (56) Dec 15<sup>th</sup> 1648.

<sup>128</sup> L.J x p.641- 650; The Moderate T.T. E. 544 (10) Tue Feb 13<sup>th</sup>- Tue 20<sup>th</sup> Feb 1649 p.312. Although Mabbott erroneously stated that the Peers had supported the trial, he was right to point out that they had at least been privy to politics.

<sup>129</sup> For Mulgrave's attendance see L.J x 624, 625, 626, 627, 632, 633, 635, 636, 638, 639, 641, 642, 645, 647, 649. Table 4 Below.

<sup>130</sup> L.J x p.641 (attendance upon the 2<sup>nd</sup> Jan), p.647 (attendance upon the 29<sup>th</sup> Jan) For his alleged support of the Bill See Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T. E. 537 (20) Tue 26<sup>th</sup> Dec- Tue 9<sup>th</sup> Jan 1649- Nedham states that Grey supported the ordinance to secure the return of his "cracked fortunes." For his sitting upon a parliamentary committee See Worden Rump p.178.

<sup>131</sup> Worden Rump p. 178; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T. E 546 (7) Tue 27<sup>th</sup> Feb- Tue 7<sup>th</sup> March 1649 p.1277.



Salisbury was not such a regular attendee of the chamber and his “radical credentials”<sup>132</sup> are not so easy to define. This may explain why the Commons were divided over his appointment. But it is significant to note that he was present upon the day the Lords considered introducing a bill affirming that it would be treason hereafter for a king to levy war against Parliament. This was certainly a sign that Salisbury was willing to consider a major change to the constitution.<sup>133</sup>

It is clear from the backgrounds of all these peers that the Commons thought carefully before they nominated peers to the new executive. Although none of these peers had supported the regicide, their action had given the MPs some cause to believe that they would support the new regime. Moreover, considering that the peers had rejected offers to act as commissioners to try the King - a fact that Charles had used to his advantage<sup>134</sup>, it was perceived to be expedient to invite a select few to sit upon the Council of State. In some respects the decision to appoint peers to the Council of State demonstrated the desire upon the part of the Commons to consolidate, rather than extend the revolution. They were responding also to the unpopularity of the new regime, attempting to court favour with a group that had been identified with the parliamentary cause. However, behind this notion of expediency and conservatism rested a firm principle to place men who had shown an inclination to support the regime in positions of power.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> L.J x p.626, 632, 639, 642.

<sup>133</sup> C.J vi p.141; Note 114 Above; For his attendance upon the 9<sup>th</sup> January See L.J x p.642.

<sup>134</sup> BM ADD Mss 37,344 fol. 247; Howell State Trials iv p. 995; Adamson ‘Peerage in Politics’ p.275.

<sup>135</sup> In this important respect my findings differ from those found in Worden and Underdown’s accounts.

The question as to why the peers sat upon the Council is far more difficult to determine. Did they join what Professor Underdown has called a revolutionary bandwagon or were there more positive reasons, as Dr Worden argued, for taking their place on the Council?<sup>136</sup> Unfortunately the available evidence is again very thin and information gleaned from their attendance upon the Council of State does not provide for a definitive conclusion.

The Earl of Pembroke was held in contempt by Royalists, Levellers and by his own peers, but this criticism was not based upon the tireless work he performed for the new regime.<sup>137</sup> A number of MPs objected to his candidature and Pembroke repaid his supporters by attending the Council three times in February, once in March and five times in April.<sup>138</sup> He was elected as a Knight of the shire of Berkshire in April but this did not create a desire to take more responsibility in the Council as he failed to attend any of the sessions in May.<sup>139</sup> Pembroke's contribution to the politics during this revolutionary period was negligible. After July he rarely attended until November and December when he suddenly became a more active member.<sup>140</sup> He was perhaps aiming for re-election<sup>141</sup> but such a hope was ended by his

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<sup>136</sup> Underdown Pride's Purge p. 281-3; Worden Rump p.45-48, 62-7.

<sup>137</sup> For the attacks upon Pembroke in the Royalist Press See Chapter 5 Below ; The Earl of Pembroke's Farewell to the King T.T. E.476 (22) 19th Dec 1648; The Speech of the Earl of Pembroke at his admittance as a member of the House of Commons T.T. E. 551 (6) 16<sup>th</sup> April 1649; The manner and election of Philip Herbert Late Earl of Pembroke - A satire T.T. E. 551 (16) 16<sup>th</sup> April 1649. For the Leveller view The Moderate T.T. E. 536 (2) Tue 19<sup>th</sup> Dec- Tue 26<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648 p.216, 216; For the attitude shown by his Peers See Worden Rump p.73; Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T. E.477 (30) Tue 19<sup>th</sup> Dec- Tue 26<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648.

<sup>138</sup> C.J vi p. 140-1; Pembroke attended upon the 19<sup>th</sup>, 23, and 24<sup>th</sup> of February: Upon the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> of March: Upon the 16<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup>, and 23<sup>rd</sup> April. He did not attend in May. All this is taken from the attendance record for the Council of State. See C.S.P.D 1648-9 (introduction).

<sup>139</sup> Worden Rump p.192-3 and sources listed in n.1 p.193; Also C.J vi p.187;

<sup>140</sup> C.H. Firth House of Lords p.224.

<sup>141</sup> As it happened most of the members were reelected (not Pembroke because he had died) but this was not a certainty. Worden Rump p.221-2.

premature death. He was afforded a state funeral to which all the MPs were instructed to attend. The precise views of the members attending the funeral are probably lost to us forever, but if they were in a genuine state of mourning it was not for the loss of a hard working and able politician.<sup>142</sup> But Pembroke's attendance was not the exception amongst the peerage. Salisbury's is little better, but both were surpassed by Mulgrave. He did not attend one session of the Council, and was thus not elected the following year.<sup>143</sup>

The Earl of Denbigh was the exception; more than any other peer he was willing to support the new regime basing his justification upon the grounds that he had served Parliament during the Civil War coupled with the simple notion that the Commons were now the de facto rulers. In February his attendance was better than the majority of the members of the Council; he attended more sessions than Sir Henry Vane and Alderman Wilson, but not as many as Oliver Cromwell.<sup>144</sup> His attendance in March and April was not quite so impressive but he was above the norm in May 1649. Denbigh also sat upon a number of committees<sup>145</sup>, but given the wide powers given to the Council in terms of high politics, he only played a peripheral role. Although he sat upon an important committee concerning future alliances with foreign states this was the exception rather than the norm. It also supports the idea that the peers were included upon the Council to provide a certain amount of respectability from foreign nations. For the majority of the time, Denbigh was not involved in issues concerning either reform or on the important issue of the Commonwealth's survival. His responsibilities concerned

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<sup>142</sup> Blair Worden was not too critical of Pembroke but I (for once) have some sympathy with the Royalist polemicists. For Worden's discussion of Pembroke See Rump p.27-8, 73, 77, 97, 178, 180, 192, 221. See n.137 Above for examples of Royalist attacks upon the Earl.

<sup>143</sup> Firth House of Lords p. 223; Worden Rump p.221.

<sup>144</sup> This is all based upon the introduction in the C.S.P.D 1649-50 and p.1-149.

<sup>145</sup> C.S.P.D 1649-50 p.37, 42, 44, 131.



arrangements for Dr Dorislaus' funeral, negotiations with individual merchants, dealing with isolated Royalists and ceremonial responsibilities in London, and looking after foreign dignitaries.<sup>146</sup> Although a relatively active member of the Council, Denbigh was not afforded, or did not take the opportunity to become involved in the weighty issues of state.

Although some peers were allowed back to central politics after the abolition of their chamber, in terms of their influence upon central politics, they exerted an influence that can only be described as marginal. Circumstance had upon the one hand provided them with a small opportunity to remain working within the Government but on the other side. It was clear that the Civil Wars and the Interregnum had reduced the power of the Lords in central government. The English Revolution resulted in the execution of the King - the head of the nation both socially and politically. It also shattered the political power and influence of the Lords, albeit for a short time.<sup>147</sup> The available evidence does not provide a simple explanation as to why the peers returned to central politics. Their role in the Council does not support the idea that they were committed moderates determined to halt any extension of the revolution. Moreover, the evidence produced hitherto does not imply that the moderates in the Commons wanted the Lords to sit upon the Council to represent the old order and to act as a buffer against the Army. It is possible to tentatively suggest that the Lords were invited to sit because they had shown certain radical credentials and their presence would make the events of December and January more acceptable to the conservative nation. The peers accepted

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<sup>146</sup> He sat upon a committee "to consider what alliances this crown had with foreign states, and whether to continue the same" C.S.P.D 1649-50 p.37; For Dorislaus's funeral See p.159; for negotiation with merchants p. 42,44; for his responsibility for ceremonial occasions see p.173; for his dealings with individual Royalists See p.139.

<sup>147</sup> The Lords would of course return. See Ronald Hutton *The Restoration* (Oxford 1986) p. 133 for just one example of the Lords functioning at the start of the Restoration process. For an account of the recent decline of the aristocracy see David Cannadine, The Decline and fall of the British Aristocracy, (1990).

office out of habit and, after the abolition of the chamber, they were at least afforded a certain amount of dignity.

## The Lords in Opposition.

The last section was concerned with the Lords who remained at Westminster and played a role in Westminster politics. The next part of this chapter considers the Lords who played either no or little part in central politics. I am not going to consider the peers who were regarded as Royalists because they have been the subject of three excellent studies.<sup>148</sup> This chapter deals with those members of the peerage who either wrote pamphlets objecting to the revolution or decided against attending the chamber despite having the option to do so.

On two occasions the Earl of Denbigh attempted to increase the membership of the Lords.<sup>149</sup> He only met with limited success, and it is clear that a number of Lords did not wish to participate in radical politics. The Lords Dacres, Northumberland and Middlesex, sent messages saying that they could not attend due to illness.<sup>150</sup> Middlesex's excuse was rather absurd because a few days earlier he had been in good enough health to challenge a group of troopers.<sup>151</sup> The Earl of Lincoln asked for leave to go to his county due to urgent business there, "he having not been there for many years."<sup>152</sup> The Earl of Mulgrave gave an early

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<sup>148</sup> Insights into the role of the royalist aristocracy can be found in D.E Underdown Royalist Conspiracy in England (Yale 1960) passim; Hutton Charles II p.14-48.

<sup>149</sup> L.J x p.636-7, 648; Whitelock Memorials vol ii p. 481.

<sup>150</sup> L.J x p.639 for Dacres and Northumberland; L.J x p.641 for Middlesex; G.F Trevallyn Jones Saw Pit Wharton p.130.

<sup>151</sup> The Joint Resolution and Declaration of the Parliament and the Council for taking away the King and the House of Lords T.T. E. 538 (1) 11<sup>th</sup> Jan 1649 p.1; n.47 above.

<sup>152</sup> L.J x p.639; Trevallyn Jones Saw Pit Wharton p.130.

indication about Wharton's disinclination to become involved in politics by informing the House that the Earl could not attend due to "urgent business."<sup>153</sup> Lord Hunsdon used the death of his mother in law as an excuse not to attend upon the 28<sup>th</sup> of December accompanied by an assurance that he would attend at a later date.<sup>154</sup> He kept to this promise, entering the chamber on the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> of January but this was the total extent of his commitment.<sup>155</sup> Many peers did not have the courtesy to send excuses. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December Denbigh sent messages to twenty nine peers asking them to attend the chamber the following Thursday. The members mentioned did send their excuses, but the Lords Suffolk, Stamford, Saye and Sele, Hereford, La Warr, Montagu and Bruce failed to offer any excuse.<sup>156</sup> Some of these peers were conspicuous by their absence,<sup>157</sup> but the majority of the eligible Lords did not want to play a part in the politics post purge era. They demonstrated their opposition to the new regime in three ways: through voting against the bill to place the King on trial, by sending rather feeble explanations for not attending the chamber and by simply not acknowledging requests to take their seats.

This type of passive resistance was the norm. Unlike the political and religious Presbyterians, the Lords tended to refrain from rather public displays of opposition.<sup>158</sup> There were occasions when certain individual peers would vent their hostility to the regime. The Earl of Northampton challenged Sir William Brereton to a fight in one of London's narrow streets;

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> L.J x p.641.

<sup>155</sup> L.J x p.642-3.

<sup>156</sup> L.J x p.639.

<sup>157</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T. E.538 (18).Tue 9<sup>th</sup> Jan- Tue 26<sup>th</sup> Jan 1648.

<sup>158</sup> See Chapter 4 below. For the best account of Presbyterian Literature See Underdown Pride's Purge p.146-7, 152-3, 161-4, 167, 174-8; Worden Rump p.84-5, 123-6, 264-8.



Northampton was defending the integrity of the monarch and also settling an old family score.<sup>159</sup> Lord Middlesex, in the words of Veronica Wedgwood, “expressed his feelings for some troopers in the streets below by emptying a chamber pot” on the heads of a number of soldiers.<sup>160</sup> These were isolated examples and they represented the frustration of individuals rather than a deliberate and coordinated response to the new regime.

Upon the 8<sup>th</sup> February a document appeared that attacked the new regime in a direct and forthright fashion. ‘The Declaration and Protest of the Peers of the Land’ criticised the purging of the Commons, the execution of the King and it brought a warning that the ensuing constitution would result in “anarchy and confusion.”<sup>161</sup> Using language that was similar to the political Presbyterians,<sup>162</sup> the peers claimed that the rightful succession rested with the nearest heir and government should reside with the peers until Charles II was restored.<sup>163</sup> Although this was a formidable document, it was a rare example of an outspoken attack upon the part of the peers. There is plenty of evidence of hostility to the revolution, as various groups spoke out against the new regime, but the Lords appear to have preferred the more dignified approach with most of them retiring from active politics. This passivity has prompted one historian to comment upon the “moral redundancy” that appeared to consume the English peerage at the time of the regicide as they refused to stand up for their beliefs. It must, however, be remembered that these peers had fought against the King and to risk anything for him was always going to be a difficult option. During any time of dramatic change it is difficult to remain neutral and there is a propensity to condemn the neutral as

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<sup>159</sup> Wedgwood Trial p.162.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid; n.47 and 152 above.

<sup>161</sup> C.S.P.D 1649-50 p.4.

<sup>162</sup> See note 159 above.

<sup>163</sup> C.S.P.D 1649-50 p.4.

being ideologically weak or deliberately protecting their own interests. Such a depiction of the Presbyterian peerage is unduly derogatory. First, by denouncing the trial the peers excluded themselves from power illustrating a principled attachment to the notion of monarchical government. Second, they did face a dilemma; they wished to preserve the old order but it would have left Charles as the Head of the Government. They were willing to advocate such an unpalatable situation but they were not prepared to risk life or imprisonment to help an untrustworthy king. This appears to be an understandable position to assume. Moreover, as the peers were subjected to taunts from the Royalist press, it must be remembered that not a single royalist risked their life in the weeks before the regicide to save the King. Royalists wrote prolifically about their martyred monarch without following his example.<sup>164</sup>

One other peer requires comment. The Earl of Warwick's role in the revolution is difficult to determine. In the weeks after the purge there were a number of conflicting accounts about Warwick's motives. As I mentioned in the first chapter, Nedham seized upon the ambiguity that surrounded Warwick's role to claim that the Earl was planning to move against the new regime.<sup>165</sup> Warwick's reasons for returning to London in early December were the subject of speculation in the press. 'The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer' suggested that Warwick had returned due to poor weather.<sup>166</sup> The paper entitled 'A Declaration from Both Houses' claimed that the Earl's poor health precipitated his return to London.<sup>167</sup> Even some Seamen

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<sup>164</sup> Ian Ward 'The English Peerage' p.14.

<sup>165</sup> Nedham's tactics as a journalist are discussed in chapter 1. For his account of Warwick see Mercurius Pragmaticus T.T. E.476 (35) Tue 12<sup>th</sup>- Tue 19<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648.

<sup>166</sup> The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T. E.476 (39) Tue 12<sup>th</sup>- Tue 19<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648. The same report can be found in The Moderate T.T. E. 477 (4).

<sup>167</sup> A Declaration from Both Houses T.T. E. 477 (7) Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup>- Wednesday 20<sup>th</sup> 1648.

questioned Warwick's commitment to the new regime.<sup>168</sup> Given Warwick's Presbyterian background it is not surprising that there was speculation about his attitude towards the new regime and it is also clear that Warwick had some misgivings about the trial of the King, demonstrated by his refusal to serve as a commissioner to try the King.<sup>169</sup> However, as Bernard Capp has shown there is "no evidence that Warwick ever thought of betraying Parliament" and this view is confirmed by all of the available evidence.<sup>170</sup> However, the fleet was of vital importance to the Rump given the reaction from abroad to the moves against the King.<sup>171</sup> In the period between the purge and the regicide the Rump took a number of initiatives to secure the support of Warwick: he was praised for his good affections, he was in close contact with Cromwell and protestations of loyalty to the Earl were made from his own Seamen.<sup>172</sup> The support of Warwick was regarded, in the short term, as essential because it was believed that his dismissal from office could induce another revolt in the Navy.<sup>173</sup> But it is unlikely that the Rump ever intended to retain Warwick in the longer term and his dismissal from office occurred when it was clear that he would not move against the new regime. His loss of commission also prompted a major reorganisation of the Navy.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> The Declaration and Engagement of the Commanders, Officers and Seamen Under the Control of Robert Earl of Warwick. T.T. E.536 (11). 14<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648.

<sup>169</sup> Adamson 'The Peerage in Politics' p. 270; Trevallyn- Jones Saw pit Wharton p.142.

<sup>170</sup> Bernard Capp Cromwell's Navy p.41.

<sup>171</sup> Bernard Capp "Naval Operations" in John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (ed), The Civil Wars: A Military History of England Scotland and Ireland 1638-1660 (1998) p.182-7.

<sup>172</sup> The Naval Expedition of the Right Honourable Robert Earl of Warwick T.T. E.536 (32) 2<sup>nd</sup> Jan 1649.

<sup>173</sup> Capp Cromwell's Navy p.43.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid p.45-72.



Warwick's opposition to the revolution was diluted. Despite the considerable attempts to secure his support he did not act as a commissioner and he failed to attend the chamber. However, he was not willing to move against the new regime and even on the day of the regicide he signed an official paper for the Navy.<sup>175</sup> He was not willing to move against Parliament and he epitomises the position of many of the Lords. Although he would petition Parliament on behalf of his half-brother the Earl of Holland, Warwick accepted his dismissal and he retired from politics. He was an old man who had served the parliamentary cause with distinction but the revolution was not the outcome he had envisaged.<sup>176</sup> It is interesting to note that his position was rather similar to that of Fairfax. Both men were torn between loyalty to the traditional order which explains their reluctance to countenance the trial of the King, with a deep rooted dislike of Charles' person, coupled with a sense of affection for many of the men who framed the English Revolution. It is possible that if both men had joined forces they could have prevented the regicide. This was not lost on the Parliamentarians, as it was rumoured that a close eye was kept on Fairfax on the eve of the regicide and Warwick's candidature for a position upon the Council of State was considered.<sup>177</sup> But this was not an issue for either man. Another conservative reaction to the projected revolution would have plunged the nation into another Civil War and they were not willing (and the possibility of success would have been extremely doubtful) to do this in the name of Charles Stuart. Recent historians have tended to focus upon the lack of ideological commitment upon the part of the parliamentarians. In many respects this is true, but the framers of the English Revolution demonstrated more of a commitment to their cause than the peerage did for theirs.

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<sup>175</sup> Capp Cromwell's Navy p.44.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid p.41.

<sup>177</sup> Worden Rump p.186; Gentles New Model Army p.307-9, 311.

## Conclusions.

The conclusions to this chapter will concentrate upon four themes. First, I will consider the historiography paying especial attention to Dr Adamson's findings. Second, comment will be made on the view that a core of peers remained in the chamber after the purge who were willing to support radical legislation and even countenance the trial of the King provided that the result was deposition rather than regicide.<sup>178</sup> Third, I will consider Dr Adamson's view that the Commons and the Army showed a certain deference to the Lords; according to Dr Adamson this explains the lenient treatment they received at the hands of the Army.<sup>179</sup> Finally, I will attempt to place the information in this chapter in the context of the political situation in 1648/9 endeavouring to demonstrate the importance of the Lords within the wider context of the revolution itself.

It is often inevitable that two historians covering the same period will arrive at different conclusions.<sup>180</sup> It will already be clear that my findings differ from those found in Dr Adamson's work. Over the forthcoming pages some of my criticisms of his work will be developed in greater detail, but it is important to state that I have found no evidence to support the view that he has stretched the sources beyond acceptable levels. It is true that he uses "rhetorical stratagems" to demonstrate the importance of the Lords, but this is very different to a deliberate attempt at the distortion of evidence to challenge accepted views.<sup>181</sup> The area

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<sup>178</sup> Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 262, 272.

<sup>179</sup> 'Ibid' p.258-62, 265-6.

<sup>180</sup> The same was true of Blair Worden's study of the Rump Parliament just after the publication of David Underdown's Pride's Purge. See Worden Rump p.41-2 esp n.2 p.42.

<sup>181</sup> Thus I step rather gingerly into the debate between Adamson and Kishlansky. It will be clear that I agree with Kishlansky that Adamson used rhetorical stratagems to support his case and that he overstated the importance of the Lords. See Kishlansky "Saye What?" H.J 33,4 1990 p.919-923; For an example of this see Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 260.(cont over)

of disagreement rests with his view that the Army and the Commons were prepared to fashion legislation to suit the Lords coupled with his belief that Denbigh was willing to employ subtle tactics to preserve his radical majority. This inevitably results in a challenge to one of his central arguments - the notion that the Lords still performed an essential role in the legislative process. In many ways this thesis provides support for Dr Adamson's argument. Prior to his pioneering work upon the Lords it was assumed that the abolition of the chamber was the natural consequence of the purging of Parliament, since all of the Lords refused to countenance radical politics.<sup>182</sup> This thesis provides support for the view that the final demise of the Lords was not inevitable from the moment that Pride stood at the entrance of the House of Commons thus concurring with the notion that there was not a strong ideological movement to rid the Lords of their political power.<sup>183</sup> Also a study of the Lords in this period is as justified as the more popular investigations into the trial of the King and the Whitehall debates.<sup>184</sup>

The decision by a small group of peers to support the destruction of the Newport negotiations, remain in the chamber after the 4<sup>th</sup> January vote and to take their seats in the Council of State shows that the Lords were divided amongst themselves upon how best to respond to the

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This said, I do not feel that Adamson has deliberately manufactured evidence to support his case. I am of course referring to the final chapter of his doctoral thesis and I am not in a position to comment upon the period considered by Kishlansky. It appears to me that a solution to this argument would have to include a personal check of all the sources in question. For the entire debate see J.S.A Adamson "The English Nobility and the Projected Settlement of 1647" HJ xxx (1987) p.567-602; Mark A Kishlansky "Saye What" HJ xxxiii (1990) p.917-37; J.S.A. Adamson "Politics and the Nobility in Civil War England" HJ xxxiv (1991) p.231-55; Mark A. Kishlansky "Saye no More" JBS xxx (1991) p.399-488.

<sup>182</sup> See the comments made in the introduction. Underdown Pride's Purge Wedgwood Trial and Firth House of Lords all see the destruction of the Lords as being almost inevitable. This view was followed in Jonathan Scott England's Troubles (Cambridge 2000) p.156; Ward 'The English Peerage' p.15.

<sup>183</sup> It will be argued that the demise of the Lords was not inevitable.

<sup>184</sup> Ian Gentles New Model Army p.285-294.



revolution. Denbigh believed that the peers could work with the Commons but Manchester, apart from returning to make it clear that he would allow his name to be associated with the trial of the King, subscribed to the view that nothing could be achieved without a full House of Commons.<sup>185</sup> This contempt for the legislature, shared by the majority of the peers, mirrored the attitude of many of the Presbyterian MPs in the lower chamber.<sup>186</sup> The passion for retaining the traditional trinity was demonstrated in their utterances during the debate held on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January - this too was a testimony of their social and political conservatism.<sup>187</sup> It is likely that the King was still not trusted, but some of the peers may have started to have more sympathy for his person. The growing radicalism that had been evident since the Windsor prayer meeting certainly pushed the peers in a conservative direction.<sup>188</sup> They may also have been impressed with the position Charles took during the Newport negotiations. Traditional accounts have tended to highlight Charles' ability during his trial, but his actions on the Isle of Wight certainly won him the admiration of some of those he came into contact with. It is interesting to note that the former radical Say and Sele, who had played a key part in the Newport negotiations refused to participate in politics after the 7<sup>th</sup> December.<sup>189</sup> Moreover, Charles' correspondence from Newport, which went directly to Manchester,

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<sup>185</sup> See n.66 above.

<sup>186</sup> Many Commoners entitled to sit in the House also retired from politics. Worden Rump p.23.

<sup>187</sup> L.J x p.641.

<sup>188</sup> Patricia Crawford "Charles Stuart, That Man of Blood" JBS xvi (1977)

<sup>189</sup> BM Harl Mss 6988 f.211-12, 14, 16; BM Egerton Mss 254 f.389, 390, 392(letter to Fairfax); His Majesties last speech to the Lords Commissioners T.T. E.475 (21) Dec 6<sup>th</sup> 1648; His Majesties Declaration concerning the proceedings of the Army T.T. E. 476 (23).Dec 12<sup>th</sup> 1648.

demonstrated Charles' apparent willingness to support the treaty, a stance he would maintain right up to his death.<sup>190</sup>

The attitude of the few peers who attended the chamber on a regular basis after the purging of the lower chamber is more difficult to discern. As mentioned above they were willing to countenance radical legislation, but it has been suggested that they were not willing to support the trial of the King.<sup>191</sup> Dr Adamson's claim that a radical peerage remained in the chamber, a group whose support was courted by the Commons, requires qualification. Instead of regarding these peers as equal partners in the legislative process it is possible to depict the Lords in a very different light. It will be argued that they were not willing to support the notion of a trial but they attempted to avoid controversy by consistently attempting to appease the Commons.<sup>192</sup>

Until the 2<sup>nd</sup> January the Lords accepted practically all of the legislation sent to them by the Commons.<sup>193</sup> On the 20<sup>th</sup> December the Commons sent an ordinance to the Lords for the payment of £3,000 to John Lilburne for money owed to him from his services to the parliamentary cause. Dr Adamson claims that this ordinance encountered opposition in the Lords and that the Commons accepted the amendments "without demur."<sup>194</sup> But this was not an example of the Lords asserting their constitutional parity with the Commons. The amendment to the ordinance simply asked that the deserts of Oliver Cromwell "be

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<sup>190</sup> BM Harl Mss 6988 Mss f.211-16.

<sup>191</sup> I have found no evidence to support the view that any of the Lords were willing to sanction the trial.

<sup>192</sup> This is discussed above. See L.J x p.624- 652.

<sup>193</sup> L.J x p.642-641.

<sup>194</sup> Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 260-1.

recommended to the House of Commons for the same.” This was not opposition to the ordinance but merely an addition which would have inevitably resulted in approval from the Commons.<sup>195</sup> As mentioned earlier, the Lords considered a bill on the 9<sup>th</sup> January that it would be treason hereafter for a king to levy war against Parliament but this was dropped, in all likelihood, because the Lords knew that such an innovation would not have won support in the Commons. Although Dr Adamson has placed great emphasis on a letter sent by Algernon Sidney to his patron the Earl of Leicester, it is possible to interpret the source in a rather different light. In his letter written on the 9<sup>th</sup> of January Sidney suggested that the House of Commons had been “too hasty” in discarding the Lords, since the peers that attended upon the 9<sup>th</sup> were prepared to sanction the trial of the King. Despite the fact that this source shows a certain inclination upon the part of the peers to support radical legislation it cannot be regarded as a definitive statement of intent. The source certainly proves that the peers who attended upon the 9<sup>th</sup> were more radical as a body than those who attended upon the 2<sup>nd</sup>. However, they were still not willing to support the trial as the legislation considered upon the 9<sup>th</sup> categorically stated that it would be treason hereafter for a king to wage war against his people. This could be regarded as a rejection of any attempt to try Charles for his guilt during the Civil War. It is more likely that the Lords were attempting to court favour with the Commons by demonstrating their radical credentials, whilst also preventing the trial of the King. This rather cautious approach explains the limited opposition made by the peers to both the 4<sup>th</sup> January vote and the final decision to abolish the chamber.<sup>196</sup> There is not sufficient evidence to support the view that the Lords would have favoured deposition rather than regicide for two reasons: First, the bill considered upon the 9<sup>th</sup> January suggests that Charles

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<sup>195</sup> It is obvious that the Commons would not have objected to this amendment considering that upon the 7<sup>th</sup> December they had voted their thanks to Cromwell for his services to the kingdom. C.J vi p.94.

<sup>196</sup> It was believed that the Lords were contemplating issuing a Declaration against the vote taken by the Commons upon the 4<sup>th</sup> but they decided against it. BM Add Mss 37,344 fol.243; Sidney’s letter is housed in the British Library- BM ADD Mss 21,506 fol 55.



would have remained on the throne with provision that any further indiscretion would result in the ultimate sanction. Second, the decision not to proceed with the bill supports Ian Ward's view that the "by 1649 the English peerage was quite unable and quite unwilling, to speak in a united voice about anything."<sup>197</sup> As mentioned earlier there was a division amongst the peerage upon how best to respond both to the purging of Parliament and the 4<sup>th</sup> January vote.<sup>198</sup> Of those attending upon the 9<sup>th</sup>, Denbigh, Salisbury and Mulgrave were invited to sit upon the Council but their role in the future would demonstrate different attitudes towards the Commonwealth.<sup>199</sup>

The desire to avoid controversial legislation was part of a plan conjured up by the Earl of Denbigh and a handful of peers to provide the Lords with their only opportunity to retain a certain amount of influence in the legislature.<sup>200</sup> The position of the Lords meant that they had little option but to avoid the wrath of the Commons. It was inevitable that after the regicide the issue of the role of the peerage in politics would have to be debated. The position of the Lords as an equal partner in the legislative process was destroyed after the 4<sup>th</sup> January vote, but it was still possible that they could have performed a consultative role. This possibility was shattered by both ideology and circumstance.<sup>201</sup> Denbigh and his fellow peers had been attempting to avoid confrontation clinging to the hope that their chamber would avoid outright abolition.

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<sup>197</sup> Ward 'The English Peerage' p.15-16.

<sup>198</sup> But I would suggest that they were united against the trial.

<sup>199</sup> See above.

<sup>200</sup> Denbigh's tactics were simple- to retain some kind of legislative role by avoiding confrontation.

<sup>201</sup> Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p.286-7. Dr Adamson attributes abolition to circumstance but I feel that it was a combination of this and ideology.

Upon the day of the regicide the Lords considered a petitioners complaint concerning Dr Dove's ejection from college offices in Cambridge. Dr Ward stated that this showed the "moral redundancy" of the peers.<sup>202</sup> This was part of Dr Ward's argument that suggests that the Lords were not willing to cause disruption throughout the Interregnum. It also provides a challenge to Dr Adamson's view that a radical aristocracy survived the purging of Parliament. My argument provides some support for both of these views but both accounts overstate their respective cases. Dr Ward is correct when he argues that the Lords had little influence over politics from Pride's Purge onwards and his view that the Lords were "useless" by the start of February is supported by the available evidence and it is clear that after the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January the Lords did not influence a single piece of legislation.<sup>203</sup> However, his view that the abolition of the Lords was inevitable as part of a republican "cleansing process" is open to question. It will be argued later that the purging of the lower chamber and even the regicide did not in themselves ensure that the Lords would be formally abolished.<sup>204</sup> Moreover, as mentioned above, the peers cannot be regarded as a homogenous body as they were divided upon how best to respond to the revolution.<sup>205</sup> }

Although there was a divergence of opinion upon how best to respond to the revolution between those who thought that something could be achieved by remaining at Westminster, and those who believed that a retreat from politics was the only option, Dr Adamson's view of the survival of a radical aristocracy is open to question. Denbigh and the other peers

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<sup>202</sup> Ward 'English Peerage' p.14.

<sup>203</sup> Examples can be found in L.J x p.624-651; C.J vi p. 93-133.

<sup>204</sup> Ward 'English Peerage' p.15. My case is argued below.

<sup>205</sup> There appears to be little point attempting to name the Lords as presbyterian or Independent at this stage considering that so few would serve the new regime. For a discussion of the term presbyterian see Chapter 4 below. Worden Rump p.4-11.

nominated to join the Council of State were not willing to support the trial of the King, illustrated by their decision not to act as a Commissioner, their rejection of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January votes and their refusal to sit upon the Council of State until their names were disassociated from the regicide. The decision to serve the new Government showed that these peers were more radical than some of their colleagues, but they were still not willing to support the trial of the King. Also, the evidence presented in this chapter argues that Denbigh was not attempting to control the membership of the chamber<sup>206</sup>; wanting rather to ensure that as many Lords as possible joined the chamber. Both Drs. Adamson and Ward depict Denbigh as the master tactician attempting to keep his majority, to either push through the trial or to ensure that the members who did return were willing to placate the Commons.<sup>207</sup> The evidence presented in this chapter portrays Denbigh in a different light. He was a man who took the lead in attempts to ensure that the Lords would play a role in a future constitution and this prevented him from making protests against the regicide. But he should not be viewed as a man lacking in principle. When the Lords rejected the bill to support the trial Denbigh refused to act as a commissioner. He would adopt the same stance when he was asked to join the Council of State pointing out that the original oath was }contrary to how he acted “as a peer in the House of Lords”<sup>208</sup> There is no doubt that Denbigh was the most influential peer in politics but he was not attempting to manipulate the chamber to suit his own political agenda. In more modern times he would be regarded as a man who assumed the role of “primus inter pares” willing to adhere to a majority decision.<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> See Above, for Denbigh’s attempts to fill the Chamber.

<sup>207</sup> Ward ‘English Peerage’ p.6; Adamson ‘Peerage in Politics’ p.265-7.

<sup>208</sup> Firth House of Lords p.222-3.

<sup>209</sup> His objection to the oath to join the Council of State defended his position as a peer in the chamber as much as this being a reflection of his personal position.



One aspect of Dr Adamson's thesis that requires serious qualification is his view that the Army and the Commons showed a certain deference towards the Lords. Dr Adamson claims that the Army took a far more lenient approach to the Presbyterian peers than they did to their colleagues in the lower chamber. He points out that the peers were not arrested for their part in the Newport negotiations; Michael Oldisworth Pembroke's patronage secretary was "carefully omitted from the list of MPs to be imprisoned; he cited the story of the Earl of Middlesex, stating that the Army deliberately played down the incident and this "once again showed the Army's concern to maintain the support of the remaining peers." Throughout the final chapter of his thesis Dr Adamson claims that the Army went to great lengths to pacify the Lords suggesting that this amounted to "one rule for the Commons but another for the Lords".<sup>210</sup>

This evidence cited by Dr Adamson is open to question. There is no evidence to support the view that Oldsworth was deliberately omitted from the list of MPs to be secluded. As I mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis the first purge was poorly planned and a number of moderates survived Pride's clutches and entered the chamber. To single out Oldsworth (without a single footnote to support it) as a special case does not take account of the nature of the purges and the argument is further undermined by the fact that Oldsworth would become a regicide.<sup>211</sup> The same is true of the Earl of Middlesex. Although it is true that he did not receive punishment for the assault upon the soldiers Fairfax went to great lengths to demonstrate that the soldiers would show restraint. He made it perfectly clear that he expected his soldiers to "behave and demean themselves civilly and peaceably to all sorts of

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<sup>210</sup> Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 260 (for Oldisworth)- his view was supported by Ian Gentles The New Model Army p. 282; For Middlesex Adamson 'Peerage in Politics' p. 265-6.

<sup>211</sup> Chapter 2 above.

people”<sup>212</sup>, a stance he would maintain after the regicide. Although opposed to the moves against the King, Fairfax was not idle in the weeks between the purge and regicide. He channelled his efforts into attempts to ensure that the Army would be paid their arrears, believing that respectable behaviour would help this cause. He also wanted to counter Royalist accusations concerning the nefarious activities of the soldiery. To do this the troopers were subjected to harsh punishment for any indiscretion, including riding the wooden Horse and being stripped to the waist and hit by every member of the regiment.<sup>213</sup> Middlesex was spared from punishment not out of deference to the peerage but because the leaders of the Army wished to appear as reasonable as possible. To imprison an old Earl for a couple of drunken remarks would have been seized upon by the enemies of the new regime as confirmation of all the evils they had predicted.<sup>214</sup>

One question does remain. Why did the Army manage the House of Commons but decided to leave the Lords alone? There is I believe an answer to this question but it is not found through notions of respect for the integrity of the upper chamber.

First, although the Lords supported the Newport negotiations, the passion was found in the Commons. It was William Prynne who on the eve of Pride’s Purge made long speeches defending the integrity of Parliament. Moreover, the attendance in the Commons was far greater than in the Lords and it was clear to the Army that the ideological force behind the

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<sup>212</sup> There is a shortage of secondary sources upon Fairfax’s actions at this stage. This is quoted from Three Proclamations by His Excellency T.T. E. 475 (9) p.3 See p.5-6 for further controls of the soldiers; A Letter from the Lord General Fairfax to the Lord Mayor, Alderman and common Council of London. All of the above were dated December 1648. Further examples can be found in Rushworth Historical Collections vii p.1356-1358, 1385.

<sup>213</sup> The Perfect Weekly Account Wed 20<sup>th</sup> Dec- Wed 27<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648 ; Whitelock ii Memorials p.478; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T. E. 536 (5) Tue 19<sup>th</sup>-Tue 26<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648 p.1197-8.

<sup>214</sup> See Chapter 5 below.

conservative reaction came from the Commons not the Lords.<sup>215</sup> Second, the Lords effectively purged themselves; after the first purge of the Commons attendance figures in the upper chamber were at a record low. The Commons still needed to be managed and this explains the Army's presence outside their door in the month after the initial purge.<sup>216</sup> Third, the Lords supported all the necessary legislation until the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January vote. After that date the Commons assumed control so a purge of the Lords was not required. Fourth, the same argument used with the Earl of Middlesex is appropriate here; to send in the troops to remove four or five peers would have been regarded as an unnecessary use of force. Finally, and underpinning all of these factors is the simple but pertinent fact that the Lords were not regarded as important participants in the legislative process. Their support for the revolution was formal but not essential. Some peers were nominated as commissioners in the hope that this would make the revolution look more respectable but they were never regarded as essential to its success.<sup>217</sup>

One other reason explains why the Army was more lenient towards the Lords than they were to the Commons. The petitions that flooded to Fairfax from Norwich, Hull, Portsmouth, Warwick, Boston, Surrey and from the Northern Armies demanded justice against the King and the leading members of the Commons with little or no reference to the Lords.<sup>218</sup> In the

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<sup>215</sup> The Substance of a speech in the House of Commons by William Prynne T.T.E 539 (11) 4<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648;

<sup>216</sup> Chapter 1 above.

<sup>217</sup> Rushworth Historical Collections vii p.1383.

<sup>218</sup> Examples of Petitions can be found in A New Remonstrance from the Northern Army T.T. E.475 (4) 4<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648; The Declarations and Humble Representation of the Officers and Soldiers in Col Scroops, Col Saunders and Col Wauton's Regiments. T.T.E. 475 (24) 5<sup>th</sup> December 1648; The Humble Petition of the Regiments at Dover Castle in The Moderate T.T. E. 477 (4) Tue 5<sup>th</sup> Dec- Tue 15<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648 p.211 (cp), See also an anonymous letter p.204; The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T E. 536 (5) Tue 19<sup>th</sup> Dec- Tue 26<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648 p.1197; The Humble Petition and Addresses of the Officers and Soldiers in Boston (see over)



absence of such pressure coupled with the apparent redundancy of the upper chamber, the leaders of the Army felt little need to move against the peers.

The findings in this chapter suggest that the Lords did not play a significant role in the revolution. It has been argued that, although the peers differed amongst themselves upon how to respond to the events between December and February, they displayed a degree of unity upon the issue of the trial of the King. This thesis has challenged notions of deference upon the part of the Commons and the Army towards the Lords. As it happened, the Commons discarded the opinions of the Lords with consummate ease. A simple chronology of the events illustrates this point. Upon the 2<sup>nd</sup> January the Lords rejected the bill for the erection of a High Court of Justice. As soon as the Commons appreciated what had happened they voted themselves supreme in the legislature. The Lords attempted to secure a “fair correspondence” but their pleas were not listened to by the now omnipotent lower chamber. Finally, when the King had been dealt with the Lords were abolished as a chamber. It is true that some MPs hoped that the second chamber would remain, but as a consultative body only. This shows that when the debate occurred upon the 5<sup>th</sup> February the goal posts had shifted dramatically. Even if the moderates had won the day and the Lords had been allowed to remain - albeit with diminutive powers, the simple fact remains that the Lords’ decision upon the 2<sup>nd</sup> January ensured that the Commons would dominate the new Government. To demonstrate their

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found in The Moderate T.T. E. 536 (2) Tue 19<sup>th</sup>- Tue 26<sup>th</sup> Dec 1648 also Humble Petition from Kent p.222; Petitions from Glamorgan and Denbigh can be found in The Moderate T.T. E. 536 (30) Tue 26<sup>th</sup>- Tue 2<sup>nd</sup> Jan 1648/9 p.231; Petition from Norwich in The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer Tue 26<sup>th</sup> Dec- Tue 2<sup>nd</sup> Jan 1648/9; Petition from the Common Council of London in The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer T.T. E. 539 (6) Tue 16<sup>th</sup> Jan- Tue 23<sup>rd</sup> Jan 1649 p. 1227; Whitelock Memorials vol iv p.478-82, 496, 518; Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 1368, 1372, 1373, 1388, 1389, 1400; See also David Underdown “Honest Radicals in the Counties” in Pennington and Roots (eds) Puritans and Revolutionaries (Oxford 1978) p.186-205; Fairfax was also under pressure to provide material aid to his soldiers- eg The Humble Petition of the Hundred maimed soldiers, widows and orphans” Heads of a Dairie T.T. E. 537 (25) Tue 2<sup>th</sup>-Tue 9<sup>th</sup> Jan p.41.

commitment to the omnipotence of their chamber the Commons removed the Lords as commissioners the day after the 2<sup>nd</sup> January vote.<sup>219</sup>

John Adamson concludes his doctoral thesis by stating that the House of Lords was abolished due to a functional breakdown rather than a crisis that had engulfed the aristocracy. His claim that it was the decision upon the part of the Lords to insist upon equal status coupled with the publication of the text of the King's speech appearing upon the 5<sup>th</sup>, along with the Royalist declaration nominating the peers as the legal government, was questioned in this chapter.<sup>220</sup>

These circumstances helped to ensure that the peers faced outright abolition but the issue of an equal share in government was not the principle at stake. However, in one respect his argument upon the so called crisis facing the aristocracy can be supported. Although the discussions at Whitehall assumed the destruction of the House of Lords, their demise was not inevitable from the first day of the purge of the Commons. If the Lords had supported the trial and the execution of the King their chamber would have survived but its perpetuation would have been dependant upon the wishes of the Commons. It was the Commons who took all of the initiatives during the revolution and they had the support of the Army but, had the Lords been prepared to acquiesce

with the revolution, the abolitionists would not have been able to muster sufficient support. This, however, does suggest that there was a certain crisis facing the aristocracy involved in politics. The days of the Baronial magnate influencing their clients in the Lower Chamber can, arguably, be identified in the early stages of the Long Parliament, but by 1648/9 this situation had altered dramatically.<sup>221</sup> The only means of protecting their political status was to

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<sup>219</sup> Rushworth Historical Collections vii p. 1383.

<sup>220</sup> Adamson Peerage in Politics p.287.

<sup>221</sup> J.S.A. Adamson "The Baronial context of the English Civil War" TRHS 5<sup>th</sup> ser 40 (1990) p.92-132; John Morrill "The making of Oliver Cromwell" in John Morrill (ed) Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (1990) p.45-7.

support the revolutionary aspirations advanced in the Commons. The Lords were not willing to do this and they paid the political price for their principles.

Considering that this chapter has suggested that the Lords played a rather inconsequential role in affecting the course of the events leading up to the regicide, it is worth considering what conclusions can be drawn concerning the nature of the English Revolution.

In some respects we have to return to the Whig interpretation of events. This was a revolution dominated by a small clique of determined radicals, who with the support of the Army, were willing to dramatically alter the English constitution and as a consequence the House of Lords were swept away.<sup>222</sup> Although these findings support this traditional picture two reservations require stipulation. First, it is too much of a teleological approach to history if we assume that the abolition of this chamber was inevitable from the moment that Pride and Grey stood at the door of the Commons to restrict the membership. Second, and more importantly, these MPs who would finally abolish the second chamber did not regard themselves as the bastions of a new constitutional order. This study shows that, despite all of the rhetoric about elected chambers and power being vested in the people, the Commoners were not initially determined to rob the Lords of their constitutional position.

Both Jonathan Scott and Colin Davies have placed great influence upon “religious and constitutional anti-formalism.”<sup>223</sup> Dr Scott claims that there was a tradition of republicanism that was more concerned with “principles of Government and persons” rather than forms.<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> S.R. Gardiner History of the Great Civil War vol iv. This appears to be his main argument.

<sup>223</sup> Scott England's Troubles p.158-9, 230, 242-3; J.C. Davis “Cromwell's Religion” in Morrill ed Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution p.181-208.

<sup>224</sup> Scott England's Troubles p.156.



This chapter provides some support for his argument. The Commons were willing to dispense with constitutional forms when it hindered their goal of attacking the Monarch but this is different to an ideological fixation that wanted to sweep away all of the conventional forms of government. The House of Lords was abolished, not because of an attachment to a belief in classical republicanism but, because the personnel were found to be wanting. There was no need to remove the Lords whilst they supported the moves against the King but when the peers rejected this move they had to be usurped, and what is more they would not be trusted again. This provides more support for Blair Worden's argument that the majority of the regicides "opposed not the office of kingship but the person of the King" than it does for accounts that see a great republican tradition in England.<sup>225</sup> But in turn this should not obscure the ideology or question the motivation and determination of the MPs. Although the evidence left by the regicides is woefully inadequate, their determination to dispense with the King was very similar to the attitude of the more militant members of the New Model Army.<sup>226</sup> It was inevitable that regicide would culminate in more bloodshed and this could have embroiled the nation in a continental war but, in the minds of many of the MPs, this was a risk that had to be taken. Upon two occasions during his trial Charles commented that there were no Lords present as he endeavoured to show the illegality of the court.<sup>227</sup> It is perhaps one of the most ironic episodes of the English Revolution that the abolition of the Lords was not due to Charles death, but more to do with his life.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> This chapter has suggested that there were limits to the republicanism of the MPs. I regard the Revolution as being provoked by a desire to destroy Charles rather than an ideological attachment to Republicanism. This will be developed in the conclusion of this thesis. Worden *Rump* p. 50.

<sup>226</sup> Examples can be found in n.219 above.

<sup>227</sup> BM Add Mss 37,344 fol.247.

<sup>228</sup> This was partially inspired by Ronald Hutton's remarks upon Cromwell; Ronald Hutton *The Restoration. A Political and Religious History of England and Wales* (Oxford 1986) p.120.

## The Presbyterians

The last three chapters have focussed upon an individual, and two groups of politicians who were allowed to participate in revolutionary politics. This chapter will concentrate upon a very disparate group that were either excluded from the political process or retired from Westminster because they objected to the purging of Parliament. Traditionally historians have labelled this group as the “Presbyterians.” However, the term itself has created a great deal of controversy,<sup>1</sup> and without wishing to become embroiled in the intricacies of the debate, I will attempt to provide a justification for the retention of the term, whilst making it plain that my use of the word Presbyterian does not in anyway suggest that this group were a homogenous entity. Moreover, the central theme of this chapter will suggest that both the former MPs and the Presbyterians not involved in Westminster politics were not united upon how to respond to the revolution.

In the introduction to ‘The Rump Parliament’ Blair Worden noted that;

“the use of the terms Presbyterian and Independent has provoked a vigorous debate, conducted in the pages of Journals, whose convolutions and technicalities must recently have bewildered or wearied the non-specialist reader still more than the argument about who, at the end of the seventeenth century, were respectively the Whigs and the Tories. Yet no one writing about Rump politics could, or should avoid reference to the issue, and it is necessary to create some kind of order to the apparent chaos surrounding it.”

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<sup>1</sup> David Underdown, Pride’s Purge, Politics in the English Revolution (Oxford 1971) p.45-75. Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament (Cambridge 1975) p.1-19. A summary of the whole debate can be found in an article in Past and Present 44 (1969) S.Foster, “Presbyterian Independent Exorcised” p.52-75; There then followed a series of articles in Past and Present 47 (1970): J.H Hexter, “Presbyterians, Independents and Puritans: A Voice from the Past” p.134-36; B.Worden, “The Independents: A Reprisal in History” p.116-21; V. Pearl, “Exorcist or Historian: The Dangers of Ghost Hunting” p.122-27; D.Underdown, “The Presbyterian Independents Exorcised: A Brief Comment” p.128-29; G.Yule, “Presbyterians and Independents: Some Comments” p.130-33; S. Foster, “A Rejoinder” p.137-46

The clarity of Worden's research appeared to put an end to the debate. He concluded the picture, started by Jack Hexter and developed by Valerie Pearl and David Underdown, which demonstrated that seventeenth century politics was not a firm structure of a war and peace parties that would develop into the Independents and Presbyterians respectively.<sup>2</sup> Most importantly he was able to show that Pride's purge did not result in the exclusion of a Presbyterian party leaving a radical Independent party to govern the nation. Dr Worden therefore, used the term independent sparingly as a description of the MPs that sat in the Rump, whilst retaining the term 'Presbyterian' as a description of "that section of opinion which had supported the parliamentary cause in the Civil War but which was alienated by, and which steered clear of politics after, Pride's Purge and the execution of the King."<sup>3</sup>

This chapter will follow the definition made by Dr Worden upon the grounds that the term is derived from contemporary usage. Although the term is very broad it does have its uses if it is remembered that Presbyterian means opposition to the purge and the regicide. The use of the term for the secluded and the abstaining members does not demonstrate support for the view that these men belonged to a political party that was excluded from Parliament as a result of the purges. Two useful studies of the Presbyterians by Lehand Carlson and George Abernathy portrayed the Presbyterians as a homogenous group with both historians following Samuel Gardiner's view that the purging of Parliament separated two distinct political parties.<sup>4</sup> Both Professor Underdown and Dr Worden have shown that the members of the Rump were a heterogeneous group and the Presbyterians must be treated in the same fashion. Nathaniel Fiennes, John Crewe, Sir John Evelyn, William Pierrepont and Philip Lord Wharton had

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<sup>2</sup> Worden Rump p.6. See articles in n.1 above.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid p.6-7.

<sup>4</sup> L.H Carlson "A History of the Presbyterians from Pride's Purge to the Dissolution of the Long Parliament," Church History xi (1942); G. Abernathy The English Presbyterians and the Stuart Restoration 1648-1663. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society (1965).



opposed the Presbyterians in 1647, demonstrated by their fleeing from the Parliament and/or taking the 4<sup>th</sup> of August engagement.<sup>5</sup> In 1647 they were opposed to the Presbyterian faction headed by Denzil Holles, but if we are to accept the traditional two party view, they became members of the enlarged Presbyterian party upon the first day of the purge. It is true that the events in December and January provided them with some common ground, but this chapter will argue that their dislike of the revolution did not result in a shared ideology that transcended former differences of opinion. This chapter will suggest that there was a remarkable absence of a corporate response by this group. Moreover, in some respects the chapter will suggest that the term Presbyterian was far broader than contemporaries appreciated. Although the polemicists endeavoured to portray a united political group in reality Presbyterianism can hardly be described as a loose collective mentality yet alone a political party. But as mentioned above it is justified by contemporary usage. William Sedgwick was regarded by contemporaries in 1649 as a Presbyterian but before that date he was regarded as one of the New Model's radical chaplains. William Prynne described himself as a member of the Presbyterian party, but in his writings after the purge he did not demonstrate any desire to support a rigid Presbyterian church settlement. At the other end of the scale Massey escaped from custody and joined the Royalist cause and this has clouded the term even more. Moreover in a declaration just after his escape he makes it plain that he was starting to have reservations about having joined the parliamentary cause in the first place. This chapter will, whilst taking into account the difficulty with the source material at our disposal, suggest that the term 'Presbyterian' essentially means constitutional royalism but this is not helpful because of they could not agree upon what they objected to most about the revolution.

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<sup>5</sup> Underdown Pride's Purge p.366-390 for a full listing of MPs early political behaviour. See also, Denzil Holles, Memoirs (T. Goodwin, London 1699) p.210.

It is also important to state that the retention of the term Presbyterian does not imply that the secluded and abstaining MPs subscribed to a form of religious Presbyterianism. Professor Hexter was the first historian to note that there was a problem with the Presbyterian Independent and it was this article that precipitated the debate upon the nature of allegiances in the Long Parliament.<sup>6</sup> The historian is confronted with a series of problems when attempting to determine the religious beliefs of a group of individuals who lived over three hundred years ago. The first is the nature of the available evidence; few of these Presbyterian MPs left diaries, statements and letters that provide an insight into their spiritual convictions. Even Cromwell's religion is difficult to define within the protestant demarcations established by contemporaries and followed by historians.<sup>7</sup> Where it is possible to determine the religious beliefs of these Presbyterian MPs they do not fall into a neat category. Some MPs, for example Sir Samuel Luke, favoured a ridged Presbyterianism based upon the Scottish Model. Others including Sir Simonds D'Ewes, William Pierrepont and arguably the most famous Presbyterian William Prynne favoured a primitive form of episcopacy.<sup>8</sup> If a generalisation is to be made concerning the religious beliefs of the secluded and abstaining members in the 1640s, it seems that few of them were willing to countenance a rigid Presbyterian settlement based upon the Scottish model. Most MPs objected to Laudianism and lended support to the erastian church settlement which was established in 1646. As Clare Cross pointed out few MPs were willing to substitute "one form of government, prelacy, with another Presbyterianism even less susceptible to lay control."<sup>9</sup> This view is supported when it is

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<sup>6</sup> J H Hexter, See Note 1 above.

<sup>7</sup> J.C. Davis, "Cromwell's Religion" in Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (1990) p.181-208. Davis found the traditional labels used by contemporaries as being singularly unhelpful when it came to Cromwell's religion.

<sup>8</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.21 and 63.

<sup>9</sup> Claire Cross, "The Church in England 1646-60", in G.E Aylmer (ed), The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement (1972) p.101.

acknowledged that from 1645 onwards the Scots, the Presbyterian Divines and the citizens of London waged an intensive campaign to secure the establishment of jure-divino Presbyterianism. Mark Kishlansky has shown that from 1645 onwards Parliament was subjected, first to petitions and then remonstrances demanding the establishment of a high Presbyterian church settlement. The rejection of the proposals of the Westminster Assembly shows that few MPs were doctrinaire Presbyterians.<sup>10</sup> The findings in this chapter will attempt to reveal the religious beliefs of the MPs after the purging of Parliament. It was widely reported by Royalist writers that the regicide would see the end of any kind of order in church and state; for some radicals this was the first step on the way to a new Jerusalem. It would not be inconceivable to imagine that the conservative MPs, fearing the breakdown of order, lent their support to the Divines to halt the possible degeneration into a state of anarchy. This would be part of what Professor Davis has called “the rage for conformity.”<sup>11</sup> This chapter will suggest, where the sources allow, that this was not the case and that there is much evidence of common ground between the Presbyterian laity and the clergy.

This chapter will not attempt to provide a history of the Presbyterians during the revolution. David Underdown’s book ‘Pride’s Purge’ provides a very useful narrative of their actions between the purge and regicide and he pays particular attention to the activities of the clergy. Therefore the chapter will not make too much reference to the reaction of the divines, especially between the purge and regicide. The chapter will not deal with the issue of Presbyterian involvement in conspiracies. This has already been the subject of a good study and the development of conspiracies appears to have commenced after the period covered by

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<sup>10</sup> Mark Kishlansky The Rise of the New Model Army (Cambridge 1979) p.76-102. Valerie Pearl, “London’s Counter Revolution” in G.E. Alymer, The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement 1646-1660. (1972)

<sup>11</sup> See chapter 5 below. Underdown, Pride’s Purge p. 156-7. This was one of the main themes of J.C. Davis’ work on the Ranters, Fear, Myth and History ... the Ranters and the Historians (Cambridge 1986) passim.



this thesis. This account will look at the issues raised above concerning the nature of Presbyterianism but it will also endeavour to answer one other important issue. As mentioned above, the Rump Parliament found itself in an unenviable position in February 1649. It was remarkably unpopular and it faced problems from all quarters. Dr Worden has convincingly argued that one of the major considerations in the early months of the Rump was to isolate Royalists from Presbyterians. It was suggested in chapter one above that the Levellers were excluded from influence, partially because of the actions of their leaders. This chapter will suggest that sufficient Presbyterians showed enough of a willingness to support the regime so as to encourage the Rump to adopt a conciliatory policy. It will be suggested in the conclusion that if the Levellers had adopted the same approach the revolution may have been very different.

The last three chapters have attempted to provide a revised account of the purge itself. This one will begin with an account of the members excluded as a result of the purges.

## The Purges

Upon the 4<sup>th</sup> January 1649 William Prynne claimed that more than two hundred MPs had been secluded from Parliament as a result of the Army's "unparalleled force upon the House".<sup>12</sup> Since Prynne's publication, a number of historians have provided their own estimates.<sup>13</sup> There

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<sup>12</sup> William Prynne, A Brief Memento to the Present Unparliamentary Juncto, T.T.E. 537 (7), 4<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.3.

<sup>13</sup> The three main texts are Brunton and Pennington Members of the Long Parliament (1968) Underdown Pride's Purge; Worden The Rump Parliament. Other texts which have not discussed the different findings of these three works include G.E. Aylmer, Rebellion or Revolution who places the figure "between 95 and 120 MPs"; David L. Smith "The struggle for New Constitutional and Institutional forms" in Morrill ed Revolution and Restoration, p. 16 followed Underdown's figure of 186 secluded members (see below for Underdown's methodology).

are three studies which stand above the rest. In 1954, Douglas Brunton and Donald Pennington suggested that two hundred and fifteen MPs were secluded as a result of Pride's purge.<sup>14</sup> Professor Underdown argued that one hundred and eighty six MPs were denied entry, with a further forty five imprisoned.<sup>15</sup> Dr Worden questioned both these figures. Worden suggested that both totals were too high, and that in all probability no more than one hundred and ten MPs (including the imprisoned members) were secluded. The argument outlined below, will to an extent support Dr Worden's assertion. There are two reasons which have prevented me from accepting his case wholesale. First, he failed to develop his argument; this was not a neglect of duty by Dr Worden, since his study concentrated upon the sitting MPs rather than those secluded. Second, in this paper, it will be suggested that the number of MPs secluded was slightly higher than Worden suggested.<sup>16</sup>

The different findings of these three historians cited above has primarily arisen because of the nature of the available evidence.<sup>17</sup> The list of MPs in Pride and Hewson's hands does not survive. There are a number of later lists, but they do not inspire much confidence as they make little distinction between the secluded and abstaining MPs. Only two contemporary lists survive, but neither can be regarded as foolproof guides as to the number of secluded members.<sup>18</sup> Although a number of contemporary newspapers provide useful details of the

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<sup>14</sup> D. Brunton and D.H Pennington, Members of the Long Parliament (1968) p.41-3, p.225-45.

<sup>15</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.212-13, p.361-90.

<sup>16</sup> Worden, The Rump , p.391-2. See also below.

<sup>17</sup> The problem with the source material for the period between 1649 and 1653 is brilliantly discussed by Worden, The Rump Parliament p.348-404. See also, Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic (Manchester 1997 ) p.11-19.

<sup>18</sup> A List of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members , T.T. 669 f.13 (62), 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648. A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members T.T.E. 539 (5), 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1649. See below Table 1. The problems involved with both sources are discussed below.

events surrounding the purge, they failed to print the names of the secluded members. A number of Presbyterian pamphlets can be consulted but they cannot be entirely trusted. The 'Presbyterians' were determined to show the notorious nature of the Army's actions. Had they admitted that a number of MPs decided to leave Westminster out of their own volition, it would have undermined their repetitive onslaughts about the illegality of the purge.<sup>19</sup> Conversely, the Army played down the scale of the purge, attempting to persuade the nation that they would not be unreasonable.<sup>20</sup> Such problems with evidence are insoluble. What it does mean is that it is most difficult to compile a definitive list of secluded MPs.

Professor Underdown<sup>21</sup> rightly disregarded the later lists,<sup>22</sup> arriving at his total of one hundred and eighty-six MPs, by making extensive use of the two available contemporary lists. The first list he used was almost certainly written by William Prynne.<sup>23</sup> It appeared in the pamphlet entitled 'The Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members', and contained the names of ninety-eight MPs. The second list he used was an anonymous publication which possessed the names of two hundred and fourteen MPs. Underdown's method was straightforward, "collating the anonymous list with Prynne's, excluding the obvious errors

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<sup>19</sup> For an account of the Presbyterian opposition see below. Clement Walker, A Complete History of Independency, Part II, 4 vols (1661) p.33-178.

<sup>20</sup> See A letter of Lord Fairfax ... right understanding between the City and Army T.T.E. 475 (32), 8<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>21</sup> Although this section differs from Underdown's account, his remains by far the most detailed and useful account of the purges. Pride's Purge p.143-207.

<sup>22</sup> Brunton and Pennington made extensive use of the later lists; for the difference between their findings and Underdown see Members of the Long Parliament p.225-45 and Underdown, Pride's Purge p.361-90.

<sup>23</sup> Underdown came to this conclusion. It will be discussed in slightly more detail in my forthcoming section upon the Presbyterians – footnote 8 above.



and adding the names which do not appear in either.”<sup>24</sup> It is his use of these two sources, which I believe, requires qualification.

Although he did not support his assertion with evidence, Dr Worden described this anonymous publication as “patently unreliable”.<sup>25</sup> By Underdown’s own admission the list was not ideal, conceding that “the author must have been working to some extent from guesswork”. Underdown clearly held four substantial reservations about using the list. First it was hastily compiled. Second, it contained several confusing misspellings. Third, it made no distinction between the imprisoned and secluded members. Fourth, it included Herbert Board who had been dead for months. Most significantly, Underdown admitted that the author “could not possibly have known whether members absent in the country had been actually secluded or were merely abstaining voluntarily.”<sup>26</sup> All these justified reservations did not prevent Underdown from making extensive use of the list. Eighty-one MPs in his secluded category came from the anonymous publication without any supporting evidence.<sup>27</sup>

Apart from Herbert Board mentioned above, Underdown was forced to concede that the anonymous publication made a number of errors.<sup>28</sup> William Ashurst, William Pierrepont, John Baker and Sir Gilbert Pickering featured in the anonymous publication but were not identified by Underdown as secluded MPs. Ashurst and Pierrepont were two of the Long Parliament’s most prominent politicians. Pierrepont’s decision to voluntarily withdraw from

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<sup>24</sup> Quoted in Underdown Pride’s Purge p. 212.

<sup>25</sup> Worden Rump p. 391.

<sup>26</sup> Underdown, Pride’s Purge, p. 212.

<sup>27</sup> See Table 3 below; Underdown, Pride’s Purge. p. 361 – 90.

<sup>28</sup> See Table 1 & 3 below.

the purged Parliament was reported in the press.<sup>29</sup> Although he remained critical of the purge, as late as 26<sup>th</sup> January 1649, he was not identified as one of the Army's opponents.<sup>30</sup> William Ashurst remained in Parliament until the 19<sup>th</sup> December, and was therefore not a victim of the three purges. Like Pierrepont, Ashurst was critical of the purges, but he remained "resolved not to fall out" with the Army.<sup>31</sup> Although the author of the anonymous publication can be excused a few mistakes, the fact that two such high profile politicians were wrongly categorised is significant. As mentioned above, Underdown named eighty-one MPs using the anonymous publication as his sole reference. Out of these eighty-one MPs, forty-eight have untraceable political backgrounds and do not feature in the journals of the House of Commons during the five weeks before the original purge. Since the author of the anonymous publication was mistaken about Pierrepont and Ashurst, it is surely logical to assume that he would have confused a number of these faceless MPs.<sup>32</sup>

The author of the anonymous publication was not just confused or mistaken upon a few isolated occasions. It is clear that he knew very little about the MPs he claimed were secluded. He did not know the christian names of forty-three of them; upon nine occasions he wrongly asserted a christian name.<sup>33</sup> Underdown felt obliged to alter the author's spelling seventy-two times. Although many of these were minor alterations, a number required substantial

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<sup>29</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, T.T.E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December, p. 531; BM Add Mss 37,344 f. 236.

<sup>30</sup> Whitelock Memorials ii p. 509.

<sup>31</sup> William Ashurst, Reasons Against the Agreement of the People T.T.E. 536 (4), 20<sup>th</sup> December 1648, quoted p.14. Worden, The Rump Parliament p.24.

<sup>32</sup> See Table 3 below. Underdown, Pride's Purge , p.361-90. C.J vi, p.66-93.

<sup>33</sup> The anonymous publication wrongly cited the christian names of Edward Fowell, Sir Thomas Parker, Richard Rose, Sir Edward Spencer, Sir William Spring, Sir Thomas Trenchard, Sir Simonds D'Ewes. Sir Henry Yelverton, John Thyne; see Table 1 below.

adjustment. Elisha Crymes appeared in the anonymous publication as 'Grimes', Arthur Annesley as 'Anslow', Sir Edmund Fowell as 'Edward Vowell', Sir John Hippisley as 'Sir John Ipsley', Robert Jennings as 'Gennings' and Sir William Uvedale as 'Sir William Udall'. William Gell appeared twice in the anonymous publication, but upon both occasions he was not granted a christian name.<sup>34</sup> I have been unable to place two names, those of 'Dickers' and 'Gette'.<sup>35</sup> Considering the number of errors in this list, it is impossible to accept it as an authentic guide. The list was quickly compiled, probably designed to exaggerate the scale of the Army's intervention into the political arena.

William Prynne's list does not contain the basic errors which characterised the anonymous publication.<sup>36</sup> However, Prynne's list does include one fundamental problem; should we accept a list compiled by the Army's most outspoken critic? Between the first purge and the regicide, Prynne produced an enormous amount of literature. For the most part, his literary campaign was designed to discredit the Army and those parliamentarians who remained at Westminster. Prynne argued that the purge had prevented an honourable treaty with the King, subverted the ancient constitution and produced a military anarchy which would result in the ruin of most Englishmen.<sup>37</sup> Prynne needed to demonstrate the grand scale of the Army's attack upon Parliament and he also wished to marginalise the sitting MPs. Therefore, it is possible that Prynne exaggerated the number of secluded MPs.

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<sup>34</sup> John Birch also appeared twice in the anonymous publication.

<sup>35</sup> A list of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members, T.T. 669 f.13 (62), 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648,

<sup>36</sup> See Table 1 below.

<sup>37</sup> Prynne's writings will be fully discussed below. For a discussion of his writings see below.



There is one reservation that can be levelled against Prynne's list. Dr Worden noted that Prynne's list contained a "suspiciously high proportion of members whose names do not appear in the Journals of the House of Commons, at any time during the autumn of 1648".<sup>38</sup> From a close inspection of the attendance records of the MPs in the five weeks before the purge, we can support Worden's assertion. Between the 1<sup>st</sup> November and the 5<sup>th</sup> December, only twenty-eight MPs who figured in Prynne's list appear in the journals of the House of Commons.<sup>39</sup> Although I am aware that this cannot be regarded as foolproof evidence which utterly discredits Prynne's list, the method is not totally unsatisfactory. There are a number of lists detailing the MPs imprisoned at the purge, and this, coupled with Underdown's meticulous research, means that we know the names of the forty-five MPs taken into custody as a result of the purges.<sup>40</sup> These imprisoned MPs were obviously secluded from Parliament. By using the same method, thirty-six of them attended Parliament in the month before the purge.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, apart from these imprisoned MPs, it is possible to determine the names of a further twenty-two MPs who were definitely secluded.<sup>42</sup> Seventeen of these MPs appear to have attended Parliament in the month before the purge. This high percentage of unmistakably purged MPs appearing in the journals, compared with the low percentage in Prynne's list, suggests that the MP for Newport may have confused absenteeism with seclusion. Unfortunately, considering the absence of other reliable lists, it is impossible to scrutinise Prynne's listings.

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<sup>38</sup> Worden, The Rump p.391. Table 1 below.

<sup>39</sup> C.J vi, p.66-93; Table 1 below.

<sup>40</sup> No alteration to Underdown's figure of 45 is required, Pride's Purge p.366-90.

<sup>41</sup> See Table 2 below. C.J vi, p.66-93.

<sup>42</sup> See below. Although he did not cite the sources Worden suggested that (apart from those imprisoned) we know the names of "only about twenty of the MPs turned away by the army", The Rump p.391.

If we add the imprisoned members to Underdown's List of secluded members, he believed that two hundred and thirty-one MPs were denied access to the Commons. If this figure is accepted, we have to acknowledge that between the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> December, there was a dramatic increase in the number of MPs wishing to take their seats. Ludlow stated that one hundred and twenty MPs survived Pride's clutches and entered Parliament upon the 6<sup>th</sup>; this figure is supported by evidence in the journals of the House of Commons.<sup>43</sup> Although three other purges took place, this resulted in the seclusion of no more than seventy MPs.<sup>44</sup> After these deductions, it is clear that Underdown assumed that approximately two hundred and eighty MPs turned up for parliamentary duty on the 6<sup>th</sup>. The figure is higher than this because at least forty MPs were "frighted away" because of the large military presence in London.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, we are looking at a figure of about three hundred MPs attempting to take their seats. This figure is substantially higher than any recorded attendance in the month before the purge. The average attendance in that month was one hundred and fifty-six. Although two hundred and thirty-eight MPs were in Parliament on the 4<sup>th</sup> December,<sup>46</sup> this still remains far lower than Underdown's figure cited above. It is most unlikely that there would have been such a dramatic increase within the space of just forty-eight hours.

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<sup>43</sup> C.J vi, p.93. Upon the 7<sup>th</sup> December, there was one division in the House with 78 MPs voting. A further 50 MPs had been secluded this day which makes 120 MPs attending upon the 6<sup>th</sup>, fairly accurate. The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow (ed.) C.H Firth, vol i, (Oxford 1894) p. 211.

<sup>44</sup> See below. Seventy is the highest figure.

<sup>45</sup> Clement Walker, A Complete History of Independency part ii, p.46. Clarendon History iv, p.515-14; Parliament Under the Power of the Sword, T.T.E 669 f. 13 (54), 7<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>46</sup> I have not used the division of the 5<sup>th</sup> as a guide. It was very late, and I imagine that a number of MPs had retired to bed. The average attendance is worked out from all the divisions in the five weeks before the purge C.J vi, p.66-93.

Underdown also used both Prynne's list and the anonymous publication to maximise the number of secluded members. According to his list, William Jephson and William Jesson were both secluded. The former appears in Prynne's publication as Colonel William Jephson. Prynne did not list Jesson. The anonymous publication listed a 'Jephson'. Underdown assumed that this referred to William Jesson; it appears more probably that this was a reference to William Jephson. Also, Arthur Owen appears in Prynne's list but Sir High Owen does not. The anonymous publication has a single 'Owen'. Underdown appears to have automatically believed that this was Sir Hugh Owen.<sup>47</sup> Finally, the evidence Underdown used to state that Nathaniel and Francis Bacon were secluded is debatable. Neither man appeared in the aforesaid lists. Underdown seems to have come to his conclusion upon the grounds that both men sought re-admission into the purged Parliament. This, however, is not an indication that they had been forcibly secluded. After the 22<sup>nd</sup> February, all MPs who had not attended Parliament since the 6<sup>th</sup> December had to provide "reasons for their absence".<sup>48</sup> This procedure was the same for the abstaining and secluded MPs.

As stated above, there is a major problem with the available evidence. Apart from the forty-five imprisoned members, there are only twenty-two MPs who can definitely be identified as secluded. Upon the 7<sup>th</sup> December, Sir Thomas Dacres, John Doddridge and Sir Edward Partheriche wrote to the Speaker, "signifying that coming to attend the House to do their duties, they were kept back by force."<sup>49</sup> Eight other MPs wrote a similar letter.<sup>50</sup> A

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<sup>47</sup> See below.

<sup>48</sup> Quoted in Ludlow, Memoirs i, p.223. Worden, The Rump, p.61.

<sup>49</sup> C.J vi, p.94; Cary Memorials ii, p.74-5; A Perfect Diurnall of some Passages in Parliament T.T.E. 526 (40) p. 2254; Whitelock, Memorials ii p.471.

<sup>50</sup> C.J vi p. 94; The other MPs are Sir Martyn Lumley, Sir John Temple, George Booth, Thomas Waller, Thomas Middleton, Samuel Gardiner, Esay Thomas and Arthur Owen.



Presbyterian pamphlet provides information concerning the seclusion of Edward Boys, Sir John Hippisley, Mr Packer and John Ashe.<sup>51</sup> James Fiennes' seclusion was reported in the Perfect Occurrences of Every Day's Journal.<sup>52</sup> Edward Wingate's seclusion was mentioned in Mercurius Elenticus.<sup>53</sup> It can be safely assumed that Arthur Annesley, Zouch Tate and Samuel Gott were secluded. They all signed a letter to James Cranford asking him to "License the Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded members."<sup>54</sup> Robert Harley was briefly arrested at the time of the purge and therefore denied entry.<sup>55</sup> Finally, the MP for Coventry, John Barker, was secluded because the event provoked a local riot.<sup>56</sup>

If we add these twenty-two MPs to the forty-five imprisoned members there are only sixty-seven MPs who can, from reliable information be identified as secluded members of Parliament. For this reason, I believe that it is impossible to compile a definitive list. The errors in the anonymous publication make it too dubious to be regarded as an authentic guide. Prynne's list remains the most useful source, but the high number of MPs who feature in his list, and do not appear in the journals in the month before the purge, suggests that he may have mistaken a number of names. However, his total of one hundred and fifty secluded MPs

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<sup>51</sup> The Second Part of the Narrative concerning the Armies Force and Violence upon the Commons House and Members, T.T.E. 477 (19), 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1648, p.4 for the seclusion of Edward Boys and John Ashe; p.7 for Sir John Hippisley and Mr Packer.

<sup>52</sup> Perfect Occurrences, T.T. E. 526 (35), Friday 1<sup>st</sup> December – Friday 8<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.755.

<sup>53</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, T.T.E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>54</sup> H.M.C.R. part 11. Mss of his Grace the Duke of Portland vol iii, 13<sup>th</sup> report, appendix ii, (1894) p.166.

<sup>55</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.179.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p.175.

(this adds eight MPs mentioned above who do not figure in his list and all the imprisoned members) does not appear too high. On the 4<sup>th</sup> December 1648 two hundred and thirty-seven MPs were in Parliament. If we assume that approximately the same number attempted to gain admission on the 6<sup>th</sup> December, roughly eighty MPs were secluded on the first day of the purge. This figure is attained by acknowledging that one hundred and twenty MPs attended Parliament, (i.e. took their seats) with a further forty 'frighted away'. If we then add the fifty odd MPs who were secluded between the 7<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> December, we come to a figure close to one hundred and fifty.<sup>57</sup> This is slightly higher than Worden's figure of one hundred and ten but far lower than Underdown's total. My method remains very imperfect. John Evelyn wrote that there was "confusion everywhere"<sup>58</sup> at the time of the purges. This was of course, just a symptom of the confusion in Army circles about who exactly should be secluded. Moreover, the precise personnel was never really an issue, since the purpose of the purge was to produce a tractable Parliament that would countenance the execution of the King. Unfortunately this has meant that the names and numbers of secluded MPs remain rather elusive.

### The Presbyterian MPs' Response to the Purge.

The impression created by the amount of published literature upon the reaction of the secluded members to the purge certainly suggests that there was a great deal of vocal hostility to the Army and the remaining members. The large number of declarations against the illegal nature of the Army's assault upon parliamentary politics would superficially suggest that the

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<sup>57</sup> John Gere, Might Overcoming Right. A Cleer Answer to Mr. John Goodwin's Might and Right well met. 18<sup>th</sup> January 1649, T.T.E. 538 (24), p.28. (This was a letter written to Lady Fairfax and her mother Lady Vare.)

<sup>58</sup> The Diary of Sir John Evelyn, (ed) E.S. De Beer, 6 vols, , (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1955) Vol ii p.545.

MPs were a united political party mounting a clearly defined political programme.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, if their writings were taken at face value, it would be assumed that they stood a very good chance of success.<sup>60</sup> The reality of the situation is very different. The vast majority of this literature came from the pen of William Prynne<sup>61</sup> so we are often looking at the reaction of an individual rather than a group of disaffected politicians. More importantly from the scraps of available evidence it is clear that Prynne's method of political attack was not shared by all the secluded members.

William Prynne was not consistent in his writings and actions throughout this period. In the few weeks between the purge and regicide he appeared to assume four interrelated postures. First, he was the writer who described the plight that faced the honourable (and often ageing) imprisoned members.<sup>62</sup> Second, he was the articulate spokesperson for the Presbyterian cause, or to be more specific, the cause that favoured the Newport accord. Third, he was capable of embarrassing the new Government by not owning their authority. Finally, he was the abusive critic of the Army who claimed that the regicide was part of a Jesuit plot.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Eg. The Parliament Under the Power of the Sword, T.T.E 669 f.13, 54, 7<sup>th</sup> December 1648; A True and Full Relation of the Armies Force and Violence Upon the House of Commons, T.T.E 476 (14), 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648; The Second Part of the Narrative Concerning the Armies Force and Violence Upon the Commons House, T.T.E 477 (19), 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1648. Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members cited above. A Solemn Protestation of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members, T.T.E 669 f.13 (53), 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648. A Public Declaration and Protestation of the Secluded Members of the House of Commons Against the Illegal Proceedings of Some Confederate Members since their Forcible Exclusion T.T. 669 f.13 (88), 13<sup>th</sup> February 1649.

<sup>60</sup> See for example A Solemn Protestation cited above.

<sup>61</sup> This appears to have been recognised by David Underdown, Pride's Purge p.143, n.2.

<sup>62</sup> A True and Full Relation, The Second Part of the Narrative and Parliament Under the Power of the Sword. They are all cited in full n.59 above.

<sup>63</sup> A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members was a coherent response to the revolution, and he embarrassed the regime in a pamphlet entitled, The Examination of William Prynne, T.T.E 537 (30), 10<sup>th</sup> January 1649.



Prynne provides detail of the conditions that the imprisoned members had to face during the few weeks that they were in custody. The accounts were used extensively by Professor Underdown and they provide excellent detail upon how the Army treated the members and the solidarity that existed amongst these poor members. As far as scrutiny is concerned we are almost compelled to accept them. There are no other accounts except for the Royalist and Presbyterian literature that simply followed the version presented by Prynne.<sup>64</sup> The depiction of a brutal Army goading the distinguished old gentleman is possible but they were directly answerable to Fairfax who went to great lengths to ensure that his soldiers behaved in a reasonable fashion. If this problem with evidence is insoluble one other claim of Prynne's can be disputed. His assertion that the imprisoned members were united in their desire to remain in custody until Parliament "was free" proved to be a very short-lived sentiment. As soon as prisoners were offered their paroles they were accepted and appear to have left London without making any fuss.<sup>65</sup> This is an indication that the imprisoned members were not as ideologically opposed to the purge as Prynne suggested.

The most impressive defence of his cause can be found in a pamphlet entitled 'A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members'. He may not have written this alone since a number of secluded members approached Crawford, a Presbyterian printer, to publish the document.<sup>66</sup> Prynne's pen can be identified as the 'Vindication' is similar in style and tone to

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<sup>64</sup> Eg. Clement Walker, Independency Part ii' p.30-33.

<sup>65</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.167 and 195.

<sup>66</sup> HMCR vol iii, 14<sup>th</sup> report, Manuscript of his Grace the Duke of Portland, 16<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.166. The MPs were: Arthur Annesley, Edward Stephens, William Strode, William Prynne, Edward Harley, Thomas Gewen, Zouche Tate, John Crewe, John Bulkeley, Edward Leigh, Samuel Vaughen.

the speech that he gave in support of the Newport accord just a few days before the first purge. The 'Vindication' defends the stance adopted by the secluded members. It is difficult to know how much of the content reflects a genuine belief in their cause because it was written for public consumption. The document reminds the Army of their former oaths and how the war had been fought to defend the person of the King. It attempts to counter the proposals outlined in the Agreement of the People by stating that Parliament, as it stood on the eve of the Newport negotiations, was the representative of the people through election. Prynne informed his readers that the Presbyterians had never wished to see any damage done to the Army. Prynne also warned about the dangers of allowing the religious toleration but there is no reference in this document supporting jure divino Presbyterianism.<sup>67</sup>

A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members made some very interesting references to the Newport Treaty. Prynne admitted that it was not perfect and was still in need of refinement, adding that the MPs were committed to alteration. He also claimed that the Newport accord was the best opportunity available to establish control over the King. Prynne stated that they had achieved a great deal and asserted that the King would have to become accountable to Parliament and suffer restrictions to his power. The document warns that regicide would leave a bitter royal family capable of forming an alliance with a popish power. The document concludes with a statement that they were satisfied with their position because the projected settlement that they advocated would have provided for a lasting peace.

The 'Vindication' was published upon the 22<sup>nd</sup> January just four days before the regicide and despite its attack upon the Army, it demonstrated no remorse for the part played by the Presbyterians in the demise of the King. Moreover, this account provides Charles with little

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<sup>67</sup> A Vindication cited above. For the Agreement of the People, see Gardiner, Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660 (Oxford 1906), p.359-371.

sympathy for his current position. This document essentially defends the Newport accord upon the grounds that it offered the best chance of peace. This was Prynne at his most rational but it does not characterise his stance during the revolution.

Prynne was capable of providing humour. David Underdown has identified examples of this quality - they will only be mentioned briefly here. Upon the 20<sup>th</sup> he turned up with a number of imprisoned members to see Fairfax. The General had taken to his bed so Ireton greeted the prisoners in his place. On seeing Prynne he ordered him away but Prynne refused and used the opportunity to sound his familiar tune by telling Ireton that the Army had subverted the laws etc. Ireton, who must have been familiar with Prynne's writings went bright red and left the room to calm down. The other occasion was in early January when Prynne was asked to come to the House of Commons to be questioned about one of his pamphlets. Prynne refused using the excuse that he was a prisoner of the Army and could not leave until he had the written authorisation from Fairfax. The unfortunate Fry who had been sent by the Commons returned without his illustrious prisoner.<sup>68</sup>

From the serious to the flippant and now to the vindictive. Prynne was always very sure of his own goodness, a common theme amongst some of the Presbyterians.<sup>69</sup> 'A Brief Memento' published on the 5<sup>th</sup> January 1649 was an unpleasant attack on the Rump and Army claiming that they were part of a Jesuit conspiracy designed to undermine the entire nation. Whereas

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<sup>68</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.167-8; C.J vi p.111-12; The Examination of William Prynne T.T.E 537 (30), 10<sup>th</sup> January 1649. See also, British Museum the Egerton Manuscript, 2618, fol. 31 (letter from Prynne to Fairfax.)

<sup>69</sup> This is the impression that I have gained from two accounts in particular: The Diary of the Reverend Ralph Josselin, 1616-1683 (ed) Alan MacFarlane, New Series III, British Academy Records of Social and Economic History(1976). See also British Museum Sloane Manuscript, 3945, which is a remarkably flattering account of Christopher Love's life by his wife Mary. Unfortunately it tells us very little about his involvement in conspiracies.



the 'Vindication' was a reasoned response to the political developments this account could only inflame parliamentary opinion - this is exactly what it did. It is difficult to determine how seriously Prynne believed in this Jesuit conspiracy.<sup>70</sup> His biographer, William Lamont, was convinced that this was a genuinely held conviction. This is possibly true, but during this revolutionary period Prynne displayed a complex and fluctuating personality and his references to a popish plot were sporadic and certainly not the central theme of his writings during these months.<sup>71</sup>

For the purposes of this thesis four important conclusions can be drawn from this brief study. First, the most outspoken Presbyterian critic of the new regime failed to produce a consistent set of responses to the revolution apart from repeating the fact that he was an MP elected by his constituents who was prevented from doing his duty by an unelected Army. Second, this man was responsible for the majority of the literature that condemned the purge. It is interesting to note that the outspoken polemicist Clement Walker who always printed the responses of the secluded members, was very reliant upon the writings of Prynne which suggests that others were not as critical.<sup>72</sup> Third, his writings were, in part, designed to vindicate his own actions during the Civil War. The purge and the subsequent regicide infuriated him but from his writings he should not be regarded as a Royalist. The purge had turned him against the Army but he still believed in the stance that he had taken during the war. It appears likely, especially from the evidence in the 'Vindication', that he would have needed a great deal of persuasion to join the new Stuart cause. Finally Prynne's personal

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<sup>70</sup> A Breife Memento to the present Unparliamentary Juncto ... T.T E. 537 (7), 4<sup>th</sup> January 1649; C.J vi, p.111-112.

<sup>71</sup> William Lamont, Marginal Prynne (1963) p.186. Also, William Lamont, Puritanism and Historical Controversy (1996) p. 15-25.

<sup>72</sup> Walker, A History of Independency, Part ii p.34-94.

crusade certainly declined after his release from custody. There is no evidence to suggest that he agreed to tone down his writings in exchange for liberty, but he, like many of his colleagues, appears to have gone into temporary retirement.<sup>73</sup>

Other Presbyterian MPs attacked the regime for its reliance upon the Army and the subversion of the fundamental laws as a result of the purging of Parliament. These accounts tended to come from men whom were imprisoned and likely to face prosecution rather than those in temporary custody.<sup>74</sup> They all conformed to the principle adopted by Prynne, of showing how the Army was attempting to alter the fundamental laws by preventing these MPs from going to the House to perform their duties etc. Thomas Smith recounted to his constituents about how he made a vociferous protest upon the day of the purge in a similar fashion to the method adopted by Prynne - although he may have exaggerated the scale of his opposition.<sup>75</sup> The reactions in the localities varied. As mentioned above John Barker's seclusion provoked a riot. But Sir Anthony Irby's constituents, whilst grateful for his services, welcomed the reformation and looked forward to the political developments.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid. As will be argued below, Walker appears to be running out of proclamations from Prynne and any other secluded members after the regicide.

<sup>74</sup> A Declaration of Waller, Massey, Clotworthy and Copley cited in Walker p.40-41. A Short Declaration by Colonel Edward Massie T.T.E. 541 (7), 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1649. The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer T.T.E. 476 (39), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.1185.

<sup>75</sup> The Charge Against Mr. Thomas Smith Clarke Papers vol ii, p.160. Contrast this with Cary Memorials ii p.74-5 and C.J vi p.94-5.

<sup>76</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.175. A Letter Written to the Honourable Member of the Commons, Sir Anthony Irby (from his constituents at Boston, thanking him for his services) T.T.E. 669 f. 13 (59), 20<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

Not all of the MPs adopted a confrontational posture. Some MPs merely wrote to the Speaker informing him of their seclusion without passing comment upon the actions of the Army. Dacres and Dodderidge merely informed Lenthall that they had been told by the Army that their “names were both on a list” and that they were not permitted to perform their duties.<sup>77</sup> Most appear to have returned to their localities accepting that there was little they could do. The problems with evidence is more apparent here than in any other part of the thesis. It is obvious that these MPs objected to the purge but there is no evidence that they were willing to risk the wrath of the Army by publicly attacking the purge and the subsequent regicide. There is evidence, however, that these men may not have been as committed to their cause as Prynne’s writings suggest. As a symbol, the purging of Parliament is the illustration of how the Army controlled the political nation. But this was not an Army that concerned itself with the repression of opinions. On many occasions a pamphlet critical of the purge was followed by a response from a supporter of the Army making it plain that there was more to their cause than the sword. Prynne, Sedgwick and the Presbyterian divines were not punished for their writings and some of them were very critical of the purge and the regicide. The press remained relatively free as journalists pursued a variety of positions upon the revolution. The Presbyterians had the opportunity to vent their opposition but it appears that they chose not to.<sup>78</sup>

On the 20<sup>th</sup> of January William Ashurst produced a pamphlet entitled ‘Reasons Against The Agreement of the People’. Ashurst had survived the purging of Parliament but he left in

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<sup>77</sup> See Cary Memorials ii and C.J cited in n.75 above.

<sup>78</sup> For Sedgwick’s pamphlets see below. For the Army’s defence of their position see (eg): A Just Vindication of the Reputation of Mr White E. 538 (10) 13<sup>th</sup> January 1649. A Vindication of the Army T.T. E, 538 (29), 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1649. An Answer of the Cities Representatives Set Forth by some Ministers of the Gospel T.T.E. 541 (23), 7<sup>th</sup> February 1649. John Price, Clerico-Classicum T.T.E. 554 (1), 19<sup>th</sup> February 1649.



protest soon after the 20<sup>th</sup> December. He was regarded by contemporaries as a leading Presbyterian, but the survival of this document demonstrates the lack of unity amongst the Presbyterians.<sup>79</sup>

He began by telling his readers that he and a group of colleagues were opposed to the Agreement of the People, and that he decided to write his reservations because he believed that it “was unchristian and unsafe to let so great dissatisfactions live privately.” He then outlined his view that subscription to the Agreement of the People would be detrimental to the kingdom. He suggested that if it were implemented the nation would be in perpetual strife as each new parliament would endeavour to make its own laws. He outlined the perennial warnings about the dangers of allowing religious liberty and how this would result in “anarchy and confusion” The paper defended the existing constitution upon the grounds that the implementation of the Agreement would result in more civil strife. Ashurst is presenting the case for peace after the period of civil conflict and he believed that this was best served by returning to familiar territory and for him this was a mixed monarchy. His attitude to Charles is rather ambiguous. In the pamphlet he stated that the proposals outlined in the Agreement would remove kings, “not only this one.” It is possible therefore that Ashurst may have accepted deposition provided that the institution of monarchy remained. The pamphlet still refers to Charles’ party as the common enemy and one of his central arguments was based upon the notion that the projected settlement would divide the “cause.”<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Worden, The Rump p.24. Wood, Athanie Oxonienses, (3 vols 1692), vol ii p.81.

<sup>80</sup> William Ashurst, Reasons Against Agreement with a Paper Entitled Foundations of Freedom; or, the Agreement of the People T.T.E 536 (4), 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

This is a very important piece of evidence concerning a Presbyterian MP who objected to the purging of Parliament. The events upon the 6<sup>th</sup> had infuriated him but he was still not willing to sever his connections with the parliamentary cause. Moreover, this document was far more concerned about the Agreement of the People than it was with the purging of Parliament and he showed little regard for the plight of the King. He only supported the retention of tithes because a suitable alternative had not been found - this was not a Presbyterian who bitterly resented the Army's role in politics. For Ashurst and his friends it was not the purge but the Agreement that was the concern. Moreover, he still regarded himself as part of the parliamentary cause, and his reasoned and polite reservations meant that many in Parliament would listen to him. Ashurst's opponents believed that his opinions had the support of a number of secluded members.<sup>81</sup>

The two case studies cited above suggest that there is little evidence that a new united group emerged to put up resistance to the purge and regicide. In addition to the pamphlets written above there appears to have been one other method of Presbyterian hostility to the new regime. Direct appeals to the Lord General himself. On the 30<sup>th</sup> December a secluded member wrote to Fairfax pleading with him to spare the King's life upon the grounds that he would not achieve divine forgiveness if he did not act. Colonel Harley also wrote to Fairfax a week before the regicide asking him to intervene to stop the trial of the King. In both these letters the authors made their affection towards Fairfax plain. This must have added to the burdens of the General who disapproved of the trial and faced considerable pressure from his wife and his friends to intervene. These two letters show the diversity of the Presbyterian MPs response

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<sup>81</sup> For Ashurst Ibid. For the belief that the secluded and abstaining members united see the response to Ashurst's pamphlet entitled The State of the Kingdom Represented to the People T.T.E 539 (14), 25<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.1.

to the regicide;<sup>82</sup> Prynne focussed upon the assault on parliamentary liberties, Ashurst concerned himself with the projected settlement at Whitehall and these two MPs were concerned about the person of the King.

The evidence produced here suggests that there was not a collective response to the purging of Parliament. After the regicide the Presbyterians were much quieter, and although they did produce one document that was Royalist in tone it is unlikely that it represented mainstream Presbyterianism. 'A Public Declaration and Protestation of the Secured and Secluded Members' followed the traditional line used by Prynne of attacking the purge upon the grounds that it was an assault upon the liberties of Parliament, which were enshrined in documents such as Magna Carta, the Oaths of Allegiance and the Solemn League and Covenant. It then went on to attack the new regime promising that the Presbyterians in the land would join with their brethren in Scotland and restore Charles II as king. This document coincided with the publication of two other Presbyterian pamphlets. The first was 'A Declaration of the Peers ...' purporting to represent the views of the entire aristocracy; this too promised to support the pretensions of Charles Stuart. The last pamphlet in this trio was entitled 'Six Propositions of Undoubted Verity', which followed the lines of Prynne's earlier interventions attacking the illegality of the purge but making no reference to siding with the King.<sup>83</sup> The perennial problem with regard to these public declarations remains. It is

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<sup>82</sup> A Letter of Advice from a Secluded Member of the House of Commons to Lord Fairfax, signed E.S, T.T.E 536 (38), 30<sup>th</sup> December 1648. It is likely that this was the MP for Tewkesbury, who was imprisoned at the purge. (See Underdown, Pride's Purge p.386 for his political background.) Colonel Edward Harley to Fairfax 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1649, HMCR, The Manuscript of his Grace the Duke of Portland, 14<sup>th</sup> report, 1894, p.167-8.

<sup>83</sup> A Publike Declaration and Protestation of the secluded Members, 669 f. 13. (88), 13<sup>th</sup> February 1649; A Declaration of the Peers of this Realme ..., T.T. 669 f. 13. (84), 8<sup>th</sup> February 1649; See also CSPD 1649-50, p.1-4; Six Propositions of Undoubted Verity T.T E, 541. (13), 5<sup>th</sup> February 1649.



impossible to determine the number of people who supported these documents and who wrote them. From the evidence in his other writings it is unlikely that Prynne wrote the 'Public Declaration', because most of his other writings had not advocated resistance to the new regime by supporting Charles II.

The publication of these three documents effectively marked the end of the attacks upon Parliament by the secluded members. Clement Walker printed most of the declarations made by the Presbyterian MPs in the weeks after the purge. Most of the accounts cited above appear in his book A Complete History of Independency as he was keen to show the depth of the Presbyterian hostility. Although the book is one-sided, abusive and patently unreliable in determining the activities of the MPs who took their seats, it does provide a vital clue about the activities of the Presbyterian MPs. The events between the purge and regicide marked the high point of the Presbyterian opposition to the revolution and most of the accounts were either printed in full or summarised by Walker. He also included a batch of articles which appeared in the middle of February, but after that date there was remarkably little detail of Presbyterian hostility. We can conclude, with a degree of confidence that the MPs apparently decided to end their public protestations. After February, Walker had to be content with making personal attacks against the grandees and highlighting the Leveller hostility to the new regime.<sup>84</sup> It is interesting to note that Nathaniel Fiennes, Thomas Lane, John Barker, George Booth, John Dodderidge, Samuel Gardiner, Thomas Middleton Sir Richard Onslow, Thomas Strode, Zouche Tate, Sir John Temple, Edward Vaughan; twelve of the MPs that we know for certain were secluded at the purge, were nominated as commissioners for the Assessment . There is no evidence that they voiced any objection. Moreover, at least ninety-nine of the secluded or abstaining members were nominated as commissioners with no

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<sup>84</sup> Walker, Independency, part ii p.32-125 and p.125-185. The former contains far more upon the public declarations of MPs.

recorded protest. The list of commissioners was not entirely indiscriminate; the most vocal opponents, William Prynne and Clement Walker were not on the list - the two men who were trying to depict the existence of an enraged political party.<sup>85</sup>

The evidence presented here suggests that the Presbyterian MPs were not united upon how to respond to the revolution. It has also suggested that this opposition was not particularly widespread and it complements the activities of the majority of the peers. There is, however, one generalisation that can be made. The English Presbyterian MPs were very different to their namesakes in Scotland. Professor Hutton noted that the Scottish Parliament declared for Charles II on the 5<sup>th</sup> February because the regicide had offended the two impulses of the covenanting movement. The first was the religious due to the breach of the Solemn League and Covenant. The second was the patriotic because they had killed the King of the Scots without reference to that nation. This is undoubtedly the right order. The letters coming from Scotland complained about the breach of covenant and the dangers of “toleration” before referring to the affront to the person of the King.<sup>86</sup> The English Presbyterian MPs were primarily concerned about the liberties of Parliament and then they would move to a discussion of the dangers of toleration and the attack upon the King’s person. They always began with the first but the order varied with the other two. As mentioned above, their principle concern about religion was the danger of toleration. It was mentioned earlier that few of the MPs before the revolution of 1648/9 were doctrinaire religious Presbyterians. It can be suggested that this remained the case after the revolution.

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<sup>85</sup> These are taken from C.H Firth and R.S Rait (eds), The Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660 3 vols, (1911), vol ii, p.31-47.

<sup>86</sup> Ronald Hutton, Charles II (Oxford 1989) p.37; Gardiner, Constitutional Documents p.267-271; A Letter from the Commissioners of Scotland to William Lenthall T.T E. 539 (10), p.1-9.

In the conclusion to chapter three it was argued that many of the peers left politics because they did not have the will to risk another conflict in the name of Charles Stuart. The findings in this chapter suggest that this sentiment was shared by the Presbyterian MPs. Even the most outspoken found it difficult to demonstrate any real sorrow for the King, and despite the depths of their hostility to the purge their writings do not tend to show an inclination to support the Royalist cause. Historians have demonstrated the divisions that existed at the Royalist court in exile upon the issue of allegiance with their former Presbyterian foes.<sup>87</sup> From the majority of the Presbyterian writings it is evident that they, in turn, had little sympathy for the Royalist cause. The opponents of the regicide remained deeply divided and this must have been some comfort to the new Government.

### The Presbyterian Clergy

This section will not attempt to provide a narrative of the activities of the Presbyterian clergy. David Underdown has provided a detailed and accurate account of their activities between the purge and the regicide and there is no need for any revision of his thesis, and Blair Worden has shown how this clerical opposition continued into the Rump.<sup>88</sup> It is clear from these two accounts that the clergy were the most vocal opponents of the new regime and that they did attempt to mobilise opinion against the regicide. This section will look at how they regarded the secluded members and what form their opposition took. The findings are mainly taken from the clergy in London although I have drawn upon declarations from the localities.

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<sup>87</sup> Ronald Hutton, Charles II p.40-42.

<sup>88</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.146-7, 152-3, 161-4, 174-8, 194-5 Worden, The Rump p.81-3, 184, 213, 222-3, 243-8.



The clergy, as we would expect, based their opposition to the regicide upon the grounds that it breached the Solemn League and Covenant. This was at the forefront of their aims and features in all of their protestations. But their response to the revolution shows that they were an extremely articulate group, who used their religious beliefs to launch an impressive defence of political and religious Presbyterianism.

Between the purge and the regicide, the Presbyterian Divines in London produced three very detailed documents that outlined their political and religious stance. The first was a letter to Fairfax that was deliberately published on the 18<sup>th</sup> January. It claimed to be a defence of their decision not to engage in the Whitehall debates. They took eighteen pages to vindicate their position as seemingly implacable opponents of the revolution. It begins with an attack upon the Army for “seizing and imprisoning the King’s person” when their brief had been to “defend his person.” The clergy also defended their stance throughout the Civil War reasserting the case that war had been fought to defend the person of the King from his evil councillors and settle the Protestant religion. But this official publication was not full of polemical attacks against the Army. As Professor Underdown has shown, this was the case in particular congregations but this document was more cautionary in tone. It advocated the retention of the King, but instead of outright condemnation, it offered an olive branch. It reminded the Army that they were “once honourable and precious in their eyes.” The document concludes with a plea to the Army to mend their ways so the Godly could unite.<sup>89</sup>

On the 24<sup>th</sup> January another document was produced by the London clergy entitled ‘An Apologetical Declaration’. This outlined the same arguments cited above but placed even

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<sup>89</sup> A Serious and Faithful Representation of the Judgements of the Ministers of Gospel T.T.E. 538 (25), 18<sup>th</sup> January 1649. For examples of opposition see Worden and Underdown cited in n.88 above.

more attention to the breaking of the Solemn League and Covenant. As the regicide approached this document was more forthright than the last, warning that their calling would never allow them to be silent. This was far more threatening carrying the tacit warning that they were willing to suffer persecution for their cause. However, it was similar to the letter to Fairfax in that it defended their participation in the Civil War and although it provided a stringent defence of Charles upon the grounds that his life had been guaranteed, it did not demonstrate too much concern for his person.<sup>90</sup>

The third document was entitled 'The Vindication of the Ministers of the Gospel' which was published just three days before the regicide. It was a formidable attack upon the Army and it categorically asserted that they would encourage their congregations to stand against the regicide upon the grounds that the act was contrary to the word of God. It was by far the most forceful document produced by the Assembly of Divines during this period.<sup>91</sup>

The three documents cited above demonstrate the strength of feeling generated by the revolution amongst the London clergy. It also portrays a degree of organisation behind the scenes, demonstrated by the cumulative radicalisation of the threats as the regicide dawned. It also shows how much pressure the Army and Parliament came under from this influential body of people and why the defenders of the Army would write pamphlets that attacked the clergy for meddling in politics.<sup>92</sup> This was the official face of the Westminster Divines but others members of the clergy were railing against the new regime, some of whom had been closely associated with political and religious radicalism.

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<sup>90</sup> An Apolegetical Declaration 24<sup>th</sup> January 1649, E. 539 (9)

<sup>91</sup> A Vindication of the Ministers of the Gospel T.T.E. 540 (11), 27<sup>th</sup> January 1649.

<sup>92</sup> John Drury, A Case of Conscience Resolved T.T.E 548 (29), p.2-30. In this pamphlet Drury suggests that Presbyterians should be concerned with preaching for peace and unity, see especially p.30.

One of the new brand of Presbyterians was William Sedgwick, although in one of his pamphlets he described himself as a Royalist. He produced a number of tracts that had one theme. He wanted to see the preservation of the King because he believed that this was the only means of preserving peace. But his attitude to the Army was not consistent. In a pamphlet produced upon the 11<sup>th</sup> December he expressed outright contempt for their actions.<sup>93</sup> He accused them of confusing justice with malice suggesting that their arrears of pay was the guiding principle behind their actions. This was followed by another pamphlet produced on the 20<sup>th</sup>. It was not so intemperate against the Army and he produced a series of recommendations for a settlement that would have preserved the King, but allowed for the introduction of an Act of Oblivion.<sup>94</sup> Three days later he appeared to have changed tact again admitting that he had been too harsh on the Army. He asserted that they had a right to demand reform and he accepted that God had revealed his anger for Charles. He accepted the Army's right to have intervened in politics in 1647 but now he politely pointed out that they had gone too far. He condemned a number of the Presbyterian MPs for being too lenient with the King seeing this as a wonderful opportunity for the Army to act as mediators between the factional groups in Parliament.<sup>95</sup> Sedgwick may have been trying a number of ploys to persuade the Army to deviate from their desire to kill the King or he may not have been sure himself about what he believed in. Whatever the reason he was not providing any coherence to the Presbyterian cause.

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<sup>93</sup> Sedgwick, Justice upon the Armie Remonstrance T.T.E. 475 (34), 11<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.31 where he claimed to be a Royalist.

<sup>94</sup> The Spiritual Madman T.T.E. 477 (9), 20<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>95</sup> A Second View of the Army Remonstrance E.477 (20), 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1648.



Other Presbyterians were willing to vent their hostility against the Army. Perhaps the most unequivocal was John Gere who sent an open letter to Lady Fairfax and her mother Lady Vere accusing the Army of being in league with the devil. He was full of support for the secluded members and made the rather amusing remark that the King had asked for the imprisonment of five members and was denied, whereas the Army had imprisoned forty and secluded over a hundred.<sup>96</sup> Such a hostile approach was not shared by all the Presbyterian ministers. John Gauden made it plain that he disliked the Army but he was still very fond of their persons. Yet, a pamphlet claiming to represent the views of many counties warned the Army and Parliament that all their actions were, from the first day of the purge, illegal. This pamphlet adopted a novel form of pressure by naming the MPs who were associated with the purge and warning them of their impending unpopularity if they proceeded to execute the King.<sup>97</sup>

The reaction of the Presbyterian clergy reveals a number of important issues about the nature of the English Revolution. First, it shows the nature of religious Presbyterianism at the time of the regicide. The Assembly of Divines did produce a coherent response to the events before the regicide. As mentioned above they based their philosophy upon an attachment to the Solemn League and Covenant which promised to preserve the King's life and establish national Presbyterianism which, in their view, was embodied in the Newport settlement. The purge had shattered that prospect and brought about the spectre of religious toleration. This

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<sup>96</sup> Might Overcoming Right E. 538 (24), 18<sup>th</sup> January 1649, especially p.24-8; See also, C.V Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I (1964), p.111.

<sup>97</sup> The Religious and Loyal Protestation of John Gauden .T.T.E. 538 (11), 5<sup>th</sup> January 1649; For another example of a mild response see George Gillespie, A Useful Case of Conscience T.T.E. 539 (12), 25<sup>th</sup> January 1649; A Remonstrance and Declaration of Several Counties and Boroughs T.T.E. 536 (23), 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1648.

fear of toleration was at the heart of all the literature that appeared during the revolution. There were very few theoretical justifications of their own doctrine although they were at pains to point out that God was waiting in judgement to determine the true nature of man's deeds. This was a warning that they should not rely upon immediate providence as a symbol of God's intentions. Thomas Watson, in a sermon before the House of Commons, quoted psalm 50.21 that states that God watched evil deeds in silence and would later cast his judgement.<sup>98</sup> But the findings in this section suggest that there was even division amongst the clergy upon the manner in which they should respond to the revolution. This is another indication that Presbyterianism meant little more than an aversion to revolution. Although the clergy prayed heartily for the imprisoned members and identified the two causes, the clergy did not receive the support from the MPs that they so desperately needed.<sup>99</sup>

The clergy were the main opposition to the revolution. As David Underdown has shown they caused the Army Council a great deal of trouble which precipitated a warning upon the 22<sup>nd</sup> December that further hostility would be greeted with a draconian response from the Army.<sup>100</sup> In contrast, the Royalists were cowed and although they printed a number of pamphlets they were not in a position to act. The lack of potency in their cause was demonstrated in one pamphlet that stated that a certain Major White advocated the regicide and his wagon promptly overturned killing the unfortunate man. This may have pleased a royalist audience but it shows that they were incapable of influencing any kind of policy in the weeks leading

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<sup>98</sup> Thomas Watson, Gods Anatomy Upon Mans Heart, T.T.E. 536 (7), 27<sup>th</sup> December 1648, especially p.3-6.

<sup>99</sup> Underdown, Pride's Purge p.163.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid

up to the regicide.<sup>101</sup> The members of the clergy believed that they could influence policy and this explains why they continued their protests right up until the regicide. It should have become clear that these were hostile in tone and represented a direct challenge to the Army. This challenge did not end after the regicide.

In the first week after the execution it was reported that castles were being secured in Lancashire.<sup>102</sup> The public were made aware that a union existed between the Royalist and the Presbyterian clergy in Manchester. A letter from Devon in the same week complained that the Presbyterian clergy were inciting their congregations to act against the new regime.<sup>103</sup> It was feared that the general level of poverty was providing the clergy with the opportunity to incite local inhabitants against Parliament and the Army.<sup>104</sup> The problem in Lancashire appears to have been the most serious area of discontent. Letters sent to London suggested that Ashton's forces, which should have been disbanded, were still in arms – they warned that he was capable of launching a counter revolution.<sup>105</sup> As a political force the Presbyterians continued to mount a campaign against the new regime. One pamphlet produced on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March

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<sup>101</sup> The Visible Vengeance T.T.E. 476 (40), 19<sup>th</sup> December 1649. It was rather surprising that a parliamentary pamphlet refuted the testimony, see A Just Vindication of the Reputation of Mr White T.T.E. 538 (10), 13<sup>th</sup> January 1649.

<sup>102</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer, T.T.E 541 (27), Thursday 1<sup>st</sup> February – Thursday 8<sup>th</sup> February 1649.

<sup>103</sup> The Kingdomes Faithful and Impartial Scout, T.T.E. 542 (2), Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> February – Friday 9<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.12.

<sup>104</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer, T.T.E. 548 (30), Thursday 20<sup>th</sup> March – Thursday 27<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.2006.

<sup>105</sup> The Impartial Intelligencer, E. 550 (18), Wednesday 11<sup>th</sup> April – Wednesday 18<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.43.



attacked the Presbyterians for raising the prospect of another civil war.<sup>106</sup> In these circumstances we are left with the question as to why Parliament tolerated their hostility.

One of the reasons for this has been explained by Blair Worden. The conservative nature of the MPs ensured that they would not wish to crush a cause, for which they had a great deal of sympathy. As mentioned in chapter one, his depiction of the conservative nature of the MPs does not require major revision.<sup>107</sup> But other factors demand consideration.

Despite the depth of the Presbyterian opposition one factor remains fairly consistent. The clergy and the MPs did not regret the part that they had played in the Civil War. When Cromwell would later talk of the 'Union of the Godly', he would have had the Presbyterians in mind. It would not have been lost to the MPs that the transition from supporting the parliamentary cause in the 1640s to fighting for an untrustworthy Stuart would have been difficult for many Presbyterians. Considering that there was not a deep rooted attachment among the religious and lay Presbyterians, the prospect of appeasing, at least elements of this group, made good political sense. As I have mentioned on many occasions in this thesis, the background to all of the decisions taken by the Rump must be seen in the context of the grave dangers that faced the regime.

Further encouragement would have come from some of the utterances made by the Presbyterians. As mentioned above, the 'Apologetical Declaration' still demonstrated a certain respect for the Army. A petition from Banbury just three days before the regicide,

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<sup>106</sup> A Gospel Engine T.T.E. 545 (29), 2<sup>nd</sup> March, p.1-22.

<sup>107</sup> Worden, The Rump, passim.

called for the retention of the King's person and the normal Presbyterian demands for the preservation of the true Protestant religion and an adherence to the Solemn League and Covenant. But before these demands were stipulated they made their loyalty and gratitude to the Army patently clear. Moreover, their demands were not based solely upon religion. The principle objection to regicide was founded upon the fact that this would inflame foreign nations and provoke another war.<sup>108</sup> On the 7<sup>th</sup> February, after consultation with the Assembly of Divines, the clergy in Lancashire produced their opinion of the regicide. As we would expect it was very critical of the new Government, but it still advocated a Godly union under the Presbyterian mantle.<sup>109</sup> A Presbyterian pamphlet published on the 8<sup>th</sup> March entitled, 'The Essex Watchmen's Watchword', called for an end to any kind of religious toleration, and it was critical of the Parliament for deviating from its war aims. However, the document which had sixty two subscribers was principally concerned with the prospect of the implementation of the Agreement of the People. It is significant to note that the Royalists were still described as "malignants" and the objection to the Agreement was in part based upon a fear that it would allow papists and Royalists to hold office.<sup>110</sup> The same description of the Royalists was found in another long Presbyterian pamphlet which appeared on the 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1649. The pamphlet entitled, 'A Modest and Clear Vindication' was a response to Price's pamphlet, 'Clerico-Classicum', which had launched a sustained attack upon the Presbyterians. As with the pamphlets cited above, it continued to identify the normal Presbyterian grievances but the author of this publication was not contemplating a Presbyterian counter revolution.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> The Humble Advice and Earnest Desires of Certain Well-affected Ministers of Banbury and Brackley, T.T.E. 540 (12), 27<sup>th</sup> January 1649, especially p.3 and 6.

<sup>109</sup> A Solemn Exhortation made and published to the Several Churches of Christ within the Province of Lancaster, T.T.E. 542 (7), 7<sup>th</sup> February 1649, especially p.15.

<sup>110</sup> The Essex Watchmen's Watchword, T.T.E. 546 (11), 8<sup>th</sup> March, especially p.6-10.

<sup>111</sup> A Modest and Clear Vindication, T.T.E. 549 (10), 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1649. Also, T. Price, Clerico-Classicum, T.T.E. 544 (1).

Finally, a great deal of this Presbyterian opposition was based upon an attempt to prevent the implementation of the Agreement of the People.<sup>112</sup> Although some Presbyterians would become involved in conspiracy with the cause celebre, being the case of Christopher Love in 1651, the Presbyterians were not united in a desire to overthrow the Commonwealth. In the introduction to this thesis, it was stipulated that one of the aims was to identify Presbyterian petitions. Whilst this has been a futile exercise it is clear that many Presbyterians still influenced the direction of the Government's policy. Their heterogeneous character, coupled with an indication in certain quarters that they would acquiesce with the new regime, ensured that their views would be considered. It was not, therefore, inevitable that the MPs would have attempted to appease the Presbyterians. Had they all been intent upon making excessive attacks upon the new regime, they would have left Parliament with no choice but to destroy them.

### Conclusions.

This study suggests that the divisions that existed in the 1640s between the two strands of Presbyterianism were not overcome as a result of the revolution. They did not join forces to form a group which felt that they were part of a disinherited minority. They were unable to launch a united campaign aimed at undermining the new regime. This contrasts quite starkly with the unity that was achieved in the Commons. Even the Presbyterian clergy adopted a variety of postures, and the divisions which existed among the MPs almost make the term more misleading than it is illuminating. As far as the apparent protestations of the secluded

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<sup>112</sup> There are examples of this in most of the pamphlets cited in the text and in the notes above. The best examples are found in William Ashurst's pamphlet and in the Essex Watchman's Watchword, in n.110 above.



members were concerned, we should perhaps describe them as ‘Prynneism’ rather than Presbyterianism. As mentioned above, the term still retains its value since men such as Ashurst and Sedgwick were described as part of the Presbyterian movement.

The very term Presbyterian is not misleading solely because of its religious connotations. The problem is compounded by the natural assumption to link the movement in England with the one in Scotland. The declarations from the Covenanter party in Scotland were far more vociferous in their desire to seek revenge for the breach of covenant. In England, such proclamations were the exception rather than the norm.

In the first chapter of this thesis, it was suggested that Cromwell wanted to welcome all the sons revolution to support the post regicide settlement. The MPs also wanted to consolidate their position and the activities of some Presbyterians gave them cause to believe that there was at least some hope that they would support the new regime. They were willing to punish Presbyterians who disobeyed ordinances, illustrated by the arrest of Thomas Cawton for praying for the exiled King.<sup>113</sup> Yet, on the other hand, they retained the system of tithes and the Agreement of the People was cast aside. This was not only due to the conservatism of the MPs. It had as much to do with the circumstance of needing to send an army to Ireland allied to the respective responses of the Presbyterians and the Levellers. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> April 1649 the Lord Mayor of London, Reynoldson, appeared before the House of Commons. This Presbyterian had refused to proclaim the act abolishing kingship. When he was asked to explain his actions he responded with these words:

“[his] conscience being charged as it was, with several oaths at and before the entering of his mayoralty he could not dispense with it in proclaiming that Act; and that he hath done it.”

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<sup>113</sup> Worden, The Rump, p.81-2 and 196.

The Commons refused to accept this excuse and they placed him in the tower for one month and fined him two thousand pounds, which was to be distributed to the poor in London. This demonstrates how seriously Parliament took the enforcement of their Ordinance, but this was mild in comparison to Lilburne. On the 29<sup>th</sup> March he published 'The Second Part of Englands New Chains Discovered.' In this publication he accused the present Parliament of exceeding "in the nature and measure all the wickedness" of both the Royalist and Presbyterian parties put together. As mentioned above, the attack by Lilburne was described as a declaration of war against the Parliament and the Grandees.<sup>114</sup> This in many ways represents the different approaches of the Levellers and the Presbyterians. In such circumstances it can come as no surprise that the former were crushed and the latter were at least listened to.

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<sup>114</sup> C.J vi, p.177. For Lilburne see "The Second Part of Englands New Chains Discovered' in William Haller and Godfrey Davis (eds), The Leveller Tracts, 1647-1653 (New York 1944), p.187.

## The Press

It will have become clear from both the text and the footnotes in the preceding chapters, that newspapers feature as a major source in this study of the English Revolution. There are both positive and negative reasons for this. On the positive side, as will be argued, newspapers do provide valuable evidence upon both the supporters and opponents of the new regime. Moreover, they are genuinely contemporary which contrasts with so much of the information upon the revolution<sup>1</sup> It was made clear in the second chapter of this thesis that the retrospective accounts of a conflict between the Army and the Parliament owed more to the events of April 1653 than they did to the Army's interventions in 1648. On the negative side, as Professor Worden, and more recently Dr Kelsey found, historians have little option but to make use of newspapers due to the dearth of private correspondence and the limitations of the surviving diaries.<sup>2</sup> Considering that this thesis has found no new piece of evidence which dramatically illuminates the actions and motivation of the participants under scrutiny, it seems appropriate to make an assessment of these sources. For the purposes of this thesis there is a very compelling case to make such a study; in my chapter upon Cromwell, a number of pages were devoted to the questioning of Marchamont Nedham's account of Cromwell's attempts

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<sup>1</sup> I have followed the views outlined by Mark Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army (Cambridge 1979), p.1, of being very suspicious of evidence which was not strictly contemporary.

<sup>2</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament 1648-53 (Cambridge 1974), p.398-404; Sean Kelsey Inventing a Republic (Manchester 1997) p.11; J.S.A Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics 1645-1649' (PhD thesis, Cambridge 1986) p.257-279. Adamson is a good example of a historian who consulted a vast number of manuscripts until his final chapter which dealt with the period covered in this thesis. Blair Worden, A Voyce from the Watchtower (Camden Fourth Series 21, Part 5, 1978), p.55-80. Blair Worden, review Spalding, "The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelock" EHR (108), (1993) p.122-34; Some of the diaries used include: Edmund Ludlow, Memoirs ed. C.H Firth, 2 vols (Oxford 1894). John Evelyn, Diary (ed) E.S de Beer 6 vols, (Oxford 1955). Bulstrode Whitelock, Memorials of the English Affairs, 4 vols (Oxford 1853). Clement Walker, The Complete History of Independency (1661). Ralph Josselin, The Diary of Ralph Josselin 1616-1683, (ed.) Alan Macfarlane. British Academy, Records of Social and Economic History, new series, iii (1916).



to spare the King's life.<sup>3</sup> In an attempt to show that I have not blindly relied upon the prejudices of other journalists, this chapter will place the newspapers within the context of the respective political attitudes of all the main journalists.

The second and equally important reason for writing this chapter is novelty. It is the first work upon the press which concentrates upon the revolution itself. There are a number of excellent studies upon the press but they tend to cover a wider period and they possess a different agenda to my work.<sup>4</sup> This chapter will attempt to deal with the attitude of the press to the political groups which have been considered in the previous chapters. In the process, this will lead to comments upon censorship, the political influences of the journalists, the amount of information available to the general public and how the newspapers support or refute general trends in political historiography.

Gilbert Mabbott used his position as the Government's official censor to produce the most lively and politically adept newspaper.<sup>5</sup> A copy of the Moderate was available every week during this revolutionary period,<sup>6</sup> and it is clear that Mabbott was a man of strong political

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<sup>3</sup> See chapter one above

<sup>4</sup> A.N.B Cotton, 'London Newsbooks in the Civil War. Their Political Attitudes and Sources of Information', (Oxford D.Phil 1971). M.J Seymour, 'Aspects of Pro-government Propaganda during the Interregnum', (Cambridge PhD 1986). Joad Raymond, Making the News. An Anthology of Newsbooks of Revolutionary England 1641-1660, (Moreton-in-Marsh, 1993). J. Frank, The Beginning of the English Newspaper 1620-1660. (Cambridge.Mass 1961). David Underdown, A Freeborn People. Politics and the Nation in Seventeenth Century England , p.90-111, (for his consideration of The Man in the Moon) Blair Worden, "Wit in a Roundhead, the Dilemma of Marchamont Nedham" in S.D Amussen and M.A Kishlanksy (ed), Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Early Modern England. (Manchester 1995).

<sup>5</sup> C.V Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I , (1968) p.50.

<sup>6</sup> All of the newspapers cited are listed in the bibliography. I have attempted to place page references for all the newspapers that provided them. In some cases I have corrected the numbering.

conviction; he was also a professional journalist who attempted to influence political events by appealing to the Government and to a wider readership.

As is well known, Mabbott's political views were closely associated with the so called Leveller party. However, in his coverage of the events between Pride's first purge and the regicide, he showed scant regard for the debates upon the Agreement of the People.<sup>7</sup> In one edition he complained that disputes over the reserve concerning religion ran the risk of eclipsing the more important issue of bringing the King to justice.<sup>8</sup> Instead of supporting a specific constitution, his editorials are stoked with divine justification for regicide, with a warning that divine sanction would be dispatched upon those who reneged upon their duty by failing to punish a murderous prince.<sup>9</sup> These were attempts to entice his readers to support regicide, and his overriding ambition to see Charles brought to justice dominated all his editorial comments.<sup>10</sup>

Mabbott did not just use his editorials leading up to regicide to persuade his readers that regicide was the most appropriate course of action. He also attempted to push Parliament into acting, warning that "procrastination is peril, and the mother of ensuing misery"<sup>11</sup> He balanced this criticism with praise when it became clear that Parliament was embarking upon

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<sup>7</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.212.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. He would change his stance after Lilburne's arrest.

<sup>9</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.101-2; The Moderate T.T. E.536 (30), Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1648/9, p.225-6; The Moderate T.T.E. 538 (15), Tuesday 9<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 16<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.249; The Moderate T.T. E. 539 (17), Tuesday 16<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1649, p.261; The Moderate T.T.E. 540 (20), Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> January – Tuesday 30<sup>th</sup> January, 1649 p.273.

<sup>10</sup> This is true in all of his newspapers between the purge and the regicide. Although he was a leveller, the desire to see justice against the King eclipsed his desire for the implementation of the Agreement and the abolition of the House of Lords.

<sup>11</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 538 (15), Tuesday 9<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 16<sup>th</sup> January, 1649 p.249.

the trial and ultimately, the execution of the King.<sup>12</sup> Throughout this period, Mabbott maintained pressure upon Parliament by printing a number of radical pamphlets which called for justice against the King.<sup>13</sup>

Mabbott was forced to widen his attack upon Charles I after the regicide when it was rumoured that the MPs were discussing the possibility of asking Charles II to take the throne.<sup>14</sup> In his paper covering the events between January 30<sup>th</sup> and February 6<sup>th</sup>, Mabbott warned that the “infamy of tyranny is immortal” and he suggests that God “may visit the sins of the father upon the son”.<sup>15</sup> As this coincides with these important constitutional debates, it can be assumed that Mabbott was attempting to exert a certain degree of pressure upon the policymakers at Westminster. In public at least, Mabbott shared the same limitations identified in a number of the MPs. He was convinced that Charles I had to die, but he was unsure about the nature of the constitution which should follow. It is interesting to note that this leading Leveller journalist was not totally convinced by the Agreement of the People.<sup>16</sup>

It would be entirely wrong to assume that Mabbott was an opportunist journalist who altered his editorials every time the political climate appeared to change. As a professional journalist he was capable of adaption, but he remained consistently opposed to the Presbyterians and the peers. Mabbott attacked the secluded members in all the editions between Pride’s purge and

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<sup>12</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 539 (17), Tuesday 16<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1649, p.261.

<sup>13</sup> To save space I have not cited all these in full. The full listings are found in the notes above and below. The Moderate E. 477 (4), p.211-12. E. 536 (2), Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December, p.213. E. 539 (17), Tuesday 16<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> January, p.261-2, p.296.

<sup>14</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 541 (15), Tuesday 30<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> February 1649 p.285.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> See above. Blair Worden The Rump Parliament (Cambridge 1974), p.49-60.



the regicide, at one stage describing them as an “that proud flesh being an equal tryanny to monarchy”<sup>17</sup>. After the regicide these attacks ended, a further indication that the majority of the secluded members retired from active politics.<sup>18</sup> His contempt for the clergy remained throughout this period. He warned of the connection between the Presbyterian clergy in England and the covenanter party in Scotland.<sup>19</sup> He also disliked the rigid nature of the Presbyterian church, which he rightly regarded as a threat to the principle of Liberty of Conscience.<sup>20</sup> But most importantly, Mabbott regarded all Presbyterians as enemies because of their engagement with the Scots during the Second Civil War. This sole act should, in Mabbott’s view, have excluded them from any role in the future constitution, reflecting the attitudes of the majority of the radicals both inside and outside Parliament.<sup>21</sup> This explains his profound annoyance with the decision to confirm the Presbyterian church settlement which resulted in the continuation of tithes.<sup>22</sup> It is also important to acknowledge that Mabbot was an avowed anti-Scot<sup>23</sup> and this made him implacably opposed to any form of Presbyterianism, especially in light of the alliance between the two forms of Presbyterianism during the Second Civil War.

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<sup>17</sup> The Moderate E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.201. Quoted, The Moderate E. 536 (30), Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1648/9 p.231.

<sup>18</sup> See chapter 4 above.

<sup>19</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 548 (21), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March 1649 p.374.

<sup>20</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 546 (20), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.359. Also T.T.E. 550 (10), Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April – Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April, p.397.

<sup>21</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 545 (11), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February 1649 p.321.

<sup>22</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 550 (10), Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April – Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.398.

<sup>23</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 544 (10), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.309-10.

Mabbott made consistent attacks upon members of the House of Lords and the leading peers of the land. Even at the time when the Lords ratified nearly all of the revolutionary legislation sent to them by the lower chamber, Pembroke was described as the “old cobweb”.<sup>24</sup> Although Mabbott claimed that, he was advised not to make detrimental remarks against the Lords,<sup>25</sup> the temptation was too great. Between the purge and regicide Mabbott attempted to show that the Lords played a diminutive role. These attacks upon the Lords certainly derived from Mabbott’s dislike of hereditary right, which extended to the King.<sup>26</sup> But his vociferous attacks in late February 1649 upon the Lords who were allowed to sit in the Council of State was more than just a case of antipathy towards people born to privilege. Mabbott could not understand why the peers were allowed office in the Commonwealth when they had been identified with the Presbyterian party, and thus by implication with the Scots also. In Mabbott’s view the peers played a part in the tumults of 1647: the decision to revoke the Vote of No Addrenes and the Newport negotiations of 1648.<sup>27</sup> For Mabbott liberty and privilege should have only been bestowed upon those who had consistently displayed a desire for impartial justice against Charles I.

The leniency that the Commons displayed towards the Lords and the Presbyterians, coupled with the apparent failure of the regime to implement reform, provoked annoyance but not

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<sup>24</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 536 (2), Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December 1649, p.221.

<sup>25</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 541 (15), Tuesday 30<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.294.

<sup>26</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 545 (11), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.321. The Moderate T.T.E. 536 (2), Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December 1649, p.213-4.

<sup>27</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 545 (11), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.321.

outright condemnation.<sup>28</sup> This changed with the publication of John Lilbourn's 'England's New Chains Discovered'.<sup>29</sup> From the 28<sup>th</sup> of February onwards, Mabbott used his paper as a vehicle to make outspoken remarks against the new regime. This included: attacks upon the Council of State,<sup>30</sup> the failure to disestablish the Presbyterian church,<sup>31</sup> the moves against the leading Levellers,<sup>32</sup> the regimes failure to alleviate the plight of the poor<sup>33</sup> and the corrupt nature of the Government.<sup>34</sup> Mabbott became the greatest advocate of the leveller cause, and his papers were full of petitions on behalf of the Leveller leaders.<sup>35</sup> As it became clear that the Leveller cause was on the brink of collapse, Mabbott resorted to Presbyterian language by suggesting that God was waiting to exact revenge against the new regime. In Mabbott's case it is clear that Lilburne was capable of inciting leveller based hostility.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 544 (10), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.312.

<sup>29</sup> England's New Chains Discovered, E.545 (27) Monday 26<sup>th</sup> February 1649.

<sup>30</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 548 (21), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.373. He begins this editorial with the words 'Monarchy is retained.'

<sup>31</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 550 (10), Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April – Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.397.

<sup>32</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 550 (28), Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.409; The Moderate, T.T. E. 549 (12), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1649, p.385. In this account he does not mention Lilburne, but he talks about how MPs manipulated the law.

<sup>33</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 548 (2), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.361. The Moderate T.T.E. 552 (20), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May 1649, p.473.

<sup>34</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 550 (10), Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April – Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.398. Sir Peter Temple received especial criticism in this edition.

<sup>35</sup> Although he had not supported the agreement wholesale, his paper certainly supported the leveller cause. Examples: The Moderate T.T.E. 546 (20), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March, 1649 p.349-61. The Moderate T.T.E. 550 (28), Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.416-20.

<sup>36</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 553 (15), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May 1649, p.478.



It is clear from the evidence produced thus far that Mabbott had a clearly defined political opinion. As mentioned above, he would use petitions to support his own political stance; he was also capable of reprehensible reporting, an example being his claim that Charles I had an illicit affair during his stay on the Isle of Wight.<sup>37</sup> But Mabbott did provide his readers with news, even if this contradicted his own views. He printed Presbyterian literature which attacked the purging of Parliament.<sup>38</sup> He also reported upon the fact that the majority of the London Common Council refused to sign an oath of loyalty to the new regime<sup>39</sup>. He never attempted to gloss over the fact that foreign nations objected to the regicide.<sup>40</sup> Even at the height of Parliament's moves against the Levellers, he was willing to print the regimes justification of their stance.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, despite all his opinionated remarks, he continued to provide his readers with an accurate account of parliamentary business, he also meticulously informed his readers about foreign affairs.<sup>42</sup> Although a man of conviction, Mabbott was dedicated to the cause of providing accurate news. This is illustrated best in his account of the King's trial where Charles' excellent performance was recorded accurately by one of his greatest critics.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> C.V Wedgwood, Trial, p.50. This was not the norm for Mabbott – contrast with the royalist sources.

<sup>38</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.205-6. Presbyterian hostility was reported throughout the period between the purge and regicide.

<sup>39</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 536 (2), Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.215-16.

<sup>40</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 439 (17), Tuesday 16<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1648, p.271.

<sup>41</sup> The Moderate T.T. E. 549 (12), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1649, p.387; The Moderate E. 550 (10). The Moderate E. 551 (20), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.431-33.

<sup>42</sup> This was true of every edition during the revolutionary period.

<sup>43</sup> I am not as critical of Mabbott's reporting of this as Veronica Wedgwood appears to be, Trial p.126-6. My account is based upon: The Moderate T.T.E. 540 (20), Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> January – Tuesday 30<sup>th</sup> January, 1648 p.275, p.278.

John Dillingham's paper, *The Moderate Intelligencer*, also appeared throughout this period<sup>44</sup>. The Editors views do not conform with the conventional political groupings identified by both contemporaries and historians.<sup>45</sup> Dillingham was delighted to witness the seclusion of the Presbyterian MPs, vindicating the purge upon the grounds that it was essentially a Presbyterian tactic which had been used in 1647.<sup>46</sup> But, he also objected to the principle of religious freedom believing that this could only result in confusion and strife.<sup>47</sup> His attitude towards the King was ambivalent; Veronica Wedgwood suggests that he "showed a cautious bias" in the King's favour. Her argument was endorsed by Blair Worden in his study of the Rump Parliament.<sup>48</sup> To a certain extent this is correct. In his edition covering the events between Thursday 21<sup>st</sup> December and Thursday the 28<sup>th</sup>, Dillingham outlined both sides of the argument in the debate over the future of the King, without making his own opinions clear. His attitude was, however, expressed in his reporting of the events abroad. He showed support for monarchies and also included a condemnation of popular participation in politics. In the same edition he warned of opposition to moves against the King, and he supported a moderate petition from York.<sup>49</sup> But this is the last editorial which contemplated a settlement with the

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<sup>44</sup> The Paper is listed in the bibliography. Paging is very irregular, and in some cases, non-existent.

<sup>45</sup> See below and above for my observations upon the so-called Presbyterians. This was mentioned in the last chapter.

<sup>46</sup> *The Moderate Intelligencer*, E. 476 (24), Thursday 7<sup>th</sup> December – Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.1777. From this point on in the notes all the sources cited will commence with the Thomason call mark of E. followed by the week of publication.

<sup>47</sup> *The Moderate Intelligencer*, E. 477 (14) Thursday 14<sup>th</sup> December – Thursday 21<sup>st</sup> December 1648, p.1780.

<sup>48</sup> Blair Worden, *The Rump Parliament*, p.403. C.V Wedgwood, *The Trial* p.49.

<sup>49</sup> *The Moderate Intelligencer*, E. 536 (18), Thursday 21<sup>st</sup> December – Thursday 28<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.1802 (debate concerning the King.) p.1805 shows his support for monarchies.

King. When it became clear that Parliament was intent upon bringing the King to justice, Dillingham supported the regicide upon the grounds that the kingdom must be settled. For Dillingham the execution of the King afforded the greatest prospect of peace.<sup>50</sup> He accepted that relations between King and Parliament had deteriorated to such an extent that there was little prospect of a restoration of trust, thus making another conflict possible<sup>51</sup>. He also blamed Charles for this situation.<sup>52</sup>

The theme of peace continues in his editorials after the regicide. He attacked the Presbyterians for creating opposition.<sup>53</sup> He warned his readers of the misery caused by war using the conflict in Germany as his example of the appalling costs.<sup>54</sup> The plight of the poor (which had been caused by the war) dominated his editorial from the 1<sup>st</sup> March until the 5<sup>th</sup> April.<sup>55</sup> In these editions he called upon the Government to intervene and also he suggested to the gentry and middling sorts that they should provide more employment by displaying greater enterprise; he suggests that a new culture needed to be implemented which placed more emphasis upon new commodities.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer E. 537 (3), Thursday 28<sup>th</sup> December – Thursday 4<sup>th</sup> January 1648, p.1813.

<sup>51</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer E. 538 (21), Thursday 11<sup>th</sup> January – Thursday 18<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.1837.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid; The Moderate Intelligencer E. 539 (13) 1649, no pages at all in this edition.

<sup>53</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer E. 545 (2), Thursday 15<sup>th</sup> February – Thursday 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1649.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid

<sup>55</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer E. 546 (13), Thursday 1<sup>st</sup> March – Thursday 8<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.1921-22; The Moderate Intelligencer E. 546 (24) Thursday 8<sup>th</sup> March – Thursday 15<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.1933. The Moderate Intelligencer E. 548 (13) 1649 p.1945. The Moderate Intelligencer E. 548 (30) Thursday 10<sup>th</sup> March – Thursday 27<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.1957.

<sup>56</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer E. 546 (13), Thursday 1<sup>st</sup> March – Thursday 8<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.1921.



These interesting editorials come to an end in April, with the editor bowing to pressure as he acknowledged that many people did not approve of his comments.<sup>57</sup> From this point onwards he filled his paper with even more information from abroad, whilst he continued to report upon political events at Westminster and news from the localities. Dillingham made few personal observations upon political issues. He objected to Lilburne out of his fear that Leveller unrest would result in more civil strife.<sup>58</sup> Dillingham never questioned the expedition to Ireland, and he was at pains to justify this stance.<sup>59</sup> Otherwise he took the job of printing news seriously and his papers are full of relevant political information.

My findings do not support Blair Worden's suggestion that Dillingham had "scant sympathy for the purge and regicide"<sup>60</sup> However, this argument does support Worden's view that Dillingham was not an official spokesman for the Government.<sup>61</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer acknowledged opposition to the regime.<sup>62</sup> Dillingham paid tribute to Lockyer's bravery and

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<sup>57</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer E. 549 (17), Thursday 29<sup>th</sup> March – Thursday 5<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.1905.

<sup>58</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer E. 546 (20) Thursday 8<sup>th</sup> March – Thursday 15<sup>th</sup> March 1649; The Moderate Intelligencer E. 549 (17) Thursday March 29<sup>th</sup> – Thursday 5<sup>th</sup> April 1649 p.1906; The Moderate Intelligencer E. 552 (4) Thursday 19<sup>th</sup> April – Thursday 26<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.2008; The Moderate Intelligencer E. 555 (2) Thursday 2<sup>nd</sup> May – Thursday 8<sup>th</sup> May 1649, p.2025. In these last two editions he failed to print Lilburne's attacks. Contrast with Mabbott's approach in The Moderate above.

<sup>59</sup> The Moderate Intelligencer E. 552 (26), Thursday 26<sup>th</sup> April – Thursday 2<sup>nd</sup> May 1649, p.2015-16.

<sup>60</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p.403.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. Worden rightly points out his independence.

<sup>62</sup> The opposition to the regime was mentioned in every edition. There was not an attempt to present the view that there were no problems facing the new regime.

his views upon the poor would not have made pleasant reading for the Government.<sup>63</sup> Dillingham was pursuing his own, rather limited agenda which advocated an end to civil strife. The fact that this view coincided with the Government's appears to have been incidental.

Henry Walker, the editor of *Perfect Occurrences*, included a short editorial with a Hebrew phrase conveniently translated into English.<sup>64</sup> His editions also included a phrase of the week, usually written by an MP, although on one occasion the honour was bestowed upon George Fleming, the Master of Ceremonies.<sup>65</sup> Throughout this period, Walker's editorials supported the Government. He welcomed the purge, and even before a High Court of Justice had been erected, he justified regicide upon the grounds of conquest.<sup>66</sup> At one stage he talked of "Gods reign on earth"<sup>67</sup> and he regarded the introduction of the new Great Seal as the start of a glorious age.<sup>68</sup> However, when it became clear that the Government was not going to extend the revolution far beyond the execution of the King, Walker praised them for being gracious. His blatant desire to support the existing Government, means that it is impossible to determine his political views. Unlike Mabbott, Walker made no attempt to exert pressure upon the politicians. In light of these remarks it would be easy to dismiss Walker as merely an apologist for the Government. In one important respect this is true. In all his editions between

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<sup>63</sup> N. 55 above. He was especially critical of the Government in *The Moderate Intelligencer* E. 548 (13), Thursday 15<sup>th</sup> March – Thursday 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1649, p.1945.

<sup>64</sup> The paper is cited in the bibliography.

<sup>65</sup> MPs included: Miles Corbet, *Perfect Occurrences* E. 527 (28), Friday 23<sup>rd</sup> February – Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1649, p.857; Ireton, *Perfect Occurrences* E. 527 (35), Friday 9<sup>th</sup> March – Friday 16<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.899; William Armyn, *Perfect Occurrences* E. 529 (7), Friday 30<sup>th</sup> March – Friday 6<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.921. Nicholas Love, *Perfect Occurrences* E. 529 (15), Friday 6<sup>th</sup> April – Friday 13<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.937.

<sup>66</sup> *Perfect Occurrences* E. 526 (45), Friday 22<sup>nd</sup> December – Friday 30<sup>th</sup> December 1649, p.773.

<sup>67</sup> *Perfect Occurrences* E. 527 (3), Friday 29<sup>th</sup> December – Friday 5<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.781.

<sup>68</sup> *Perfect Occurrences* E. 527 (8), Friday 5<sup>th</sup> January – Friday 11<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.797.

December 1648 and May 1649, he never criticised the Government. His consistent attacks upon the Royalists, coupled with the neglect of news concerning Charles II, points towards a professional propagandist. Moreover, Walker consistently cited or printed petitions which were supportive of the new regime. However, as with Mabbott and Dillingham, Walker took the printing of news seriously. He printed Presbyterian objections to the new regime;<sup>69</sup> he provided a full account of the King's trial expressing Charles' courage<sup>70</sup>; he even presented Charles as a martyr before the trial began; and he printed examples of William Prynne embarrassing the Government by the latter's refusal to acknowledge Parliament as a lawful authority.<sup>71</sup> He included Scottish justifications for their proclamation of loyalty to Charles II<sup>72</sup>; he acknowledged Lilburne's verbal and written denunciations of Parliament<sup>73</sup> and he printed William Bray's outspoken attack against Fairfax. Walker did not attempt to deny both the unpopularity and the dangers facing the new regime - although these were not at the forefront of his reporting, there is little evidence of deliberate concealment.

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<sup>69</sup> Perfect Occurrences E. 526 (40), 8<sup>th</sup> December – 15<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.745-46; Perfect Occurrences E. 526 (42), Friday 15<sup>th</sup> December – Friday 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1648, p.766, makes Presbyterian hostility clear; Perfect Occurrences E. 526 (45), Friday 22<sup>nd</sup> December – Friday 30<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.774, shows the difficulties the regime was having with the Common Council of London; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (5), Friday 5<sup>th</sup> January – Friday 12<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.789; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (17), Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> February – Friday 9<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.825, mentions the publication of A Vindication of the Ministers of the Gospel, for details of this pamphlet see Chapter 4 above; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (21), Friday 9<sup>th</sup> February – Friday 16<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.839-40; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (31), Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> March – Friday 9<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.888, 894, prints Presbyterian opposition, Thomas Cauton was arrested and Christopher Love was being questioned.

<sup>70</sup> Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (11), Friday 19<sup>th</sup> January – Friday 26<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.806-8; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (14), Friday 26<sup>th</sup> January – Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1649, p.818-19.

<sup>71</sup> Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (5), Friday 5<sup>th</sup> January – Friday 12<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.789.

<sup>72</sup> Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (21), Friday 9<sup>th</sup> February – Friday 16<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.839-40.

<sup>73</sup> Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (28), Friday 23<sup>rd</sup> February – Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1649, p.865-66; Perfect Occurrences E. 527 (39), Friday 16<sup>th</sup> March – Friday 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1649, p.913-14.



Although Walker's editorials were short, this was an improvement on Samuel Peck, whose paper *A Perfect Diurnall* did not include any editorial comment.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, he only made two direct political remarks, both of which were attacks upon the English and Scottish Presbyterians.<sup>75</sup> Despite this lack of editorial direction, it is patently clear that Peck was a supporter of the new regime. He appeared determined to show unity amongst the political leaders. This occasionally resulted in distortion such as his claim that no animosity existed during the debates over the Agreement of the People.<sup>76</sup> He also glossed over the discussions which arose during the debate concerning the future of the House of Lords.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, he was less willing than his colleagues to acknowledge criticism of the new regime.<sup>78</sup> However, this paper should not be dismissed as a piece of propaganda. Peck did acknowledge the difficulties facing the regime and his attention to detail was most impressive.<sup>79</sup> His news was presented in a rather bland fashion, but *A Perfect Diurnall* was a very informative and, by large, accurate newspaper.

Three other newspapers, whose content and form closely resembled *A Perfect Diurnall*, require brief comment. *A Perfect Summary of Exact Passages* came out on the 29<sup>th</sup> January. The first two editions provided a formidable justification of regicide, which was based more

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<sup>74</sup> For the general location of these papers, see bibliography below.

<sup>75</sup> *Perfect Diurnall* E. 527 (9), Monday 5<sup>th</sup> February – Monday 12<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.2224; *Perfect Diurnall*, E. 572 (33), Monday 5<sup>th</sup> March – Monday 12<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.2356.

<sup>76</sup> *Perfect Diurnall* E. 526 (43), Monday 18<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December 1649, p.2071.

<sup>77</sup> *Perfect Diurnall* E. 527 (18), Monday 5<sup>th</sup> February – Monday 12<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.2324.

<sup>78</sup> This can be seen in all the editions cited in the bibliography. Good examples can be found in *Perfect Diurnall*, E. 527 (16), Monday 29<sup>th</sup> January – Monday 5<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.2263; *Perfect Diurnall*, E. 527 (25), Monday 19<sup>th</sup> February – Monday 26<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.2238-9.

<sup>79</sup> Despite the lack of political comment the attention to detail is still most impressive.

upon the fashion in which Charles I had ruled, rather than an aversion to the principle of monarchy.<sup>80</sup> This would change from the 19<sup>th</sup> of February onwards when the editor avoided personal remarks. Instead, the paper resorted to presenting factual and detailed accounts of parliamentary business.<sup>81</sup> The second paper was Daniel Border's *The Kingdoms Faithful and Impartial Scout* which came on to the market in March.<sup>82</sup> The paper provides useful detail upon Charles II's activities and excellent coverage of the trials of the leading Royalists were sustained throughout the proceedings<sup>83</sup>. Again, Border was reluctant to make his political perspective clear. Finally *A Perfect Summary of Exact Passages* appeared on the 16<sup>th</sup> April. The paper concerned itself with parliamentary business and in terms of content it was not as useful as Peck's paper<sup>84</sup>. All three of these newspapers supported the Government, but as usual they provided a comprehensive account of parliamentary business.

Although the last five newspapers supported the Government, their editorials did not suggest that this was their function. This is in stark contrast to a paper entitled *A Modest Narrative of Intelligence* which appeared on the 7<sup>th</sup> of April.<sup>85</sup> The editor made it plain that he had been approached by "friends" of the Government to write a new paper.<sup>86</sup> Historians have tended to

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<sup>80</sup> *A Perfect Summary of Exact Passages*, E. 527 (13), Monday 22<sup>nd</sup> January – Monday 29<sup>th</sup> January 1649, p.1-2; *A Perfect Summary of Exact Passages*, E. 527 (20), Monday 5<sup>th</sup> February – Monday 12<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.17.

<sup>81</sup> This is clear in all the newspapers which follow. For full listing see bibliography below.

<sup>82</sup> For all the publications consulted in this thesis see the bibliography below.

<sup>83</sup> *The Kingdoms Faithful Scout*, E. 527 (27), Friday 23<sup>rd</sup> February – Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1649, p.38; *The Kingdoms Faithful Scout*, E. 527 (32), Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> March – Friday 9<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.41-2, 46-8.

<sup>84</sup> See the listings in the bibliography below.

<sup>85</sup> See the bibliography below for a full listing of this newspaper.

<sup>86</sup> *A Modest Narrative of Intelligence*, E. 550 (5), Saturday 1<sup>st</sup> April – Saturday 7<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.1, was the first paper. See the bibliography for a full listing.

neglect this paper, but it provides the clearest indication of the motives of the rumpers in the early years of the republic.<sup>87</sup>

The editorials provide a sustained attack upon the Leveller movement and a vindication of the Government's actions. The editor supported the moves against the leading Levellers because Lilburne and company were determined to divide the Army, and it was feared that this would frustrate the expedition to Ireland.<sup>88</sup> He attacked the Levellers for regarding all Scots as implacable opponents and he was also critical of the tendency to treat Royalists and Presbyterians as a homogenous group<sup>89</sup>; this was a deliberate show of support for the Rump's attempts to isolate Royalists from Presbyterians.<sup>90</sup> The editor was also critical of the Leveller's attacks upon the new regime as they failed to provide a realistic alternative. This explains his depiction of the Levellers as "perpetual seekers" and "convinced trouble-makers."<sup>91</sup> Finally, the Editor justified the Rump's decision not to hold fresh elections upon the grounds that new elections would result in the return of people hostile to the new regime.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p.403. J. Frank, The Beginnings of the English Newspaper, p.190-1. My thesis makes extensive use of this paper because, I believe it acts as the official Government mouthpiece.

<sup>88</sup> A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 550 (5), Saturday 1<sup>st</sup> April – Saturday 7<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p1-2; A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 550 (22), Saturday 7<sup>th</sup> April – Saturday 14<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.9; A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 551 (9), Saturday 14<sup>th</sup> April – Saturday 21<sup>st</sup> April 1649, p.9, 17. A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 552 (7), Saturday 21<sup>st</sup> April – Saturday 28<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.25.

<sup>89</sup> A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 551 (9), Saturday 14<sup>th</sup> April – Saturday 21<sup>st</sup> April 1649, p.17.

<sup>90</sup> This is discussed in chapter 2 of my thesis. It was also a major theme in Blair Worden's work.

<sup>91</sup> A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 550, Saturday 1<sup>st</sup> April – Saturday 7<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.9.

<sup>92</sup> A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 555 (8), Saturday 5<sup>th</sup> May – Saturday 12<sup>th</sup> May 1649, p.41.



A Modest Narrative of Intelligence was the only newspaper to justify the killing of Robert Lockyer and also point out that not everyone was impressed with the pomp and circumstance which was on display at his funeral.<sup>93</sup> Although the editor tended to refrain from personal attacks upon the Leveller leaders, the Diggers were dismissed as “would be peers” and drunkards.<sup>94</sup> Despite the fact this newspaper was, ostensibly, designed to act as the Government’s mouthpiece, it still conformed to a recurring theme. First, the paper reported upon parliamentary legislation in a detailed fashion, without finding it necessary to praise the framers of the legislation.<sup>95</sup> Second, despite his attacks upon Lilburne he did print petitions supporting the Leveller leader.<sup>96</sup> And finally, as we saw in Mabbott’s newspaper, the editor did attempt to persuade the Government to act; in this newspaper encouragement was given to alleviate the plight of the poor and deal with the Army’s arrears of pay.<sup>97</sup>

In contrast to a Modest Narrative of Intelligence, two other official newspapers, The Perfect Weekly Account and Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer,<sup>98</sup> did not go to great lengths to support the new regime. The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, edited by Richard Collings showed a great deal of sympathy for the Presbyterian MPs secluded at Pride’s purge and he wrote a

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<sup>93</sup> A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 553 (12), Saturday 30<sup>th</sup> April – Saturday 5<sup>th</sup> May 1649, p.5-6.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. p.33.

<sup>95</sup> This editor supported the Government at the start of his paper but then dealt with the news without comment. This is true in all of the newspapers. For a full listing see the bibliography below.

<sup>96</sup> A Modest Narrative of Intelligence, E. 553 (12), Saturday 30<sup>th</sup> April – Saturday 5<sup>th</sup> May 1649, p.37-8.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid p.36.

<sup>98</sup> See the bibliography below for a full listing.

great tribute to the popularity of the King<sup>99</sup> in his edition which immediately followed the regicide;

“This day it did not rain at all, yet it was a very wet day in several places in and about the City of London, by reason of the abundance of affliction that fell from many eyes for the death of the King.”<sup>100</sup>

His apparent support for the King and the Presbyterians appears to contradict the support he had for the Army. He was willing to publish their great achievements extending especial praise to Oliver Cromwell.<sup>101</sup> After the regicide he did report Royalist activity but in no greater detail than some of the other newspapers. In terms of editorial value, this paper offers little, apart from one remark he made suggesting that there was a possibility of an alliance between Levellers and Royalists. In his book, ‘Literature and Revolution’, Nigel Smith suggests that this projected alliance was strongly urged by Collings. This argument does require one important qualification: it was only mentioned on one occasion and was merely a reflection of one particular Royalist view. It was not mentioned again by Collings and can hardly be regarded as a policy that had the support of his paper.<sup>102</sup>

Daniel Border’s *The Perfect Weekly Account* also showed a real admiration for Charles I.

This is shown in his report of Charles’ final moments alive:

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<sup>99</sup> *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, E. 476 (39) 1648, p.1185-7. Although, he does not state his support for secluded members he does spend a great deal of time upon their declarations. *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, E. 541, Tuesday 30<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.1241.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, E. 476 (9), Tuesday 7<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> December 1648 p.1179.

<sup>102</sup> Nigel Smith, *Literature and Revolution, 1640-60* (New Haven 1994) p.64.

“no man have come with more confidence and appearance of resolution than he did.” After the regicide, apart from one occasion, when he asked Parliament to take more notice of the poor, he was not willing to comment upon political issues. He simply and accurately reported the news. Joseph Frank dismissed this paper as second rate. It is true that his paper did not contain as much news as some of the other papers, but Frank’s view that Border was anxious not to attend the Government requires one qualification; he was also unwilling to praise the new regime preferring to provide an accurate account of events.<sup>103</sup>

Four other official newspapers have not yet been discussed. ‘A Declaration collected out of the Journals of Both Houses’<sup>104</sup> went out of circulation in December. It produced two informative editions and his editorials demonstrated support for the Army and the remaining MPs. Another paper ‘The Impartial Intelligencer’<sup>105</sup> lived up to its name by simply printing news without comment apart from an occasional attack against the Leveller leaders.<sup>106</sup> The Army’s Modest Intelligencer appeared sporadically; it supported the regicide, but then advocated caution and unity.<sup>107</sup> Finally, Mercurius Brittanicus appeared in late April with the avowed intention of launching an attack upon the Royalist Mercurius Pragmaticus.<sup>108</sup> It was

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<sup>103</sup> The Perfect Weekly Account, E. 546 (20), Wednesday 28<sup>th</sup> February – Wednesday 7<sup>th</sup> March 1649, p.409. For a full listing of these papers see Appendix D below.

<sup>104</sup> A Declaration Collected out of the Journals of Both Houses, E. 476 (17), Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December – Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> December 1648; A Declaration Collected out of the Journals of Both Houses, E. 477 (7), Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> December – Wednesday 20<sup>th</sup> December 1649.

<sup>105</sup> The Impartial Intelligencer, E. 549 (15), Wednesday 28<sup>th</sup> March – Wednesday 4<sup>th</sup> April 1649; The Impartial Intelligencer, E. 550 (18), Wednesday 11<sup>th</sup> April – Wednesday 18<sup>th</sup> April 1649.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. This is clear in all the editorials.

<sup>107</sup> The Armies Modest Intelligencer, E. 541 (16), Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> January – Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> January 1649.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. Two editions appeared during this period: Mercurius Brittanicus, E. 552 (27), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Friday 24<sup>th</sup> May 1649 and Mercurius Brittanicus, E. 555 (15), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May 1649.



scathing in its tone, but it provides an opportunity to consider the aforesaid Pragmaticus and the other Royalist newspapers.

On the 13<sup>th</sup> of February 1649, the editor of Mercurius Elencticus informed his readers that he was finding it extremely difficult to publish his paper.<sup>109</sup> He did, however, ensure readers that he would continue his work, but would be unable to guarantee the exact date of publication. This was not an isolated incident; a number of Royalist newspapers complained that the ‘state blood hounds’ were attempting to prevent Royalist publications.<sup>110</sup> However, this did not prevent the production of numerous Royalist publications to go with the large corpus of parliamentary papers.<sup>111</sup> Between the 6<sup>th</sup> of December and the 21<sup>st</sup> of May, nine separate Royalist titles were, at some stage, on sale; with a number of counterfeits in circulation, a minimum of fifty four Royalist editions were available for public consumption.

Mercurius Pragmaticus accounts for twenty of these editions. From the 6<sup>th</sup> of December until the 26<sup>th</sup> of January, the paper was edited by Marchamont Nedham. Following Nedham’s temporary retirement from journalism it becomes difficult to determine the names of the journalists. Variations in style, coupled with complaints about counterfeits, suggest that a number of journalists wrote under the title. As with all the other Royalist newspapers, Pragmaticus exaggerated Royalist victories at sea, made vicious attacks against the purged

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<sup>109</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, T.T.E. 542 (13), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February 1649.

<sup>110</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus: E. 537 (20), E. 550 (13), E. 544 (17). Mercurius Elencticus: E. 476 (4), p.525, E. 542 (13). Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles: E. 551 (15), E. 552 (15). The Man in the Moon: E. 550 (26). Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls: 556 (4).

<sup>111</sup> These are all cited in the bibliography.

Parliament and consistently maintained that a large pro-monarchical European Army was on the brink of launching a counter-revolution.<sup>112</sup>

Fourteen editions of *Mercurius Elencticus* appeared during this period.<sup>113</sup> The authentic version was edited by George Wharton, but a number of counterfeits were produced. *Elencticus* was the only Royalist newspaper which covered the execution of Charles I. Along with *Pragmaticus*, it was the only title to appear in February 1649.

On the 16<sup>th</sup> of April a new and cheaper Royalist newspaper came on the market. Joseph Frank described the editor, John Crouch as the “smuttiest newsman produced by the puritan Revolution.” An analysis of Crouch’s editorials supports this view; every edition contains invectives against the new regime and these observations were rarely supported by fact. As David Underdown points out “nobody could ever have read it for its news coverage”.<sup>114</sup>

*Mercurius Melancholicus* produced two editions. Both of these appeared in the weeks between Pride’s purge and the regicide. It is unclear who edited the paper but the journalist had little understanding of the political situation; the editor still believed that William Prynne was behind the moves against the King.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> All the titles are listed in the bibliography most are cited below.

<sup>113</sup> These are listed in Appendix D, listings of *Mercurius Elencticus*.

<sup>114</sup> David Underdown, *A Freeborn People*, p.95.

<sup>115</sup> *Mercurius Melancholicus*. E. 536 (27), Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December 1648- Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January 1649; *Mercurius Melancholicus*, Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January – Monday 8<sup>th</sup> January 1649, E. 537 (19).

Two editions of a paper entitled *Mercurius Elencticus* for King Charles appeared during this period. Both papers ran concurrently between April 30<sup>th</sup> and May 14<sup>th</sup>. In his first editorial the journalist promised to be unfailingly objective:

“So equal balanced, complete compact, so smoothly eminent, so truly exact”.<sup>116</sup>

The image of objectivity was quickly destroyed as the editor launched a diatribe against anyone associated with the radical cause. The editor made little attempt to provide a credible political commentary.

Another Royalist newspaper entitled *Mercurius Philo-Monarchicus* appeared twice. The editor claimed that he would provide information upon the exiled King. Instead he joined his colleagues in launching attacks against the new regime.<sup>117</sup>

On the 24<sup>th</sup> April Nedham returned to write under the title *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles II. He edited four newspapers in this period, all of which illustrated his aptitude for journalism. In early May 1649 Nedham had to compete with a ‘counterfeit’ *Pragmaticus*. The paper can be identified by its failure to carry the ‘e’ in Charles.<sup>118</sup> Although Nedham bitterly resented this competition, the counterfeit was little different to any of the other existing Royalist newspapers. It attacked the new regime and had little understanding of the political situation. It appears that Royalist complaints about counterfeit editions reflected the journalists’ annoyance about lost revenue, rather than the content of the fraudulent papers.

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<sup>116</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus* for King Charles, E. 554 (5), Monday 30<sup>th</sup> April – Monday 7<sup>th</sup> May, 1649.

<sup>117</sup> *Mercurius Philo Monarchicus*, E. 550 (27), Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> – Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April 1649, p.1.

<sup>118</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, they can be found: E. 552 (15), 24<sup>th</sup> April. E. 551 (15), 17<sup>th</sup> April. E. 555 (13), 1<sup>st</sup> May. E. 556 (4), 15<sup>th</sup> May. *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charls, they can be found: E. 554 (14), 8<sup>th</sup> May, E. 554 (12), 1<sup>st</sup> May, E. 556 (5), 15<sup>th</sup> May.



It is clear from the content of the Royalist newspapers that the editors had little interest in providing their readers with accurate information. This contrasts with the parliamentary papers which tended to focus upon factual detail as opposed to editorial comment. It is worth considering the aims of the Royalist editors.

The most dominant theme was a desire to provide their readers with hope. The view of all the papers was neatly expressed by *Mercurius Elencticus* for King Charles, “shall my lines run, that each strain shall invite your contemplations, yet provide delight”<sup>119</sup> The Royalist often created an image of an outraged Europe, who would unite and come to their rescue. *Mercurius Pragmaticus* informed readers that France, Denmark and Holland had pledged their support to Charles II<sup>120</sup>. A month later another edition under the same title claimed that Sweden and Austria had joined the coalition.<sup>121</sup> Other editions pursued this theme<sup>122</sup> but *The Man in the Moon* provided the most exaggerated account. Upon the 23<sup>rd</sup>, Crouch told his readers that Charles could secure aid from every European state, but the young King had rejected the overtures because he did not wish to see strangers in the land.<sup>123</sup> Even Nedham included accounts suggesting that 5,000 Spanish troops were on the verge of launching an invasion for Charles II.<sup>124</sup> It is difficult to imagine how anyone would believe such accounts; it contrasts with the parliamentary papers which acknowledged Royalist triumphs.

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<sup>119</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus* for King Charles, E. 554 (5), Monday 30<sup>th</sup> April – Monday 7<sup>th</sup> May.

<sup>120</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 546 (4), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> March 1649.

<sup>121</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 549 (13), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 4<sup>th</sup> March 1649.

<sup>122</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 554 (10), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May 1649, p.16; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 555 (37), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May 1649, p.32.

<sup>123</sup> *The Man in the Moon*, E. 551 (10), Monday 16<sup>th</sup> April – Monday 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1649, p.12.

<sup>124</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May 1649. See also, *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles, E. 554 (12), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May 1649.

It is easier to understand the Royalists reports that the seas were dominated by Prince Rupert. The strength of the Royalist fleet was contrasted with the weakness of the parliamentary Navy. The disparity between the two was used as a device to persuade parliamentary seamen to desert the republican Navy. It was a propaganda play which had some chance of success because Parliament was finding it difficult to recruit seamen.<sup>125</sup> Moreover, the reports concerning success for Charles in securing support from Scotland and Ireland must have added to the concerns at Westminster, especially when the parliamentary press acknowledged the danger.

The aim of the Royalist journalists was to paint a picture of a Government on the brink of collapse. They also devoted a great deal of attention to the problems facing the Government at home. Most of these focussed upon Leveller discontent, but any sign of opposition was also readily reported. These accounts ranged from the breakdown at local government in Exeter,<sup>126</sup> to pro-Royalist risings in Wales.<sup>127</sup> The press attempted to show that everyone in the country objected to the rule of the Rump and this extended from Levellers to Presbyterians.

Although Royalist journalists found it convenient to use other groups to illustrate the new regimes unpopularity, journalists never forgot that they were writing a Royalist newspaper for Royalist readers. Journalists revealed their admiration for those men and women<sup>128</sup> who had, from the first day of the conflict, supported the Royalist cause. In editorials, Royalist readers were reminded that they belonged to a glorious cause, and although facing adversity, should

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<sup>125</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 549 (13), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1649.

<sup>126</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 548 (22), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 28<sup>th</sup> March 1649.

<sup>127</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus cited n.125 above.

<sup>128</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May 1649.

seek comfort from the exclusive party which they belonged to. This is illustrated in two verses written by George Whorton:

“Happy condition we live in,  
And yet we want no woe,  
But we have comforts lodged within,  
Which rebels ne’re shall know

We Cavaliers have secret joys  
Which Traitors never had,  
We have little wealth, yet jocund boys  
We live to laugh them old” <sup>129</sup>

Any man who proved willing to make the final sacrifice for the Royalist cause received undiluted praise from Royalist journalists. This is illustrated by the reports upon the trial of Hamilton, Holland and Capel.<sup>130</sup> The press also made frequent references to Charles I who had, according to the *Man in the Moon*, provided himself to be the “most Christian anointed crowned, religious, just, pious, virtuous and wise Prince in the world”.<sup>131</sup> All the references to Charles I illustrated how the late King had died for a glorious cause.<sup>132</sup> Journalists were eager to inform readers that the cause had not died with the King. Reports concerning Charles II’s

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<sup>129</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, E. 477 (31) Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>130</sup> Eg: Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 556 (18), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March 1649.

<sup>131</sup> The Man in the Moon, E. 550 (26), Monday 16<sup>th</sup> April 1649.

<sup>132</sup> Eg: Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 540 (15), 24<sup>th</sup> January – 30<sup>th</sup> January 1649; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 546 (18), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March 1649; Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 551 (15), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May 1649.



health, coupled with the latter's determination to re-gain his crown, were designed to provide 'old loyal' Royalists with the feeling that their sorrow would be short-lived.<sup>133</sup>

Although journalists always remembered the old Royalists, their depiction of a society destroyed by a military tyranny was aimed at a wider readership. Between Pride's purge and the regicide, the four available newspapers<sup>134</sup> used dramatic imagery to warn readers about the kind of society which would follow the destruction of the monarchy. *Mercurius Pragmaticus* predicted the demise of law and religion. Nedham also argued that the abolition of monarchy would result in chaos as every faction competed for supremacy. This, Nedham argued, would have ramifications throughout society as "no man of wealth and power would be secure from the malice of his inferior".<sup>135</sup> Appealing to a war-weary nation, Nedham contrasted a harmonious state under a monarch with the prospect of a society without a King: "Instead of peaceable government under hereditary kings, the land will grown under the burden of successive tyrannies and be tormented with usurpation, upon usurpation and rebellion upon rebellion".<sup>136</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus* warned of anarchy and confusion.<sup>137</sup> The

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<sup>133</sup> Eg: *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 550 (32), Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April 1649; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 552 (12), Monday 23<sup>rd</sup> April – Monday 30<sup>th</sup> April 1649; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 21<sup>st</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May 1649; *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles, E. 551 (15), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May.

<sup>134</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, can be found: E. 476 (2), E. 476 (35), E. 477 (30), E. 537 (20), E. 538 (18), E. 540 (15); *Mercurius Elencticus*, can be found: E. 475 (22), E. 476 (4), E. 476 (36), E. 477 (31), E. 536 (31); An edition of Merc. Elen in J.B Williams, *A History of the English Newspapers* p.200; *Mercurius Melancholicus*, can be found: E. 536 (27), E. 537 (19). *Mercurius Impartialis* can be found: E. 476 (3).

<sup>135</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December; For similar arguments see: *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 476 (35), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 538 (18) Tuesday 9<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> January 1649 (Nedham ran a double edition.)

<sup>136</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>137</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 475 (22), Wednesday 29<sup>th</sup> November – Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

editor of *Mercurius Imparticalis* warned of the dangers facing “wives and children” in a society which had lost its traditional structures.<sup>138</sup> *Mercurius Melancholicus* attached particular significance to the dangers facing the church.<sup>139</sup>

This tactic of depicting a society which was being destroyed, continued after the purge. The papers were full of stories revealing the full horrors of military rule. *Mercurius Pragmaticus* told of an old man walking through the streets accompanied by his young children. The youngsters were slaughtered by a collection of soldiers because their father had revealed his preference for monarchy.<sup>140</sup> Royalists used other tactics, apart from violence, to show how society was being destroyed. *The Man in the Moon* focussed upon the “dire poverty and the tears of widows”.<sup>141</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles used the regime’s attack upon the Diggers as an example of a brutal conquest over “feeble souls and empty bellies.”<sup>142</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of the regicide, Royalists attempted to show how everyone, from the top of the social ladder down to mere beggars had been adversely affected by the revolution. As the Army began to show signs of discontent, the newspapers adapted their stance. Instead of attacking the Army, journalists turned most of their attention to the members of the purged Parliament and the Grandees.

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<sup>138</sup> *Mercurius Imparticalis*, E. 476 (3), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December– Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1649, p.8

<sup>139</sup> *Mercurius Melancholicus*, T.T.E. 536 (27), *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January, p.1-3.

<sup>140</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 540 (15), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 30<sup>th</sup> January 1649.

<sup>141</sup> *The Man in the Moon*, E. 551 (10), 16<sup>th</sup> April – 23<sup>rd</sup> April, p.13; *The Man in the Moon*, E.554 (4), 30<sup>th</sup> April – 7<sup>th</sup> May, p.3; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 555 (21) p.3; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 555 (33), 14<sup>th</sup> –21<sup>st</sup> May, p.53.

<sup>142</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, E. 551 (15), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April.

The information provided upon the Royalist press thus far has shown its attempts to undermine the Rump Parliament by producing wild accusations. The next section considers, not just their attitude to the MPs, but also the extent of their access to political information.

The editions of *Pragmaticus* and *Elencticus* which reported upon the events between Pride's purge and the regicide provide the historian with some useful information. Nedham identified Sir Thomas Wroth, Sir Peter Wentworth and Edmund Prideaux as the most outspoken critics of the votes to continue the Newport negotiations.<sup>143</sup> Sir James Harrington, Sir Henry Mildmay, John Ven, Edmund Harvey, Francis Allen and John Blackhiston, Oliver Cromwell and Sir Gilbert Pickering were associated with the moves against the Presbyterians.<sup>144</sup> In total Nedham suggested that more than forty MPs played a leading role in the events leading up to regicide. *Mercurius Elencticus* also provides evidence showing that a number of MPs were involved in bringing the King to justice.<sup>145</sup> This is very useful evidence for the historian, but it is the only occasion for which the Royalist newspapers can be used for a reconstruction of parliamentary history.

Despite identifying a number of determined MPs, *Elencticus*, *Pragmaticus* and *Melancholicus* depicted a small and subservient Parliament reliant upon the Army. The image of a submissive Parliament was employed by all the Royalist newspapers. The polemical attacks which had been evident prior to the regicide increased. *Mercurius Pragmaticus* used

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<sup>143</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, T.T.E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>144</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* E. 476 (35), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December 1648; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 475 (22), Wednesday 29<sup>th</sup> November – Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December 1648; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December; Further examples in *Mercurius Elencticus* can be found: E. 476 (36), E. 477 (31), E. 536 (31).

<sup>145</sup> These can be found in *Mercurius Elencticus*: E. 475 (22), E. 476 (4), E. 476 (36), E. 477 (31), E. 536 (31).



descriptions which included “King choppers”, “cut throats” and “blood suckers”<sup>146</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus* spoke scathingly about the regicides at Westminster.<sup>147</sup> *The Man in the Moon* called the MPs the “new popes”.<sup>148</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles simply referred to the members as “rebels”.<sup>149</sup> Nedham’s rival used the simple description “a foul house”<sup>150</sup> *Mercurius Philo Monarchicus* called them the “cauker-worms” of the body politic.<sup>151</sup>

It is clear (and it should also be added that the other parliamentary papers did not have access to political division at Westminster), that after the regicide, not a single Royalist journalist had access to the workings of Westminster. The editor of *The Man in the Moon* promised information upon the activities at Westminster, but his insights were limited to Henry Marten’s sex life, Bradshaw’s cowardice and the low social origins of the MPs<sup>152</sup>. The editions of *Pragmaticus* provide us with slightly more information citing the names of nine leaders of the Commonwealth.<sup>153</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus* refers to taxes being paid for Marten’s whores.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 544 (9), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 546 (18), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> March.

<sup>147</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 542 (13), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February.

<sup>148</sup> *The Man in the Moon*, E. 550 (26), 9<sup>th</sup> April - 16<sup>th</sup> April 1649.

<sup>149</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May 1649.

<sup>150</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls*, E. 555 (14), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May 1649.

<sup>151</sup> *Mercurius Philo Monarchicus*, E. 555 (34), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May 1649.

<sup>152</sup> *The Man in the Moon*, E. 551 (10), Monday 16<sup>th</sup> April – Monday 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1649, p.10; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 555 (33), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May 1649, p.54; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 552 (8), Monday 23<sup>rd</sup> April – Monday 30<sup>th</sup> April.

<sup>153</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 544 (9), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February.

<sup>154</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May.

The editors of the Royalist newspapers portrayed Parliament as a homogeneous body. It is interesting to note that they made no distinction between the Regicides and those MPs who returned to Westminster after the purge.

As we would expect, the newspapers reported upon the demise of the Lords as another example of the illegal nature of the Commons rule.<sup>155</sup> It is interesting to note, however, that Royalist journalists neither praised nor forgave the Lords for their respective stands in the Civil War. Even the peers who had been outspoken opponents of the trial, did not receive praise from the journalists. Instead, newspapers condemned these peers as a collection of fools who had failed to act at the appropriate time.<sup>156</sup> The only two Lords to receive a great deal of attention, were Pembroke and Denbigh. These peers' decision to serve the new government resulted in widespread condemnation.<sup>157</sup>

Throughout this period every Royalist journalist attacked the Grandees for their role in the English Revolution. At the centre of these attacks stood the figure of Oliver Cromwell. Every editor enjoyed commenting upon the size of his nose, but it was not just his physical appearance which provoked comment and other disparaging remarks highlighting his

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<sup>155</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 548 (3), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March 1649; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 542 (13), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February 1649; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 546 (18), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March 1649.

<sup>156</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, E. 542 (13), cited above n.155.

<sup>157</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 550 (13), Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April – Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 551 (19), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 544 (9), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 552 (16), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 554 (10), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May, p.15; The Man in the Moon, E. 551 (10), Monday 16<sup>th</sup> April – Monday 23<sup>rd</sup> April, p.10; The Man in the Moon, E. 555 (33), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May, p.52.

“cruelty”,<sup>158</sup> “lack of originality”<sup>159</sup>, “cowardice”<sup>160</sup> and above all, his “ambition”.<sup>161</sup> This is in complete contrast to the parliamentary newspapers which made very little reference to the future Lord Protector.

Henry Ireton did not receive as much attention as Cromwell, but he was still regarded by Nedham as the driving force behind the revolution.<sup>162</sup> As we would expect, most newspapers revealed Ireton to be an ambitious, cowardly and corrupt man.<sup>163</sup> Fairfax was not immune from attack. *Mercurius Elencticus* blamed him for Pride’s purge and refused to exonerate him for the regicide.<sup>164</sup> Editions of *Pragmaticus* berated Fairfax for his unscrupulous ambition.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 551 (19), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May, p.7.

<sup>159</sup> *The Man in the Moon*, E. 552 (8), 23<sup>rd</sup> April – 30<sup>th</sup> April, p.11; *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, E. 552 (15), 24<sup>th</sup> April – 1<sup>st</sup> May, p.11.

<sup>160</sup> *The Man in the Moon*, E. 554 (4), 30<sup>th</sup> April – 7<sup>th</sup> May, p.26; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 552 (8), 23<sup>rd</sup> April – 30<sup>th</sup> April, p.24; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 554 (10), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May.

<sup>161</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 540 (15), Tuesday *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 548 (22), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March. 22<sup>nd</sup> January – 30<sup>th</sup> January; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 548 (3), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 549 (13), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 550 (2), Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 551 (19), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 542 (13), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 545 (19), Wednesday 21<sup>st</sup> February – Wednesday 28<sup>th</sup> February; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May, p.5-6; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 554 (4), April 30<sup>th</sup> – May 7<sup>th</sup>; *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, E. 554 (12), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May; *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May; *Mercurius Elencticus for King Charles*, E. 554 (5), Monday 30<sup>th</sup> April – Monday 7<sup>th</sup> May.

<sup>162</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, E. 552 (15), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May, p.11.

<sup>163</sup> Most of these are found in n.161 above.

<sup>164</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 475 (22), Wednesday 29<sup>th</sup> November – Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December, p.518; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 545 (19), Wednesday 21<sup>st</sup> February – Wednesday 28<sup>th</sup> February; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 552 (14), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May, p.5. See Over for n.165.



The Man in the Moon informed his readers that upon the day of the regicide, Fairfax kissed his wife “and told her that he thanked God he had that day a King without a head.”<sup>166</sup> A number of newspapers still believed that Fairfax was amongst the most important radicals in the land. But not all the papers agreed upon the amount of influence exerted by Fairfax. *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles believed that Ireton and Cromwell were the central forces behind the revolution; instead of viewing Fairfax as a prime author, the Lord General was depicted as a monkey.<sup>167</sup>

As mentioned above, it appears likely that the Royalist press directed their editorials to a wider readership than just their royalist supporters. In the section above, we have seen how the press depicted a troubled society. In their editorials the press blamed the Grandees, Lords and Commons for their sufferings. However, journalists appreciated that the Royalists and neutrals could not, by themselves, destroy the new regime. The two groups who proved to be the most hostile opponents of the new regime were the Presbyterians and the Levellers - the two groups associated with causing the rebellion. To accept these groups as fellow-sufferers would leave the journalists open to the charge of betrayal, by a Royalist party who resented any concessions to their former foes.<sup>168</sup> On the other hand, journalists wished to debilitate the new regime. If the purged Parliament was to be destroyed by forces from within England, it would be achieved by either the Presbyterians or the Levellers. This section will analyse the manner in which the Royalist press treated their former enemies.

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<sup>165</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 540 (15), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 30<sup>th</sup> January 1649. *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 548 (22), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March 1649.

<sup>166</sup> *The Man in the Moon*, E. 550 (26), April 16<sup>th</sup>, p.5.

<sup>167</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May, 1649.

<sup>168</sup> David Underdown, *Royalist Conspiracy in England*. (Yale 1960), p.12.

Between Pride's purge and the regicide, Marchamont Nedham showed some sympathy for the Presbyterian MPs who were either imprisoned or secluded from Parliament as a result of the purge. For standing up to the Army, Nedham praised Sir Robert Harley and other secluded members, describing them as "bravely resolved" gentlemen.<sup>169</sup> Major General Massey and William Prynne were congratulated for writing against the Army.<sup>170</sup> Nedham also appears to have supported the compromise agreed at Newport, considering the praise he gave Nathaniel Fiennes for speaking "honestly" in favour of the treaty.<sup>171</sup> From this evidence, it appears that Nedham acknowledged that the Royalist cause would be best served by disregarding former hostilities and accepting the Presbyterians as political friends. His view is illustrated in this quotation:

"and because they now weep with the loyalists, though from a different cause, for companies sake, they shall be honoured with the names of fellows in affliction, though they never were in affection."<sup>172</sup>

In contrast to Nedham's approach, George Wharton, the editor of *Mercurius Elencticus*, did not initially show too much concern or respect for the Presbyterian MPs. Instead of lamenting the imprisonment of some MPs Wharton remarked that "these members were the principle contrivers of our miseries." Moreover Wharton suggested that the old crimes committed by the Presbyterians were coming back to haunt them.<sup>173</sup> By his next edition Wharton's approach altered. Although he began his paper by saying that the Presbyterian opposition was "raw and

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<sup>169</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid* E. 537 (20), Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 9<sup>th</sup> January.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>172</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 476 (2), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December.

<sup>173</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.530.

inconsiderable”, he did accept that if the Presbyterians distanced themselves from the new regime they would be able to “acquit themselves of all blame, contempt and infamy.”<sup>174</sup> In his subsequent edition, Wharton described Prynne and Ashurst as “worthy members” because they wrote against the new regime.<sup>175</sup> Within a just matter of weeks Wharton had moved noticeably closer to Nedham’s position.

The other two newspapers which appeared between the purge and regicide gave hardly mention to the political Presbyterians. *Mercurius Imparticalis* made one reference to William Prynne, pointing out that he had a foul mouth. However, since Prynne was attacking the Army, the editor was content to report it.<sup>176</sup> *Mercurius Melancholicus* claimed that seven thousand Presbyterians from Lancashire were planning to launch a counter-revolution. Apart from this single and unreliable piece of information, the editor did not concern himself with the presbyterians.<sup>177</sup> After the regicide, the Royalist press ceased to report upon the activities of individual Presbyterians with the exception of the four MPs who remained in prison,<sup>178</sup> and reports concerning Sir Robert Harley’s opposition to the Commonwealth’s new coin.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, T.T.E. 477 (31), Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December p.545.

<sup>175</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 536 (31), Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 2<sup>nd</sup> January, p.550.

<sup>176</sup> *Mercurius Imparticalis*, T.T.E. 476 (3), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December, p.3.

<sup>177</sup> *Mercurius Meloncholicus*, E. 536 (27), Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January.

<sup>178</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 550 (13), Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April – Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 551 (19), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 550 (26), 16<sup>th</sup> April, p.7; *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, T.T.E. 552 (15), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April, p.12.

<sup>179</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May; *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls*, E. 555 (14), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May.



Two editions of Royalist newspapers advocated a Presbyterian-Royalist alliance. An edition of *Mercurius Pragmaticus* appearing at the start of April suggested that this option should not be closed.<sup>180</sup> Nedham (whilst writing for *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles) praised the Presbyterians for their resolve and predicted that they would “resume true resolutions of English loyalty”.<sup>181</sup> However, not all journalists favoured this approach. The editor of *The Man in the Moon* remained hostile to the Presbyterians for the role they played in the Civil War. In an edition of *Pragmaticus*, the editor claimed that not a single Royalist would mourn the death of Major-General Browne. The manner in which the Royalists should treat their former enemies was the central issue dividing the Royalist party during the Interregnum.<sup>182</sup> It quite clearly divided the press in England.

It was, arguably not the lay Presbyterians who were the problem when it came to a possible alliance. Two editions of *Mercurius Elencticus* reveal a definite hostility to the Presbyterian clergy. The first appeared soon after the regicide:

“This is not out of any affection they have to monarchy that they rise against their rebellious bretheren of the Army, but because they had not the honour to do it themselves.”<sup>183</sup>

Considering that the Presbyterians still demanded a rigid church settlement, coupled with the bad blood that existed because of the war, it was always unlikely that they would have cemented a formidable alliance.

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<sup>180</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 554 (17), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May.

<sup>181</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, T.T.E. 551 (15), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April.

<sup>182</sup> Ronald Hutton, Charles II (Oxford 1989), p.40-41.

<sup>183</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, in J.B Williams, A History of English Journalism to the Foundation of the Gazette, p.209.

In February 1649, *Mercurius Pragmaticus* and *Mercurius Elencticus* reported upon Scotland's hostility to the new regime. The editors enjoyed writing about this hostility, but this merely expediency rather than any notion of affection.<sup>184</sup> However, as soon as it became clear that the Scottish Government were imposing strict terms on the King, the press altered their approach. With the exception of Nedham, all the newspapers attacked the Scottish Government.<sup>185</sup> Once Montrose arrived, the press were quick to point out the success he enjoyed.<sup>186</sup> Marchamont Nedham was the only royalist journalist who refrained from attacking the ruling party in Scotland. He suggested that Scotland was crying out for Kirk and King. Having changed sides himself already, Nedham was more willing than any other journalist to overlook the previous nine years.<sup>187</sup>

The press' attitude towards the English Presbyterians and the ruling Kirk party in Scotland, highlights the press' reluctance to forgive their former enemies. With the Levellers, the question of forgiveness was even more burdensome, since the Agreement of the People had assumed the destruction of the monarchy.<sup>188</sup> In the weeks before the regicide, the available

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<sup>184</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 545 (15), Monday 20<sup>th</sup> February – Monday 27<sup>th</sup> February; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 546 (18), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> March; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 524 (13), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February.

<sup>185</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 551 (12), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April; *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charls*, E. 554 (12), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May; *Mercurius Elencticus for King Charles*, E. 554 (5), Monday 30<sup>th</sup> April – Monday 7<sup>th</sup> May; *Mercurius Philo-Monarchicus*, T.T.E. 555 (34), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May.

<sup>186</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 554 (10), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May 1649; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 555 (37), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May 1649; *Mercurius Elencticus for King Charles*, E. 550 (10), Monday 7<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May 1649; *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, T.T.E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 555 (33), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May 1649, p.56.

<sup>187</sup> See below. *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, E. 552 (15), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May 1649; *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May.

<sup>188</sup> Ian Gentles, *The New Model Army*, p.286.

Royalist newspapers attacked the Leveller programmer. Mercurius Elencticus castigated any MPs associated with the Levellers. Wharton also warned his readers that the Agreement would only benefit “thieves and cheats”. Finally, Wharton suggested that the implementation of the Agreement would result in the destruction of “religion, law and monarchy.”<sup>189</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus described the Levellers as “made beasts with cursed principles”.<sup>190</sup> Nedham viewed the Levellers as being central to the Revolution, implacably opposed to any kind of compromise.<sup>191</sup> Mercurius Melancholicus blamed the Levellers for causing the initial rebellion.<sup>192</sup> However, between Pride’s purge and the regicide, the available Royalist newspapers made few references to Lilburne. It would be wrong to assume that this dearth of news suggests that Lilburne was opposed to the regicide. Upon the advice of Parliament, the Leveller leader had returned to his native Durham to secure £3,000 from the estates of Royalist delinquents.<sup>193</sup>

In an edition of Mercurius Pragmaticus, published upon the 20<sup>th</sup> February, the editor reported upon the purged Parliament’s failure to implement the Agreement.<sup>194</sup> In the subsequent addition, the paper warned the Grandees that the Levellers were drawing up articles.<sup>195</sup> Apart from these two references, no other comment concerning the Levellers was made. The

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<sup>189</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, E. 536 (31), Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> January, p.551; Mercurius Elencticus, E. 546 (36), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December, p.534-5.

<sup>190</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 476 (35), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December; Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 477 (30), Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December.

<sup>191</sup> See chapter 1 above.

<sup>192</sup> Mercurius Melancholicus cited above, E 536 (27), Monday 25<sup>th</sup> December – Monday 1<sup>st</sup> January, p.3.

<sup>193</sup> Ian Gentles, The New Model Army, p.304-5.

<sup>194</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 544 (9), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> February.

<sup>195</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus, E. 545 (15), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February.



situation dramatically altered with the publication of John Lilburne's, 'England's New Chains Discovered'.<sup>196</sup> From the 26<sup>th</sup> February, the Levellers became the most important news, as journalists appreciated that Leveller hostility could cripple the new regime.

All the Royalist newspapers recognised that Lilburne could kindle a fire throughout the kingdom,<sup>197</sup> which could divide the Army and possibly lead to a restoration. From February until May, all the Royalist journalists attempted to encourage the Leveller's to revolt.<sup>198</sup>

However, the majority of journalists could not resist making personal attacks upon John Lilburne and Leveller doctrine. *Mercurius Pragmaticus* still held the Levellers responsible for the death of the King.<sup>199</sup> Another Leveller, William Everard, was described as a man concerned with the liberties of the deer.<sup>200</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus* shared this aversion to Lilburne, a man who had been "eminently active in the ruin of the kingdom."<sup>201</sup> The editor of the *Man in the Moon* failed to sympathise with Lilburne's imprisonment; instead of lamenting upon John's unfortunate condition, the editor suggested that he was receiving his just reward.

<sup>202</sup>The paper also reported upon Lilburne's ambition, going as far as claiming that John wished to be head of state.<sup>203</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus* for King Charles, commented upon the

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<sup>196</sup> John Lilburne, England's New Chains Discovered in Alymer (ed) p.142-8.

<sup>197</sup> E.g. *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, T.T.E. 546 (4), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> March; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, T.T.E. 548 (3), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March.

<sup>198</sup> See examples in the notes listed below which provide specific references.

<sup>199</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, T.T.E. 546 (4), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> March; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 550 (32), Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 551 (12), Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April.

<sup>200</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 546 (4), Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> February – Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> March.

<sup>201</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, T.T.E. 550 (32), Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 17<sup>th</sup> April.

<sup>202</sup> *The Man in the Moon*, T.T.E. 550 (26), 16<sup>th</sup> April, p.7; *The Man in the Moon*, E, 551 (10), 16<sup>th</sup> April – 23<sup>rd</sup> April, p.11.

<sup>203</sup> *The Man in the Moon*, T.T.E. 552 (8), Monday 23<sup>rd</sup> April – Monday 30<sup>th</sup> April, p.18; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 554 (4), Monday 30<sup>th</sup> April – Monday 7<sup>th</sup> May, p.31.

extra-ordinary pomp at Lockyer's funeral for a man of "so obscure a condition".<sup>204</sup> *Mercurius Philo Monarchicus* believed that the Levellers were resolved to "level the House as low as the boys do the brothels at Shrovetide".<sup>205</sup>

The tendency to make personal attacks upon the Leveller leaders, and upon Leveller doctrine was not advocated by Marchamont Nedham. In his editorials, Nedham (when writing under *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles), praised Lilburne and his Leveller colleagues. In democratic language, Nedham proclaimed that Lockyer "died a very martyr for the liberties of England".<sup>206</sup>

Despite the attacks made upon Lilburne, all the Royalist editorials encouraged the Levellers to continue and advance their campaign against the new regime. Accounts included praise for Leveller women who petitioned on behalf of John Lilburne.<sup>207</sup> For the ideologically committed, the newspaper pointed out the Grandess aversion to Leveller doctrine.<sup>208</sup> Leveller readers were told that Lilburne faced execution and he was being kept in "inhumane and barbarous conditions".<sup>209</sup> For the solidier concerned with financial matters, came the news that they would not receive a penny,<sup>210</sup> but most importantly the Royalist press argued for an

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<sup>204</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus for King Charles*, T.T.E. 554 (5), Monday 30<sup>th</sup> April – Monday 7<sup>th</sup> May.

<sup>205</sup> *Mercurius Philo-Monarchicus*, E. 555 (34), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May.

<sup>206</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles*, T.T.E 551 (15), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May, p.14.

<sup>207</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 550 (13), Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April – Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 552 (16), Tuesday 34<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May.

<sup>208</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 550 (13), Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> April - Tuesday 10<sup>th</sup> April; *The Man in the Moon*, E. 555 (33), 14<sup>th</sup> May – 21<sup>st</sup> May, p.55.

<sup>209</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 546 (18), Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 555 (37), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May, p.30.

<sup>210</sup> *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 554 (10), Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May – Tuesday 21<sup>st</sup> May, p.30.

armed revolt. The foundation of their argument rested upon the simple, yet powerful suggestion that if the Levellers did not fight, they would be destroyed.<sup>211</sup> Even after Burford, the press continued to advocate military action.

The attempts to persuade the Levellers to revolt, reveals a Royalist press writing for a wider readership. Upon occasions, journalists congratulated themselves and other newspapers for their part in persuading the Levellers to revolt.<sup>212</sup> Whilst it is clear that journalists aimed to encourage the Levellers, there was not a total shift in editorial style. Despite all the encouragement which was extended to the Levellers, the personal attacks upon the Leveller leaders demonstrate that the press never regarded them as fellow-sufferers. Praise was only afforded to Levellers and Presbyterians because the Royalists themselves were not in a position to harm the new regime. In early May, it was reported that a group of Cavaliers had murdered Dr. Dorislaus. The widespread celebrations which greeted this one isolated incident, suggests that, had the Royalists caused problems, the papers would have focussed upon this, rather than reporting upon Leveller discontent.<sup>213</sup> However, the Royalists were crushed which left the journalists with little alternative but to focus upon other disaffected group, and yet essentially the press was encouraging the erosion of the radical cause. As one edition of *Mercurius Pragmaticus* highlighted, “not even the cavaliers can work better things with an army, than this striving for priority amongst themselves.”<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> E.g. *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 548 (22), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> March.

<sup>212</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles, E. 555 (13), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May 1649; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 552 (16), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May, 1649; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 555 (9), Monday 7<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May, p.18.

<sup>213</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles, E. 555 (4), Tuesday 8<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May, p.30; *Mercurius Pragmaticus* for King Charles, E. 556 (4), Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> May – Tuesday 22<sup>nd</sup> May; *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 555 (9), Monday 7<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May, p.23-4; *Mercurius Philo-Monarchicus*, E. 555 (34), Monday 14<sup>th</sup> May – Monday 21<sup>st</sup> May.

<sup>214</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 548 (3), Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> March – Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> March.



The evidence produced upon the Royalist press suggests that the majority of journalists found it difficult to forget the part played by both the Presbyterians and the Levellers in the Civil War. Marchamont Nedham proved to be the exception. He was willing to support both Levellers and Presbyterians. He also proved adept in his use of Leveller language. Nedham's attacks upon the Council of State, mirrored Lilburne's views. His attempts to encourage the Leveller soldiers to ignore their senior officers could have been written by Lilburne himself. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of May, Nedham told Leveller leaders that "they were not born with saddles on their backs, to be ridden by their officers".<sup>215</sup> Nedham was far more flexible than the other Royalist journalists. In April 1649 he appreciated that the Levellers were capable of toppling the regime so he was willing to support them. It is hardly surprising that the new Government appreciated Nedham's ability; by the end of 1650 he had changed sides again and become the Commonwealth's leading spokesman.<sup>216</sup>

### **The English Press during the Revolution.**

In conclusion, it is worth considering the nature of the English press during the revolution and to comment upon the type of information available to the public. This conclusion will also deal with two other issues. First, it will mention the strengths and limitations of newspapers as a source for this period of history. Second, the conclusion will compare the observations

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<sup>215</sup> Mercurius Pragmaticus for King Charles, E. 552 (15), Tuesday 24<sup>th</sup> April – Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> May. See also Leveller tracts England's New Chains Discovered, Second Part of England's New Chains and Picture of the Council of State, p.156-245.

<sup>216</sup> See below for the Government's decision to employ Nedham and above for his career as a Royalist. He was, of course, one of the great turncoats.

made by editors with the current historiography. Some of these issues have been raised earlier in the thesis.

The information in this chapter has identified a major difference between the Royalist and the so-called official or licensed press. Superficially, this would come as no surprise, based upon the assumption that the official press were subjected to severe restraints. To an extent this is true, as there appears to have been a certain amount of self-censorship. However, the editorials in *The Moderate*, *The Moderate Intelligencer* and, to a lesser extent, the *Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, show that the editors were not afraid to voice their concerns about the direction of the Government's policy. It is, perhaps a testimony to the freedom of the press that the official censor was also the most outspoken (with the exception of some, but not all the Royalist papers) critic of the new regime. This is made all the more remarkable when we consider that this was the first revolution that the country had had, and the new Government began to rule with arguably the narrowest base of support.

Despite this apparent lack of censorship, the Government took the control of public opinion seriously. As Blair Worden argues, the readiness of politicians to employ and reemploy Nedham, shows the importance the Government attached to the press.<sup>217</sup> Nedham is rightly regarded as the great propagandist of the Civil War period. But the Rump took the initiative before they re-employed Nedham; the publication of the *Modest Narrative of Intelligence* was the first step towards the creation of a newspaper which would intelligently defend the Government's position. The need for such a paper demonstrates the Rump's vulnerability, but it also shows the importance of the press and the Rump's desire to avoid censorship. Although the laws were tightened in September 1649, M. J. Seymour suggests that they were

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<sup>217</sup> Blair Worden, "Wit in a Roundhead" in S.D Amussen and M.A Kishlansky (eds), Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Early Modern England (Manchester 1995) (Essays presented to David Underdown,) p.301.

not enforced in a draconian fashion.<sup>218</sup> It is also evident that the public had access to a wide-variety of news, although it is difficult to determine how obtainable the clandestine newspapers were to the population living outside London. For the lower class person who clung to the traditional order, *The Man in the Moon* must have made excellent reading. For the poor soldier bitter about his arrears of pay, the publication of *Mercurius Militaris* would have been welcomed; this paper included bitter attacks against the Grandees and the proposed expedition to Ireland.

The person interested in politics could turn to one of the licensed newspapers for a full account of events at Westminster<sup>219</sup> But there is a more important consideration. If Professor Underdown is correct in his view that 70% of the Artisans in London were literate, it is clear that the English people had a large body of news and opinion to help them formulate a political belief. Nigel Smith suggests that newspapers “were at the heart of Civil War and Interregnum politics; the pulse of the body politic.”<sup>220</sup> Although there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate the precise influence the newspaper had, it is clear that England was a very well-informed nation and that the Government took the role of the press seriously.

The Press also provides the historian with indispensable information for a study of the English Revolution.<sup>221</sup> The desire of the editors to report upon a wide-variety of issues has resulted in an archive which covers a large cross-section of opinion. The press provides information upon Presbyterian and Royalist opposition, radical demands for impartial justice and Leveller

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<sup>218</sup> M.J Seymour, ‘Pro Government Propaganda’, p.330-45.

<sup>219</sup> See above, A Perfect Diurnall is the best example.

<sup>220</sup> Nigel Smith, Literature and Revolution in England 1640-1660, p.69

<sup>221</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p.466.



opposition to the new regime. Some of this detail is of vital importance, especially upon the radical petitions and on the geographical location of Presbyterian opposition, since they are not found in other source's. But it is important to make one serious qualification. The editors failed to provide detailed information upon the political perspectives of the leading MPs and the press also failed to include details upon political divisions within Parliament. The editors would report upon conflict within the Commons, but they were reluctant (or did not know) to provide the names of the leading protagonists. There are two very good examples of this. From the information in the Journals of the House of Commons, using the method of identifying Tellers in motions<sup>222</sup>, we know that William Puretoy and Sydenham supported some kind of role for the Lords in the future constitution.<sup>223</sup> Using the same method we also know that Henry Marten and Lord Grey, along with forty two MPs, advocated abolition.<sup>224</sup> Although the newspapers reported upon a protracted debate,<sup>225</sup> and upon occasions it is clear that divisions existed,<sup>226</sup> they failed to provide the names of the leading spokesmen.<sup>227</sup> The same scenario can be seen in the appointment of the first Council of State. The newspapers mentioned the debates, but we are not informed that Marten and Harrison's candidature were rejected and that there were disagreements upon whether the Earl of Salisbury should be admitted. Again, such information can only be found in the Journals of the House of Commons.<sup>228</sup> The reluctance of journalists to comment upon parliamentary faction, questions

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<sup>222</sup> This method was used in chapter 2 above to look at allegiances between regicides and conformists.

<sup>223</sup> C.J vi p.134.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid

<sup>225</sup> Perfect Occurrences, E. 527 (17), Friday 2<sup>nd</sup> February – Friday 9<sup>th</sup> February 1649; A Perfect Diurnall, E. 527 (19), Monday 5<sup>th</sup> February – Monday 12<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.2321.

<sup>226</sup> The Moderate, E. 541 (15), Tuesday 30<sup>th</sup> January – Tuesday 6<sup>th</sup> February 1649, p.294.

<sup>227</sup> This is true of all the newspapers.

<sup>228</sup> E.g. C.J vi p.141.

Blair Worden's argument that specific newspapers represented the views of a particular group of MPs.<sup>229</sup>

It is also clear that newspapers were reluctant to comment upon the political views of the MPs. Only Royalist newspapers commented upon the MPs who dominated the House of Commons.<sup>230</sup> Unfortunately, the motivation of many prominent MPs during the revolution is not available and this provides the greatest difficulty to an historian of this period. The survival of a handful of manuscripts, explaining the motivation of several MPs is useful, but also frustrating because they only scratch the surface.<sup>231</sup>

However, the press does provide a clue to the position of the majority of MPs during the revolution. In my previous chapter upon the Commons, it was suggested that political divisions were not the norm, as Parliament decided to unite against the threefold threat of Royalism, Levellerism and Presbyterianism. Unity was achieved through a moderate programme of reform aimed at securing the acquaintance of those who had supported the parliamentary cause in the Civil War, but were disaffected with the course of the revolution. It has been argued in this chapter that the press was, by and large, free from governmental control. Moreover, it is clear that editors were willing to project their own political stance. It is, therefore, possible that the dearth of reports upon political divisions reflected the political situation, rather than illustrating the limited access journalists had to the corridors of power at Westminster.

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<sup>229</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament p.406.

<sup>230</sup> Mercurius Elencticus, E. 475 (22), Wednesday 29<sup>th</sup> November – Wednesday 6<sup>th</sup> December 1649.

<sup>231</sup> For useful manuscripts for parliamentary views see NLW Mss 11434B, A Vindication of the Army and Parliament, f.2.

In this respect, it is clear that information gleaned from the press can provide an insight into the secretive world of Westminster politics. It is worth considering how the detail found in the press is consistent with some of the current historiography; this conclusion will consider debates over the Agreement of the People, the role of the House of Lords and the influence of the clergy upon politics.

The traditional view that the Grandees allowed the debates over the Agreement to take place whilst they got on with the important business of the King's trial is challenged in the works of Ian Gentles and Barbara Taft.<sup>232</sup> The latter view is supported by the detail found in the newspapers. There is no support for Lilburne's accusations (made quite a long time after the debates) of a sinister plot by the Grandees to deliberately thwart the Levellers.<sup>233</sup> In contrast, all of the newspapers showed that the debates were taken seriously.<sup>234</sup> Moreover, upon two occasions it is clear that the editors were of the view that too much time and importance had been attached to the projected constitution. Gilbert Mabbott, the most famous Leveller journalist, demanded that less attention should be given to the Agreement as he encouraged politicians (from both the Army and Parliament) to focus upon the King's trial.<sup>235</sup> The editor of the *Moderate Intelligencer* displayed concern about the "strife and contention" which would follow if the proposals for liberty of conscience became part of the constitution.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> Ian Gentles, *The New Model Army*, p.285-94. Barbara Taft, 'The Council of Officers Agreement of the People', *HJ* 28 (1985), p.169-85.

<sup>233</sup> John Lilburne. The tract is, *Legall Fundamentall Liberties*, was critical of the Grandees, but I accept the case put forward by Barbara Taft in n. 232 above.

<sup>234</sup> *A Perfect Diurnall*, E. 526 (4), p.2557-2260. *The Moderate*, E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December, p.212. *A Declaration of Both Houses*, E. 477 (7), p.19.

<sup>235</sup> *The Moderate*, E. 477 (4), Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December, p.12.

<sup>236</sup> See notes 49-58 above.



Considering that the newspapers were contemporary, coupled with Lilburne's propensity to make personal attacks when he did not get his way<sup>237</sup>, it is possible to conclude (taking account of Taft's and Gentles' research) that the debates upon the Agreement were not "merely a sop to the radicals to distract them while the Grandees got on with the more serious business of cutting off the King's head".<sup>238</sup>

In light of my chapter upon the House of Lords and the importance attached to John Adamson's work upon the upper chamber, it is worth considering the press' attitude towards the Lords and compare their accounts with the current historiography.<sup>239</sup> Unlike the uniformity which characterised the press treatment of the debates upon the Agreement of the People we find a mass of conflicting evidence.

Between the first purge and the regicide, in keeping with their portrayal of a political system dominated by the Army, the two available Royalist newspapers depicted a small and subservient second chamber.<sup>240</sup> However, the criticism directed against the Lords suggests that the Royalist press believed that the peers still performed a function in the political process.<sup>241</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus* reported upon a meeting held between the Lords and Fairfax. Nedham stated that Pembroke, acting as the chief spokesman agreed to "renounce all titles and privileges" and do "anything which should be judged beneficial for the kingdom".<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> This was argued in my chapter upon the Commons.

<sup>238</sup> Ian Gentles, *The New Model Army*, p.289.

<sup>239</sup> See chapter upon the Lords and Introduction. Sources are listed in full.

<sup>240</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 476 (35), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December 1648; Same title, E. 477 (30) and E. 538 (18); *Mercurius Elencticus*, E. 476 (4), Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 12<sup>th</sup> December.

<sup>241</sup> See listings in n.240.

<sup>242</sup> *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, E. 477 (30), Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

Although this account is not substantiated by any other source, it is important to note that Nedham accepted that the Lords still retained contact with the Army. The evidence from the Royalist press supports Dr. Adamson's view that there is "nothing about the actions of either army or commons in the month after the purge to suggest that they saw the Lord's as implacably opposed to bringing the King to justice."<sup>243</sup> Moreover, there is nothing to suggest from the Royalist press that in the month between the purge and the vote to proceed with a trial of the King, the Lords were not performing an essential legislative function.

The majority of the 'official' newspapers reported upon the activities of the Lords, mainly their concurrence to legislation sent to them from the Commons, without mentioning the diminutive size of the chamber. These papers do not make a point of mentioning the importance of the Lords, but it is clear that the Lords still performed a legislative function.<sup>244</sup>

By contrast The Moderate and a paper entitled A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses<sup>245</sup> regarded the Lords as a tiny and irrelevant chamber.

From the information available from the press, it is possible to use evidence to support three very different arguments. C.V. Wedgwood and David Underdown's view that the Lords were, from Pride's purge onwards, a small and useless chamber, merely going through the motions is supported by the evidence in the Moderate.<sup>246</sup> Dr. Adamson's view that the Lords still performed an important role can be supported by the evidence found in the Royalist newspapers. Also the view expressed in my chapter which suggests that the Commons wanted

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<sup>243</sup> Adamson, 'The Peerage in Politics, 1646-9', (Cambridge PhD thesis, 1986) p.286.

<sup>244</sup> This is clear from all of the papers available apart from the two cited below.

<sup>245</sup> A Declaration Collected Out of the Journals of Both Houses, Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> December – 20<sup>th</sup> December 1649; The Moderate, T.T.E. 536 (2), Tuesday 19<sup>th</sup> December – Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> December, p.220.

<sup>246</sup> This is clear from all the editions of the Moderate cited in the notes above.

to retain the support of the Lords is evident in a number of newspapers. In this case, it is difficult to form conclusions using the press as a form of adjudicator.

The evidence obtained from the press is valuable for three principle reasons. First, as an end itself it shows the nature of journalism during the English Revolution. Instead of a collection of bland 'government prescribed' newspapers, we find editors willing to promote a defined political line, but there is not evidence to suggest that all of them were in the pockets of their masters at Westminster. Second, a study of the press confirms Dr. Worden's view that newspapers, along with the Journals of the House of Commons, are the most important source for a study of politics during the revolution. Finally, newspapers tell us a great deal about the kind of society the Rump was attempting to create. The first months of a new Government which combined legislative and executive responsibilities showed that it was not willing to curtail editorial independence to further its own political ends. This contributed to a press which took the business of reporting the news seriously and the survival of the newspapers, especially when we consider the lack of other sources is an invaluable source for a study of revolutionary politics.

Blair Worden's book 'The Rump Parliament' was published in 1974. He concluded his section upon the press with these words:

"I believe that on matters of information mid seventeenth-century newspapers were more trustworthy than are their twentieth century counterparts."<sup>247</sup>

Given the current quality of our newspapers, Dr. Worden's remarks appear even more appropriate.

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<sup>247</sup> Worden, The Rump, p.404.



## Conclusion

The conclusion to this thesis will endeavour to demonstrate the areas that I regard as being new and important. In the final pages I will attempt to place my findings within the wider context of the revolution itself.

In terms of factual detail, this thesis has suggested that Pride's Purge was, to an extent, a misnomer. Although Colonel Pride stood at the entrance of Parliament's door upon the 6<sup>th</sup> of December, he played no part in the planning of the purge. More importantly, the first purge failed to provide a sufficiently tractable Parliament and precipitated a series of other purges, which were not dominated by the notorious colonel. The findings in this thesis have also extended the motivation that governed this assault upon Parliament. The purging of Parliament was designed to bring the king, other leading royalists and the MPs who had been impeached in 1647 and/or invited the Scots to engage in the Second Civil War to justice.<sup>1</sup> As for the other hundred or so MPs, they were either to be secluded or suspended from the House.<sup>2</sup> It was pointed out that the remaining MPs were satisfied with the restrictions placed upon their membership by the Army.

The evidence presented in the first part of chapter four suggests that the purging of Parliament resulted in the seclusion of approximately one hundred and fifty MPs, a figure that is at variance with the totals of one hundred and eighty six and one hundred and ten found in the

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<sup>1</sup> See chapter 2 above. I do not feel that historians have placed sufficient weight upon the importance of the Scots. See Below.

<sup>2</sup> See chapter 2 above. The Humble Proposals and Desires of His Excellency the Lord Fairfax. T.T.E. 475 (25) 7<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

works of David Underdown and Blair Worden respectively.<sup>3</sup> In chapter three it is suggested that the purge also had a profound impact upon the membership of the Lords, not through outright force, but more due to the presence of the Army that “frightened away” many members.<sup>4</sup>

In the chapter upon the Press, it is argued that the evidence found in the official newspapers was not pre-ordained by their masters at Westminster. But the aim of this chapter is more than a desire to highlight the role of this important body of opinion. Any historian writing upon the politics of the Rump period is faced with a major shortage of evidence. This inevitably results in a reliance upon the corpus of tracts in the Thomason collection with special attention paid to the newspapers. A fine example of this can be found in John Adamson’s doctoral thesis. His bibliography contains a vast number of manuscript sources but hardly any of these are cited in the final chapter of his thesis.<sup>5</sup> My chapter upon the Press is, to an extent, an apologia for the entire thesis. As the conclusion stated, I believe that the newspapers produced in this revolutionary era are more reliable than the majority of the newspapers on sale today.<sup>6</sup> I do believe that the factual content found in the official newspapers in the early years of the Rump period can be relied upon.

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<sup>3</sup> See chapter 4 above, Tables i, ii, and iii below; Worden The Rump Parliament. (Cambridge 1974)

<sup>4</sup> Clement Walker A Complete History of Independency (London 1660) Part ii, p.30-31.

<sup>5</sup> J.S.A Adamson ‘The Peerage in Politics’, Cambridge PhD thesis 1986, p.257-9. See his bibliography at the end of his thesis.

<sup>6</sup> Anthony Seldon Major. A Political Life (1997) p.801-7.

This thesis makes the same contention stated by Dr Kelsey its immediate predecessor.<sup>7</sup> I have not uncovered fresh evidence that has been locked away and never scrutinised. I do not, therefore, claim to have unearthed evidence that magically explains the actions and motivation of some of the figures considered in this thesis. This is especially true of the Presbyterian MPs. In my conclusion to this chapter, I suggest that the majority of these MPs simply retired from politics in the period 1649-53. I can confidently make this assertion upon the grounds that they issued no tracts condemning their new masters. This said, and despite a trail through potential manuscripts,<sup>8</sup> I am unable to demonstrate their precise views upon the revolution and the early months of the Rump's existence. However, there is sufficient evidence to provide a new interpretation of certain important aspects of the English Revolution.

This first chapter of this thesis portrayed Cromwell as one leader amongst many men involved in the English Revolution. Although there is still an element of mystery concerning his involvement in politics in December 1648, sufficient doubt has been cast upon the royalist sources to suggest that the alleged overtures to the King were one of three possibilities. First, they were an aberration upon the part of Cromwell, a sudden hesitation that did not amount to a serious alteration of policy. This can be defended upon the grounds that we know nothing about the precise terms apart from a vague mention of Charles assuming the position of a Doge of Venice. It is also possible that these terms were discussed but never actually presented to the King.<sup>9</sup> Charles did not mention this mission at his trial which is a most

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<sup>7</sup> Sean Kelsey Inventing a Republic (Manchester 1997) p.11.

<sup>8</sup> Many of these are cited in the bibliography. The main sources tend to be royalist eg. Clarendon Mss, Carte Mss, the Nicholas Papers and the Egerton Mss.

<sup>9</sup> See Nedham to Nicholas. Bod. Library, Clarendon Mss. 34. fol 17; S.R. Gardiner, A History of the English Civil War, vol iii, p.556-7.



surprising omission considering that he made it plain from the onset that he would rather suffer death than accept limitations to his power and dignity.<sup>10</sup> Second, it is possible that Cromwell used this apparent overture to show moderates of his conciliatory stance and to contrast this with the unreasonable posture assumed by the King. Finally, it is possible that the so called Denbigh scheme was merely the product of Royalist wishful thinking encouraged by their leading protagonist Marchamont Nedham. It is difficult to support one view more than the other, but one inescapable conclusion must be drawn. The failure of any of the leading Royalists, (and this of course includes Charles) or the prominent Parliamentarians to mention the proposed compromise suggests that it was not taken too seriously. Whitelock was certainly not involved in the negotiations; had he been, or even heard about them they would have featured in his memoirs.<sup>11</sup>

Given the evidence presented in this thesis upon this mission, it should not be assumed that this was yet another example of Cromwell's dualist personality. My depiction of Cromwell as a more committed revolutionary is at one with the arguments found in the works of Ian Gentles and John Morrill, but I will now endeavour to show the significance of his views upon the Revolution itself and the early years of the Rump regime.<sup>12</sup> It will be suggested that the ideology Cromwell bequeathed to the new regime was consistent, prudent, largely unoriginal and based almost solely upon his religious anti-formalism.

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<sup>10</sup> A Message Sent from Both Houses of Parliament to the King's Majesty in the Isle of Wight. T.T.E. 473 (41), 29<sup>th</sup> November 1649, p.2. See Wedgwood Trial passim; Charles Carlton, Charles I the Personal Monarch, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (London and New York), p.343-54.

<sup>11</sup> See the comments made by Whitelock in chapter 2 above.

<sup>12</sup> John Morrill and Philip Baker, 'Oliver Cromwell, the Regicide and the sons of Zeruaiah', paper given to the institute of Historical Research December 1999; Gentles New Model Army, p.283-94.

Apart from Royalist sources, Cromwell is portrayed by contemporaries as a firm supporter of the purge, trial and regicide. This view is confirmed by his own writings and speeches upon the subjects. He naturally wanted to keep as many people as possible involved in politics and this explains his attitude towards the abstaining members of Parliament. But, this thesis suggests that he conceded very little. Although he was influential in allowing members of the Council of State to take the retrospective oath of approval this was sufficient for Cromwell at the time of grave political danger and consistent with his desire for a union of the Godly peoples. His attitude towards the House of Lords and the Levellers was again consistent. He supported the Lords because many of them had appeared to demonstrate support for the first stages of the revolution and he hoped that they would join the new regime in the post revolutionary era. This would remain an important principle that determined Cromwell's thinking until his death in 1658. His attack upon the Levellers was based upon an ideological aversion to some of their views which were apparent in the Putney debates and his only known intervention in the discussions at Whitehall. But his overriding concern was his desire to maintain unity of the Army – a view he demonstrated between September and December 1648. Cromwell feared the Royalists and the destruction of the unity of the Army would have precipitated the return of the Royalists.<sup>13</sup> This said his attempt to marginalize the royalist cause is very different to portrayals of Cromwell as a man possessed with a fluctuating political temperament as he was torn between conflicting principles that created an ideological see-saw that had an important impact upon the early months of the Commonwealth. Instead he was the prudent politician who was willing to persuade moderates to return, but his principles did not allow him to make any concessions. It is important to note

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<sup>13</sup> This was argued above.

that, during this revolutionary period, Cromwell did not initiate a single policy that compromised the revolution of 1648/9.

Cromwell's attachment to the revolution placed him at the forefront of the parliamentary movement, and this, allied to his position in the Army made him one of the most important people in the land. However, this does not mean that he was the architect of the Rump regime.<sup>14</sup> The policies adopted in early years of the Rump regime must be regarded as a corporate rather than an individual enterprise. The findings in both chapters one and two revealed that Cromwell was one leader amongst many. The attempt to secure the return of the abstaining members and the loose interpretation of the test of dissent were made in Cromwell's absence. This was another example of his following rather than initiating policy which is consistent with his attitude towards the radicalism in the Army in the months before the purge.<sup>15</sup>

One other point upon Blair Worden's depiction of Cromwell as the architect of the new regime requires comment. The two major initiatives that demonstrated his conservatism were the attempts to retain the House of Lords and the confirmation of the Presbyterian church. Both these initiatives met with failure at a time when parliamentary unity and consensus were the norm. This is not evidence that Cromwell was not important, it merely reveals that he was not the dominating force in parliamentary politics.

The findings of this thesis provide support for all the articles that make the case for the centrality of religion in Cromwell's character.<sup>16</sup> Professor Davis's view of Cromwell's anti-

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<sup>14</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p.19, 179, 191-3.

<sup>15</sup> This was the central theme of chapter 1.

<sup>16</sup> J.C. Davis, "Cromwell's Religion", in John Morrill (ed.) Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (Longman 1990). p.181-208; Blair Worden, "Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate" in W.J. Sheils (ed.) Persecution and Toleration: Studies in Church History xxi (Oxford 1984), p.199-233; "Oliver Cromwell and the Sin of Achan" in D.Beales and G.Best (eds.) History, Society and the Churches (Cambridge, 1985), p.125-45



formalism upon the precise nature of church government explains why Cromwell was able to countenance the confirmation of the Presbyterian church provided that there was sufficient provision for a degree of liberty of conscience.<sup>17</sup> This thesis also supports the notion that Cromwell's decision to support the regicide was based upon his belief in the centrality of providentialism - this is certainly evident in his utterances upon the subject.<sup>18</sup> It is also clear that this would be the dominant principle that governed his politics for the rest of his life. It is also interesting to note that this belief in providence could lead to self-examination and humility. In the 1650s after a series of military defeats Cromwell was in a desperate state wondering whether he, and the nation, had deviated from God's wishes. It has also been convincingly argued that one of the reasons for Cromwell's refusal to accept the crown was based upon his belief that this would be tantamount to a rejection of God's providence.<sup>19</sup> Although this thesis has not considered the sources upon which these accounts are based the general theme is certainly a logical one. This thesis has argued that Cromwell's justification for regicide was based upon providence revealed by Charles persistent failure in war; to move against this at a later date would have required an ideological shift that does not appear consistent with the findings in this thesis.

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<sup>17</sup> J.C Davis, "Cromwell's Religion" in John Morrill (ed), Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution, p.181-208.

<sup>18</sup> This is the main theme in most of the recent work. The collection of essays cited in n.17 is the best example.

<sup>19</sup> Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (Oxford 1997), p.195-200. Blair Worden, "Oliver Cromwell and the Sin of Achan", p.137-45. For an alternative view see Ronald Hutton, The British Republic p.72-3 (1990), (reprinted 2000). Hutton provides a convincing case to support the view that Cromwell rejected the crown out of a fear of reprisal from the Army. This was certainly one of the considerations that governed Cromwell's decision, and above I suggest that personal factors did feature in Cromwell's thinking. However, the general feeling I have is that Cromwell feared God more than he feared Pride. Moreover, Peter Gaunt has shown that Cromwell "retained tight control over the army until his death", showing a willingness to move against the Army when he saw fit. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (Oxford, 1997), p.196-7.

The chapter upon Cromwell suggests that the origins of his revolutionary outlook to politics dates back to the start of the Second Civil War. The biographical importance of this rests with the fact that this view is not the orthodoxy. However, in terms of politics, the findings in the first chapter are even more significant. There is a danger of taking the dissolution as the starting point of the Rump regime and looking back to find evidence that explains this famous event. This thesis rejects the notion that there were any signs of this potential conflict in the early stages of the revolution. Instead, Cromwell's views were compatible with the majority of the MPs and as the following chapters suggest, there was not a substantial conflict of interest between the aims of the Parliamentarians and the mainstream views of the Army. We should therefore reject the notion that the Rump was always destined to fail because a conflict with the Army was inevitable.<sup>20</sup> We should reject too the notion that Cromwell was always in the unenviable position of acting as mediator between the radical Army and the reactionary Commons. With Cromwell, the problems involved with interpretation are distorted further by the power and influence he enjoyed at a later date.<sup>21</sup> The purging of Parliament, the regicide, the formation and composition of the Council of State, the abolition of the House of Lords and monarchy stand as the great events in the English Revolution; Cromwell supported most of these but he did not initiate any of them.

The findings of the second chapter demonstrate the level of commitment to the principle of regicide amongst the parliamentary MPs. This questions part of Dr Worden's argument that

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<sup>20</sup> This, therefore, challenges the view presented by Blair Worden that portrays the Army as a radical force against a Parliament that always regarded itself as a temporary expedient. Worden, The Rump Parliament passim.

<sup>21</sup> This is almost an inevitable consequence of biography. The accounts of Cromwell's activities during the revolution quite obviously place Cromwell at the centre of events. Chapter 2 above attempts to demonstrate the importance of other less known regicides.

was at pains to demonstrate the moderation and conformity of the new regime.<sup>22</sup> Although the thesis fails to uncover any new private correspondence that provides an insight into the precise thoughts of the MPs, the tireless work performed by a vast number of MPs upon committees seems to suggest that they were more committed to the principle of regicide than the works of David Underdown, Blair Worden and to a lesser extent Veronica Wedgwood allowed.<sup>23</sup> It is also suggested that the decision to allow the conformist MPs to enter the house was not necessarily an indication of the moderation of those that played a part in all of the major radical legislation that was passed between the first purge and the regicide. Many of the non-regicides had played a part in politics after the purge with many of them involved in the legislation that destroyed the Newport accord, therefore making the possibility of regicide a reality. Thus the decision to allow many of these MPs to return was not a major compromise of policy. It is also suggested that the significance of signing the regicide document was not as important to contemporaries as it was to both the restoration politicians and historians. Even at the restoration, the principal targets were mainly, but not exclusively, the regicides. A.W. McIntosh has shown that sitting in the court upon the day of sentence, rather than signing the regicide document, was the key issue for the politicians of the restoration period. However, it was not just the regicides and those sitting on the day of judgement, that were considered for the ultimate punishment. The speaker Lenthall, St John and Whitelock were considered for punishment. Heselrige was only saved by the direct intervention of George

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<sup>22</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p.33-73. David Underdown, Pride's Purge was more willing to depict the regicides and early dissenters as revolutionaries but he does state that some of them (most famously Oliver Cromwell), were reluctant participants. see p.5, p.208-256.

<sup>23</sup> See n.22 above. Veronica Wedgwood was more concerned with the spectacle at the time of the trial and therefore there is not a detailed discussion upon the motivation of the regicides during the trial of the King. She does, however, provide some very useful information upon the trial of the regicides, and here she portrays them as being more committed than is suggested in the works of Underdown and Worden. C.V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I, p.216-24.



Monck and the unfortunate Sir Henry Vane was executed. Not all of the regicides were executed. Richard Ingoldsby survived by making the absurd claim that Cromwell forced his hand at the time of the signing. The signing of the document was not, therefore, the only prerequisite for punishment in the early 1660s, which appears to suggest that many of the politicians involved in the revolution, were regarded as a homogenous body.<sup>24</sup>

This case is strengthened by contemporary responses to the MPs that sat in the Rump. Both Royalist and Presbyterian writings made little distinction between those that signed and those that did not. The few divisions that did arise in Parliament were not demarcated by regicide and non-regicide. Moreover, the view that signing the regicide document marked the commitment of a revolutionary majority (upon the grounds that they would face the consequences if there was a Royalist restoration) was only sustained by Gilbert Mabbott who had no contact with Royalist thought. In marked contrast to this Royalist journalists were promising retribution against all the rumpers.<sup>25</sup> It was at the Declaration of Breda, after eleven years in exile, that Charles was willing to be conciliatory. In February 1649, when he believed that he would not have to make concessions to his former enemies, it is likely that any M.P associated with the new regime would have been liable for punishment if the royalists had been victorious.<sup>26</sup> Considering that there was a genuine threat to the new regime,

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<sup>24</sup> Ronald Hutton, The Restoration, A Political and Religious History of England and Wales (Oxford 1985), p.132-4. Ronald Hutton, Charles II (Oxford 1989), p.170-71. C.V. Wedgwood cited above (n.23), p216-24. Margaret A. Judson The Political thought of Sir Henry Vane (University of Pennsylvania 1969), makes little reference, rather surprisingly, of Vane's stance after the fall of Cromwell. A.W. McIntosh "The Number of English Regicides". History 67, 1982, p.197-200.

<sup>25</sup> The Moderate T.T.E. 544 (10), Tuesday 13th –Tuesday 20th February 1649 p.312; The Moderate T.T.E. 545 (11), Tuesday 20<sup>th</sup> – Tuesday 27th February 1649 p.321.

<sup>26</sup> See chapter 5 below. Some royalists would not even support the Presbyterians that wanted to join the royalists. Sir Edward Nicholas to Sir George Lane (April 8<sup>th</sup> 1649), Carte Papers i p.254. For a general attack upon all puritans see HMCR Earl of Westmoreland MSS 10<sup>th</sup> Report (1906) p.22.

those MPs that decided to join were willing to risk a great deal for the new regime. This shows more of a commitment to the revolution than the theory advanced by David Underdown, which claims that these conformists joined a revolutionary bandwagon. It also points to more of a belief in the revolution than Blair Worden's view, that many MPs took up their seats to moderate the revolution by keeping power in civilian hands.<sup>27</sup>

The chapter upon the MPs who sat in the Rump takes issue with both David Underdown and Blair Worden's view that there was a lack of commitment to the moves against the King. This, however, does not naturally lead to a support for some more recent interpretations that place great emphasis upon the republican beliefs of many of the MPs. Sean Kelsey has shown that once the Rump was established it was able to achieve an identity by creating a republican culture. Sarah Barber has shown how a small clique of republican MPs endeavoured to secure a degree of permanency for the new regime. In many respects both arguments have a great deal of validity. As time passed there was an attachment to the principle of a republic, but, amongst the MPs this usually came a long time after the regicide and the view was only shared by a small minority. Dr Kelsey's portrayal of the construction of an image is enlightening, but his book fails to deal with one important issue. Despite all of the later changes the events of 1648/9 essentially created a republic by accident. The findings in my chapter suggest that the majority of the participants in the political process, both inside and outside of Parliament, advocated regicide out of either an inherent distrust of Charles or a belief that Charles must die because of his failure to adhere to God's providence.<sup>28</sup> Deposition

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<sup>27</sup> See above chapter 2. For debate over Underdown's findings see Worden *The Rump*, p.5, 9, 16, 41-2, 48, 50, 53-5, 63, 97, 123 – Worden's views upon the membership can be found p.1-73.

<sup>28</sup> This was stated in the text above. *The Declaration of his Excellency, the Lord General Fairfax* T.T.E. 474 (11) 1<sup>st</sup> December 1648; *The Humble Desires of His Excellency the Lord Fairfax* T.T.E. 475 (25), p.1-7 (7<sup>th</sup> December 1648). *A New Remonstrance from the soldiery to His Excellency the Lord General Fairfax* T.T.E. 476 (25) p.1-3. *An Ordinance* (See Over)

was not an option because of the close relationship enjoyed by Charles and the other possible candidates.<sup>29</sup> The revolution started as being anti-Charles and it was only later that the case for republicanism was advanced.

Sarah Barber's view that a few republican MPs supported the regicide because they wished to alter the entire constitution is plausible, but it must be remembered that this view was only shared by a small minority of MPs. The argument advanced in chapter three suggests that there were few doctrinaire republicans. If there had been a determination to fundamentally alter the existing structure, the Lords would not have been consulted in the aftermath of Pride's Purge. The assault upon the Lords came as a direct result of their decision not to proceed against the King. Although the Agreement of the People assumed the destruction of the Lords there is no evidence that the majority of the MPs shared this view. The majority of the MPs were not concerned with the future constitution in the weeks between the purge and the regicide. There were three issues that dominated proceedings between the first purge and the regicide. First, and most significantly, they had to deal with the King. Second, they wanted to punish the MPs associated with the engagement with the Scots. Finally, they

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of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament for the choosing of Common-Councilmen T.T.E. 476 (29) 18<sup>th</sup> December p.1-2. A Pair of Cristal Spectacles ... by a member of the House of Commons T.T.E. 476 (30), 18<sup>th</sup> December 1648, p.1-8. A Declaration of the Officers Belonging to John Lambert T.T.E. 477 (10) December 29<sup>th</sup> 1648. A Vindication of the Army T.T.E. 538 (29) 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1649. A Declaration of the Parliament of England T.T.E. 544 (17) 22<sup>nd</sup> February. The Execution of the late King Justified and the Army and Parliament Vindicated T.T.E. 545 (7) February 26<sup>th</sup> 1649, passim, especially p.1, 25, 58-59. Reasons to Resolve the Unresolved T.T.E. 545 (10) 26<sup>th</sup> February (1649) (Rob Robins) – this pamphlet begins with an assault on monarchy but it ends up being a very personal attack upon Charles p.1-8. The Parliament Justified T.T.E. 545 (14) 27<sup>th</sup> February 1649 p.8. A Declaration of the Parliament T.T.E. 548 (12) p.5, 6, 7-162 (17<sup>th</sup> March 1649). A Vindication of the Army and Parliament (probably by Morgan Llwyd- National Library of Wales) Mss 11434B

<sup>29</sup> A Declaration from the Prince of Wales concerning the illegal proceedings of the Commons of England T.T.E. 542 (15), 13<sup>th</sup> February. A True Relation of the King's Speech to the Lady Elizabeth and the Duke of Gloucester T.T. 669 f.14 (9); BM Harl Mss 6988 f.211; BM Egerton Mss 254 (1) f.292.



wished to bolster the number of MPs attending the chamber upon the condition that this increase did not jeopardise the proceedings against the King. The desire for sweeping constitutional change was not shared by the majority and this explains why it took so long to officially establish the new regime. More importantly, the provision for entry into the Commons was based upon a retrospective acceptance that to negotiate with the King was an erroneous policy; it did not ask for a firm commitment to the principle of republicanism. Although this thesis has questioned a number of Dr Worden's arguments, upon one fundamental issue we agree. The decision to abolish monarchy and the House of Lords was, ostensibly, a reaction to a particular King rather than an aversion to the institution of Monarchy itself.<sup>30</sup>

Although this thesis supports the notion that many of the MPs were not doctrinaire republicans, they did prove adept at making a republican regime work. It should not be automatically assumed that their constitutional conservatism made them adverse to radical politics. Sir Henry Vane is perhaps the best example of a man who objected to the purge and the regicide but was generally regarded as one of the most radical MPs.<sup>31</sup> This thesis suggests that the rather low key response to the revolution was due to their own conservatism and events outside of Westminster, which pushed them towards moderation and conformity. The more positive attitude shown by some of the Presbyterians, which was in marked contrast to the position assumed by the Levellers, meant that a more conservative stance was taken in the weeks after the regicide than might otherwise have been taken

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<sup>30</sup> Sarah Barber Regicide and Republicanism: Politics and Ethics in the English Revolution 1646-1659 (Edinburgh 1998), p.147-165, sees a greater attachment to republicanism than Blair Worden does in The Rump Parliament, p.33-60, esp. p50-51. My interpretation is far closer to Dr Worden's than it is to the one advanced by Dr Barber and Dr Kelsey's Inventing a Republic.

<sup>31</sup> See Ronald Hutton, The Restoration, p.29-30. Violet A. Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger (1970) A. Judson, The Political thought of Sir Henry Vane. Both of these last mini biographies provide an insight into the political thinking of Sir Henry Vane.

Blair Worden's argument, which demonstrated the conservative nature of the majority of the MPs has, in essence, been supported by these findings. The English Revolution was not extended in the months after the regicide because many of the MPs were not committed to the principle of radical reform. For all of the recent accounts that have portrayed a deep rooted attachment to republican focus, they have not been able to eclipse the central argument advanced by Blair Worden and David Underdown – to sit in the Rump was not an indication of wholesale commitment to the new regime. This thesis provides the names of a number of MPs who had failed to demonstrate any indication of their support for the revolution.<sup>32</sup> However, the thesis attempts to make one qualification to this argument. The MPs that sat in the Rump were willing to countenance new forms and ideas – demonstrated by their willingness to defend the regime when it faced intellectual assaults from its many opponents. It has been assumed in the past, that from its birth, the Rump was, in Professor Hutton's words, pushed in two powerfully opposed ideological directions. This thesis suggests that essentially the events outside of Westminster meant that the MPs had little option but to implement conservative policies.<sup>33</sup>

The chapter upon the Commons develops the theme initially taken by Blair Worden, that the threats facing the new regime meant that there would be little chance for a major reformation of society.<sup>34</sup> The royalist threat was a real one. Although recent research has shown that Charles II's alliance with both the Irish and the Scots was based upon known links of mutual self interest, rather than a united ideological belief, for the MPs at Westminster, the prospects would still have been alarming. Moreover, there was a very real threat from abroad as Europe

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<sup>32</sup> See chapter 2 above.

<sup>33</sup> See above. This was one of the main themes discussed in chapter 2.

<sup>34</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p.163-9.

had failed to embrace republicanism on a grand scale. This explains why the Council of State and Parliament spent the majority of their time building up the strength of the Navy and ensuring that a fully paid and equipped Army would be sent to Ireland. This was the immediate concern for politicians and this is another reason why reform was not the predominant concern at the start of the revolution.

Second, and most importantly, this thesis suggests that there was not a gulf between the aims of the Army and Parliament. It is suggested that Parliament took a stand against the Levellers because of their onslaughts against the Army. The only real sign of any conflict between the Army and Parliament was seen upon the day of Pride's Purge. After that date, although the Commons would seek clarification of certain issues, most notably the future membership of the Commons, the relationship is characterised by close co-operation and mutual self-interest. They also shared one principle belief that would last throughout the period covered by this thesis.

Although some MPs had not been willing to support regicide, if a generalisation is to be made, both sides believed that Charles had to be judged for inviting the Scots to invade England and after the regicide they were united in their belief that the Stuarts should not return. The dislike of Charles and the justification for regicide based upon personal grounds was shared by both these groups. Historians have rightly portrayed the Army as the central force in politics. During the revolution they were primarily concerned with exacting justice upon the king and this was the motivation that governed the minds of the MPs. There was a lack of vision upon both sides. The Army wanted to get rid of Charles but had little idea about what should replace monarchy. This thesis suggests that for the majority in the Army there was little pressure placed upon the Commons to reform. Given the conservative nature of some MPs this would have come as a relief but it does not explain their conservatism and



moderation. These MPs knew who their political masters were and they would have had to respond – but were simply not asked to.

This leads to another important issue raised in this thesis. Traditionally, the politics of this period has been characterised by notions of reform and reaction. Reform was demanded by the Army, and this was only accepted by the Commons when they really were compelled to do so. This may have been the case later on, but the politics during the revolution was based upon consensus between the two sides. It is, therefore, important to look at the latter period of the Rump Parliament to explain the conflict between Parliament and the Army. There is no evidence to suggest from the revolutionary era, that a potential clash was inevitable. It is, therefore, suggested that the future conflict between Cromwell and the Army against Parliament should be studied from a fresh perspective and it provides some tentative support for Sean Kelsey's argument that suggests that the army should be regarded as a heterogeneous body. This said, it was fairly united in this revolutionary era, due to their support for the moves against the King and their desire for the preservation of the Commonwealth. It can therefore be assumed that the differences emerged after the completion of the Third Civil War and this was an outcome of an increased amount of confidence within the Army caused by yet more success on the field of battle.

To return to the reasons for the conservatism of the MPs, we need to focus upon the activities of the Levellers and the Presbyterians. It is suggested in chapter two that the MPs were willing to take the Agreement of the People seriously and although they were unlikely to have been implemented the projected settlement wholesale, the prospect of reform in response to the Leveller demands was very real. The revolution which established justifications of the new constitution upon the grounds that it was performed in the interests of the people was more akin to the philosophy of Levellerism than Presbyterianism. To understand the new regime's failure to implement reform we must consider the actions and apparent influence of

John Lilburne. His attacks upon both the Army and the new government ensured that his views would not be considered. As I mentioned in the second chapter, the MPs had demonstrated a degree of cordiality to Lilburne and had promised to debate the Agreement of the People at a later date. His attacks upon the regime virtually ensured that he could not be regarded as a participant in the political process. Lilburne raised the stakes even before the Rump had had an opportunity to consider any of his ideas. His self-styled maverick posture, which based politics upon personal attacks, coupled with his aim of inciting division and hostility in the Army ensured that the new government were left with no option but to distance themselves from him; Lilburne's rhetoric precluded any chance of compromise. His complete inability to engage in *realpolitik* ensured that the reforms he apparently craved for would never be realised. Professor Hutton rightly stated that the left wing radicals who still meet at Burford to honour the memory of the Leveller idea should only attend "if they care passionately about the pay of the armed forces. Professor Hutton was, of course questioning the depth of support for Leveller ideas in the Army."<sup>35</sup> This thesis takes an even more cynical view of the contribution and motivation of the leaders of the Leveller cause. It suggests that Lilburne played a significant part in the first republican's regime adoption of conventional and conservative policies.

In contrast to the Levellers, the Presbyterians were not as vocal in their opposition of the new regime and importantly they did not threaten the unity of the Army. The majority of the Presbyterian MPs refrained from making direct attacks against the regime, and with the exception of William Prynne, they showed little inclination to undermine the new regime. Even Prynne tended to abstain from making outspoken attacks after his release from custody in the middle of January 1649. The Presbyterian clergy were more vocal, but the findings in chapter four suggest that there was little possibility of an alliance with the Royalists.

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<sup>35</sup> R. Hutton, The British Republic, p.18.

Moreover, they were more inclined to attack the principle of liberty of conscience rather than the entire philosophy behind the new regime. As far as the Rump were concerned, the Presbyterians remained a disaffected minority group whose centre of gravity was closer to them than it was to the cause of the Stuarts under their new incumbent.

It is difficult to determine whether the Presbyterians deliberately intended to influence politics by pursuing a more moderate path. Chapter four suggests that there is some evidence to support the notion that this was a conscious decision, but this conflicts with the argument that the Presbyterians never regarded themselves as a corporate entity. Despite this ambiguity, one factor is patently clear; the Presbyterian response to the revolution ensured that they would at least be recognised, whereas the Levellers effectively secluded themselves from influence.

The chapter upon the House of Lords identifies two important aspects of the English Revolution: First, the findings suggest that the Lords were not as influential in the political process as Dr Adamson's thesis claims. Their power and influence depended upon their supporting the initiatives advanced in the lower chamber. This is important in itself because it places the impetus behind revolution back with the members of the so called lower house, but this should not detract from one key element of Dr Adamson's work; the abolition of the House of Lords was not an inevitable consequence of the purging of the lower chamber. This in turn leads to the second important finding of my research. The evidence presented in chapter three undermines recent accounts that see a depth of republican feeling amongst the members of the House of Commons and it firmly re-establishes the centrality of Charles I in the politics surrounding the revolution.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> See the works of S. Kelsey and S. Barber cited above. Also David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge 1999). It appears to me that Norbrook's belief that many English writers were familiar with republicanism before the regicide may be correct, and this would appear to have helped the later (see over)



The chapter upon the Press reveals the nature of the English political system and the limitations of the available evidence. As I mentioned previously, a study of the Press is an end in itself; this thesis has attempted to illustrate how the various editors regarded, and responded to the revolution. For the purposes of this conclusion, I wish to highlight two areas that were included in the chapter. First, it was suggested that the Press were not in the pockets of their Westminster masters and this was a principle that was applauded by some contemporaries. It also undermines some of the remarks made by John Lilburne, who was at pains to demonstrate that the Press enjoyed little freedom of action.<sup>37</sup> With the exception of the 'Modest Narrative of Intelligence', few of the papers were published to support the new regime. In light of this interpretation we can use the evidence bequeathed by the seventeenth century journalists with confidence. These newspapers, allied to the diminutive number of parliamentary divisions recorded in the journals of the House of Commons, suggest that parliamentary politics during this revolutionary period was characterised by agreement and consensus, rather than distrust and division. Even the Royalist newspapers, who always had an eye for political division, regarded the Commons as a united body. The Second important issue raised in this chapter relates to the royalist Press. Whereas the parliamentary MPs stood united, this Press was divided upon how to respond to their former enemies – the Levellers and the Presbyterians and thus the divisions amongst royalist editors mirrored the divisions at the Royalist core.<sup>38</sup>

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transition republicanism. However, the sources cited in this thesis suggest that, in the early years of the revolution, the justifications for a new government were principally based upon Charles' failings as a monarch.

<sup>37</sup> John Lilburne, *England's New Chains Discovered* in William Haller and Godfrey Davis (eds). The Leveller Tracts 1647-1653 (Columbia University Press) p.161.

<sup>38</sup> These divisions were first established by David Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England (Yale 1960) p1-10; Ronald Hutton, Charles II p.41. The latter pointed out that there were cross-currents between these groups, thus undermining the ideological distinctions between the two groups.

This then leads to another important issue raised by this thesis. For all the research undertaken upon the membership of the Rump Parliament and the divisions amongst the MPs<sup>39</sup>, the commoners who sat after the revolution were more united than any of their opponents. The Lords failed to establish a united front; some peers simply left Parliament, whereas others, such as Manchester only returned to reject the trial of the king. The differing ideologies are further revealed by the position adopted by the small group of peers led by the Earl of Denbigh. Although they did not support the trial, they certainly attempted to retain influence from a position of principled appeasement. The Presbyterian MPs were effectively represented by one or two men. The central theme of chapter four suggests that they cannot be regarded as a homogenous entity. A comparison between the writings of William Prynne and William Ashurst confirms this argument.<sup>40</sup> The Presbyterian clergy were more united but again they found it difficult to produce a consistent and coherent response to the revolution. Their opposition was confined to individual protests against the new regime. There were few collective documents produced to outline their reservations. It can be concluded that the term Presbyterian, whilst still retaining its value upon the grounds that it stems from contemporary usage, is, to an extent, a misnomer. Some Presbyterians would join the royalist side, others would retire from active politics altogether. With the exception of Christopher Love, few Presbyterians would make a stance based upon a distinct ideology.<sup>41</sup> The Royalists, both in

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<sup>39</sup> By far the most detailed research upon the factions is found in Blair Worden's The Rump Parliament passim.

<sup>40</sup> See above. Prynne, 'A Brief Memento to the Present Unparliamentary Juncto' T.T.E. 537 (7), 4<sup>th</sup> January 1649. William Ashurst, 'Reasons Against Agreement, with a paper entitled Foundations of Freedom', T.T.E. 536 (4), 26<sup>th</sup> December 1648.

<sup>41</sup> Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, p.243-248. H.G. Denton, "The Presbyterian Plot of 1651", *Journal of the Presbyterian History Society*, (1952). I mentioned in the text above that there was no evidence of conspiracy in the early months of the revolution. The article above suggests that conspiracy started in 1650. (B. Worden, The Rump Parliament p.244 n.3.) Worden showed that a group of clergymen were hostile to the Commonwealth from (see over)

the Press and outside, failed to produce a united front, with some royalists being unable to overcome their resentment of their former enemies. Most Royalist writers, decided to detach themselves from political reality by limiting their protests to producing, quite literally, scores of tracts extolling the virtues of their dead sovereign. This helped create the myth of Charles I the martyr, but it did little to aid the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy.<sup>42</sup> The Levellers, too, produced a political programme that lended itself to martyrdom rather than political influence.

In marked contrast to these groups, the MPs at Westminster managed to unite despite their political differences. Some MPs were early dissenters from the 5<sup>th</sup> of December vote, whilst others did not register their opposition to the said vote until February 1649. Differences also emerged over the role of the House of Lords and the membership of the Council of State. Yet, despite these differences, they managed to maintain a united front and sustain good relations with the Army. In terms of ideology, the men that sat in Parliament during this revolutionary era, were more committed than their opponents.

I will conclude this thesis by re-emphasising two aspects of the English Revolution that have been mentioned for, but usually for a slightly earlier period. I wish to place the findings of this thesis within their British context and to re-establish Charles I as the principle figure in

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the start, (p.81-2), but my findings suggest that it was only a small minority that advocated extreme measures. The problem with sources is very real here, not helped by Christopher Love's widow Mary. She wrote a brief history of her husband that demonstrated his godliness but it tells us little about his involvement in conspiracy. BM Sloane Mss. 3945.

<sup>42</sup> Some examples include: An Elegie on Charles I, T.T.E. 553 (1). A Hand-Kirchife for Loyall Mourners, T.T.E. 541 (6), 30<sup>th</sup> January. A Coffin for King Charles, T.T. 669. f.14 (22), 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1649. A Faithful sigh, on the universally-lamented Death of our most gracious sovereign Charles I, T.T.E. 560 (4), 30<sup>th</sup> January 1649. The King's Last Farewell to the World, T.T. 669. f.13. (77).



the revolution. This in turn, questions Jonathan Scott's recent attempt to place the revolution within a European context.<sup>43</sup>

The findings of both chapters one and two, demonstrate the importance of Charles' engagement with the Scots as being the prerequisites for both the purge and the regicide. It also acted as a grounds for the permanent seclusion of MPs whom were linked with the Scots. Although the connection cannot be totally proved, it is more than likely that future regicides were persuaded that Charles could not be trusted due to this engagement with the Scots.<sup>44</sup> If this is the case, then the events in Scotland had a dramatic bearing upon the course of the revolution and the future of the British Republic. The covenanters immediately proclaimed Charles II king upon the death of his father and began a series of negotiations with the young king that would culminate in the Third Civil War. This resulted in the emergence of Oliver Cromwell as the most significant figure in English politics and would lead to an enhanced feeling in the Army about their own omnipotence based upon their belief in the providence of God. Perhaps this self-confidence explains the future conflict between the Army and Parliament. This is certainly consistent with the evidence presented in chapter two rejecting

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<sup>43</sup> Jonathon Scott, England's Troubles (Cambridge 2000). This book shows that republican writers drew upon European examples to justify their actions (eg p.311). However, at the time of the revolution they tended to focus upon Charles' failings. See n.28 above. Also justifications were found through precedent in English History. See The People informed of their Oppressors and Oppressions, T.T.E. 536 (17), 28<sup>th</sup> December 1648. My historical method owes more to the writings of the revisionist historians. For example, Mark Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army, (Cambridge 1979 and "The Army and the Levellers: The Roads to Putney" (HJ. 22, 4. 1979.) However, I have argued that there was a determination upon the part of the MPs to destroy the King and this owes more to the writings of the 1990s than it does to the 1970s. J.P Sommerville, Royalists and Patriots – Politics and Ideology in England 1603-40, (2<sup>nd</sup> edition 1999). I tend, however, to suggest that the desire to kill the King was based upon a religious conviction and a deep sense of anger provoked by the Second Civil War. I do not, therefore, see a deep rooted conflict in English society about the nature of Government. This explains my rejection of the more recent accounts that argue for a strong attachment to a republican tradition held by a significant number of the political nation.

<sup>44</sup> See chapter 1 above and sources listed. See also, An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, T.T.E. 476 (29), 18<sup>th</sup> December, p.1-3.

the notion of an inevitable crisis. The conflict in Ireland would also have a profound effect upon the nature of the English Revolution. The unnatural alliance, provoked by Charles II, between O'Neil and Ormond in Ireland,<sup>45</sup> ensured that policy in England would be dominated by preparations for war, rather than a concentration upon domestic reform. It also meant that Leveller demands for a substantial alteration of the constitution would be rejected as their actions threatened the unity of the Army. Although this thesis has been very critical of the posture assumed by Lilburne, had the conflict in Ireland never occurred, his ideas would not have been greeted with such a draconian response by Parliament.

Finally, this thesis rejects the teleological approach of the Whig, Marxist and post-revisionist writings that point towards a deep rooted conflict within English society.<sup>46</sup> It also questions the view that there was any kind of highroad to republicanism. The revolution was about Charles I and no amount of historical revision should alter this incontrovertible fact. The justifications of the regicide in the immediate aftermath of the event concerned the actions of that particular king rather than a vindication of republican forms of government. This does, of course, beg one question: Why was Charles not replaced by another monarch? The answer is not, I believe, found in an attachment to republicanism. As Blair Worden rightly points out, at no stage during the interregnum did so called republicans define themselves with that term.<sup>47</sup> Charles was not succeeded by another monarch because there was not a viable alternative. Both the young Prince Charles and the Duke of Gloucester were regarded as being too closely associated with the discredited king, and thus would have precipitated further concerns about

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<sup>45</sup> Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. 23 fol. 534.

<sup>46</sup> See n.43 above. S.Kelsey, Inventing a Republic. S.Barber, Regicide and Republicanism.

<sup>47</sup> Blair Worden, "On the Winning Side", Times Literary Supplement, 29<sup>th</sup> January 1999.

indemnity.<sup>48</sup> Charles I lost his head because of an attachment to a belief, shared by many MPs and the Army, in radical providentialism. This belief that the king must die was deemed as a necessity and transcended all consideration about the future constitution. Once this essential step had been taken, the invitation to another monarch was not a tenable alternative. It is important to appreciate that Charles' influence was not just evident in the amount of hatred he instilled in his opponents. The Presbyterians found it difficult to associate with the Stuart cause, which was a reflection of their attitude to the dead king rather than a distrust of his son. Although depicted as a glorious martyr, the legacy of Charles' life had a profound effect upon the political nation. His actions during his reign provoked naturally conservative men to take the once unimaginable step of executing one of God's anointed. For people who could not sanction such an act, Charles still retained an influence. For disaffected peers, political and religious Presbyterians, and members of the Press, to join his cause after his death, was either too unpalatable or simply not worth the risk.

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<sup>48</sup> See chapter 2. Also see sources listed in n.29 above. The Kingly Myrror T.T.E.1317 (5), 4<sup>th</sup> April 1649.



**List of MPs categorised as secluded by Underdown:  
How their names appeared in the anonymous publication  
and in the Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members.  
Also dates the MPs appear to have attended Parliament in the month<sup>1</sup> before the Purge**

<b>Underdown 'Pride's Purge'</b>	<b>Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members</b>	<b>Anonymous Publication</b>	<b>Dates they appear in Journals in the Month before the Purge</b>
1. John Alford	✓	✓	-
2. Mathew Allin	Mathew Allen	Mathew Allen	3, 4 Nov; 1 Dec
3. Arthur Annesley	Mr Arthur Aneslee	Anislow	2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24 Nov; 1, 2 Dec
4. John Arundell		Arundel	-
5. John Ashe	John Ash		21, 23, 25 Nov; 1, 4 Dec
6. Ralph Assheton		Ashton	-
7. Sir Ralph Assheton	Sir Ralph Ashton		5 Dec
8. Sir Edward Ascough	Sir Edward Askew	Sir Edward Ascough	-
9. Francis Bacon			1 Nov
10. Nathaniel Bacon <sup>2</sup>			1, 25 Nov
11. John Barker	✓		-
12. Maurice Barrowe	Maurice Barrow	Maurice Beunow	-
13. Edward Baynton		Edward Bainton	-
14. Anthony Bellingfield		Anthony Beddingfield	-
15. James Bellingham <sup>3</sup>			-
16. Micheal Biddulph	Micheal Bicusse	Micheal Biddolph	-
17. Sir Robert Bindlosse		Sir Robert Benlowes	-
18. John Bond		✓	-
19. George Booth	John Booth	Colonel Booth	24, 25 Nov; 1 Dec
20. John Bowyer	John Buller	✓	-
21. John Boys			1, 3, 17, 25 Nov
22. Sir Humphrey Briggs		Humphrey Bridges	-
23. Peter Brook	✓	Major Brook	1, 27 Nov
24. Sir Ambrose Brown	✓	✓	-
25. Sir John Burgoyne	Sir John Burgen		-
26. John Button		✓	-
27. James Campbell	✓	James Kambell	-
28. Henry Campion		✓	-
29. Charles Lord Carr		Lord Carr	-
30. Charles Cecil (Viscount Cranbourne)		Lord Cranbourne	5 Dec
31. Robert Cecil		Robert Cicill	-
32. Thomas Ceeley		Thomas Cleen	-
33. Robert Charlton		✓	-
34. Sir Thomas Cheeke		✓	-
35. Francis Chettle		Sir Fran Chettle	-
36. Sir Henry Cholmley		✓	-
37. Samuel Clarke		Sam Clarke	-
38. Edward Lord Clinton		Lord Clinton	-
39. Sir John Corbet	✓	✓	-
40. Elisha Crymes		Grimes	-
41. Sir John Curzon	Sir John Curzon	Sir John Curzon	4, 6, 25 Nov
42. Sir Thomas Dacres	✓	✓	22 Nov
43. Thomas Dacres <sup>4</sup>			-

44. William Davies	William Davie	Col Davis	-
<b>Underdown</b>	<b>Vindication</b>	<b>Anonymous</b>	<b>Dates in Journals</b>
45. John Doddridge	✓	Duddridge	1, 3, 4, 22 Nov
46. John Doyley		John Deyley	-
47. Erasmus Earle		Erasmus Erle	30 Nov
48. William Edwards	✓	✓	-
49. Sir Charles Egerton		✓	-
50. John Elford		✓	-
51. William Ellis	✓		13, 18 Nov
52. Robert Ellison		✓	
53. Thomas Erle	Thomas Earl	✓	4, 11 Nov
54. George Evelyn		George Eveling	-
55. Sir John Evelyn		Sir John Eveling	13 Nov
56. James Fiennes		James Fienes	4, 13 Nov
57. William Lord Fitz-William	✓	✓	-
58. Sir Edmund Fowell		Edward Vowell	
59. Edmnund Fowell		Younger Vowell	17 Nov
60. William Foxwist	William Hoxwist	✓	17 Nov
61. Samuel Gardiner	✓	Gardiner	-
62. Framlingham Gaudy	Francis Gowdy	Gaudy	-
63. Thomas Gell	✓	Gell	-
64. John Glyn		✓	13 Nov
65. George Gollop		Gallop	-
66. Samuel Gott <sup>5</sup>			
67. Thomas Grove	✓		-
68. Robert Harley <sup>6</sup>			4, 21, 25 Nov
69. John Harris	✓		-
70. Herbert Hay	✓		-
71. James Herbert		✓	4, 10 Nov; 4 Dec
72. John Herbert		✓	
73. Philip Lord Herbert		Philip Herbert	7 Nov
74. Sir John Hippisley		Sir John Ipsley	25 Nov
75. Peregrine Hoby	Peregrine Hobbye	Perogine Hobby	-
76. Thomas Hodges		✓	-
77. Thomas Hodges	✓		-
78. John Holcroft	✓	✓	-
79. Denzil Holles	Denzil Hollis	Denzil Hollis	1 Dec
80. Francis Holles	Francis Hollis	Younger Hollis	-
81. George Horner	George Hornet	George Honer	23 Nov
82. Bennett Hoskins		Hoskins	-
83. Henry Hungerford	✓	✓	-
84. Robert Jenner	Robert Genner		4 Dec
85. Richard Jennings	Richard Genings	Gennings	-
86. William Jephson	William Jepson		-
87. William Jesson		Jepson	17, 22 Nov
88. William Jones	✓	✓	25 Nov
89. George Kekewich <sup>7</sup>			-
90. Sir Norton Natchbull	Sir Norton Natchpole	Sir Norton Knatchpoole	-
91. Walter Kyrle		Walter Kile	
92. William Langton		✓	25 Nov
93. Sir John Leigh		Sir John Lee	-
94. Lewis Lewis		Lewis (younger)	-
95. Sir William Lister	✓	✓	-
96. John Lloyd	John Floyd	John Floyd	-
97. Henry Lucas	✓	Lucas	-
98. Capel Luckyn	Capel Luckinge	Capell Lucken	-
99. Sir Oliver Luke	✓	Oliver Luke	
100. Sir Martin Lumley	✓	✓	1 Nov
101. Sir Nicholas Martyn	Sir Nicholas Martin	Sir Nocholas Martin	-
102. Sir John Maynard		✓	1, 2, 25 Nov



103. John Maynard		✓	15 Nov; 5 Dec
<b>Underdown</b>	<b>Vindication</b>	<b>Anonymous</b>	<b>Dates in Journals</b>
104. Thomas Middleton		Middleton (Sussex)	-
105. Thomas Moore		✓	1, 9, 25 Nov
106. Sir Poynings Moore		✓	-
107. Thomas More		✓	-
108. William Morgan		✓	-
109. George Montagu		✓	-
110. Sir Thomas Myddleton	Sir Thomas Middleton	Sir Thomas Middleton	-
111. Thomas Myddleton	✓	Middleton	-
112. Sir Robert Napier	Sir Robert Napper		-
113. John Nash	✓	✓	-
114. Sir Robert Need****	✓	✓	-
115. John Nelthorpe	✓		25 Nov
116. Anthony Nicoll		Anthony Nichol	4, 9, 14, 24 Nov
117. Sir Duley North	✓	✓	21, 22 Nov
118. Sir Roger North	✓		-
119. Arthur Onslow		Onslow (junior)	-
120. Arthur Owen	✓		-
121. Sir Hugh Owen		Owen	-
122. William Owfield	✓		-
123. Henry Oxinden	Henry Oxenden	Oxenden	-
124. Robert Packer	✓	Robert Parker	-
125. Sir John Palgrove	Sir John Pagrove	✓	-
126. Sir Philip Parker	✓	✓	-
127. Sir Thomas Parker		Sir John Parker	-
128. Sir Robert Parkhursk		✓	-
129. Sir Edward Partheriche	Sir Edward Partridge	Sir Edward Partridge	17 Nov
130. Henry Peck	✓	Peck	-
131. John Pelham	✓	Pelham (younger)	-
132. Sir Thomas BPelham	✓	✓	-
133. Sir Francis Pile		Sir Francis Pile	-
134. Sir William Playters	✓	Sir William Platers	-
135. Edward Poole	✓	Sir Edward Poole	
136. Sir Neville Poole	✓	✓	-
137. Sir John Potts		Sir John Pots	9, 13 Nov
138. Thomas Povey	✓	✓	-
139. Sir Richard Pryse		Richard Price	-
140. Charles Pym	✓	✓	-
141. John Ratcliffe		✓	-
142. Hall Ravenscroft		Ravencroft	-
143. Charles Rich	✓	Charles Richards	6, 7 Nov
144. Hugh Rogers		✓	-
145. John Rolle		John Rolls	29 Nov
146. Richard Rose		John Rose	-
147. Thomas Sandys	Thomas Sands	Sands	25 Nov
148. John Selden		✓	13, 15, 16, 17 Nov
149. Sir John Seymour	✓		-
150. Robert Shapcote		Shepcott	-
151. George Skutt	George Scut	Scutt	-
152. Simon Snow	✓	Snow	-
153. John Spelman	John Selman		-
154. Sir Edward Spencer		Sir John Spencer	-
155. Sir William Spring		Sir John Spring	-
156. Herbert Springett		Herbert Springham	
157. Henry Skupleton		Younger Stapletor	17 Nov
158. ZouchTake		✓	4, 13, 29 Nov
159. Sir John Temple	✓	✓	27 Nov
160. Thomas Temple	✓		-
161. Samuel Terrick	✓		-



162. Simon Thelwell	Simon Thewell		-
<b>Underdown</b>	<b>Vindication</b>	<b>Anonymous</b>	<b>Dates in Journals</b>
163. Alexander Thistlethwaite		Alex Thistlethwaite	-
164. Edward Thomas <sup>8</sup>	✓	✓	22 Nov?
165. Esay Thomas		✓	22 Nov?
166. John Thomas		Thomas of Devon	22 Nov?
167. John Thynne	Thomas Thinn	Thomas Thyn	-
168. Richard Tolson		Tolson	-
169. Nicholas Tretusis		Tresusis	22 Nov
170. Sir Thomas Trenchard		Sir John Trenchard	-
171. John Trevor		Younger Trevor	9 Nov
172. Sir Thomas Trevor	✓	✓	4 Dec
173. Sir Humphrey Turton	Sir Humphrey Tuston	Sir Humphrey Tuston	22 Nov
174. Thomas Twisden		Twisden	16 Nov
175. Sir William Uvedale		Sir William Udell	-
176. Sir Henry Vane (Senior)		Sir Henry Vane	2 Nov
177. Samuel Vassall	✓	Vassall	4, 10 Nov
178. John Waddon	John Whadden	✓	-
179. Thomas Waller	✓	✓	1, 16, 17 Nov
180. Richard Whitehead		Whitehead	-
181. Henry Wills			-
182. Edward Wingate	✓	Wingate	-
183. Richard Winwood	✓	Winwood	-
184. William Wray		William Ray	-
185. Sir Richard Wynn	Sir Richard Win	Sir Richard Wyn	-
186. Sir Christopher Yelverton		Sir Henry Yelverton	13, 30 Nov

## Notes to Table 1

- <sup>1</sup> In the right hand column I have listed the MPs identified by Underdown as secluded. Where a ✓ appears, it signifies that Underdown has made no alteration to the spelling or added or altered a Christian name. Where there is a difference I have reproduced the names as they appeared in either list. Column 3 includes the dates the MPs attended the House during the five weeks before the first purge. The method used includes MPs named to committees and/or were tellers in motions. The same method was used by Dr Worden to gauge attendance patterns during the “Rump Parliament”, p. 392 – 394.
- <sup>2</sup> Underdown’s decision to categorise the Bacons is discussed in the text above
- <sup>3</sup> I am unable to explain why James Belingfield featured in Underdown’s List. Bellingfield does not feature in either Prynne’s list or the anonymous publication; Underdown produced no additional information explaining why he featured in his list.
- <sup>4</sup> Thomas Dacres’ seclusion is also a mystery. Both the anonymous publication and Prynne’s List mention Sir Thomas Dacres but not Thomas Dacres. As with James Bellingfield above, Underdown provides no additional information.
- <sup>5</sup> Samuel Gott’s seclusion is mentioned in the text.
- <sup>6</sup> For Robert Harley’s seclusion in the text.
- <sup>7</sup> Kekewich’s seclusion is again not explained by Underdown. See Footnotes 3 and 4 above.
- <sup>8</sup> The journals of the House of Commons only mention Mr Thomas. It could be any one of these three.

MPs Imprisoned between 6<sup>th</sup> December and 30<sup>th</sup> January<sup>1</sup>

Imprisoned members identified in Underdown's 'Pride's Purge'	Anonymous Publication	Dates appeared in Commons Journals
1. John Birch <sup>2</sup>	✓	4, 9, 13, 16, 21, 22 Nov; 1, 5 Dec
2. Thomas Boughton	Boughton	-
3. Richard Browne	✓	18
4. John Bulkeley	John Buckley	10, 11, 13 Nov; 1, 2 Dec
5. Francis Buller	✓	-
6. Sir John Clotworthy	✓	1, 4, 9, 10, 15, 18, 22 Nov
7. Lionel Copley	✓	1, 3, 4, 9, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, Nov
8. John Crewe	John Crew	1 Dec
9. Sir Simond's D'Ewes	Simon D'Ewes	-
10. Francis Drake	Drake	3, 4, 7, 21 Nov
11. Sir Walter Erle	✓	1, 4, 6, 9, 16, 17, 21, 23, Nov; 1, 4, Dec
12. Nathaniel Fiennes	Nathaniel Fienes	18, 21 Nov
13. Francis Gerard		6, 9, 10, 24 Nov
14. Sir Gilbert Gerard	Sir Gilbert Gerard	4, 13, 22 Nov
15. Thomas Gewen	Gewen	17, 21, 22 Nov
16. Giles Green	✓	4 Nov
17. Sir Harbottle Grimston	✓	13, 17, 21 Nov
18. Edward Harley	Col Harlow	4, 21, 25 Nov
19. Sir Robert Harley	Sir Robert Harlow	4, 17, 21, 28 Nov
20. Sir Anthony Irby	✓	17, 18, 21 Nov
21. Richard Knightley		14, 17, 20, 27 Nov; 2 Dec
22. Thomas Lane	LANE	1, 9, 15, 16 25 Nov
23. Edward Leigh	Colonel Leigh	-
24. Sir William Lewis	✓	1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 16, 21, 25 Nov; 25 Dec
25. Sir Martin Lisker	✓	1, 25 Nov
26. Sir Samuel Luke	✓	7 Nov; 1, 4 Dec-
27. Sir William Lytton	Sir William Litton	-
28. Edward Massey	✓	1, 9, 22 Nov
29. Sir John Meyrick	Sir john Merrick	-
30. Sir Richard Onslow	✓	22, 25 Nov
31. Henry Pelham	✓	
32. William Priestley	Priestly	1, 17 Nov
33. William Prynne	William Prinne	10, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 25 Nov
34. Sir Robert Pye	✓	24, 25 Nov; 4 Dec
35. Sir Benjamin Rudyard	Sir Benjamin Ruddiard	-
36. Sir Thomas Soame	✓	4 Nov
37. Edward Stephens	✓	22 Nov
38. William Strobe	✓	22, 25 Nov
39. John Swynten	John Swinten	2, 4, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21 Nov; 1 Dec
40. Charles Vaughan <sup>3</sup>	✓	25 Nov
41. Edward Vaughan	✓	
42. Clemont Walker	✓	4, 25 Nov
43. Sir William Waller	✓	4 Nov
44. Thomas Lord Wenman	Lord Wenman	1 Dec
45. William Wheeler	Wheeler	4, 9, 14, 17, 21, 25 Nov



## Notes to Table 2

- <sup>1</sup> As mentioned in the text no alteration is required to Underdown's list of imprisoned members. The politics behind their imprisonment will be discussed in my section upon the 'Presbyterians'.
- <sup>2</sup> John Birch featured twice.
- <sup>3</sup> Upon the 25<sup>th</sup> November the Journals just mention a Mr Vaughan so it could have referred to either Charles or Edward.

**MPs whom Underdown categorised as Secluded  
Using the anonymous publication as his sole reference<sup>1</sup>**

1. John Arundall	28. Edmund Fowell	55. Sir Francis Pile
2. Ralph Assheton	29. John Glyn	56. Sir John Potts
3. Edward Baynton	30. George Gollop	57. Sir Richard Pryse
4. Anthony Bellingfield	31. James Herbert	58. John Ratcliffe
5. Sir Robert Bindlosse	32. John Herbert	59. Hall Ravenscroft
6. John Bond	33. Philip Herbert	60. Hugh Rogers
7. John Button	34. Sir John Hippisley	61. John Rolle
8. Henry Champion	35. Thomas Hodges	62. Richard Rose
9. Charles Lord Carr	36. Bennett Hoskins	63. John Seldon
10. Charles Cecil	37. William Jesson	64. Robert Shapcote
11. Robert Cecil	38. Walker Kyrle	65. Sir Edward Spencer
12. Thomas Ceeley	39. William Langton	66. Herbert Springett
13. Robert Charlton	40. Sir John Leigh	67. Henry Stapleton
14. Sir Thomas Cheeke	41. Lewis Lewis	68. Zouch Tate
15. Francis Chettel	42. Sir John Maynard	69. Alexander Thistlethwaite
16. Sir Henry Cholomley	43. John Maynard	70. Esay Thomas
17. Samuel Clarke	44. Thomas Middleton	71. Richard Tolson
18. Elisha Crymes	45. Thomas Moore	72. Nicholas Tretusis
19. John Doyley	46. Sir Poynings Moore	73. Sir Thomas Trenchard
20. Erasmus Earle	47. Thomas More	74. John Trevor
21. Sir Charles Egerton	48. William Morgan	75. Thomas Twisden
22. John Elford	49. George Montagu	76. Sir William Uvedale
23. Robert Ellison	50. Anthony Nicoll	77. Sir henry Vane (Senior)
24. George Evelyn	51. Arthur Onslow	78. Richard Whitehead
25. Sir John Evelyn	52. Sir Hugh Owen	79. Henry Wills
26. James Fiennes	53. Sir Thomas Parker	80. William Wray
27. Sir Edmund Fowell	54. Sir Robert Parkhurst	81. Sir Christopher Yelverton

**Notes to Table 3**

<sup>1</sup> If Underdown’s List of MPs is consulted, p. 361 – 90, Underdown was unable to trace the political backgrounds of forty-eight of these MPs.



**Table 4 Lords Attendance 1<sup>st</sup> November 1648- 2<sup>nd</sup> January 1649<sup>1</sup>**

**Bold denotes attendance after the first purge.**

1. Berkeley (Nov) 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, (Dec), 2, 4, 28, (Jan), 2.
  2. Bruce (Nov) 2, 6, 9, 10, 15, 20.
  3. Dacres (Nov) 3, 13, 14, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, (Dec), 1, 2, 4, (Jan), 2.
  4. Denbigh (Dec) 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, 29, (Jan), 2.
  5. Grey (Nov) 1, 2, 6, 7, 14, 16, 17, 20, 27, 30 (Dec), 13, 14, 18, 28, 29, 2.\*
  6. Hereford (Nov) 1, 2, 4, 8, 13, 20, (Dec) 1
  7. Howard (Nov) 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 30, Dec 1, 2, 4, 6, 7.
  8. Hunsden (Nov) 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, (Dec) 2, 4, 5, 6, (Jan) 2.
  9. Kancie (Nov) 23.
  10. Kent (Nov) 1, 2, 6, 7, 14, 17, 20, (Dec) 13, 19, 23, 26, 28, 29, (Jan) 2.
  11. La Warr (Nov) 1, 2, 3, 9.
  12. Lincoln (Nov) 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 30, (Dec) 1, 2, 4, 5.
  13. Manchester (Nov) 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 1, 2, 4, 5 6, 7, (Jan) 2.<sup>2</sup>
  14. Maynard (Nov) 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, (Dec) 1, 2, 4, 5, (Jan), 2.
  15. Middlesex (Nov) 8, 10, 11, (Dec) 1, 2, 4, 5.
  16. Montagu (Nov) 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, (Dec) 2, 4, 5 13.
  17. Mulgrave (Nov) 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22, 25, 30, (Dec) 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 26, 28, (Jan) 2.
  18. North (Nov) 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 20, 22, 24, 30, (Dec) 1, 2, 5, 7, (Jan), 2.
  19. Northumberland (Nov) 1, 2, 4, (Jan), 2.
-

20. Nottingham (Nov) 1, 3, 6, 7, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, (Dec) 2, 13, 15, 16, 18 19, 20, 21, 23, 28.
21. Pembroke (Nov) 30, (Dec) 2, 4, 5 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, 29 (Jan) 2.
22. Rutland (Nov) 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, (Dec) 1, 2, 4, 5 6, 7, (Jan), 2.
23. Salisbury (Nov) 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, (Dec), 12, 16, 28.
24. Sarum (Nov) 30, (Dec) 1, 2, 4, 5.
25. Say and Sele (Nov) 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 27, (Dec) 1, 2, 7.
26. Stamford (Nov) 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, (Dec) 1, 2, 4, 5 6.
27. Suffolk (Nov) 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30, (Dec) 1, 2, 4, 5.
28. Wharton (Dec) 1, 5, 7.

## Notes to Table

\* Lord Grey does not feature in the list of lords attending on the 2<sup>nd</sup> January in the Journals of the House of Lords but it is clear from that source that he introduced the Bill. See L.J p.641.

1. For an analysis of the attendance figures see the text above. The statistics for this table are taken from L.J p.572-641.

2. Manchester was Speaker all of the sessions he attended with the exception of 2<sup>nd</sup> of January but he did dominate proceedings on that day.

## Bibliography.

### **Manuscripts.**

#### **Bodleian Library.**

The Carte Manuscripts. 23.

Clarendon Manuscripts. 31, 34, 39, 40.

#### **British Library.**

##### *Additional Manuscripts:*

4,929. Sermon Notes.

5,015. Catalogue of Manuscripts for the British Museum.

5,497. Ordinances of Parliament. 1642-1649.

10,114. Memorandum. Book of J. Harrington MP.

15,859-15,864. The Diary of Thomas Burton.

15,903. Original Letters.

18,979. The Fairfax Correspondence. 1625-1688.

19,399. Royal and Noble Autographs.

21,506. Algernon Sidney to the Earl of Leicester. Fol 55.

22,620. Collections Relating to Norwich.

24,861. Letters and Papers of Richard Mayor of Bursley. 1639-1689. vol ii.

28,002. 1648-1651. Family of Oxendon Correspondence. Vol iv

29,747. John Rushworth's Papers.

35,332. Ordinance Office Deliveries for Land Service.

42,586. Brockman Papers. vol i.

44,848. Copies of State Papers.



*Egerton:*

1,788. Secret Correspondence of Charles I with H. Firebrace.

2,541. Nicholas Papers. f. 389.

2,618. Historical Letters and Papers. 1556-1753.

2,651. Barrington Family Correspondence.

2,648. The Barrington Papers.

*Harleian:*

454. The Diary of Sir Humphrey Midmay. 1633-1651.

3,783. Letters to William Sancroft.

4,288. Remonstrance Concerning Church Government.

4,808. Letters of Kings and Copies.

6,988. Royal Letters and Warrants. 1625-1655.

7,001. Original Letters of State, Warrants etc. 1633-1724.

7,396. Sir Thomas Herbert Memoir of King Charles I.

*Stowe:*

184. Historical Papers. 1628-1651.

354. Collections Relating to Parliament Henry III to George III.

361. Speeches in Parliament. 1558-1695.

*Sloane:*

3,945. Life of Christopher Love by his Widow, Mary.

**Printed pamphlets from the Thomason Collection.**

**A Catalogue of the Names of so many of those Commissioners as safe and sentenced the late King Charles to Death. 27.Jan 1649. E. 1017. (7)**

A Coffin for King Charles: a Crowne for Cromwell: a Pit for the People. You may sing this to the tune of "Faine I would." 23.April 1649. 669. f. 14. (22)

A Crowne, a Crime; or, The Monarch-Martyr. (Verses.) 13.Feb 1649. 669. f. 13. (87)

A Declaration and Protestation of William Prynne and Clement Walker, Members of the House of Commons, against the present proceedings of the Army and their faction now remaining in the said House. 19.Jan 1649 669. f. 13. (72)

A Declaration from the Northern Associated Counties declaring their Resolution touching the proceedings of the Parliament and Army. (A Letter signed: Nehemiah Reinoldson, Doncaster.) (A List of the Names of the Councill of State for the Common-wealth of England.) 14.Feb 1649. E. 544. (6)

A Declaration from the Prince of Wales concerning the Illegal Proceedings of the Commons of England. 13.Feb 1649. E. 542. (15)

A Declaration of Lord Fairfax concerning the Supply of Bedding required from London for the lodging of the Army in voyd houses to prevent the Quartering of the souldiers upon the inhabitants. Together with a draught of his Warrants for that purpose. 7.Dec 1648. E. 475. (40)

A Declaration of Parliament concerning the Tryall of the King. Also the Resolution of the Army touching the person of the King. (Letters from Windsor.) 1.Jan 1649 E.536. (36)

A Declaration of the Commons against a scandalous book entituled, The Second Part of Englands New Chains discovered, &c. 27.March 1649. 669. f. 14. (13)

A Declaration of the Commons in Parliament expressing their Reasons for the Adnulling of these ensuing Votes (i.e the Ordinances of the 8<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> June, 1648, abandoning the proceedings against the eleven impeached Members, and of the 17<sup>th</sup> Aug, ordering the negotiations for the Newport Treaty.) 15.Jan 1649 E. 538. (23)

A Declaration of the House of Commons declaring that the People are under God the Originall of all just power: that the Commons in Parliament being chosen by and representing the people have the supream power: that whatsoever is enacted by the House of Commons hath the force of Law, although the consent of the King or House of Lords bee not had thereunto. 4.Jan 1649 E. 537. (18)

A Declaration of the Parliament of England expressing the Grounds of their late Proceedings and of Setling the present Government in the way of a Free State. 22.March 1649. E. 548. (12)

A Declaration of the Peers of this Realme against the late Treasonable Proceedings of some Members of the Commons House. 8.Feb 1649. 669. f. 13. (84)

A Declaration sent from Lord Hopton to the inhabitants of Cornwell and the Counties adjacent concerning his Ingagement for their joynt assistance to settle Him in his Crowne. 8.Feb 1649. E. 544. (3)

A Faithful Subject's Sigh, on the universally-lamented Death of our most gracious Sovereigne Charles I. (In verse.) 30.Jan 1649. E. 560. (4)

A Gospel-Engine, or Streams of Love and Pity to prevent New Flames in England, being a petitionary Letter to the London Ministers, Subscribers of the Representation. (Signed: Rapha Harford.) 2.March 1649. E. 545. (29)

A Great and bloody Fight at Sea between five Men of War belonging to the Parliament and a Squadron of the Irish Fleet, etc. (Letters from Edinburgh, 8 Feb. and from Bristol and Worcester, 9 Feb.) 9.Feb 1649. E. 542. (6)

A Hand-Kirchife for Loyall Mourners or a Cordiall for Drooping Spirits, Groaning for the bloody murther of our Gracious King. A Letter to a Friend. 30.Jan 1649. E. 541. (6)

A Just Remonstrance of the Lord Mayor, Common-Councill-men and other Citizens of London against two later Ordinances, 18 and 20 Dec, 1648, of the Lords and Commons that now sit for the choosing of Common Councill Men and other Officers within the City. 1.Jan 1649 E. 536. (29)

A Letter from the Commissioners of Scotland (William Kerr, Earl of Lothian, John Chersley and William Gkendoning) residing at London to William Lenthall Speaker of the House of Commons, concerning the present Proceedings against Religion, the King and Government 6 Jan. with their Protestation against taking away his Majesties Life, 22 Jan. 6.Jan 1649 E. 539. (11)

A Letter from the Lord Mayor and Common Councill of London, in answer to a Letter from the L.Genrall; and the Armies seizing great summes of money from Weavers Hall and Goldsmiths Hall. 8.Dec 1648. E. 475. (39)

A Letter of Advice from a scheduled Member of the House of Commons to Lord Fairfax, to admonish him of the Kings danger, his own duty and the sad consequence of tyranny. (Signed: E.S.) 30.Dec 1648 E. 536. (38)

A Letter of Lord Fairfax to the Lord Major for the better preserving a right understanding between City and Army. With an order of His Excellency to Col. Dean to seize the publike Treasuries of Goldsmiths, Weavers and Haberdashers Hall to pay Quarters. 8.Dec 1648. E. 475. (32)



A Letter written to an Honorable member of the House of Commons, sir Anthony Irby (from his constituents at Boston, thanking him for his services.) 20.Dec 1648 669. f. 13. (59)

A List of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members. 26.Dec 1648 669. f. 13. (62)

A List of the Names of the Judges of the High Court of Justice for tryall of the King. 11.Jan 1649 669. f. 13. (68)

A Manifestation from Lieutenant Col. John Lilburn, William Walwyn, Thomas Prince and Richard Overton, now Prisoners in the Tower, and others commonly, though unjustly, styled Levellers. 14.April 1649. E. 550. (25)

A Message from the Royall Prisoner at Windsor to the Kingdome of Scotland. (Letters from Windsor.) 3.Jan 1649 E. 537. (1)

A Modest Vindication of the late Vindication of the Ministers of London from the scandalous Aspersions of John Price in a Pamphlet entituled Clerico-Classicum. By a friend to a regulated Monarchy, a free Parliament, etc. 3.April 1649. E. 549. (10)

A necessary Testimony against Toleration and the present proceedings of Sectaries in England. From the Commissioners of the Kirk of Scotland. Also the return of the Estates of the Parliament of Scotland thereupon, manifesting that all the members have disclaimed the proceedings of the English Army against His Majesty. 18.Jan 1649 E. 541. (3)

A New Declaration concerning the King from the Commons, and the Proclamation of the Lord Fairfax and the rest of the Commissioners appointed for tryall of the King concerning their sitting in Westminster Hall. 9.Jan 1649 E. 537. (28)

A new Paire of Spectacles of the old fashion for the Scots Commissioners to helpe their Eyesight when they are returned to the Parliament at Edenburgh to give account of their Protest against the demands of the Parliament of England. 5.March 1649. E. 546. (3)

A New-years Gift presented by Lord Fairfax and the General-Councell of Officers in severall Propositions for equal distribution of Elections. An Equal Representation of the People, etc. 1.Jan 1649 E. 536. (24)

A New-yeers Gift for the Kings Majesty from his loyall Subjects residing in London; and a Declaration of the Kings speedy coming to London. 1.Jan 1649 E.536. (26)

A Parallel between the Ministerial Ingenuity of the Forty-seven London Ministers and the foule miscarriages of the Army in their Declarations. With an Answer to the Letter from the Ministers of London. (In defence of the action of the General Council of the Army and of the Kings Trial.) 26. Feb 1649. E. 545. (8)

A Petition presented by the inhabitants of Newport Pagnell to the Lord Generall faifax and the Generall Councell at White Hall, desiring the person of the King might be brought to a speedy justice. 26.Dec 1648 669. f. 13. (61)

A Proclamation by the Lord General. (Forbidding disorderly or uncivil behaviour on the part of the soldiers stationed in London.) 12.Feb 1649. 669. f. 13. (86)

A Proclamation by the Lord Generall, concerning Free-Quarter. 20.Feb 1649. 669. f. 13. (91)

A Proclamation for Tryall of the King. Proclaimed in Westminster Hall, at the Exchange and in Cheapside. With the Proceedings of the High Court of Justice against him. 8.Jan 1649 E. 537. (34)

A Proclamation of L. Fairfax requiring all Persons who have engaged for the King now in London, to depart the City within twenty-foure houres. With a Petition of the Officers and Souldiers in the Isle of Weight, Portsmouth and Hurst presented to his Excellency. 9.Jan 1649 E. 537. (36)

A Publike Declaration and Protestation of the secluded Members of the House of Commons, against the illegal proceedings of some few Confederate Members since their forcible Exclusion. 13.Feb 1649. 669. f. 13. (88)

A Remonstrance and Declaration of severall Counties, Cities and Burroughs against the Unfaithfulness and unwarrantable Proceedings of some of their Knights and Burgesses in Parliament. (In favour of the King and Presbyterianism.) 23.Dec 1648 E. 536. (23)

A sad and serious Discourse upon a terrible Letter sent by the Ministers of London, to the Lord General and his Councel of War. By W.Ca, a Member of the Army. 25.Jan 1649. E. 540. (3)

A Serious Representation of the Judgements of Ministers within the Province of London. A Letter from them to the Generall and his Councell of War. (giving the reasons of their Refusal to meet with the Officers of the Army "in their consultations about matters of Religion." Signed by forty-seven London Ministers. 18.Jan 1649 E. 538. (25)

A Short Declaration by Colonel Edward Massie, one of the Imprisoned Members of the House of Commons. Together with his Protestation against the Illegal and Tyrannicall proceedings of the Army. 19.Jan 1649 E. 451. (7)

A Solemn Exhortation made to the Churches within this Province of Lancaster. By the Provincial Synod assembled at Preston. 7.Feb 1649. E. 542. (7)

A Solemn Protestation of the imprisoned and secluded Members of the Commons against the violence of the Army. 11.Dec 1648. 669. f. 13. (53)



A true Copy of the Articles Agreed upon for the Surrender of Pontedfract Castle (between Major General John Lambert and John Morris, Governor of the Castle.) Also Major General Lamberts Letter to the Speaker for the demolishing of the said Castle. 22.March 1649. E. 548. (25)

A true Narrative of the Title, Government and Cause of the Death of the late Charles Stuart, King of England. 5.Feb 1649. E. 541. (14)

A true Relation of His Majesties sad condition in Hurst Castle. (A letter from the Isle of Wight, signed: George Vaughan.) 6.Dec 1648. E. 475. (19)

A true Relation of the King's Speech to the Lady Elizabeth and the Duke of Gloucester, the day before his Death. 29.Jan 1649. 669. f. 14. (9)

A True Relation of the Officers and Armies forcible seising of divers eminent Members of the Commons House, 6 and 7 Dec. Also a Letter written by an Agent for the Army in Paris, 28 Nov., to a Creature of the Army, clearly discovering that their late Remonstrance and Proceedings do drive on the Jesuits and Papists Designs. 6.Dec 1648. E. 476. 914)

A true Report of the great Costs and Charges of the five Hospitals in the City of London (Christ's Hospital, St. Bartholomew's, St. Thomas's, Bridewell and Bedlam) in the maintenance of their great number of poore, this present yeare. 26.March 1649. 669. f. 14. (11)

A Vindication of the Imprisoned and Secluded Members of the House of Commons, 23.Jan 1649. T.T.E. 539 (5).

A Vindication of the Ministers of the Gospel in London, from the unjust Aspersions cast upon their former Actings for the Parliament, as if they had promoted the bringing of the King to Capitall punishment. (Signed by fifty-eight Ministers). 27.Jan 1649. E. 540. (11)

A Warrant of Lord Fairfax to (Richard Lawrence) the Marshall Generall of the Army to put in Execution the former Ordinances & Orders of Parliament concerning the regulating of printing scandalous Pamphlets. 9.Jan 1649 E. 538. (1)

A Word to Mr. Wil. Prynn Esq and two for the Parliament and Army. Presented to the consideration of the Readers of Mr. William Prynn's last Book. 6.Jan 1649 E. 537. (16)

An abridgement of the late Remonstrance of the Army (signed by John Rushworth) 27<sup>th</sup> December 1648 E.536 (8)

An Act for the Abolishing the Kingly Office in England, Ireland and the Dominions thereunto belonging. 17.March 1649. 669. f. 14. (2)



An Act of the Commons for the Adjourning of part of the Term of Hilary. 16.Jan 1649 669. f. 13. (70)

An Act prohibiting the Proclaiming of any person to be King of England or Ireland. 30.Jan 1649. E. 1062. (27)

An Agreement of the Frew People of England. Tendered as a peace-offering to this distressed nation. Lieutenant Colonel John Lilburne, Naster William Walwyn, Master Thomas Prince and Master Richard Overton, prisoners in the Tower of London. 1.May 1649. E. 571. (10)

An Answer to the Cities Representation set forth by some Ministers of the Gospel of London concerning the Proceedings of the Army. By a Presbyterian Patriot. 7.Feb 1649. E. 541. (23)

An Apologetical Declaration of the Conscientious Presbyterians of London. 24.Jan 1649. E. 539. (9)

An Elegie on Charles I. 4.May 1649. E. 553. (1)

An Ordinance of Parliament concerning the Election of Common-councill Men and other Officers in the city of London. (forbidding the election of any "That subscribed, promoted or abetted any engagement in the yeare 1648 relating to a personall Treaty with the King" 20.Dec 1648 669. f. 13. (59)

An Ordinance of the Commons of England in Parliament assembled (constituting the High Court for the Trial of Charles I.) with a List of the Commissioners and Officers of the said Court by them elected. 3.Jan 1649 E. 536. (35)

Articles exhibited against the King and the Charge of the Army drawn up by the General Councill of Officers, etc. (A letter from Windsor) 28.Dec 1648 E. 536. (21)

Articles of Impeachment of High Treason exhibited by the Commons of England in a Free Parliament against Lieutenant General Oliver Cromwell, Commissary-General Henry Ireton, Sir Hardeesse Waller, Colonel Pride (and other Members of Parliament, officers of the Army, etc. A satire) 19.Dec 1648 E. 476. (37)

Ashhurst, William: Reasons against Agreement, with a paper intituled Foundations of Freedome; or, the Agreement of the People. 26.Dec 1648 E. 536. (4)

Ball, Will of Barkham: The Power of Kings discussed: or an Examen of the Fundamentall Constitution of the Free-borne People of England: in answer to severall Tenants of Mr. David Jenkins. 30.Jan 1649. E. 540. (21)

Bennet, Robert. Colonell: King Charles Triall justified. 9.May 1649. E. 554. (21)

Bray, William. Captain, for himself and the Officers and Souldiers that are for Rughteousnesse and Peace: To the Supreme Authority the Commons in Parliament; an Appeal in the Claim of Justice against the Lord Fairfax. 19.March 1649. E. 546. (30)

Bray, William: To the Supreme Authority of the Nation, the Commons assembled in Parliament. A second appeale in behalf of the Sovereignty of Justice over all Persons, against Thomas Lord Fairfax. ? standing committed by Order of the House for my first Appeal. 2.April 1649. E. 549. (6)

Brooks, Thomas: Gods Delight in the progresse of the Upright. A Sermon before the House of Commons at their monethly Fast. 26.Dec 1648 E. 536. (6)

Burrell, Andrewes: A Cordiall for the Calenture and other diseases which distemper the Seamen. Or, a Declaration discovering how Englands Sea Honour may be regarded as in the raigne of Queen Elizabeth. 5.Jan 1649 E. 537. (10)

Canne, John: The Snare is broken. Wherein is proved that the Nationall Covenant and Oath was unlawfully given and taken. Here also is vindicated the Parliaments later proceedings. 1.May 1649. E. 552. (22)

Cardeil, John: Gods Wisdom Justified and Man's Folly condemned. A sermon before the House of Commons. 31.Jan 1649. E. 540. (24)

Cokayne, William: The Foundations of Freedomw Vindicated: or the Reasons of William Ashurst against the Paper stiled The Peoples Agreement examined and discussed. 7.Feb 1649. E. 541. (25)

Collier, T: A Vindication of the Army-Remonstrance. Being a moderate answer to Mr. Sedgwicks book, intituled Justice upon the Army-Remonstrance. 20.Dec 1648 E. 447. (6)

Cook, John: King Charles his Case; or an Appeal to all Rational Men concerning his Tryal. (In favour of the Sentence of the High Court of Justice.) 9.Feb 1649. E. 542. (3)

Danvers, Henry: Certain Queries concerning Liberty of Conscience. Propounded to those Ministers of Leicestershire when they met to consult that Representation which they so privateky framed. 27. March 1649. E. 548. (20)

Dell, William: The Way of true Peace and Unity among the Faithful. Pp 140. 8.Feb 1649. E. 542. (1)

Dove, Christopher: A just Vindication of the Reputation of Mr. White, alderman if Exon. In answer to a pamphlet cald the Visible Vengeance. 15.Jan 1649 E. 538. (10)



Dury, John. Minister of the Gospel: A case of Conscience resolved: concerning Ministers medling with State-matters in their Sermons and how far they are obliged by the Covenant to interpose in the affairs of Civil Government. 29.March 1649. E. 548. (29)

Eleutherius Philodemius: The Armies Vindication; wherein are proved: First, that there is a power residing in the People above Kings. Secondly, that Kings are subject to Law. In reply to ("Justice upon the Armie" and other pamphlets by) Mr. William Sedgwick.

Englands Fortresse: exemplified in his Excellency the Lord Fairfax. Humbly presented by E.C. (Edward Calver). 20. Feb 1649. E. 544. (14)

Englands Standard Advanced. A declaration from M. Will Thompson, and the oppressed people of this nation now under his conduct in Oxfordshire. 6.May 1649. E. 553. (2)

Erbery, William: The Lord of Hosts; or, God guarding the Camp of Saints. 24.Dec 1648 E. 477. (22)

Eye Salve to anoint the Eyes of the Ministers of London that they may see their Error in opposing the Proceedings of the Parliament and Army in the due execution of Justice. By a Minister of the Gospel. 13.Feb 1649. E. 542. (16)

Geree, John: Might overcoming Right. A Cleer Answer to Mr. John Goodwin's Might and Right well met. 18.Jan 1649 E. 538. (24)

Goodwin, John: Right and Might well met. Or a briefe enquiry into the proceedings of the Army. Wherein the equity of the said proceedings are vindicated. 2.Jan 1649 E. 536. (28)

Hartley, William: The Priests Patent cancelled, or the Lay-mans Answer to the Priests Objections. 13.Feb 1649. E. 542. (17)

Haywood, William: A Sermon tending to Peace. Preached before His Majesty at Newport during the time of his late Treaty. Dec. 1648 E. 475. (3)

Heads of the Charge against the King drawn up by the Generall Councell of the Armie, &c. 24.Dec 1648 E. 477. (25)

His Majesties Declaration concerning His coming from Windsor to White-Hall. Also the Queens Message to Lord Fairfax. (Letters from Windsor 4 and 6 Jan and from Westminster 6 Jan) 4.Jan 1649 E. 537. (13)

His Majesties Declaration concerning his present restraint under the power of the sword. Likewise, the Proceedings of the Councell of Warre, Charge against the King, and his Majesty to be tried at Windsor. (Letter from Windsor) 21.Dec 1648 E. 477. (28)



His Majesties Declaration concerning the Charge of the Army (A letter signed: J. Willis, Windsor.) 1.Jan 1649 E. 536. (25)

His Majesties Declaration concerning the Proclamation of the Army and His Resolution touching their bringing of Him to Tryall. (Letters from Copenhagen, 4 Jan, Halifav, 6 Jan and Windsor, 10 Jan) 10.Jan 1649 E. 537. (37)

His Majesties last Proposals to the Officers of the Armie (said to be written and dictated by his Majesty. Letters from Windsor, etc.) 27.Dec 1648 E. 536. (13)

John Lilburn and divers other Citizens of London: Englands New Chairs discovered: or the serious apprehensions of a part of the People, in behalf of the Commonwealth: being presenters of the Large Petition of 11 Sept. 1648. 26. Feb 1649. E. 545. (27)

Kiffin, William: Walwins Wiles; or, The Manifestators Manifested, viz. John Lilburn, Will. Walwin, Richard Overton and Tho. Prince, discovering themselves to be Englands new Chains and Irelands back Friends. 10.May 1649. E. 554. (24)

King Charls his Speech made upon the Scaffold at Whitehall-Gate immediately before his Execution. 30.Jan 1649. E. 540. (17)

Leinsula, Francis: The Kingdoms Divisions anatomized, with a Vindication of the Armies Proceedings. 1.March 1649. E. 545. (25)

Liberty of Conscience asserted, or Persecution for Religion condemned. By a well-wisher to the Kingdomes good. 20.March 1649. E. 548. (4)

Mr William Prynne his Defence of Stage-Plays, or a Retractation of a former Book of his called Histrio-Mastix. (A satire) 10.Jan 1649 E. 537. (31)

Mr. Prynnes Demand of his Liberty to the Generall. With his Answer, and his Protestation thereupon. 26.Dec 1648 669. f. 13. (63)

Mr. Prynnes Letter to the Generall, demanding what kind of Prisoner he is, and whose prisoner, with an appearance to his Action of false imprisonment which he resolves to prosecute. 3.Jan 1649 669. f. 13. (65)

Nethersole, Francis. Sir: The Self-condemned. Or a letter to Mr. Jo. Goodwin (in reply to "Right and Might well met.") 8.Jan 1649 E. 538. (2)

New-Babels Confusion. Or Severall Votes of the Commons against certain Papers entituled: the Agreement of the People for a firm Peace, etc. (Resolutions of the House of Commons, of

November and December, 1647. Collected and published by William Prynne.) 30.Jan 1649. E. 540. (19)

No Papist nor Presbyterian; but the modest Desires and Proposals of some well-affected and Free-born People; offered to the Generall Councell of the Armie in order to the Agreement of the People. 21.Dec 1648 E. 477. (17)

Not Guiltie plead for the Lords and others of the Kings Partie. (A defence of King Charles I.) 20. Feb 1649. E. 544. (12\*)

Owen, John: A Sermon preached to the House of Commons, on a day of Solemne Humiliation. With a discourse about Toleration. 31.Jan 1649. E. 540. (25)

Poyer, John. Col. (now a Prisoner at Whitehall): Poyer's Vindication in answer to a lying Pamphlet (by John Elliot) intituled A Short Comment upon the Grounds of Poyer's taking up Arms in the second Difference, which are Monstrous Lies. 29.March 1649. E. 548. (31)

Price, John: Clerico-Classicum, or The Clergi-allarum to a third War. Being an answer to A Serious Representation of the Judgements of Ministers of the Gospel of London. 19.Feb 1649. E. 544. (1)

Pryn, William: Mr Pryn's last and finall Declaration to the Commons of England concerning the King, Parliament and Army; shewing that it is High Treason to compasse the deposition or death of King Charles. 5.Jan 1649 E. 537. (12)

Prynn against Prinn. Or the Answer of William Prynne, Utter Barrester, of Lincolnes Inne, to a Pamphlet lately published by William Prynne, a Member of the House of Commons, intituled A Briefe Memento to the present. Unparliamentary Juncto. (A satire). 26.Jan 1649. E. 540. (6)

Prynne, William: A Breife Memento to the present Unparliamentary Junto touching their present Intentions to depose and execute Charles Steward, their lawful King. 4.Jan 1649 E. 537. (7)

Prynne, William: The Vindication of William Prynne from some scandalous papers newly published (i.e. "Mr. William Prynn his Defence of Stage-Plays"). 10.Jan 1649 669. f. 13. (67)

Redingstone, John: Plain English to the Parliament and Army. (A denunciation of King Charles I) 12.Jan 1649 E. 438. (4)

Richardson, Samuel: An Answer to the London Ministers Letter to his Excellency & his Counsel of War. Also an Answer to John Gerees Book intituled Might overcoming Right. 27.Jan 1649. E. 540. (8)



Robins, Ro: A Whip for the Marshall's Court and their Officers. The Petition of Robert Robins to the House of Commons against the abuses practised in the Marshals Court. And a discovery of the Jurisdiction and Priviledge of that Court. 7.Dec 1648. E. 475. (27)

Salmon, Joseph: A Rout, a Rout; or some part of the Armies Quarters beaten up, by the Day of the Lord stealing upon them. 10.Feb 1649. E. 542. (5)

(Scott), Thomas: A Pair of Cristal Spectacles with which Any Man may see plainly. 18.Dec 1648. E. 546. (30)

Sedgewick, William: A second view of the army Remonstrance; or Justice done to the Armie. 23.Dec 1648 E. 447. (20)

Sedgewick, William: Mr. William Sedgwick's Letter to Lord Fairfax in prosecution of his Answer to the Remonstrations of the Army. 28.Dec 1648 E. 536. 916)

Sedgewick, William: The Spiritual Madman; or, a Prophetie concerning the King, the Parliament, London, the Army. 20.Dec 1648 E. 477. (9)

Sedgwick, William: Justice upon the Armies Remonstrance; or, A rebuke of that evill spirit which leads them in their counsels and actions. 11.Dec 1648. E. 475. (34)

Six Propositions of undoubted verity fitt to be considered by all loyall Subjects. 1. That this Parliament gathered out of the Mysticall Writings of Jacob Behmen. pp.52. 5.Feb 1649. E. 541. (13)

Six Serious Quaeries concerning the Kings Triall by the new High Court of Justice. 9.Feb 1649. 669. f. 13. (85)

The Armies Remembrancer. Wherein they are presented with a Sight of their Sinnes and Dangers. By a Cordiall Friend to the Kingdomes welfare, Rr. 4.Jan 1649 E. 537. (6)

The Articles and Charge of the Armie against fourscore of the Parliament men. With the Names and Number of those who were seized on by Col. Pride, 6 Dec. Likewise the further demands of Generall Council. 8.Dec 1648. E. 475. (30)

The Charge of the Army and Counsel of War against the King. With a brief Answer thereunto by some of the Loyall Party. 29.Dec 1648 E. 536. (20)

The City-Ministers unmasked; or the Hypocrisie of fifty-nine of the most eminent of the Clergy of London discovered out of two of their Pamphlets; one intituled, a Serious Representation. The other A Vindication of the Ministers of London. By a Friend of the Armies. 5.March 1649. E. 546. (2)



The Copie of a Letter written to the General from Lieut. Col. John Lilburn, M. Richard Overton. (In behalf of certain soldiers who “were adjudged to cast lots for their lives, and one of them to dy.”) 27.April 1649 669. F. 14. (23)

The Debates of the House of Commons touching His Majesties Concessions and Answers upon the Treaty. With their Votes concerning their Instructions to Col. Hammond for security of His Majesties Person. Together with His Majesties last Speech to the Lords-Commissioners at their departure from the Isle of Wight. 6.Dec 1648. E. 475. (21)

The Declaration and Engagement of the Commanders, Officers, Seamen under the Command of the Earl of Warwicke declaring their concurrence in the Remonstrance of the Army. (Signed: Robert Moulton, Richard Haddocke and others. Dated from the Ship St. George in the Downes.) Also a Representation of the Forces under Sir Michaell Livesey, Commander in Chiefe in Kent. 24.Dec 1648 E. 536. (15)

The Declaration and Proposals of the Citizens of London concerning Lord Fairfax and the Armies entering and quartering within the Wals. With the Answer of His Excellency. 9.Dec 1648. E. 476. (6)

The Declaration of Cornet Thompson and the rest of the Levellers executed in Burford Churchyard. 18.May 1649. E. 556. (7)

The Declaration of his Excellency, the Lord General Fairfax, and his General Council of Officers showing the grounds of the Armies advance towards the City of London. 1.Dec 1648 E. 474 (13)

The Declaration of Lieut. Gen. Crumwel concerning the Levellers, and his Letter to the Regiments who have declared against the Parliament. (A newsletter.) 14.May 1649. E. 555. (12)

The Declaration of Major-Generall Brown concerning the Ford Fairfax and the Army, the raising of Forces for securing and guarding London. With his Speech in Parliament touching the same. 6.Dec 1648. E. 475. (18)

The Declaration of the Officers of the Garrison of Hull, presented to the Lord Generall. (Signed: Jo. Hemingway. Preceded by a letter to Lord Fairfax signed R. Overton.) 9.Jan 1649 E. 545. (17)

The Declaration of the Officers of the Hull. Also a Petition presented to Parliament by the Lord Generalls Regiment of Horse for the speedy calling of all publike Treasurers to an Accompt and for taking away of Free-Quarter. 22.Feb 1649. E. 545. (17)

The Declarations and Representations of the Officers and Souldiers in Colonel Scroops, Colonel Sanders and Col. Wautons Regiments, presented to the Lord Fairfax. 5.Dec 1648. E. 475. (24)

The Demands and Desires of Lord Fairfax and his Generall Councell to the Lord Mayor and Aldermen. Likewise the Impeachment of the Army concerning Major Generall Brown. 11.Dec 1648. E. 475. (36)

The Essex Watchmen's Watchword to the Inhabitants of the said County. 8. March 1649. E. 546. (11)

The Examination of Mr. Wil. Prynne, by order of the House of Commons; with his Answer. Likewise several Votes in prosecution of the Tryal of the Kings Majesty. 10 Jan 1649 E. 537. (30)

The Execution of the late King justified, and the Parliament and Army vindicated. By a Wel-Wisher to the safety and freedom thereof. 26.Feb 1649. E. 545. (7)

The Foxes Craft discovered; in destroying the Peoples best Friends who stand in their Prerogative way. As will appeare by their usage, not onely of Captaine Bray but also of his Troope. By John Navlier, Quartermaster, Richard Ellegood and John Marshall, appointed by the Troope for the prosecuting these things. 2.April 1649. E. 549. (7)

The Hue and Cry after Sir John Presbyter. (A satire, in verse.) 4.May 1649. 669. F. 14. (25)

The Humble Advice and Earnest Desires of certain well affected Ministers of Banbury and of Brackly to Lord Fairfax and the General Councell of Warre, (against the trial of King Charles I, the exclusion of Members of the House of Commons, etc. Signed by nineteen Ministers). 25.Jan 1649. E. 540. (12)

The Humble Answer of the General Councell of the Army to the Demands of the Commons in Parliament concerning the securing or secluding of some Members thereof. 3.Jan 1649 E. 537. (14)

The Humble Proposals (to the House of Commons) of the Lord Fairfax and of the General Councel in order to a speedy prosecution of Justice and the Settlement propounded by them. 6.Dec 1648. E. 475. (25)

The Humble Representation of the Committee and other well affected Persons in the County of Leicester, to the Lord Fairfax and the Generall Councell of Officers in reference to the Agreement of the People as touching Religion. 22.Feb 1649. E. 545. (22)

The Hunting of the Foxes from New-Market and Triploe Heaths to Whitehall, by five small Beagles, late of the Armie. Or the Grandie-Deceivers unmasked. Directed to all the Free-Commons of England, but in especiall to all that are engaged in the Military Service of the Commonwealth. By: Robert Ward, Thomas Watson, Simon Graunt, George Jellis and William Sawyer, late Members of the Army. (With an account of the Trial by Court-Martiall of these five soldiers.) 21.March 1649. E. 548. (7)



The Joynt Resolution and Declaration of the Parliament and Counsell of the Army, for taking away of Kings and Lords. 11.Jan 1649 E. 538 (1\*)

The Kentish Petition to Parliament, to proceed to a speedy bringing to justice the person of him, who as a King ought to have defended us, but as a Tyrant hath waged war against us. 23.Dec 1648 669. f. 13. (64)

The Kingdomes Case; or the question resolved Whether the Kings Subjects may or ought to ayd each other in repressing the persons now assembled together under the name of the Kings Army. By him that prayeth the peace of the Kings Kingdome. Ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons concerning printing that the book be printed. 11.Dec 1648. E. 475. (38)

The Kingdoms Grand Quere. What warrant there is for such Proceedes about the King. Resolved by a Minister. Also a Quere taken from the Representation of the judgement of the Ministers in London. 1.March 1649. E. 545. (21)

The Kingly Myrrour; or, King Charles his last Legacy to the Prince his son, written a little before his death. (With a woodcut as frontispiece, representing the King presenting the volume to the Duke of Gloucester.) 4.April 1649. E. 1317. (5)

The Kings Last Farewell to the World. (Verses). 669. f. 13. (77)

The Kings Majesties Message to the Prince of Wales, etc. (A letter from Hurst Castle, 6 Dec.) And Lieutenant Gen. Crumwels Declaration in reference to the King, City and Kingdom. (A letter concerning Cornwell's words at a General Councel of the Army, dated: Knottingley, 2 Dec) 6.Dec 1648. E. 475 (3)

The last damnable Designe of Cromwell and Ireton, intended to be carried on in their Generall Councell of the Army and by their Journey-men in the House of Commons, when they have engaged them in sinne past all hope of retreat by murdering the King. 29.Jan 1649. 669. f. 13. (76)

The Lawfulness of obeying the Present Government. Proposed by one that loves all Presbyterian lovers of Truth and Peace. 25.April 1649. E. 551. (22)

The Main Points of Church-Government and Discipline, plainly and modestly handled by way of Question and Answer. 17.Jan 1649 E. 1182. (11)

The manner of the Election of Philip Herbert, late Earle of Pembroke, for Knight if the Shire of Barkshire. Together with two Speeches; one by a wel-affected Tanner, the other a godly Speech of his Lordships, as it was heard with much content without an Oath. (A satire) 16.April 1649. E. 551. (16)



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The Paper called the Agreement of the People taken into Consideration and the Lawfulness of Subscription resolved in the Negative by the Ministers of the Province of Lancaster. (Signed by fifty-four Lancashire Ministers.) 6.March 1649. E. 546. (27)

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The Presbyterians Prophecie concerning the King, Parliament, City, Army and Kingdome. 21.Dec 1648 E. 477. (16)

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The Religious & Loyal Protestation of John Garden against the Purposes of the Army and others; about the trying and destroying our Sovereign Lord and King. 5.Jan 1649 E. 538. (11)

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The Thankful Acknowledgement and Congratulation of divers Apprentices within the Ward if Cripplegrate without, unto Lieutenant Colonel John Lilburn, Mr. William Walwyn, Mr. Thomas Prince and Mr. Richard Overton, now prisoners in the Tower. 6.May 1649. 669. F. 14. (30)

The Triall and Examination of the Lord Major of London (Sir Abraham Reynardson) 2 April, at the Bar of the House of Commons (for refusing to proclaim the Act for abolishing the Kingly Office in the City; with newsletters from Edinburgh, 28 March, and Bristol, 29 March.) 2.April 1649. E. 549. (4)



The Tyranny of Tyrannies. These are to signifie that the new Turkish Tyrants, Cromwell and Ireton, at a Councel of War, have already privately condemned to death Sir William Waller and Major General Browne, etc. 19.Dec 1648 E. 476. (34)

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To his Excellency Thomas Lord Faifax. The Humble Representation of the Desires of the Officers and Souldiers in the Regiment of Horse for Northumberland. (Signed in behalf of the Regiment by Joshua Wetwang, Edw. Hawnby, and twelve others.) 5.Dec 1648. E. 475. (13)

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